Poverty and Exclusion of Minorities in China and India

A. Bhalla, D. Luo

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781137283535
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: International Business
• Index: Business

Muslim minorities in China and India form only a small fraction of their respective populations, yet as they principally live in troubled border states, they are of key strategic importance in the war on terror. In this global context, this book explores whether economics is more important than the suppression of rights in explaining social unrest.

1

Poverty, Ethnicity and Exclusion

China and India are the two largest and fastest growing developing economies in the world. However, their rapid economic growth has been accompanied by rising income inequality, especially that between regions, and between religious, ethnic and social groups. There are many similarities in terms of economic development and the pattern of income inequality, but few comparative studies have been found in the literature about the welfare of religious and ethnic minorities in these two countries.¹

It is generally believed that minorities in both countries are relatively poorer than the Han majority in China and the Hindu majority in India. Yet, comprehensive and systematic comparative studies on their living conditions, education, health and political status are few and far between. In India, until the prime minister’s High-Level Committee on Muslims was appointed (the Sachar Committee; see GOI, 2006a), there was very little empirical literature on the socio-economic plight of the Muslim religious minority, which accounts for nearly 14 per cent of India’s population and 73 per cent of its minority population. For China, many studies on ethnic minorities exist in both English and Chinese but most are of an anthropological and sociological nature.² Economic studies of ethnic minorities in China are of recent origin. The four volumes edited by Colin Mackerras (2011) on Chinese ethnic minorities deal with the following main themes:

1. Theoretical questions regarding ethnic identity;

2. Historical background to the evolution of ethnic minorities;

3. Questions of politics and policy;

4. Economics and economic development.

In this book, we explore the nature and causes of minority income and non-income poverty in China and India on a comparative basis. Special attention is paid to such issues as religious/ethnic minorities’ access to education and health care. Do the low incomes of minorities limit their access to higher education, which may limit their access to the labour market? What is the extent of their political voice and representation in administrative, political and legislative bodies? We make a China– India comparison of selected minorities (in particular, the Muslims) to determine whether their economic, social and political status differs in the two countries; and, if it does, the explanatory factors. Are affirmative action policies and programmes for minorities introduced by both China and India more effective in one country than in the other? We shall also examine the international dimension of social unrest among minorities in China (for example, in Tibet and Xinjiang) and in India (the Muslims in Kashmir).

We discuss whether the backwardness of minorities in China and India is due to ethnic, religious and cultural factors. Are extreme poverty and low incomes responsible for their backwardness? The Chinese government has attributed their backwardness to cultural and ethnic factors.³ It argues that minorities are primitive and tradition-bound, which retards their progress. We examine whether this claim is valid. Are the Han better-educated and more prosperous (enjoying a higher per capita income) than ethnic minority people? Are the minority autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Tibet, Guangxi, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia) and other provinces with large minority populations poorer than the Han-dominated regions/provinces? Is social and political unrest among minorities in China and India due more to economic factors (for example, acute absolute poverty, widening income gaps, lack of jobs, social alienation) than to lack of religious and cultural freedom and political autonomy? Is unrest among minorities in the two countries triggered by external factors (instigated, for example, by terrorists from Pakistan in India, and from Chechnya and Central Asia in China) rather than internal factors? We begin our discussion with an analysis of the interrelationships between religion, ethnicity and caste.

Ethnicity, religion and caste

People enjoy many different identities. Ethnicity can mean different things to different people. As we shall discuss in subsequent chapters, ethnic identity and consciousness may be based on religion, caste (especially in India), language, ethnicity and gender. Thus, it is a multi-faceted concept.

There is individual identity and group identity. Our concern in this book is mainly with the group identities of minorities and disadvantaged social groups. Some identities are only temporary (for example, membership of associations); others are of a more permanent nature (religious or ethnic identity).

