1 Introduction
For my niece, Grace Ridley.
In what follows, an updated version of Owenâs (2017) Genetic-Social, meta-theoretical framework which has been employed in many recent publications is briefly outlined and certain meta-constructs are âappliedâ to the study of cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism can be regarded as broadly defined in the literature, with definitions which range from the arguably narrow to those broader in scope. Eugene Kaspersky, quoted in The Times of Israel (2012) for example, offered an apocalyptic picture of the development of viruses which could signal the end of the world as we know it. Broader definitions such as those offered by Kaspersky extend to types of internet usage by âterroristsâ as well as conventional assaults upon information technology infrastructures. Kaspersky appears to favour the term, âcyber terrorismâ to describe the use of large-scale cyber weapons such as Net Traveler Virus and Flame Virus, and equates these cyber weapons to biological weapons, viewing them as being equally, potentially destructive in the interconnected, global landscape. Hardy and Williams (2017) argue that the idea that âterroristsâ could cause huge losses of life, environmental damage and catastrophic economic damage by hacking into critical infrastructure systems is key to any definition of the term, cyberterrorism. Such conduct may possibly be motivated by political or religious ideology, or be possibly intended to intimidate a state government or a section of the general public. Gable (2010) suggests that an assault upon internet businesses can be regarded as cyberterrorism, but if the motivation involves attempts to inflict economic damage rather than ideological motivations, the action is more likely to be labelled as cybercrime. Baranetsky (2009) suggests that cyberterrorism overlaps somewhat with other phenomena such cybercrime and conventional âterrorismâ. NATO defines cyberterrorism as a, âcyber attack using or exploiting methods to cause sufficient destruction or disruption to generate fear or to intimidate a society into an ideological goalâ (Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, 2008: 119). It is the contention here that cyberterrorism could be incorporated within a broader umbrella definition of âcyber violenceâ (Owen 2017). The term, âcyber violenceâ was originally offered by the International Telecommunications Union of the United Nations and originally referred to gendered violence online aimed at women and girls. Whilst it is acknowledged here that women and girls appear to be disproportionate victims of online hate-trolling, cyber-grooming and so on, it is also contended that we require a much broader definition of the term which would include hostile, aggressive behaviour aimed at people of all ages, socio-economic groups, genders, ethnicities and so on. For the purposes of this chapter and in terms of the further development of the Genetic-Social framework, cyberterrorism is considered to be a form of wider âcyber violenceâ. Of course, it is also contended here that the definition of âterroristâ is highly subjective and depends largely upon oneâs status, social history, political affiliations, nationality and position within complex, geo-political situations and debates.
The intention here is to illustrate the explanatory potential of the framework, in particular meta-constructs such as the Biological Variable and Psychobiography, in conceptualising cyberterrorism, and to construct an ontologically-flexible model of cyberterrorism which may be of help in predicting such behaviour. The term, the Biological Variable refers to the evidence from behavioural genetics and neuroscience for an, at least in part, biological basis for some human behaviour. Psychobiography refers to the unique, asocial aspects of the person such as inherited disposition. Another particular meta-construct from the framework plays a key role here and that is the notion of Neuro-Agency. This term is employed in preference to the standard term âagencyâ in order to acknowledge the role of neurons in human free-will. In the course of examining cyberterrorism through the Genetic-Social lens of the Biological Variable and inherited Psychobiography, we consider evidence from Tiihonen et al. (2014) for the role of CD H13 and MAO-A genes in violent behaviour; evidence for the role of disinhibition in violence from Suler (2004) and Spiegel et al. (2009); evidence for the role of anti-social personality disorder and de-individuation in violence from Bishop (2013) and Buckels et al. (2014); evidence for the role of cortisol in aggression from Martin (1997) and evidence for links between an under-developed prefrontal cortex in teenagers with impulsivity which may be linked to violence in the work of Eagleman (2011). The approach employed here is interdisciplinary in the sense that the conceptual toolkit draws upon criminological theory, sociological theory, the philosophy of Heidegger, behavioural genetics, the neuroscience of free-will and evolutionary psychology. This post-Postmodern, ontologically-flexible framework represents an attempt to âbuild bridgesâ between the biological and social sciences and suggests a way in which criminological theory might move beyond its four main theoretical obstacles. It is contended here that interdisciplinary research and collaboration which seeks to âbuild bridgesâ between the biological and social sciences are of great benefit to the development of Realist, post-Postmodern criminologies and âaspects of our intellectual life that are complicit in the stagnation of critical criminologyâ (Owen 2014: 4).
