European Union Delegations in EU Foreign Policy

A Diplomatic Service of Different Speeds

F. Austermann

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137376312
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This first comprehensive study of the EU's diplomatic representation in the world, the EEAS, this book seeks to understand why it has failed to formulate a centralised policy towards external states. It also analyses why the EEAS has more success in centralising diplomatic structures in developing countries than with some economic partners.

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Introduction: European Diplomacy after Lisbon – Different Speeds Instead of One Voice

A Telephone Number for Europe

‘Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?’

Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger supposedly asked this question to allude to the lack of a genuine European ‘Union’ in global politics (Rachman, 2009; The Washington Post, 2012). When it comes to foreign affairs and diplomacy, the EU is still an intergovernmental club of 28 members, each with its own distinctive policy. Instead of a unitary diplomatic actor, this makes the EU look like a Hydra-like ‘beast’ on the global stage, with 28 heads and therefore 28 different voices – and numerous telephone numbers for Kissinger and other statesmen to call (Risse-Kappen, 1996; Laffan, 1998, p. 250). The ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon should have solved or at least mitigated this problem. It contains provisions that are intended to channel diplomatic activity in EU matters through Brussels, by upgrading existing and setting up new EU institutions (European Union, 2010, Art. 27 and Art. 221; Nugent, 2010, p. 380).

First and foremost, the Lisbon Treaty has established the position of a ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Barber, 2010; European Union, 2010, Art. 18). Lady Catherine Ashton, a British national, is the first to fill this new position of a prototype EU ‘foreign minister’ (Willis, 2009). Some may be skeptical about this comparison, however, calling the new High Representative a prototype foreign minister at the EU level does not seem like an exaggeration. After all, the Lisbon innovations are not so new. There used to be a ‘High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy,’ which was introduced at the end of the 1990s with the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Union, 1997). The former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, fulfilled this role for over ten years (Council of the European Union, 2013). In the course of the search for a Constitution for Europe, Article I–21 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of 2003 foresaw the upgrade of this High Representative to a ‘Union Minister of Foreign Affairs’ (European Union, 2004). Eventually, the Constitutional Treaty failed after being rejected by the French and Dutch citizens. The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the new post into the rather cumbersome ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.’ However, the essentials of the post were kept. HR Javier Solana already managed to be involved in highly political matters (Dijkstra, 2011). Nonetheless, the new HR has extended de jure powers compared to the previous one. The previous HR merely assisted the country that held the rotating EU Presidency in representing the Union abroad, and in implementing the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Meanwhile, the Lisbon Treaty transfers the competences of the conduct, the implementation, and even parts of the design of the Union’s foreign affairs to the new HR.¹

The overarching purpose of the new HR can be summarized by giving the EU a common voice in the world: Lady Ashton, who is at the same time the Vice-President of the European Commission (VP), describes her portfolio as consisting of ‘traditional diplomacy.’ Moreover, she is supposed to coordinate the foreign policy tools that the EU has at its disposal and to build consensus among all member states. She also represents the EU in international organizations such as the UN, and has a prominent role in arguably the most sensitive foreign policy tool: defense matters at EU level (European External Action Service, 2013).

Strategic interests and objectives of EU foreign policy are still unanimously decided by the Heads of State and Government of the Union’s member states (European Union, 2010, Art. 15.2, 22, 26). Somewhat at variance with this, Lisbon seeks to streamline the EU’s external affairs with another new face, namely that of the permanent President of the European Council, a role that is currently performed by the former Belgian Premier Herman van Rompuy. Just as van Rompuy chairs the European Council meetings, HR/VP Ashton presides over the Council formation that deals with foreign affairs. As part of this task, she sets the agenda and makes concrete proposals on which the foreign ministers unanimously decide. Hence, for both these crucial Council formations, there is no longer a rotating Presidency (Barber, 2010, p. 58; European Union, 2010).

