Constituent Perceptions of Political Representation: How Citizens Evaluate Their Representatives

How Citizens Evaluate their Representatives

R. Lauermann

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781137400437
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Historia y teoría política

This book examines the nature of representation in democracy, focusing specifically on the factors shaping constituent evaluations of the US House Representatives and the resulting implications for government.

1

The Nature of Representation

Abstract: Representation is a central feature of modern democracies. Direct democracy, a classical vision, is not feasible for practical and philosophical reasons. However, there are many conceptions of representative government—descriptive, symbolic, consent, non-functional—none of which adequately captures the essential characteristics of the process. Drawing from strengths found in several conceptions, representation is best captured as a three-stage process: consent, responsiveness and accountability. This conception also allows for independence of representatives, citizen input, expectations of deliberation and repeated elections to provide for more effective decision-making. Member responsiveness is multifaceted—policy, service, allocative, symbolic—and constituent evaluations of these behaviors have been neglected in the literature.

Lauermann, Robin M. Constituent Perceptions of Political Representation: How Citizens Evaluate Their Representatives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. DOI: 10.1057/9781137400437.0005.

Whether the focus of research is the British Parliament, Congress or a state legislature, representation in lawmaking is the central function performed by legislatures (Davidson 1969). In the United States, as intended by our founders who drew inspiration from the writings of John Locke, Congress is the “most representative of our national political institutions” (Fenno 1978, 244). However, as constructed, our constitution was not intended by its Federalist creators to provide for representatives who simply serve as puppets of popular rule, rather they anticipated “that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose” (Madison 1999, 50). Our system is not alone in this regard.

Modern nations that are democratic are predominantly representative democracies rather than direct democracies due to the variety of logistical, technical and intellectual limitations of engaging a large populous in day-to-day decision-making. Schmitter and Karl’s work (1991) illustrates the assumption that representation was essential to modern democracy as it is “... a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (77). Yet this characterization is still a very broad depiction of a very complex process and one which often brings confusion to the layperson, for whom democracy may mean simply “government by the people.”

Democracy without representation

When one thinks about democracy, it is typically in its purest form—direct democracy. The classical form of democracy, often recalled from ancient Greece, is one in which all citizens participate in the decision-making of government. An assembly of citizens would meet frequently and regularly to decide the issues facing the polity. Although this process may seem ideal—everyone able to participate in the decisions affecting their lives—it was less than satisfactory to the tenets of an ideal democracy.

Most accounts of democracy in ancient Greece focus on the direct nature of democratic decision-making there, yet this perspective would provide an incorrect perspective on the inclusiveness and extensiveness of the system. Although all citizens participated in the government, the definition of who was a citizen was limited—white, male and property-holding; those individuals kept as slaves also had no say in the polity. Furthermore, the direct rule of the people occurred in one particular branch of the government, the legislative assemblies. Many executive functions were conducted by individuals selected by lot; this process provided a measure of equality in that everyone who had not served had an equal opportunity of being selected for office. However, there were limits on the number of terms for which anyone could serve, and there were qualification exams that one had to pass in order to serve in office even if selected (Manin 1997).¹ Thus indirect rule occurred, and was not necessarily administered by good leaders. For many reasons, direct democracy is not possible in most modern nations except perhaps at the most local levels, reminiscent of town hall meetings, or a periodic initiative or referendum vote.

The most significant practical reason for instituting representative government is the size of current-day nations. The polity of Athens was much smaller than today’s societies, only 20,000–30,000 people. Currently, our nation has a population of about 300 million, of which at least half of the people are of voting age. Even when our nation first began, we still had approximately 4 million people. James Madison (1999), in Federalist #10, notes that a representative form of government allows for the inclusion of a “greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which a republic may be extended” (50). Practically speaking, in all but the smallest orderings of government, direct democracy is impossible. The advent of computers might provide a technical means to attempt direct democracy; however, there is no guarantee that individuals would take the time to become informed sufficiently to make effective choices. Yet, the size of the current-day polity is not the only problem.

