1.1 Craxiâs Children: 1980s Neo-nationalism and Its Legacy
The decisions taken by the Italian governments during the late 1940s and early 1950s to pursue the integration into the European and Atlantic systems was a foundational choice for republican foreign policy. The following age was supposed to be the period in which to implement and enforce the new assumptions of Italian foreign policy. The Italian ambassador and writer Pietro Quaroni once said, answering the question as to âwhoâ makes foreign policy in Italy that the right answer should be ânobodyâ. He polemically argued, âin fact, a proper [Italian] foreign policy does not existâ (in Vigezzi 1991, p. 173). Quaroniâs argument was that by choosing the anchorage to the Euro-Atlantic system, Italy had already decided its future in 1949 and 1951. He also stated that from that moment Italian foreign policy was focused on keeping up with the developments of the international system without changing the fundamental patterns of national foreign policy. Quaroni was correct in affirming that between 1948 and 1989 the main problem of Italian foreign policy was the one of adjustment to the international system through active participation in the Euro-Atlantic framework. He died in 1971 but his interpretation can be extended to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The Atlantic option was not a source of confrontation since the mid-1950s when the commitment of the Italian government to integrate into the Atlantic defensive system hindered any attempt to transform Italy into a âquasi-Austriaâ: namely, a half-neutralized country open to Soviet influence and penetration. Leftist forces finally accepted the Atlantic option. The decision of the Socialists led to their inclusion into the center-left coalition government. Later the Communists, who were initially strongly opposed the Western choice, decided to accept the Italian participation with Western institutions. This happened in the year 1976, and the Soviets were fully informed and supported the decision of the Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer (LâUnitĂ 2000).
However, the policy of international adjustment was only one of the three components that defined and shaped the international role of Italy, along with the definition of national identity and the peculiarity of being a middle power. Despite the growing convergence on the fundamental choices of Italian foreign policy, from the 1960s a frustration emerged because of the lack of initiative of the country on the international scene. An increasing number of intellectuals and practitioners of international affairs advocated the transition to a new stage of Italian foreign policy. According to them, the Italian universities did not sufficiently promote studies and research on international relations and on national foreign policy (Are 1977, p. 108). A debate also emerged on the role that political parties had to play in order to increase the awareness of public opinion on the main international issues. Some important innovations occurred moving Italy toward the establishment of a more comprehensive foreign policy community. In 1965, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), an important think tank for the study of international affairs, was established. Its first mandate was to promote research and debate on the main problems related to the nuclear age, on the role of Italy in the developing world, and on the problems of European integration (Graglia 2016, p. 51).
Despite this initiative, the transition to a more advanced and concrete debate on international relations and foreign policy-making partially failed due to the circumstances of the Cold War. Furthermore, this failure was also the outcome of a conscious decision of the political parties in power. Until the early 1980s, Italy was one of the most ideologized countries in Western Europe. This was due to the presence of the strongest Communist party of Western Europe. The struggle between two opposite visions of the Italian role in the EastâWest confrontation survived until Berlinguerâs approval to join the Western world, thus reflecting the peculiarity of the Italian political system. It was very difficult that the Communist party, even after successful elections in the 1970s, could rule the country or even enter into a coalition government because of its pro-Soviet position. As a result, the debate on Italian foreign policy was stuck in a sort of ideological trap. This condition hindered the transformation of the debate on foreign policy into a real debate on the policies that Italy should promote on the international scene.
In the late 1970s, Italy entered into a new and more troubled phase of its international life. The destabilization of the Southern flank of the Mediterranean region was not entirely a Cold War problem. The emerging security spillover effects generated by the civil war in Lebanon and, broadly speaking, by the political instability in the MENA region could not be solved by the Western defensive institutions. Italy was alone in facing a number of security concerns but, in the end, the reaction was unexpectedly positive. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, Italy developed its first security capabilities for addressing regional crises. The intervention in the civil war in Lebanon was a positive experience for Italy. The country was successful in operating out of the national territory to restore and maintain peace and stability. In the same years, two main events shook the pacific-led foreign policy of Italy: the Euro missile crisis and the first elections for the European parliament.
