US Army's Effectiveness in Reconstruction According to the Guiding Principles of Stabilization

Diane E. Chido

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9783030600051
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Militärpolitik

This book breaks down the outcomes of stabilization operations including those related to establishing or enhancing safety and security, institutions of governance, rule of law, social well-being, economic development, access to education and health care, infrastructure development, reducing corruption and all the associated elements for shoring up fragile communities. These are analyzed through the unusual lens of the US post-Civil War case of Reconstruction, and lessons are identified for improving outcomes for future stabilization missions. The book is designed to be accessible to military advisors, international development professionals, students, policymakers and planners, and all who are involved in peacebuilding in the field, not only in the ivory tower.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021

D. E. ChidoUS Army's Effectiveness in Reconstruction According to the Guiding Principles of Stabilizationhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60005-1_1

Begin Abstract

1. Stabilization and Reconstruction

Diane E. Chido¹

(1)

DC Analytics, Erie, PA, USA

Diane E. Chido

Email: [email protected]

Abstract

The post-Civil War Reconstruction period is the most all-encompassing case of post-conflict stabilization in U.S. history. President Abraham Lincoln had wisely begun planning for stabilization in 1863, developing mechanisms for reconciliation and infrastructure development projects to modernize the economy of the South, such as railroad and other infrastructure expansion to blunt Southern dependence on cotton once slavery was abolished. John Wilkes Booth’s bullet brought much of that thoughtful preparation to a halt. Although not defined as “stabilization” at the time, historians suggest that the Army had also learned applicable lessons during the occupation of some Southern states while hostilities were still ongoing and even prior to the war in the recently acquired territories of California and New Mexico.

Keywords

StabilizationPost-conflict operationsGuiding Principles of Reconstruction and StabilizationPost-Civil War reconstructionConsolidating battlefield gains

Much of this introduction is reprised from the author’s April 6, 2018 post on the U.S. Army War College’s “War Room” blog, available from https://​warroom.​armywarcollege.​edu/​articles/​everything-old-is-new-again-stabilization-lessons-from-reconstruction/​. Accessed on July 14, 2020.

End Abstract

Introduction

Picture the scene: widespread famine, millions displaced, towns destroyed, transportation and sanitation infrastructure ruined, agricultural land and property abandoned, livestock rotting, violent insurgents and dangerous brigands roaming the landscape, education and healthcare nonexistent, and corruption flourishing. Where is this? When is this? Is it Ethiopia in the 1980s? Sudan in the 1990s? Is it Northern Syria today? It is all of these, but this scene was also the reality across much of the American South in the summer of 1865.

The post-Civil War Reconstruction period is the most all-encompassing case of post-conflict stabilization in U.S. history. President Abraham Lincoln had wisely begun planning for postwar stabilization from 1863, developing mechanisms for reconciliation and infrastructure development projects to modernize the economy of the South, such as railroad and other infrastructure expansion to blunt Southern dependence on cotton once slavery was abolished. John Wilkes Booth’s bullet brought much of that thoughtful preparation to a halt. Although not defined as “stabilization” at the time, historians suggest that the Army had learned applicable lessons¹ during the occupation of some Southern states while hostilities were still ongoing and even prior to the war in the recently acquired territories of California and New Mexico.²

We Don’t Do Nation Building!

Despite insistence from politicians that the United States does not “do nation building,” the U.S. military has been engaged in this very activity nearly non-stop throughout its history, as illustrated by Fig. 1.1. Stabilization is a Joint³ and Army⁴ concept today and the most common activity for U.S. forces throughout their history.⁵ It is also an essential step in translating military victory into long-term political success.

Fig. 1.1

Trend of long-term commitment in post-conflict conditions, 1891–2015

Yet despite these compelling facts, the U.S. government does not articulate the need for these activities, so the public does not support them. Thus, the military has to constantly rename what they are so the Congress and the people do not recognize that it has been deployed for anything other than combat. As a result, with notable exceptions—i.e., post-World War II Europe and Japan, and post-Korean War South Korea, stabilization is nearly always under-resourced and poorly planned, thus often failing to consolidate battlefield gains.

Although conducting war is what the Army trains and plans for, cleaning up after war, shoring up fragile states, and providing humanitarian assistance are the stabilization operations to which the Army as a tool is most often applied. Stabilization is defined in Joint Doctrine (JP 3-07) as “the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.”⁶

Since 2009, the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,⁷ drawn from doctrine and practitioner expertise, serve as the stabilization “bible” for those in the field. Its Strategic Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization, shown in Fig. 1.2, illustrates the six critical “End states” required for effective stabilization: Safe and Secure Environment, Rule of Law, Stable Governance, Social Well-Being, Sustainable Economy and the Cross-Cutting Principles without which the effort is expected to fail.

Fig. 1.2

USIP and PKSOI’s stabilization lens

Most experts on stabilization agree that all of these elements are needed to varying degrees and in varying order to ensure stability in post-conflict or fragile states, but who should provide them, how, and to what degree for verifiable “end states” remains elusive. As political scientist Stephen Biddle noted in his 2013 article on the surge in Afghanistan, “Combat and security alone will have difficulty sustaining control if all they do is allow a predatory government to exploit the population for the benefit of unrepresentative elites.”⁸

Why Reconstruction?

This study is based on the post-Civil War Reconstruction period because it is the most significant case of post-conflict domestic stabilization in U.S. history. While stabilization was not yet a military area of expertise, some historians suggest that the Army had already learned valuable lessons conducting Reconstruction during the Civil War in parts of Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia. Army personnel had also gained experience drafting legal frameworks in the territories of California and New Mexico recently acquired in the 1840s.⁹ The U.S. Army gained additional experience in reconstruction in Mexico after the Mexican-American War, in which many Civil War generals participated as company grade officers.¹⁰

Reconstruction was the aftermath of a war fought at home and a peace still not enshrined in treaty a century and a half since cessation of large-scale violence. Louis DiMarco described this and its lessons for the future, thusly, “Post-conflict operations are a part of war; if the Army is to win the nation’s wars, it must have a robust post-conflict capability. If the Army as an institution refuses to embrace this view of war and to plan and organize for it, it is doomed to repeat the failure of the occupation of the Confederacy.”¹¹

The August 2017 Department of Defense (DoD) 2016 Biennial Assessment of Stability Operations Capabilities (Biennial Assessment) reflected DeMarco’s assessment by stating, “Consolidating military gains into political victory requires stabilization efforts that enable legitimate actors to manage conflict peacefully – making stability operations an essential way for the United States to achieve its national security objectives.”¹²

The Assessment acknowledges that “the role of DoD in stabilization efforts has changed over time throughout the course of U.S. history.” It also notes that proof of effectiveness of the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is nearly nonexistent and the lack of planning for stabilizing the areas where the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are no longer dominant, indicate the failure to understand the importance of stabilization in achieving sustainable U.S. national security objectives.

Defeated enemies do not just disappear, they regroup to fight another day, unless effective stabilization is conducted on a long-term basis. According to the second quarter 2019 DOD Inspector General report, the Islamic State has moved underground; retains 14,000–18,000 members; “is likely reestablishing financial networks” in both Iraq and Syria; “maintains an extensive worldwide social media effort to recruit fighters”; and has carried out asymmetric attacks using a “more stable” network for command-and-control and logistics.¹³

The U.S. military is suited to bringing security ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Stabilization and Reconstruction
• 2. The Cross-Cutting Principles
• 3. Stabilization and Reconstruction End States
• 4. Observations and Recommendations for Future Stabilization
• Back Matter