Ethnicity and religion

Ethnicity and the term ‘ethnic’ are defined in a narrow sense as pertaining to common race and language. In a broader sense, they may refer to group identities based on race, religion, caste, language and tribe. In India, religion and caste are the two most important factors defining ethnicity. On the other hand, in China, which is much less diverse and more homogeneous ethnically and linguistically, caste is not relevant and religion (with the exception of the Uygur and Tibetans) is not all that important. The term ‘ethnic’ is not used in India; instead, the term ‘communal’ is used to express ethnic tensions between Hindus and Muslims (majority–minority conflict) (Varshney, 2002, p. 4). On the other hand, the term ‘ethnic minority or nationality’ has been in vogue in China since the Revolution of 1949.

In much of the existing literature (see, for example, Stewart, 2008b), religious and ethnic identities are used interchangeably as if they were one and the same thing. However, distinctions can be made between the two (Stewart, 2009). Religion may invoke/expect stronger loyalty among its believers than ethnic loyalty based on such secular considerations as language, culture and history. With growing Islamophobia in the West, the religious loyalty of Muslims (but also of others practising different religions) is becoming stronger. It is hard to believe that the religious fervour of, say, Catholics (in Northern Ireland, for example) and Jews in Israel, is any less strong than that of Muslims fighting for a cause they think is divinely ordained.

There may be overlaps between religious and ethnic identities, and the two may reinforce each other. There are competing demands for group loyalty among different affiliations: religion, ethnicity and caste, for example. This is clearly the case in India. Different affiliations intermingle in the social and political fabric of Indian society.

Several situations are plausible. In a highly diverse and heterogeneous society such as that of India, no single group is likely to dominate. Therefore, discrimination against any particular group may be considered unlikely, especially if the groups are widely dispersed over a vast territory. Collier (2001) argues that, in a fragmented society, different ethnic groups may neutralize each other’s power and thus prevent the dominance of a particular group. But ‘dominance’ and ‘fractionalization’ may not be independent of each other and the precise outcome may turn out to be more complex. In China, a concentration of ethnic minorities (55 such minorities are officially recognized) in the south-west region does not lead to their domination over the Han majority (see Chapter 2). In India, the Muslim minority is more dispersed, which suggests that it is unlikely to dominate the Hindu majority despite its large absolute size. On the other hand, the Sikh minority concentrated in the northern state of Punjab is much more dominant both economically and politically even though its overall size is much smaller than that of the Muslim minority in India.

Collier (1999) argues that heterogeneous and fractionalized societies are more prone to civil strife and violence than homogeneous ones. However, his argument does not necessarily hold in either China or India. Ethnically, China is a lot more homogeneous than India. Yet, ethnic conflicts do occur there. These conflicts between minorities and the majority population, in both China and India (as well as in the rest of the world), may have different underlying causes: religion, race, language and sectarianism (e.g. Shia–Sunni conflicts among Muslims). These ethnic, religious, sectarian and class conflicts are distinct but interrelated (Varshney, 2002).

According to the Constitution, India is a secular state where any religion is free to flourish and prosper. As we discuss in Chapter 2, many different religions are practised in India. The country’s religious diversity made it essential to opt for a plural and secular society where the state offers equal and fair treatment to different religious communities. However, the goal of a peaceful and harmonious society through secularism has not been fully achieved. As we discuss in Chapters 6 and 8, religious (or communal) violence between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs does occur from time to time, even though it is generally localized.

In practice, India’s secular credentials have been attacked on several fronts. Many observers describe India as a predominantly Hindu country (Hindus constitute over 80 per cent of its population) compared with Pakistan, which is an Islamic state. Others complain that Muslims are not well-integrated with other Indian communities (Sen, 1996).⁴

This book focuses on the Muslims, a significant religious minority. Indian minorities also include the deprived social groups; namely, the scheduled castes and tribes (SCs/STs) and other backward classes (OBCs), discussed in detail in Chapter 2. These groups are included because their economic and social situation is very similar to that of Muslims although they form part of the majority Hindu community. This anomalous situation has historical roots in India’s caste hierarchy under which, for centuries, the upper-caste Hindus committed atrocities against dalits and untouchables who are far more numerous than the Muslims. SCs account for 15 per cent of India’s population, and STs 8 per cent. The OBCs are estimated to form about 32 per cent of the population although there is some controversy about their exact share.⁵