The lack of broad political engagement also provides a more pessimistic view of the way in which our polity might function in a more direct context. In our current system of democracy, voters only need to turn out for election decisions twice a year (general and primary elections). However, since the 1970s, only rarely do we see more than half of the eligible voters turn out to vote (United States Election Project, 2013).² Some might argue that people do not vote because they do not feel they would have an impact on the system—after all, what is one vote out of many millions? The costs of registering and voting, such as taking the time to cast a ballot, can be burdensome for some individuals, but these problems would be present in a direct democracy as well.³ In a system where one votes directly on policy and political decisions, rather than the politicians who choose them, an individual’s vote would still be worth the same. Absent significant changes in levels of political engagement, it is likely that people would not show up in large numbers and the decisions would be left to a small segment of society, one which is not popularly elected and accountable.

Compounding the problems of population size and involvement is the proliferation of issues and concerns that affect modern industrial nations such as the United States. One could make the argument for electronic voting in this current age of computers, yet two significant concerns arise. First, not everyone has access to a computer, especially those of lower socioeconomic status, who have typically been least able to participate in the electoral process. Second, there are so many issues which must be considered by a government—laws on environmental protection, controls on businesses to protect the interests of consumers, crime, health care and others too numerous to mention. Decision-making, with its requisite information gathering, would easily overwhelm citizens’ daily lives.⁴ When you multiply this process by the many levels of government affecting our lives—town, county, state and federal—it becomes evident that there would be time for little else than decision-making. Ultimately, representation makes sense, because it minimizes transaction costs of making collective decisions with which citizens would otherwise be inundated (Diamond 2009).

In addition to practical problems of direct democracy, there have been more philosophical (and cynical) concerns voiced about the caliber of popular decision-making. Our founders and other supporters of a more limited form of democracy, also known as democratic elitism, did not view direct democracy as a practical necessity to ensure that things were decided in the interests of all citizens. People, in their opinion, were largely unqualified to make decisions concerned with the public good, because they were “inherently incompetent” (Bachrach 1980, 2). For some supporters of democratic elitism, democracy was merely a political method, an arrangement for making political decisions (Schumpeter 1976). Elites would acquire power through a competitive struggle for the vote of the people: the ruling class would make the decisions and the people would merely select who they wanted to make the decisions. They distrusted the average citizen, believing the masses would endanger liberty. In this manner, representative government would provide a greater sense of political stability (Mosca 1939).

Other philosophers believed representative government was needed for less drastic reasons. Through popular representation, representatives act as a moderating and deliberating influence on the passions of the people. The representatives serve the public good with their enlightened decision-making. In Federalist #10, Madison (1999) noted that the main difference between democracy (in its direct form) and a republican form of government, other than extending the practical application of government to more people, is the delegation of government to a small body of citizens who are elected by the citizen body as a whole. The effect of this structure is “to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations” (50). That is, a representative body will check the mischiefs of passionate swings in public opinion and moderate the groups or factions which may not see the political actions necessary for the greater good.

Pragmatists and philosophers aside, empirical evidence suggests that technological advances will not necessarily remove the need for political intermediaries to make decisions. David Altman’s (2010) extensive analysis of direct democracy reveals that contemporary attempts at such mechanisms of citizen engagement still harbor an extensive hierarchical character. However, he does acknowledge that although not perfect, they can “serve as an intermittent safety valve against the perverse or unresponsive behavior of representative institutions and politicians” (59). Furthermore, as the purpose of democracy is to extend engagement for the purpose of increasing the nature of its deliberation, not simply the number of voices, technological developments do not universally improve the conditions for democracy (Barber 2000). Thus, representative government is likely to remain unchallenged as a primary means of settling collective decisions, even with the growth of social media in stimulating movements and unrest, witnessed recently in the Middle East, South America and even here at home.

Representation as a decision-making solution

Representative democracy provides a solution for promoting the interest of a large number of uninformed citizens over an enormous number of issues. In systems of representative democracy, individuals are elected (or sometimes appointed) to serve as an agent of the people they represent. The difference between direct democracy and representative government is not that “the few govern in place of the many, but that they are selected by election only” (Manin 1997, 41). Representative institutions are what we “deliberately designed to link public opinion and government” and to serve as the “voice of the people” (Key 1961, 481). The legislative branch is the most obvious embodiment of the representative process, as it is the lawmaking (policy-making) branch of government. But what exactly is representation? Before we are able to study it in an applied context, we must first capture its intent.