The most innovative element is arguably the HR/VP’s institutional strength. Unlike her predecessor Solana, Lady Ashton is no ‘one (wo-)man show.’ She is supported by her own institution, the European External Action Service with about 3,400 staff.² Its headquarters are located in Brussels. Reflecting the new double role of the HR/VP, these headquarters constitute a new EU body that emerges from previously existing ones: parts of both the Council Secretariat and the Commission have been integrated into the new EEAS (Council of the European Union, 2010).³

This is how the EEAS works in theory. Since its inception in December 2009, the EEAS has met a ‘barrage of criticism’ (Duke, 2012a, p. 25). The critique has been widespread and diffuse, however, there are four major points worth mentioning.

First, the persistence of unanimous decision making in EU foreign policy is at odds with the goal of creating a more unified European voice in the world through coherent, more effective, and more visible foreign policy action (Duke, 2012a, p. 25). The fact that there are two ‘new faces’ in EU foreign policy, the HR/VP and the President of the European Council, has also sparked questions about the degree of CFSP coherence post-Lisbon (Chopin and Lefebvre, 2010, p. 2).

Second, many commentators have criticized the appointment of the first HR/VP Lady Ashton in the sense that she would be a consensus candidate who lacks the needed experience in foreign policy and EU politics as well as the necessary charisma (Barber, 2010, p. 61).

Third, the point of critique that has arguably been raised most often is that of institutional competition. Merging parts of the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and adding national diplomats into a new body has led to ‘turf fights’ between the respective institutions, departments, and officials (Rüger, 2012, p. 162; Furness, 2013, p. 110). Apart from competition over competences, budgets, and decision-making power, all these institutions had developed their own organizational cultures, procedures, and ‘mind-sets’ over time (Spence, 2012, p. 133; cf. Murdoch, 2012, p. 1012; Bátora, 2013, p. 598).

Fourth, even though member states and EU officials alike have stressed the complementarity of the EEAS vis-à-vis national foreign services, establishing a Brussels-based diplomatic service still touches sensitively on member states’ sovereignty (Balfour and Raik, 2013, p. 2; Krätke and Sherriff, 2012, p. 3). They were quick to put a hold on any slightly more daring initiatives from Lady Ashton and her team, such as the suggestion to merge EU member state embassies into ‘Europe-Houses’ or the proposal to create EU military headquarters (Rettman, 2012a, 2013a; cf. Furness, 2013, p. 104). Somewhat paradoxically, it has also been lamented that Ashton has been too hesitant or not active enough (Dworkin et al., 2011; Furness, 2013, pp. 115, 119). As a result of each of these four points, the EEAS is more often than not criticized for insufficient output and for lacking a long-term strategy or ‘vision’ (Duke, 2012a, p. 27; Krätke and Sherriff, 2012, p. 6).

In many ways, the above points of critique can be questioned. At the very least, they need to be put into perspective. As far as the persisting unanimity in CFSP decision making is concerned, it should be noted that most decisions at the EU level are taken by consensus, even when qualified majority voting (QMV) is the method to use (Heisenberg, 2005). On this backdrop, a consensus project like the EU might also require a consensus candidate at its top. Regarding the ‘two faces,’ also at the national level, Heads of State and Government and Foreign Ministers have a division of labor regarding representing their country abroad and implementing foreign policy. A leader’s charisma is quite a subjective matter and lies in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, even if a better known and maybe more charismatic person had been chosen as the first HR/VP, this would not have changed the immense workload related to the EEAS (Furness, 2013, p. 114; cf. Barber, 2010, p. 61). Concerning the latter, it should be noted that organizational change is always slow and institutional consolidation a matter of time (cf. Buchanan et al., 2006, p. 141). This implies two things: first, some commentators may have had excessive expectations to think that a new diplomatic service at the EU level, which has barely been set up, could already deliver the output foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty within just a few months (Duke, 2012a, p. 26; Krätke and Sherriff, 2012, p. 6; Blockmans, 2012, p. 2). The second implication is that many problems related to the EEAS may be solved given sufficient time (Blockmans, 2012, p. 2). To give an example, one year after the inauguration of the new service, the EEAS officials were not even located in the same building (Duke, 2012a, p. 27). Hence, an initial lack of coordination does not come by surprise, neither does the fact that things improved as soon as the team moved into the Triangle Building at the Brussels’ Schuman roundabout, which was designated as the new EEAS headquarters.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the Euro crisis, which broke out one year before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and which is still on-going, has required the utmost attention and tremendous (financial) resources of EU decision makers. This increased the pressure on Ashton and her team (cf. Blockmans, 2012, p. 2). With the European integration project put in question in the course of the crisis, it was difficult to argue for further integration in the arguably highest of politics, diplomacy (Lehne, 2012). On the other hand, financial pressure also forced many national governments to cut budgets in their foreign ministries (Balfour and Raik, 2013, p. 2).

