This book has its origins in a dilemma about the role and purpose of Human Rights that I have struggled with over a number of years and then developed into a book project. It was my intuition that not only Human Rights, but international normative principles more broadly that have been developed within a Western context, are imposed by those in power ignoring the value and necessity for just and fair cross-cultural dialogue in the development of these idealised statements. That human rights may not, in fact, take into account the values and principles of all human communities. This led me to question, on what basis can discussions of international principles take place; on what basis can just and fair dialogues between cultural groups occur; is there a universally relevant shared starting point? As such, do universal foundational principles exist, viewed to be relevant and important across cultural boundaries that, if respected, could form the foundations of just and fair dialogues?
It is on the basis of this enquiry that this book finds its starting point. Its role is to ask whether foundational principles exist, shared by us all, from which meaningful and just cross-cultural dialogue can take place to establish international principles of conduct, interactions, and law. The aim of this project is to offer a possible and viable response to the concerns surrounding the homogenising nature of universalism, and the often imperialist justifications underlying it, in cases of international principle formation and application. Cross-cultural engagements are often criticised for paying either too great or too little heed to issues of cultural difference; the intention behind what follows is to suggest a shared foundational position from which these discussions can take place in a way that respects both cultural difference and universal shared foundations. As will become clear as the book progressesâa sense of weak universalism that has relevance across borders.
In making these arguments it is important firstly to justify why a project such as this holds importance to contemporary discussions of international political theory, and the contribution this makes to our broader understanding of political interactions. In an ever more transient and multicultural world the need for an underpinning universal morality to guide discussions of humanitarianism, border passage, and intervention holds an ever-growing relevance, yet an equal requirement to respect the very relevant differences that exist between the ethical decision-making processes and practices of cultural groups also holds prevalence. When engaging with the question of personal and impersonal standpoints in political theory and ethics in 1987 Thomas Nagel made the following important observation:
Ethics always has to deal with the conflict between the personal stand-point of the individual and some requirement of impartiality. The personal standpoint will bring in motives derived not only from the individualâs interests but also from his attachments and commitments to people, projects, and particular things. The requirement of impartiality can take various forms, but it usually involves treating or counting everyone equally in some respect (Nagel, 1987, p. 215).
This observation holds true not only in terms of individual ethical decision-making, the need to overcome the liberal dilemma between holding true to oneâs personal beliefs whilst also respecting the rights of others to have different values, but also in discussions of international relations and the formation of internationally applied principles and laws. On what basis should international actors, embodied within a stand point influenced by attachments to their own history and culture engage in impersonal discussions able to establish principles holding universal relevance? The role of this book is to offer one potential response to this dilemma of whether there is a role for a universal conception of morality in guiding and establishing cross-cultural dialogues that could then be utilised to establish acts of humanitarianism and intervention. In doing so it argues that underpinning empirical discussions of intervention and humanitarianism is philosophical debate focusing on the ability of culturally diverse individuals to come together and engage in dialogue. It is that philosophical debate which will be played out in what follows, and that philosophical debate that can then find application in better understanding the foundations of international relations and dialogues.
1.1 Setting the Terms of Discussion
Before developing these claims a number of key propositions must first be clarified, not leastâwhat is meant by the term foundation, and what role does political theory, particularly comparative political theory, play in understanding questions of universalism. In responding to these key questions, and in preparing the groundwork for this project, I rely on the arguments of Andrew Vincent (2007) and Fred Dallmayr (2010) to better understand the term foundation as well as the role political theory has to play in these broader international debates.
A foundational principle refers to, âsome class of statements or propositions, which are favoured absolutely over others. To be foundational , this class of statements is regarded as âfundamentalâââfundamentalâ implying that its possessors cannot avoid deferring or referring back to itâ (Vincent, 2007, p. 3). A common factor underpinning all other discussions and which forms the basis for any further investigation. In this particular case a firm principle that has relevance universally which, when respected, can form the basis for just and fair dialogue.
In line with Fred Dallmayr I see that the âpoint of comparative political theory (or cross-cultural studies) ⊠is precisely to move in the direction of a more genuine universalismâ (Dallmayr, 2010, p. 15). Rather than imposing universal principles from above a better approach to understanding potentially shared conceptions of morality and ethics is to investigate the theoretical writings of different cultures and the foundations on which they are based. It is just this approach which informs the methodology of this book. I recognise that âshared meanings and practicesâto the extent that this is possibleâcan only arise from the lateral interaction, negotiation, and contestation among different, historically grown cultural frameworksâ (Dallmayr, 2010, p. 7); to understand whether foundational principles, or shared traits, exist, we must engage in a process of interaction and contestation between theoretically and culturally diverse perspectives. To understand where similarities lie we canât simply rely on assumptions and hypotheses but must, instead, rely on interactions and investigations of the lived experiences of those outside of your own.
1.2 Sketching Out the Project
To facilitate this investigation the book takes as its starting point the Kantian framework of internal and external self -law giving, suggesting that this definition of right and autonomy has the potential to hold universal relevance if it is understood to have applications within different political and cultural environments. In doing so I seek to establish firstly what this framework would look like and secondly whether it is relevant to understanding the foundations of thought within the work of a number of African political theorists from the 1940s to the current day. The intention behind this is to assess whether, within the work of these scholars, there exist ideas equal to, or sharing foundations with, the Kantian model of self-law giving. Through carrying out this investigation the project is then able to make claims towards the relevance of these principles outside of the Kantian framework in which they were developed and suggest their relevance as universal foundational principles that can establish the groundwork for just and fair cross-cultural dialogue: that through âinteractions and contestationsâ (Dallmayr, 2010) we can make more informed claims about the relevance of these ideas within different contexts.
In making this claim the intention is not to imply that the two principles will be similarly substantiated within the different contexts, but rather that they are metaphysical points around which debates exist and can occur, both within different cultural groups and between distinct cultural or political groups. I accept that the concept of individual choiceâor internal self -law giving (to take just one example)âmay be recognised differently by diverse groups, cultures, or individuals. However, underpinning each of these decisions and discussions, the book argues, may well be a guiding principle valuing individual choice. Similarly, I recognise that in writing this book I am relying on the scholarship of a figure whose views on culture, race, imperialism, and women have been shown to be abhorrent. Whilst some scholars view this as a reason to exclude a Kantian model of autonomy from application in other settings I borrow from Mosserâs (1999) work on Kantian feminism in recognising that the insightful elements of his thinking can be âretained and utilised, without committing us to some of the indefensible positions Kant heldâ (Mosser, 1999, p. ...