1.1 The Roots of the Revolution
Tunisia achieved an average economic growth rate of 4.75% during the period 1990â2010. Given this relatively good macroeconomic performance, it is legitimate to delve into the roots of the revolution of December 2010âJanuary 2011.
The benefits of the economic growth were not shared across the various regions and social classes. In particular, the Tunisian economy was not able to create sufficient jobs for the youth, to reduce regional disparities and to limit the proliferation of the informal sector. From a political economy perspective, the authoritarian bargain between the regime and the society became gradually more and more fragile. For a long period, the legitimacy of Ben Aliâs regime was based on the economic, social and security gains. However, its legitimacy eroded when the losers began to outnumber the winners (Achy, 2011). Since the early 2000s, the perception of the regime as an immoral authority increased among the population as the result of illegal diversion of goods, corrupted bureaucracy and crony capitalism (Hibou, 2011). The first serious sign of the dictatorshipâs erosion was the revolt in the south mining region of 2008.1 However, the roots of the Tunisian âDignity revolutionâ were not only economic but encompassed a general feeling of indignity and degrading of the collective self-image. According to Hibou (2011), the uprising that followed the self-immolation of the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi (on 17 December 2010), in the inner governorate Sidi Bouzid, was the expression of a social recognition demand fueled by a sense of collective self-respect recovery. The slogan âLabor, Freedom, National Dignityâ expresses clearly the nature of this revolution, which ended the regime of Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. Initially triggered by a few thousands of people (unemployed graduates, young bloggers and Internet surfers), the revolutionary crowds were progressively escalating, especially after the appeals of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), the Lawyersâ Bar, the Association of Tunisian judges, the Tunisian League of Human Rights and other political parties and organizations. Gherib (2012) notes that the compromising relationship between the state and the UGTT exploded during the revolution. He considers that this volte-face resulted from the pressure exercised by the union workers over their elite. Whatever the internal and external factors that contributed to the trigger of the Tunisian revolution, it represents, as noted by Yadh Ben Achour, âa radical change in âmentalitiesâ and in the âcivic spiritââ. This is because it was based on the ideas of liberty and of political pluralism, of the dignity of man and of social justice, and called for the integrity in the administration of public affairs (Ben Achour, 2012).
1.2 The Post-Revolution Political Arena
1.2.1 The Political Scene After the 2011 Elections
By late January 2011, an interim government was formed while the opinion of the Tunisians diverged regarding the democratic transition process. A first current advocated an incremental change strategy. A second opinion defended a rupture with the existing political system and the rebuilding of its institutions. Given the extreme tension at that time, it was fortunate for the country that all the opponent political opinions converged toward the establishment of a political road map under the coordination of the Political Reform Commission headed by Yadh Ben Achour.2 In March 2011, the constitution of 1959 was suspended and a new constitution was expected to be written by a Constituent Assembly to be elected by October 2011. The interim Government organized a national free and fair election of the Constituent Assembly with the participation of approximately 52% of the 8.2 million registered voters. The Islamist party al-Nahdha obtained 1.5 million votes and a relative majority of the seats (41%). It formed a governmental coalition with two secular-oriented parties. A large fraction of the society had a deep suspicion of al-Nahdhaâs credible engagement in the democratic game. It feared that it will âre-orientâ the country toward more conservatism at the expense of womenâs rights (Marks, 2014). Meanwhile, the popularity of al-Nahdha among a large part of the public opinion was due not only to its resistance to the dictatorship but also to its reconciling message between Islam and democracy (Arieff, 2012). Another factor that could explain the victory of the Islamist party is the fact that the elections campaign was deeply focused on the religious question. A large fraction of the population who voted for al-Nahdha feared the âthreatâ of the secularist parties (Ben Achour, 2012). Alexis Arieff notes that the strategy of the secularist parties that consisted in opposing the Islamists may have backfired among the Tunisians hoping for the reconciliation between democracy and their Arab/Muslim identity (Arieff, 2012).
1.2.2 The Difficult Gestation and Adoption of the New Constitution
The new constitution was expected to be developed in one year but was finally adopted on 27 January 2014. The forming process slowed down mainly due to the ideological divide between al-Nahdha and the secularist parties. Ben Achour (2012) notes that the debate revolved around three focal points:
- 1.The relationship between Shariâa and the positive law
- 2.Womenâs rights and gender equality
- 3.The freedom of conscience, of thought and of expression
Tunisians are deeply religious but are also attached to the separation of the political and religious spheres (Dhif, 2015). This explains the origin of the important pressure placed on al-Nahdha by the civil society and the secular parties of the opposition throughout the constitutional drafting process. This pressure has led to compromising on the abovementioned focal points. The protests came also from the Salafist camp, which defended Shariâa as a basis for legislation and undertook violent actions as part of its demonstrations. Regarding the presence of Islam in the constitution, Rached Ghannouchiâleader and co-founder of al-Nahdhaâannounced on 25 March 2012 that the first article of the 1959 constitution was sufficient. The constitution-making process was put at risk after the assassination of two political leaders from the opposition: Chokri BelaĂŻd on 6 February 2013 and the assemblyâs member Mohamed Brahmi on 25 July 2013. During the summer of 2013, the protests against al-Nahdha and the Troika government intensified. This movement paved the way for the quartet3 to initiate a national dialogue in order to accelerate the reaching of a consensus over the political road map and to end the transition period. In recognition to that role the quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015, more precisely âfor its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011â (Nobel Prize Committee4). As a result of this dialogue, al-Nahdha withdrew from the government....