In China, the Uygur and Hui, two Muslim minorities, provide a contrast between two groups with the same religion but two different ethnic identities. The Uygur, who live mostly in Xinjiang (see Chapters 6 and 8), are much more fundamentalist in their religious identity than the Hui, who are more fluent in Mandarin than their own language (which has practically disappeared) and are well-assimilated into Chinese culture. The Hui are very dispersed and do not have a contiguous territory of their own, which the Uygur do have. They do not feel marginalized, whereas the Uygur do.⁶ The latter are, therefore, prepared to mobilize and die for their cause, whereas the Hui do not feel the need to do so, even though they are also Muslims.

Some would like to believe that globalization, modernization, and developments in science, technology and education weaken religious beliefs. However, the growth of fundamentalism in different religions in recent years points us in a different direction. Another view is that cultural norms and passions about one’s language and cultural heritage are likely to become less strong with the spread of education and globalization. The facts on the ground, increasing localization within the process of globalization, also run counter to this popular belief (see Chapter 8).

For a study of minorities in China and India, we need to bear in mind the distinction between religious and ethnic identities. In India, religion and caste are the driving forces for group identity. On the other hand, in China it is mainly ethnicity and culture. However, this is not to suggest that religion has no role to play in China. Both the Uygur in Xinjiang, and the Tibetans in Tibet and neighbouring provinces, are mobilized along religious and cultural lines, as we shall discuss in Chapters 6 to 8. Both are fighting for their religious, cultural and linguistic rights.

Ethnicity, caste and class

In India, caste, religion and ethnicity overlap. Groups mobilize around a rallying cause, be it economic, social or political exclusion. For centuries, the upper-caste Hindus have exploited the SCs (dalits) and STs. These groups have successfully fought for their voices to be heard. They have agitated for positive discrimination or affirmative action. The increasing political awareness of the dalits has enabled them to seize political power in Uttar Pradesh (UP), the most populous Indian state. They have displaced the traditional high-caste Hindu Brahmins who dominate the two main political parties (Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)) which ruled the state in the past. This is no small feat in a caste-ridden society. The success of dalits in UP may be explained by greater awareness of their political rights, a charismatic leader, and the growing importance of caste associations and other social movements.⁷

Despite the dalits’ success their social and economic position remains vulnerable. Caste is closely intertwined with economics and politics. The upper-caste Hindus enjoy high incomes, as well as political and social clout, and privileged access to higher education, and other goods and services. In rural India, the ownership of such assets as land is concentrated in the hands of upper-caste landowners. The dalits and other deprived social groups are invariably landless, and are engaged in such low-paid and demeaning jobs as the collection of human excrement and handling of animal carcasses.

The Indian caste system classifies society into four castes: Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants), and Sudras (labourers and artisans). This caste-based occupational classification excludes a large chunk of the population, the so-called ‘untouchables’ (dalits) or outcasts, who are too low to be included. Any contact with the outcasts is considered pollution of the upper-caste Hindus. The caste hierarchy continues to be practised in India despite the organization of caste associations and affirmative action (see Chapter 2).

Caste has been politicized by both the major Indian political parties, Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party, which are dominated by upper-caste Hindus. This is not surprising since the scheduled castes/tribes, including OBCs,...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Figures and Map
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Poverty, Ethnicity and Exclusion
• 2. Minorities in China and India
• 3. Poverty Incidence among Minorities
• 4. Inequalities and Access
• 5. Minority Migrants
• 6. Jammu and Kashmir (India) and Xinjiang (China)
• 7. Minority Inclusion and Welfare
• 8. Minorities in a Global Perspective
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Author Index
• Subject Index