Representation is first and foremost a relationship between elected (and even appointed) officials and those whom they serve. But how can we characterize this relationship? Heinz Eulau (1978, 31) has noted that “while we can say what representation is not, we cannot state for certain what it actually is.” This problem is evidenced by a sample of the common conceptualizations of representation that have been offered:

Descriptive representation: “In this assembly, the farmer, merchant, mecanick and other various orders of people, ought to be represented according to their respective weight and numbers; and the representatives ought to be intimately acquainted with the wants, understand the interests of the several orders in the society, and feel a proper sense and becoming zeal to promote their prosperity.” (Brutus 1787, para. 12)

Symbolic representation: “representation which focuses on the ‘activities of political leaders which create charisma, enhance belief, stimulate irrational and affective reactions in the people’ or in other words, is characterized as working on the minds of the people.” (Pitkin 1969, 13)

Representation by consent: “Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.” (Hobbes 1997, 127–128)

Non-functional representation: “any means to promote responsible government.” (Eulau 1978, 42)

Each definition seeks to emphasize a different aspect of representation and none is satisfactory in itself. But by looking at what each definition has and does not have, it may be possible to pull together a better understanding of what political representation is.

Descriptive representation. Supporters of descriptive representation claim that the shared social characteristics of representatives and their constituents most approximate democracy. Why? They believe that those individuals who share economic, gender, racial and other characteristics with those they represent, will then be able to more accurately represent their constituents. In their eyes, if representatives demographically reflect those they represent, then it is as if direct democracy is in effect. The most common example of proponents of descriptive representation in history is the Anti-Federalist movement. The Anti-Federalists, as voiced by Melancton Smith (Ketcham 2003, 336–356), believed that if the legislature were a microcosm of the whole nation, a reflection mirroring the characteristics of the people, then they would likewise mirror the wishes and interests of the people.

However, the part-by-part correspondence of race, gender, occupation or other socioeconomic or political characteristics, as suggested by descriptive representation, does not reveal what representatives should do or what interests they should represent. Descriptive representation is based on the assumption that representatives, who are similarly situated to constituents with respect to their social characteristics, will share the same views—in other words, the representatives’ actions are conducted with respect to their demographic context: socioeconomic background, ethnicity, class, gender, age, religion, occupation, and place of residence (Vogler 1988, 48). Within the African American community, Supreme Court Justice, Clarence Thomas, as well as former diplomat and once-presidential candidate, Alan Keyes, are just two examples of individuals who have subscribed to views different from those of their respective group (as measured by voting patterns and issue groups).

Several logistical problems exist with using descriptive representation as a conceptualization of the representational process. There are a number of combinations of these characteristics that can exist so a representative cannot mirror all characteristics of all constituents—which characteristic should take precedence on an issue in conflict? It is not likely that the institutional body of the legislature will collectively represent the multitude of different people. Not only that; there is always the question of which social characteristics are politically relevant (Pitkin 1969). In Federalist #35, Alexander Hamilton (1999) dismissed the appropriateness of descriptive representation as a standard for the republic, stating that “unless it were expressly provided in the constitution that each different occupation should send one or more members, that thing would never take place in practice” (182). Furthermore, occupation is only one such characteristic by which descriptive representation is measured. If we were to send one or more members from each group characteristic—i.e. race, gender, age, etc.—there would be a legislature of an unmanageable and perhaps even unimaginable size.

Aside from the fact that representatives with the same characteristics as their constituents will not necessarily have the same interests or beliefs, descriptive representation does not say what it is representatives must do to represent. They are representative merely based on their being: their biological and social characteristics. To measure the level of representation, one would simply have to compare the socioeconomic characteristics of the Congress and the people. When that evaluation is empirically done, we see th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  The Nature of Representation
• 2  The Constituent Perspective: Foundations and Formation
• 3  Muddy Waters and Perception of Representative Issue Positions: Constituent Ignorance, Delusion or Rationality
• 4  The Appropriate Response? Components of Constituent Evaluations
• 5  Who Prefers What: The Impact of Identity on Evaluations
• 6  Conclusions: Constituent Evaluations: Linking Member Behavior and Electoral Accountability
• Appendix
• References
• Index