As pointed out in the literature, the Italian decision to engage in the Atlantic response to the installation of the medium range Soviet missiles marked a turning point for the international credibility of the country (Nuti 2011). In 1979, the government chaired by Francesco Cossiga adopted the decision (finally implemented in 1983) to install the Cruise missiles in Italy as a countermeasure to the Soviet SS-20. The first election of the European parliament on June 10, 1979 was another important turning point, since for the first time the Italian people vote for a member of the European Parliament. The European elections took place only one week after the national ones. Nevertheless, 86% of the Italian population attended the second event (ISTAT 2015, p. 9)
The national mobilization in the European elections, along with the emergence of a harsh debate on the Euro missile crisis, were signals of an increasing willingness to participate in the public debate on foreign policy. As pointed out by research from the Istituto Affari Internazionali in 1976, thirty years after the end of the World War the main challenge for Italian foreign policy was the enlargement of public support to foreign policy. This mobilization of public opinion was, at the same time, an âopportunityâ and a âfactor of stalemateâ (Walker 1976).
In the political landscape of the First Republic, the Democrazia Cristiana (DCâCristian Democratic Party), which was the majority party and had the leading position in the setting up of the foreign policy, was completely unready to address the debate on foreign policy to a larger audience. The party lacked the structures for both analyzing the main foreign policy issues and to conduct non-ideological campaigns on those specific issues. Moreover, the discussion on foreign policy inside the party was a prerogative of senior leaders, and a broader discussion was not encouraged. On the contrary, leftist parties had solid structures in charge for foreign policy analysis and were still able to influence changes. Almost thirty years after the glorious (and unfortunate) campaign against the ratification of the Atlantic Pact, the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCIâItalian Communist Party) was equipped to engage in a new stage of the public debate.
Despite the charismatic leadership of Berlinguer, the PCI of the late 1970s was suffering from the credibility crisis of Soviet-inspired Communism. The other party of the Italian left, the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSIâItalian Socialist Party), on the contrary, emerged as a new political force and exploited the need for a new foreign policy in order to increase its consensus.
In 1976, the Socialist congress held in Rome at the Midas hotel appointed Benedetto (Bettino) Craxi as its new leader. He was representative of the new political generation coming from the municipality of Milan. Craxi would become the âbridgeâ between the First and the Second Republic. Many scholars see in Craxi and Craxism the precursor and the antecedent of Berlusconi and Berlusconism. For the opponents of Berlusconi, Craxi embodied the same negative path toward a corrupted and already degenerated party system. He was the most prominent leader involved in Tangentopoli, which is the judicial scandal that would bring about the end of the First Republic. This fact led opponents of Berlusconi to argue that the pathologies of Berlusconism were, to some extent, the result of the same pathologies of Craxism. On the other hand, scholars who have a more positive judgment highlighted that Craxi paved the way for the most important innovation introduced by Berlusconi. Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni (2005, p. 95), for instance, pointed out that Craxi was fundamental in changing the approach to leadership in Italy, transforming the Presidente del Consiglio into a modern prime minister. Giovanni Orsina, for his part, underlined that Craxi anticipated the normalization between traditional parties and the Italian right, thus paving the way for the transformation of the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale (ANâNational Alliance) into a governing party in coalition with Berlusconi (Orsina 2013).
An interesting point of contact between Craxi and Berlusconi is precisely in the field of foreign policy. One can even argue that Craxiâs influence on Berlusconi was more radical and relevant in the field of foreign policy than in others because of the innovations introduced. Capitalizing on a decade of scholarship on this topic, four main areas emerge in which Craxi operated significant changes: (1) transatlantic relations; (2) relations with the East; (3) basic values of Italian foreign policy and its constituencies; and (4) Italian role in the Mediterranean.