As Owen (2014: 1) suggests, âthese obstacles are the nihilistic relativism of the postmodern and poststructuralist cultural turn; the oversocialised gaze and harshly environmentalist conceptions of the person; genetic fatalism or the equation of genetic predisposition with inevitabilityâ (Owen 2009, 2012) and bio-phobia (Freese et al. 2003), that appear to dominate mainstream criminology; and the sociological weaknesses of many so-called biosocial explanations of crime and criminal behaviour (see, for example, Walsh and Beaver 2009; Walsh and Ellis 2003), which, although dealing adequately with biological variables, appear to neglect or make insufficient use of meta-concepts such as agency-structure, micro-macro and time-space in their accounts of the person. The term, Genetic-Social is adopted in order to further distance the framework from hardline Sociobiology, and to reflect a hopefully more up to date and balanced account of the mutuality and plasticity between the biological and the social.
The beginnings of the Genetic-Social framework lie in Owenâs (2006, 2007a, b) earlier attempts to expand Sibeonâs (2004) anti-reductionist framework from a focus upon agency-structure, micro-macro and time-space to include a ânewâ focus upon biological variables, reflecting his interest in behavioural genetics. This has led to the current incarnation of the framework and the addition over time of ten ânewâ meta-constructs, applied to the study of human biotechnology (Owen 2009), crime and criminal behaviour (Owen 2007b, 2012, 2014). In what follows, we briefly examine the sensitising device.
2 Genetic-Social Framework
The Genetic-Social framework arises out of a critique of the following âcardinal sinsâ of illegitimate theoretical reasoning:
- 1.Reductionism. Reductionist theories are ones which attempt to reduce the complexities of social life to a single, unifying principle of explanation or analytical prime mover such as âthe interests of capitalismâ, âpatriarchyâ, ârational choiceâ, âthe risk societyâ, âglobalizationâ and so on.
- 2.Essentialism. Essentialism is a form of theorising that in aprioristic fashion presupposes a unity or homogeneity of social phenomena. This can include social institutions, or taxonomic collectivities such as âwhite menâ, âthe middle classâ, etc.
- 3.Reification. Reification is the illicit attribution of agency to entities that are not actors or agents. An actor is entity possessing cognition that, in principle, has the means of formulating, taking and acting upon decisions. Therefore, âthe stateâ, âsocietyâ, âwhite peopleâ, etc. are not regarded as actors.
- 4.Functional Teleology. Functional teleology is an invalid form of analysis involving attempts to explain the causes of social phenomena in terms of their effects, where âeffectsâ refers to outcomes or consequences viewed as performances of functions. If there is no evidence of intentional planning by actors âsomewhere, sometimeâ, then it is a teleological fallacy to engage in explication of the causes of phenomena in terms of their effects, for example the concept of âinstitutional racismâ drawn upon in the MacPherson Report into the death of Stephen Lawrence (Owen 2014).
- 5.Relativism. Relativism is a philosophical stance associated with Poststructuralism (Foucault 1980a, b) and Post-modernism (Lyotard 1984). Arguably, relativists reject foundationalism from which theories can be generated, and fail to provide acceptable epistemologies and viable theories. The most basic criticism of Foucaultâs relativistic position is that he never applies it to himself, to his own theories and conceptual frameworks. Foucault is open, that is to say, to the self-referential objection which posits that, if all theories are the product of a particular situation, then so too is that theory, and it therefore has no universa...