Overall, the Treaty of Lisbon has certainly boosted the EU’s political capabilities. Although there have been initial difficulties in setting up the EEAS, Lisbon seems to have paved the way for Europe to speak with a more unified voice, and an answer to Henry Kissinger’s (supposed) question of whom he should call when he wants to speak to Europe. When it comes to diplomatic representation, member states have started to realize the advantages of channeling diplomatic activity through the EEAS, more specifically through the so-called EU Delegations. Their contribution to support (or to inhibit) a more united European voice in the world will be discussed in the next section.

The EEAS: a diplomatic service of different speeds

Diplomatic representations play a key role in implementing foreign policy ‘on the ground,’ meaning in third country capital cities. They also provide important analyses of developments in the host country and thereby actively shape relations between home and abroad (United Nations, 1961, Art. 3). To equip the new High Representative with these tools, the Lisbon Treaty has established a global embassy-like network at the EU level (European Union, 2010, Art. 221). The Treaty provides third countries with one ‘local telephone number’ of Europe.

During the past six decades, the European Commission, which is the Union’s executive body, had already established a network of local representations in more than 140 countries (Bruter, 1999, p. 183). Gradually they have taken over tasks and characteristics that make them comparable to traditional embassies. Examples are the involvement in traditional high politics or the acquisition of diplomatic immunities (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 21). In contrast to the EEAS, the Delegations are not an invention of the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon. Nonetheless, the Treaty upgrades these Commission Delegations into full-fledged ‘European Union Delegations.’ This upgrade is considerable. Before Lisbon, member state embassies executed the rotating Presidency of the EU Council abroad. Now, the EU Delegations take over that role (Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 5.8; Hocking, 2005a, p. 295). As a result, EU Delegations replace national embassies when it comes to leading EU internal coordination of diplomatic action abroad. They, for example, now chair the local coordination meetings of EU officials and member state diplomats, which deal with of all sorts of issue areas, from trade over science and technology to defense matters. Moreover, the Delegations take away the privilege from the member state embassies to represent the EU externally. Thus, the Head of the EU Delegation is now empowered to speak on behalf of the entire EU towards the host country in all Union-related policy matters and on a permanent basis (European diplomats, 2010). Overall, Lisbon stipulates that increased coordination and unified external representation shall trigger a more coherent European voice in the world (Rettman, 2010a; Drieskens, 2012). As far as diplomatic practice is concerned, this means a higher level of channeling diplomatic activity in EU matters through the EU and notably its Delegations, which I conceptualize in this book as the centralization of European diplomacy in third countries.⁴

As indicated above, many scholars, commentators, and national diplomats themselves claim that the EEAS and its Delegations at best complement national MFAs and their embassies – now and in the future (European diplomats, 2010; Boomgaarden et al., 2009). At worst, the EEAS may become yet another body in the Brussels institutional jungle with little to no impact (Vaisse, 2010; Adebahr, 2013, p. 14). Others conceive of the idea that the Treaty of Lisbon has sparked off a ‘creeping revolution,’ meaning that the EEAS may truly challenge the traditional structure, and in the long term possibly even the existence of Union members’ embassies (Sek, 2012, p. 2; Hocking, 2005a, p. 295; Solana in Spence, 2009, p. 253; Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 13; Blockmans, 2012, p. 1). The latter would be the ultimate evidence for a genuine centralization of sovereignty. After all, diplomacy is traditionally seen as the archetype of high politics (Glarbo, 1999, p. 634).