Craxi led two governments, from August 4, 1983, to April 14, 1987, that shaped the last political decade of the First Republic. He operated within the traditional paradigms of the Cold War, and maintaining the friendship with Washington was the cornerstone of his foreign policies. Nevertheless, Craxi renewed the spirit of the ItalianâAmerican relationship by looking for a third way between the traditional Atlanticism of the DC, on the one hand, and the anti-American mantras of the PCI and the political left, on the other. Scholars often judge Craxiâs approach to transatlantic relations by considering two main decisions taken by his governments. The first was to proceed with the installation of the Pershing missiles. This choice shows the willingness of the Italian leadership to confirm and enforce the commitment within the Atlantic Alliance. According to Sergio Romano, a historian and prominent diplomat of those years, the inclusion of Italy in the missile program stopped the decadence of the Italian position in the Alliance, which had increased during the 1960s and 1970s (Romano 2006). The second decision is related to the so-called Sigonella crisis, an important diplomatic crisis that occurred in 1985. Craxi refused to hand over to the US military the terrorist Abu Abbas, responsible for the hijacking of the Italian ship Achille Lauro and the murder of the US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The decision by the Italian government to resist Ronald Reaganâs muscular and assertive approach proved to be rewarding. After a harsh confrontation between the White House and Palazzo Chigi, Italy gain respect from the US administration as confirmed by the archival documents (Gualtieri 2004).
Craxiâs contribution to transatlantic relations was not limited to the restored commitment and increased assertiveness toward the United States. Craxi understood that the United States was a fundamental ally for addressing the increasing international instability. Craxi believed that the Soviet system was entering into a deep crisis and that this posed a threat both to the West and to the international system (Quagliariello 2006, p. 41). Despite the persisting engagement in the European Community, he believed that European countries were unable to address threats coming from a destabilized East. This is probably the most important part of Craxiâs legacy for transatlantic relations. Even though Craxi and Berlusconi operated in two completely different international political scenarios, the two leaders agreed in according relevance to the pivotal role of the United States in a changing world.
With regard to the East, Craxi changed the way in which Italy approached the Soviet threat in both ideological and geopolitical terms. In line with his Socialist spirit and with the center-left vision of Italian foreign policy, he believed in a close dialogue with the East. In particular, he believed that Eastern Europe was a strategic area for both Italy and Europe. Contrary to the Communists, however, he believed that the place of the Socialists was with the opponents of Soviet Communism. Even before his election as leader of PSI, Craxi believed in the âSocialism with a human faceâ. He was not able to bring back the Italian left toward the European tradition of social democracy. However, Craxi marked an ideological distance from Soviet Communism and the PCI, transforming the PSI into a large collector of moderate votes. In particular, he was able to speak for that liberal area not represented either by the small Partito Liberale Italiano (PLIâItalian Liberal Party) or by the too popular DC.
Since the age of De Gasperi, Craxi was the first leader who proposed a straight anti-Communist paradigm. Understanding Craxiâs anti-Communism is fundamental to explaining Berlusconiâs anti-Communist obsession, which we will discuss later. Despite their exclusion from the governmental sphere, the Communists were able to penetrate the cultural identity of the First Republic. In the public discourse of the 1960s and 1970s, the PCI developed a strong anti-Fascist rhetoric. Between March and July 1960, the monarchists and the right-wing party Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSIâItalian Social Movement) voted their confidence for a DC-led government. This vote raised harsh criticisms by the leftist parties. The following decision of the MSI to organize its national congress in Genoa, a city awarded the gold medal for its participation in the Resistenza, caused mass protests during which a number of people died. Since this so-called Tambroni crisis, the PCI took the leadership of a campaign in support of a renovated resistance (resistenza) against the Fascists and the fascist ideas that were supposed to endanger democratic life. In the years between 1963 (the establishment of the first center-left cabinet chaired by Aldo Moro) and 1978 (the death of Aldo Moro), the PCI emerged as the main counterpart of the political parties in power, and tho...