Examining Schellenberg's Hiddenness Argument

Veronika Weidner

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9783319975177
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy of Religion

This book examines the so-called hiddenness argument of the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg. ?The hiddenness of God is a topic evincing a rich tradition in the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Rather recently, an argument emerged claiming that the hiddenness of God reveals on closer inspection the non-existence of God. Some say that Schellenberg´s hiddenness argument is likely as forceful as the argument from evil rendering theism rather implausible or even false. In this book, an account of the traditional theistic notion of divine hiddenness is presented, which contrasts sharply from Schellenberg´s use of the term. Moreover, a well-needed detailed exposition of the premises of the hiddenness argument is offered, thereby preparing the ground for an even more in-depth future hiddenness debate. Furthermore, a reply to the argument is given which challenges the truth of one specific subpremise, according to which belief that God exists is necessary in order to personally relate to God. Even though a plausible case is made that the hiddenness argument is unsound, it is beyond dispute that the argument deserves more serious reflection by theists and atheists alike.

© The Author(s) 2018

Veronika WeidnerExamining Schellenberg's Hiddenness ArgumentPalgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religionhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97517-7_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Veronika Weidner¹

(1)

Catholic Theological Faculty, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany

Veronika Weidner

Email: [email protected]

End Abstract

That “atheism should be rated among the most serious characteristics of this age, and thus be examined more carefully … [, and that] in the awareness of the gravity of the questions raised by atheism , … these questions should be considered seriously and more profoundly,”¹ is a remarkable point of view expressed in Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the World, which was promulgated on the final day of the Second Vatican Council on December 7, 1965. As I see it, the argument against the existence of God which the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg presented about 28 years later merits such a diligent examination.²

In a nutshell, his argument has the form of modus tollens³ and claims that if the God of theism exists, then the following state of affairs does not obtain in the actual world: that someone who, at some time t, is not resistant toward a relationship with God lacks belief that God exists. However, according to Schellenberg the consequent of this conditional must be denied, since there is at least one individual who, at some time t, is not resistant toward a relationship with God and yet does not believe that God exists. Thus, it follows that we must also deny the antecedent of the conditional and conclude that there is no God. As Schellenberg rightly asserts, “it is a mistake to say that the hiddenness argument is a very complicated argument. It is rather quite a simple argument which requires complicated discussion.”⁴

Presumably, the hiddenness argument, as Schellenberg defends it, has evolved and gained attention only recently, because we are living in a time in which God’s existence is no longer taken for granted and in which the explanatory power of the God-hypothesis seems to be diminishing.⁵ As a recent study issued by the General Social Survey of the social science research organization NORC at the University of Chicago suggests, worldwide “there is a modest, general shift away from belief in God.”⁶ John Calvin’s view on the matter that “[c]ertainly, if there is any quarter where it may be supposed that God is unknown, the most likely for such an instance to exist is among the dullest tribes farthest removed from civilization”⁷ seems, at least nowadays, to be quite outdated. Those who lack belief that God exists might not have sufficient evidence for the existence of God at hand. At least Bertrand Russell reportedly replied, upon being asked what he would say if he were to find himself after his death to be standing, to his utter surprise, before the throne of God: “‘Sir, why did you not give me better evidence?’.”⁸ Yet, this lack of sufficient evidence that there is a God is, as Schellenberg sees it, neither a state of affairs that theists should expect to obtain in the actual world nor one which a perfectly loving God would allow to obtain. It is a common saying that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Yet, Schellenberg does not agree with the view this saying expresses. Rather, he claims that absence of evidence is evidence of absence. That is, in Schellenberg’s view, the absence of a certain kind of evidence for the existence of God is itself evidence that God does not exist.