In this book, the EEAS and especially the Delegations are seen as a case of upward dissipation of sovereignty at the expense of national foreign services as they are now, though not at the expense of member states as such. While this may seem like a rather pro-integrationist view, the book’s central message is quite skeptical about the prospects of the EEAS in giving Europe a single voice in the world. Although the Lisbon Treaty’s rules are on paper the same for EU Delegations in every third country, the level of centralization of European diplomacy, meaning the channeling of diplomatic activity in EU matters through the European Union, always depends on the target country. In some third countries, the EEAS is and will be able to easily and quickly centralize European diplomacy while this endeavor is more difficult and slower in others. Put differently, there are different speeds of European diplomacy centralization around the world and the EEAS is hence a ‘diplomatic service of different speeds.’

An interesting detail about the Lisbon-upgrade of EU Delegations indicates this variation. Notwithstanding the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, the exact workings of the new Delegations were not yet clear. After all, the EEAS first had to be set up (Council of the European Union, 2010). Nevertheless, 54 of all Commission Delegations were already transformed into EU Delegations in January 2010 (Rettman, 2010b). This partial transformation is puzzling: why were some Delegations already transformed and others were not? Another frequently cited example indicating variation of European diplomacy centralization is that the EU does not speak with one voice, notably towards countries such as the People’s Republic of China (Fox and Godement, 2009; Renard, 2009, p. 4; Körber Stiftung, 2011; Willis, 2011a). Meanwhile, such complaints are rare with regards to speaking with one voice towards Australia, Myanmar, or East Timor.

Such variation makes Europe’s new External Action Service look like a ‘diplomatic service of different speeds.’ The reproach of the Union being a disunited diplomatic player is ubiquitous. However, the underlying logic, the reasons for these different speeds, is under-researched, mostly due to a lack of comparative studies across non-EU states.⁵ This book seeks to close this research gap by answering the overarching research question: why can the EU centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others? The phenomenon to be explained, the dependent variable (DV), is the level of centralization of European diplomacy in third countries. The independent variables will be the level of development of a third country, its economic and its strategic importance, and its political culture. Before outlining the chapters and the results of this book, the following section will further explain why a change of analytical perspective from the EEAS headquarters in Brussels to the European Union Delegations (EUDs) worldwide is necessary.

A change of analytical perspective: from Brussels to the World

Even though many scholars in European studies regard the EU as an international organization sui generis (Risse-Kappen, 1996, p. 56; Hix, 1998, p. 38; Knelangen, 2005, p. 7), there is a global trend of establishing intergovernmental organizations with supranational characteristics (SN-IGOs) similar to and sometimes also on the basis of the EU model (Babarinde, 2007). Groups of nation-states collaborate or they even pool sovereignty through common institutions (Etzioni, 2001, p. xix). The EU is certainly the most advanced case (Waever, 1995, p. 389; Etzioni, 2001, p. xxi). It can therefore deliver interesting research results: first, concerning the marginalization of the nation-state as the key actor in global politics, and second, regarding the centralization of sovereignty from the national towards the supranational level.

This centralization of sovereignty is a key question in European Union studies, where it is usually termed ‘European integration.’ Researchers have delivered in-depth examinations of the variation of sovereignty centralization across policy domains (Weale et al., 2003). It is already common knowledge that the supranational EU institutions in Brussels, notably the Commission, have more agenda setting, decision making, and implementation power in trade policy or development aid than in foreign and security policy (Smith, 2006).⁶. Until now, what is traditionally referred to as high politics that is foreign policy, diplomacy, and defense, remains least centralized (Curzon, 1974). Therefore, many scholars agree with the view that the EU is an ‘economic giant’ but a ‘political dwarf’ (Diez Medrano, 2004). As a result, state-centrism tends to persist in the study of EU foreign policy, even after the Lisbon Treaty has been implemented (Smith, 2004, p. 23; Söderbaum and van Langenhove, 2005, p. 256; Union for Staff of the European Institutions, 2010). This view, however, has three shortcomings....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Introduction: European Diplomacy after Lisbon Different Speeds Instead of One Voice
• 2  Centralization of European Diplomacy in Theory
• 3  Diplomatic Representation of the EU Over Time
• 4  Analyzing the Patterns of European Diplomacy Centralization
• 5  Measuring European Diplomacy Centralization
• 6  Political Giant, Economic Power, Normative Dwarf: European Diplomacy Centralization across the Globe
• 7  Conclusion: A Diplomatic Service of Different Speeds
• Notes
• References
• Index