Rationale and Justification
As at the last count, before the better coordinated onslaught of the military beginning in 2015, Boko Haram1 in addition to the well-known presence in Maiduguri and Gwoza in Borno state had made inroads into several local government areas (LGAs) in the state such as Magumeri, Gubio, Abadam, Monguno, Nganzai, Kaza, Marte, Kukawa and Mobbar. In other words, until the better coordinated response of the Nigerian armed forces starting from mid-2015, Boko Haram had spread its tentacles across a large area of Borno and swathes of territory in other areas of the Northeast and beyond, including massive presence in Yobe, Adamawa and Bauchi states and significant tentacles in Gombe, Kaduna and Kano states. Boko Haram, apart from over 20,000 estimated deaths and far-reaching humanitarian crisis approximating that occasioned by the Nigerian civil war, has become the most daunting challenge to Nigeriaâs nationhood and development in the last decade. However, Nigeria is not in any sense a stranger to the mayhem of religious fundamentalist sects especially in the predominantly Muslim North of the country.
Nigeria has been confronted by other Islamic fundamentalist sects including the Maitatsine, the Izala Movement and even the Shia-inspired Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN ). While Izala has limited its fundamentalism to interpretation and practice of the religion, the other two, especially the Maitatsine, had unleashed violence as a tool of propagating its beliefs. Boko Haram, while resembling earlier sects, also embodies new dimensions and trajectories in Islamic fundamentalism in modern-day Nigeria. Thus, Boko Haram deserves a thoroughgoing examination both as a radical or fundamentalist sect and perhaps as an organization embodying the aspirational frustrations of the younger generations of Nigerians in the Northeast. To this end, the sect portends something new and innovative.
In this book, I proceed with the assumption that Boko Haram typifies an innovative approach to Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria and argue that the ultimate transformation of the sect into a terrorist group after 2009 was engendered mainly by two factors, namely, the stateâs initial high-handed and extra-judicial approach and the increasing misery of the populace in the Northeast that called forth the need for a counter-narrative and imagery of the state in Nigeria. The approach of the government and its agencies in dealing with the perceived threat of Boko Haram in 2009 laid the groundwork for the emergence of the sect from the rubrics as a terrorist group. In addition, while socio-economic deprivation may not sufficiently explain the emergence and growth of Boko Haram, there is no gainsaying the fact that the increasing misery among the populace especially young people created the objective condition for the popularity of Boko Haram in the Northeast. A popularity that eventually waned not by the might of the state but by the recourse of Boko Haram to internal implosion of the Islamic population through its principle of âtakfarismâ starting from 2013 to 2014.
Boko Haram is a complex organization with shadowy credentials that have privileged many credible narratives in the last five years. Even with the discounting of some of the obviously frivolous, romanticist and imponderable discourse of the sect, there is still a wide difference in the narratives that have considerable traction. While the differences in narratives can be related to both divergence in interpretations and variance in understanding the background factors behind the insurgence, there is also the glaring inability to separate rumours and popular side stories from the facts.
However, any thoroughgoing analysis of Boko Haram must appreciate the influence of such factors as the antecedent and immediate nature of the Northeast society, nature of the state and governance in Nigeria, the undeniable amenability of the environment to sectarianism, varying interpretations of both the Qurâan and Hadiths even within mainstream Islam and the Messiah complex (which can be generalized for all Nigerians irrespective of faith) in the making of Boko Haram. Therefore, as has been argued, in examining the sect one must look not only beyond its immediate emergence or formation, âbut also at the complex history of Nigeria, Islam in West Africa and the deep corruption that has robbed the continentâs biggest oil producer, largest economy and most populous nation of even basic development, keeping the majority of its people agonizingly poorâ (Smith 2016: 3). Boko Haram may reflect something more than mere radical pursuit of religious edification. Thus, âthe fight against Boko Haram is not just a fight between jihadi militants and the military. It is a conflict over Nigeriaâs very identity. At question is this: is Nigeria a secular state, governed by what we recognize as the aged principles of the rule of law, or has Boko Haram exposed it as something else?â (Walker 2016: 219).
There is no gainsaying that a lot of what has been written about Boko Haram has been overtly laced with old stereotypes regarding Nigeria and an overwhelming statist approach. While some of these accounts provide useful insights and those from official US organs even profit from an acknowledged long engagement with terrorism, they are really broad sweeping approaches to the issue. For instance, while one identifies with the influence of economic privation and state corruption in the insurgence, these are general characteristics of the Nigerian society and can be validly framed as impediments faced by both old and young people in all corners of Nigeria. Therefore, these are critical intervening variables but are not fundamental to the Boko Haram problem. Socio-economic factors are really crucial mainly in terms of explaining how and why groups like Boko Haram can attract and perhaps retain followers, but they do not satisfactorily explain why Nigeria is conducive to the production of the likes of Maitatsine, Yusuf, Shekau, al-Barnawi and so on.
Apart from a burning desire to contribute to the academic debate on extremism and Islamic fundamentalism, this book is also driven by the need to inform policies and actions at targeting the eradication of extremism in Nigeria. The book aims at offering a nuanced and evidence-based understanding of the dynamics of religious extremism in Nigeria and how the ideology of extremist sects like Boko Haram feed into socio-economic marginalization, political exclusion and corruption prevalent in Nigeria.
The information for the book, apart from extant literature and documentary data, was derived from a survey conducted between March and August 2016 in Borno state. The lull in Boko Haram activities between late 2015 and 2016 as a result of reinforced and more coordinated military action made it possible for a survey in the Boko Haram main theatre of Borno state. It was possible to be physically present in Gwoza and Maiduguri for long periods to conduct surveysâinterviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). The above provided profound insights into the perception and lived experiences of people affected by the insurgence and first-hand insider view of Boko Haram by âsuspectedâ Boko Haram members2 and sympathizers.3
Brief on Methodology
Sample and Sampling Method
The study depended on information gathered from a total of 92 respondents (i.e. 48 from Gwoza and 44 from Maiduguri including 12 FGD participants in each of these two LGAs in the state). The respondents were selected using a combination of the snowball and purposive methods. While the snowball approach was used in selecting respondents for interviews, the purposive sampling method was utilized in selecting respondents for the FGDs based on the criteria of willingness to participate, knowledge and exposure to Boko Haram activities and over five years of residence in the concerned LGA. It is important to point out here that the FGDs would have been impossible without the help of local facilitators who were recruited in the f...