However, by Schellenberg’s own admission, his reasoning is not entirely without precedent nor is it entirely original .⁹

The idea that weak evidence for the existence of God or the presence of nonbelief might count against the truth of theism does appear here and there in the history of philosophy—though quite rarely. But it took until 1993 for it to be fully developed into an explicit argument against the existence of God. And this argument is, I believe, original. (I’m not alone in saying so: my critics in philosophy have done the same.)¹⁰

For example, Schellenberg mentions that he has found hints of similar basic lines of thought in the writings of, inter alia, Joseph Butler, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Ronald W. Hepburn.¹¹

The short outline of the hiddenness argument I gave above may have reminded an attentive reader of another prominent anti-theistic argument that has constantly pressed on theists, namely the argument from evil . The ancient argument from evil and Schellenberg’s more novel hiddenness argument at least have in common that they consist of premises which entail the conclusion that God does not exist.¹² In other words, both sorts of argument question the truth of the central theistic claim that God exists and thus the truth of theism . As a result, these arguments also question the reasonableness of those still holding an affirmative doxastic attitude toward the claim that God exists or regarding the truth of theism. Hence, providing suitable theistic responses is the task of what in classical apologetics has been called a demonstratio religiosa.¹³ Furthermore, the hiddenness argument and the argument from evil have the same logical form. Both arguments are based on the aforementioned rule of inference labelled MT and claim that there is a certain state of affairs obtaining in the actual world each of which is not to be expected to obtain if God exists. More precisely, first, these arguments postulate that the existence of God exhibiting certain divine attributes, i.e., (i) perfect love or (ii) perfect omnipotence, goodness, and omniscience, makes it expectable that a certain state of affairs obtains in the actual world, i.e., ad (i), that there is no involuntary lack of belief that God exists or, ad (ii), that there is no moral evil or natural evil.¹⁴ Then, they claim that this state of affairs does not obtain, but that, on the contrary, the negation of this state of affairs is actually the case, i.e., ad (i), there is some involuntary lack of belief that God exists or, ad (ii), there is some moral evil or natural evil. Hence, they conclude that God exhibiting the aforementioned divine attributes does not exist. In other words, according to Schellenberg we

must be open to the possibility that the world would be completely different than it is if there were a God. For the properties we ascribe to God have implications, and these place constraints on what the world could be like if there were a being with those properties.¹⁵

As a matter of fact, alongside the argument from evil the hiddenness argument “has become one of the most prominent arguments for atheism in contemporary philosophy of religion.”¹⁶ Thus, I fear that Paul K. Moser’s judgement that “divine hiddenness offers no real threat to reasonable belief that the Jewish-Christian God actually exists and loves us all”¹⁷ may probably be made too hasty. In what follows, I do not enter the “much-traveled (one might say trampled) neighboring territory of the problem of evil” but turn instead to “the much-neglected and little-explored territory … labeled the problem of Divine hiddenness.”¹⁸ In my book, the overall leading research question I started with and which I have been constantly pondering about while undertaking the investigation is this. Why, if there is a God, is God’s existence not evident to everyone? Or rather, why is God’s existence epistemically hidden¹⁹ for some? This constitutes the riddle or problem of divine hiddenness in my eyes. Yet, I agree with Peter van Inwagen that as

is the case with the problem of evil, the problem of the hiddenness of God is more often referred to than precisely stated. Theologians often refer to this problem as if it were perfectly clear what it was, but their writings on the subject do not always make it wholly clear what the problem is.²⁰

I hope that this book helps making it more clear what the problem of divine hiddenness is. In my attempt of doing so, I enter the field of religious epistemology. However, I am well aware that I am not an epistemologist by training. And so I kindly ask those who are epistemologists by training to give mercy to my mistakes and, if they wish, please correct them. I approach the hiddenness argument in a systematic fashion, i.e., I am more concerned with the content of some person’s argument and the claims made in support of it than I am with the details of the historic background of the argument and its claims. On this occasion, I wish to ask pardon from historians of theology and philosophy for my abbreviated way of often only highlighting the tip of the iceberg. Furthermore, I pursue this project from a theistic point of view. Yet, I join the common academic debate about the question of whether or not there is a God without presupposing God’s existence as an unquestionable factum brutum in my reasoning. My approach differs from, for example, Alvin Plantinga’s stance in this respect. According to Plantinga, the “Christian philosopher quite properly starts from the existence of God, and presupposes it in philosophical work,” so that, as...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• Part I. Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument
• Part II. Discussion of the Hiddenness Argument
• Back Matter