1.1 The Internationalism of the Western Communist Parties in the 1960s
With the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union CPSU, the monolithic unity of communism founded on loyalty to the Soviet Union begins to rupture, and a troubled search for new balances begins. This process, which involves multiple and contradictory dynamics, brings about the preponderant and chaotic re-emergence of the national question in the transition to socialism.1 The loss of symbolic capital represented by the myth of Stalin and the homeland of socialism leads to the need for a new legitimization for the Communist movement. The contradictory responses of the Communist Parties of Western Europe, bulwarks of communism in the capitalist world, to the crisis of Stalinism allow us to perceive divergent evolutions behind the Cold War unity.2
Togliatti and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) Directorate see in Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization and in the conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese that erupts at the beginning of the 1960s, not only the end of Cold War monolithism but also a crisis of perspective for the global Communist movement, which lacks alternatives to the Soviet model of transition to socialism. So, the contradictions in the Communist movement, which have accumulated since the Second World War, which are rooted in the organizational structure and political culture built by Stalin and the Soviet leadership from the end of the 1920s, push the PCI to promote a revision of internationalism. Starting at the end of the 1950s, Togliatti raises the issue of elaborating a new strategy for the Communist movement. In the new scenario, open to peaceful coexistence and the processes of de-colonialization, the Italian Secretary would like the Soviet Union and the Western communist parties establish a special relationship with national liberation movements, with the goal of rebuilding the relationship between the Communist movement and the global revolutionary movement.3 According to Togliatti, a polycentric reorganization of the Communist movement, based on the respect of autonomies and on their own specificities, could have contained the conflict between Moscow and Beijing, whereas communist action in the capitalist countries should have been built starting from the strategic convergence of the two big Western communist parties, the Italian and the French. The PCI Secretary understands the importance of collaboration with non-communist left-wing forces, and that of building a totally autonomous and privileged relationship of Western Communists with the national liberation movements in the Western European scenario. In fact, the priority which Togliatti attributed to the European dimension and to the relationship with the liberation movements would have led to the renewal of the PCI’s political culture and would have also supported a greater emancipation of Western communist parties’ strategy from Soviet policy interests.4
The French Communist Party (PCF) takes the opposite position: after the revelations of the 20th Congress, the French leadership, led by Maurice Thorez, assumes a reticent attitude: in 1956–1957, they consider de-Stalinization to be a temporary phenomenon and place their bet on Soviet opponents to Khrushchev, more or less implicitly converging with the criticisms expressed by the Chinese Communists.
In November of 1957, the international meeting of the Communist Party is held in Moscow, where, thanks to the agreement between the Soviets and the Chinese, a document is approved condemning the Yugoslavs and identifying revisionism as the main threat to the unity of the movement. During the meeting, Jacques Duclos, who is number two at the PCF, vehemently criticizes an amendment proposed by the PCI requesting that explicit recognition of the parties’ autonomy be inserted in the final document. From the podium, Duclos attacks the PCI’s polycentrism and implicitly accuses Togliatti of revisionism.
The controversy with the Italian party confirms the PCF’s refusal, in the period 1957–1959, to begin an analysis of Stalinism and its origins, as the leadership wants to avoid any question about the consequences of Stalinism on the workings of the French party. Thus, from 1956 to 1959, the PCF proves to be incapable of producing a real theoretical and political elaboration to fill the void caused by the crisis of the political-organizational assets and ideological unity of the Communist movement.
This clear closure can be explained by several interconnected interpretive keys: the political culture of the party and its leadership, which oscillates between the reactivation of the Popular Front scheme and the reaffirmation of the iron bond with Socialist countries within the international Communist movement, interacts with the context in which the Communist Party operates in France and in the world in the 1950s.
The upheavals affecting the international Communist movement are perceived by the French leadership, in fact, as a dangerous disturbance. The sequence of events that include the Suez crisis, the escalation of the Algerian conflict, and the anti-communist wave that follows the repression of the Hungarian revolt drives the leadership and the base of the French party to close ranks in the face of the virulence of the anti-communist campaign. Between 1956 and 1958, the PCF finds itself in a condition of paralysis, marked by tactical vacillations and uncertainties with respect to the international situation as well as the internal political context. The return of De Gaulle thus brings about a further entrenchment of the Communist Party, which, starting with the referendum of 1958, denounces the influence of fascism in French political life. This attitude, which is born from a significant theoretical and strategic inadequacy, which leads the party to “consider any novelty as a repetition of something that happened in the past,” is behind the dramatic defeat in the elections of 1958. That defeat represents a greater trauma than what has been called “the shock of the 20th Congress.”5 As we will see, this serious electoral defeat necessitates a change of the political line, which Maurice Thorez and the leadership address by starting a process of slow and gradual renewal.
Between 1961 and 1964, Togliatti still tries to involve the French in an attempt to avert the convocation of a new global conference of communist parties aimed at promulgating the official condemnation of the Chinese positions. In the meantime, the Chinese have opened a violent dispute with Khrushchev. But the PCF and Thorez resist the pressure from the Italian Secretary, entrenching themselves behind loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism.6 The French, who reacted badly to the PCI’s support for the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), interpret the polycentrism of the Italians as a pretext for taking over leadership of the Western Communist movement and insist on asking the Soviets to condemn the Italian party’s revisionism.7
Resolving the tensions and suspicions between the two communist parties will require the evolution of the Soviet political picture. In a speech given in Moscow on September 28, 1964, during the centennial celebration of the First International, Boris Ponomarëv calls for building large workers’ coalitions in the capitalist countries and identifies the fight for peace and against the monopolistic international oligarchy as the primary objective of the Communist movement, in which “there is no longer ground for a centralized organization.” Faced with the fragmentation of the movement, the USSR appears inclined to recognize greater national autonomy for the Western communist parties.8
Shortly afterward there is a sudden change in the top leadership of the USSR. The immediate reaction of the PCI and the PCF to Khrushchev’s removal on October 15, 1964, is essentially the same: the PCI Directorate and the PCF Political Bureau show strong concern about the news coming out of Moscow. They fear, more than the attacks from the anti-communist press, that the new leadership under Kosyghin and Brezhnev will repudiate the process of de-Stalinization, setting aside the principle of peaceful coexistence and realigning closer to the positions of the Chinese. This would seriously impede the joint strategy pursued by the two Western communist parties at the national level. Both decide to send delegations to Moscow to ask for further explanation.9
In an atmosphere of great anxiety, the PCI leadership discusses the most suitable form for communicating the news of Khrushchev’s removal to the base. With the exception of Umberto Terracini, who demands that a clear negative opinion be expressed, all the members of the Directorate agree on the advisability of presenting a description of the events which excludes criticism, reassures the militants, and at the same time communicates the seriousness of the moment. Given the uncertainty of the situation and the scarcity of information, the Italian leaders fear that there will be a wave of arrests in the Soviet Union that will interrupt the process of de-Stalinization.10
The failure of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization represents a further step in the Soviet model’s loss of strength. Furthermore, when the dispute between the CPSU and the CPC becomes a conflict between states, the chances of success for hypot...