Adult Literacy Policy and Practice

From Intrinsic Values to Instrumentalism

Vicky Duckworth, Gordon Ade-Ojo

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137535115
• Topic: Bildung
• Subtopic: Bildungstheorie & -praxis

This book explores the gradual evolution of Adult literacy policy from the 1970s using philosophical, sociological and economic frames of reference from a range of perspectives to highlight how priorities have changed. It also offers an alternative curriculum; a transformative model that presents a more socially just different value position.

1

Exploring the Concepts: Instrumentalism, Philosophy of Education, Ideology and Value Positions

Abstract: This chapter critically engages with the philosophical drivers of education and considers how they inform and shape educational polices and specifically adult literacy. Value positions are explored through the prism of two broad educational philosophical constructs of instrumentalism and libertarianism. We relate this to ideas and debates within these areas for current issues in educational policy and practice. In specific terms, such libertarian values as intuitionism are held as counterpoint to the various strands of rationalist value in education.

Keywords: adult literacy; ideology; instrumentalism; libertarianism; philosophy; policy

Ade-Ojo, Gordon and Vicky Duckworth. Adult Literacy Policy and Practice: From Intrinsic Values to Instrumentalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. DOI: 10.1057/9781137535115.0002.

Introduction

The semantic core of the title of this book is focused on the concept of instrumentalisation. It is apt, therefore, that our preliminary task must be to explore the nature of the term instrumentalisation. However, this is not an exercise in finding the literal meaning of the term. Rather, it is more a question of locating it in the appropriate context within the discourse of educational policy. In order to adequately engage with this initial task, we shall make two comments for the purpose of clarification. First, the term instrumentalisation must be seen as a derivative of the more basic term, instrumentalism. Second, in the context of this book, instrumentalisation is in itself a mere process. In other words, we see the term as reflective of a process within a movement and as such, our main focus would be to simply locate the process within the framework of a larger movement.

As with many such engagements, our natural instinct is to head for a dictionary to find the meaning of the term. While general dictionary definitions are frequently shown to have their limitations particularly in terms of locating terms within the relevant context, there is no doubt that dictionary definitions often have their own merit. Not least, because they at least offer us a non-complex view of the semantic denotation of the words under investigation. In essence, they offer us a starting point in our excursion into the semantic field enveloping the relevant term.

One simple definition of the term instrumentalism is offered in the WordSense.eu dictionary (online – we are in an era of digital learning after all):

A pragmatic philosophical approach which regards an activity (such as science, law or education) chiefly as an instrument or tool for some practical purpose rather than in more absolute or ideal terms. (WordSense.eu, 2015)

Along a similar line of reasoning, the Encyclopaedia Britannica offers us a definition by Neufville (2014) as:

The view that the value of scientific concepts and theories is determined not by whether they are literally true or correspond to reality in some sense ... is the view that scientific theories should be thought of primarily as tools for solving practical problems rather than as meaningful descriptions of the natural world.

From these two initial excursions into the meaning of instrumentalism, two issues emerge. The first is the fact that instrumentalism is a process borne out of a particular perception. Instrumentalism as a process, therefore, can only emerge, for those who hold a particular perception of what the process means. The second issue is the fact that both definitions have clearly located the concept of instrumentalism within the framework of a larger realm: philosophical positions. The two issues are, of course, related: in order for the former to materialise, there must be an engagement with the latter. Developing a perception that informs a process is a by-product of engaging with a philosophical position.

In the context of the ongoing, we suggest that a more fruitful engagement would be to explore the larger realm, philosophical positions, if we are to understand the contextual import of the term instrumentalism. Furthermore, as a significant part of this book will be looking at various philosophical perceptions including instrumentalism, we conclude that it is best not to dwell too long on exploring the term in isolation here. Nonetheless, we shall offer a preliminary description of the term which draws from the two ‘simple’ definitions cited earlier.

In the first instance, we suggest that instrumentalism is seen as a position encapsulated in the phrase ‘a means to an end’. In order words, it is a position that symbolises that which is not intrinsic. That is, the value is not inherent but extended to another source or outlet. Second, instrumentalism is a philosophical concept which will naturally induce a range of ‘what is?’ questions. In essence, instrumentalism is best seen as a philosophical position that can be applied to various areas/disciplines including education, which is our focus in this book. In the end, it is apparent that we cannot talk of instrumentalism without recourse to the larger concept and context of philosophical values. That is what we shall now turn our attention to.

Philosophy of education

Now, we approach the more complex question of ‘what is?’ We, however delimit our focus to the realm of education, as that is our concern in this book. From the onset, we acknowledge the onerous nature of answering ‘what is?’ questions. Phillips (2013) provides an insight into the complex nature of finding answers to ‘what is?’ questions. While exploring the nature of philosophy of education, Phillips notes that:

What is ... ? Questions are extremely troublesome, in large measures because it is rarely clear what answer would satisfy the questioner’ and that, ‘it is virtually certain that the first answer that is received – and very possibly the latter ones as well – will be unsatisfactory. (p.3)

Attempts by various authors have demonstrated this complexity. Not the least, because most authors have tended to approach this question by focusing upon key terms and their cognates. Indeed, various attempts at engaging with the concept have tended to display a form of atavistic tendency. At the root of what we consider atavism in this context is the predisposition to interrogate cognate terms and in doing this, to explore what philosophers do and where they do it.

There are ample illustrations of this form of engagement with the task of attempting to unravel the phrase, philosophy of education. In his interesting contribution to Bailey’s (2011) edited book The Philosophy of Education, Standish (2011) starts with a framework which he then attempts to fill by providing answers to various questions including what do philosophers do? What is philosophy? What sort of reading might philosophy of education entail, and what is education? From the amalgam of answers to these questions, he crafts out what remains a ‘non-defined’ description of the phrase. By his own admission, what he has done ‘falls short of providing a definitive account of the philosophy of education’ (p.9). In essence, therefore, this difficulty in carving out a definitive account of such terms as the philosophy of education might well be because ‘most important concepts are essentially contestable’ (p.9). Other authors have taken a similar approach and, not surprisingly, have come to the same conclusion (see, e.g., Barrow, 2013; Maxwell, 2014).

In our view, a major reason for this seeming impasse in providing a definitive account of the term is the fact that authors have frequently engaged with the cognate terms philosophy and philosopher, and then sought to build upon these in defining or perhaps describing ‘philosophy of education’. A necessary fallout of this approach is often the limitation of our understanding of the nature of philosophy of education. This frequently used approach focuses on philosophy as the source of explanation and indeed, the definition of the concept, as if philosophy of education were an end in itself and has no relationship to or bearing on other activities. Philosophy of education, then, from this perspective, is focused on the activity and has the tendency to ignore the impact of such an activity on an ultimate product which might manifest in different sociological realms.¹

We suggest, however, that answering such a question need not be so complicated. The pivot of this approach, in our view, lies in the fact that the ultimate outcome of such an engagement is the provision of answers that are geared towards the one who raises the question ‘what is the philosophy of education?’ In other words, the answer is solely induced by the questioner. For us, however, the goal must not, and should not, be induced solely by the dictate of the ‘questioner’. Rather, the ‘answerer’ must also set out clearly the intended message. Drawing from semantic principles, the ultimate communicative act must draw on a convergence between the speaker and the hearer, and in this context, the ‘questioner and the answerer’. It is the latter viewpoint that informs the approach that we take in this book in initiating our answer to the question: what is philosophy of education?; what have we used the term to mean? Nonetheless, the complexity involved in providing an answer to the question, what is philosophy of education, remains implicit.

In order to fully illustrate both the complexity and the outcome of engaging with a definition of philosophy of education using the approach which we have earlier highlighted , we shall present a summary of the product of such an engagement by one author. From the onset, we must emphasise that there is nothing particularly significant about the work we have chosen. As far as we are concerned, the choice is informed by the fact that it is able to illustrate our argument and provide evidence of the complexity involved in defining the term, as well as offer us the opportunity to introduce our own dimensions to the process of defining the term.

Probing a philosophy of education

Our chosen illustration is the chapter written by Phillips (2013, pp.5–18) in the Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education (2013) edited by Bailey, Barrow, Carr and McCarthy. As reflected in the title of this chapter, the concern is ‘philosophy of education’. Phillips starts by acknowledging what is perhaps accepted by most people who have worked in this area – the complexity of the term. Almost predictably, Phillips’ approach is to identify three dimensions through which the task of defining the philosophy of education can be approached. This immediately sets out two major issues for consideration: what philosophy of education is not and the complexity involved in defining it. In respect of the latter, he notes that his approach might well provide a ‘slow, complex and indirect answer to the apparently simple question: what is philosophy of education’ (p.4). But by just noting the extent to which debates have popped up at every turning in our brief engagement with this term, we are convinced that most readers will agree that defining this term is anything but simple.

In clarifying what the term is not, or ought not to be, he draws a distinction between two usages of the word philosophy. On the one hand is the vapid non-technical usage of the word philosophy which has a dictionary definition as ‘what anyone who thinks abstractly’ (p.4) does. Aside from the fact that this tells us little, the non-decisive nature of this entry suggests that children are more of philosophers than anyone else. As far as we know, children are quite capable of thinking abstractly, particularly with regard to how they engage with and construct their own language use. On the other hand is the use of the word philosophy to refer to the ‘work done in university departments of philosophy or programmes in philosophy of education’. While this, at least, offers clarity on where philosophy is done/carried out, it still neither tells us what this work is nor how it is done. Again, this little input deepens the complexity involved in defining the term.

Another seemingly simplistic definition emerging from the approach of looking at cognate terms is ‘philosophy is what philosophers do’ (p.5). But we assume that every reader will by now be asking the question, who is the philosopher? Phillips himself acknowledges this, plays around with a potential definition of philosopher as ‘anyone who thinks deeply’, but in the end, discards it because of the unlimited boundaries it is capable of crossing.

Having discarded these seemingly simplistic definitions, Phillips sticks to the goal of defining the term philosophy of education by mapping out three things. Who engages in it, what does that engagement involve and in which domain does the engagement take place? He draws on three existing seminal works to illustrate the three and thus sets out his own definition of the term. In essence, he uses philosophical principles elicited from specifically chosen input by three scholars to elucidate his perception and argues that there are different constructs of the philosopher, different types of work they engage in, but fails to clarify whether all of this can, and does happen, in only one domain.

The first of these contributions is the constructivist theory of learning (Curren, 2007; Glaserfeld, 1995, 2007). At the heart of this theory is the view that ‘knowledge is not found or discovered, but is made or constructed by humans’ (Phillips, 2013, p.7). For now, we shall only look at Phillips’ disquiet about some areas of this theory. First, he registers a sense of unease in respect of the potential for insularity that this theory projects. How, he asks, can we be sure that the knowledge internally constructed by individuals is not simply relevant or peculiar to the individual, and will, therefore, not reflect a universal position? Second, he highlights the potential contestation of issues around the replication of knowledge: How can we be sure that ‘the knowledge I have constructed is identical with, or compatible with, the knowledge you have constructed’ (p.7). In essence, the theory has not really addressed the realistic potential for multiplicity of knowledge in which everyone has the right to claim that their own ‘knowledge’ is valid and true as against others’ knowledge. This, of course, underscores the potential tension inherent in the possibility that the learner’s knowledge can be divergent from the teacher’s knowledge. In Phillips’ view: the natural confusion emanating from the two issues identified earlier and the emergence of a whole range of modern interpretations of constructivism has inevitably led to some form of confusion which demands the intervention of analytic philosophers. A product of such an analytic engagement has resulted in the following:

1Construction of knowledge by individuals is from the materials being learned and not simply from some boundless data source. It is the essence of what has been labelled the ‘individual psychology’ dimension of constructionism (Phillips, 2000, 2007).

2There is a public discipline focus of constructivism which acknowledges individual contribution to already publicly available ‘knowledges’ in various fields.

Developing from these different realms of constructivism, the individual versus the social construction of knowledge as exemplified by the differences in the arguments of Piaget and Vygotsky, respectively, it becomes evident that there is the need to modify the often generalised description and claims of constructivism as a learning theory. Who, we might ask, takes responsibility for this work on discerning the specific from the general? We shall, of course, return to this theory as a means of highlighting the ways in which Phillips has attempted to answer the initial set of questions we raised: who, what and where?

The second piece of work to which Phillips anchors his search for a definition is Skinner’s engagement with the explanation of human action in which he explored the differences between behaviour and state of mind. Having established his hostility towards the principles of metaphysics, Skinner clearly sets out his rationales for the logical positivist position which sees observation and or behavioural perceptions as the heart and soul of experimental studies. He then applies this position to the study of human behaviour, and in his view, this moves such a science from the unseen to the ‘see-able’ (see Skinner, 1972).

Drawing from Skinner’s work as explained briefly above, Phillips offers a central conclusion: Skinner’s work cuts across disciplinary boundaries and has, therefore, ‘had a pronounced impact on educational practice’ (Phillips, 2013, p.10). Given that Skinner himself was not essentially an educationalist but a psychologist, the key point developing from his work was, in Phillips’ view, the fact that many elements of his work are to be found in the work of many educational researchers. Clearly, Skinner’s work is applicable, not only across disciplines, but also across periods. We shall return to the significance of this within the framework of Phillips’ definition at a later stage.

The third theoretical work to which Phillips’ exploration is anchored is Rousseau’s educational philosophy as embodied in his narrative on Emile. The central thesis of Rousseau’s theory is that when a child is ‘unencumbered by the forces of civilized society, his natural tendencies are allowed to express themselves’ (Phillips, 2013, p.11). Expatiating on this argument, Rousseau wrote: ‘harmony becomes impossible. Forced to combat either nature or society, you must make your choice ... you cannot train both’ (1955, p.7). In other words, learners are torn between their natural dispositions and societal expectations. If we gave room to the pull of the latter, there are likely to be conflicts which might not be easily resolved. In contrast, if we gave room to the former, the synergy between the learner’s nature and what they intend to learn is likely to smooth the path of learning. Rousseau himself underscores this inherent conflict by painting in very bold relief the contrast between Emile’s education and a sketch of that of Sophy, Emile’s soulmate. He encapsulates Sophy’s education in the following words: ‘ [i]t follows that woman is specially made fo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Exploring the Concepts: Instrumentalism, Philosophy of Education, Ideology and Value Positions
• 2  Changing Value Positions: A Movement in Transition
• 3  The Consolidation of an Instrumental Value Position: The Moser Committee
• 4  Exploring an Alternative: A Transformative Curriculum Driven by Social Capital
• References
• Name Index
• Subject Index