This book asserts that the Belgian army was unsuccessful in its attempts to foster a unified national identity in a linguistically, culturally, and politically fractured society. The underlying reason for this was the unwarranted interference of party politics, which was too subservient to its small but powerful electorate that valued local and personal interests above those of the nation at large. A deep-rooted antimilitarism pervaded society at all levels, restricting the influence that the army could exert. In failing to overcome this aversion to a life under arms, and in many cases neglecting those forced to undertake service through the ballot, greater civilâmilitary fissures appeared over the course of the nineteenth century. Similarly, the army found itself at the centre of a number of ostensibly social debates and contributed, in some respect, to the perpetuation of regional (linguistic), political, and cultural isolationism. The stoic way the army countered the German invasion in 1914 demonstrated a more complicated association between individuals and the concept of the nation. Despite the many obstacles, the vast majority of men from across the country found the resolve to defend independence through parallel (and sometimes competing) Belgian identities that were firmly rooted in parochialism.
The establishment of Belgian nationality has proven to be a difficult task for historians seeking to understand the dynamics behind the 1830 Revolution. Traditional views have focussed on the exploits of the Middle Ages as a starting point for the development of a national sentiment, which ran alongside a long-established military tradition.1 This was, of course, very important given the regionâs centrality to the wars of Europe. Resistance against the foreign occupier was a simple refrain for those desiring to uncover the roots of a common identity. The Brabant uprising against Austrian rule in 1789â1790 was a localised demonstration of this at the dawn of the age of nationalism, although it was the Revolution against Dutch rule in 1830 that historians have used as the genesis of the wider nation. Charles Terlinden, for example, argued that the Revolution of 1830 would not have succeeded without the persistence of a national consciousness among the masses, whose use of a tricolour as a symbol of unification ought not to go unnoticed.2 This was corroborated by Ămile Wanty in his seminal work on the Belgian Army; in it he noted the centrifugal force of the Brussels barricades in drawing together the revolutionary militias being raised ad hoc around the country. In total 80 communes were represented in the engagements in and around the capital.3
The importance of local aspects in the Revolution, and the subsequent establishment of a national identity , was highlighted in a colloquium on Belgian military history in Brussels in 1980. A variety of contributors examined the individual roles of Bruges , LiĂšge , Ghent , Tournai , Brussels , and Antwerp in the struggle against Dutch forces as well as the interrelationship between them. It demonstrated the belief that the success of the Revolution was the sum of its constituent parts, which invoked the concept of a wider, all-encompassing, national movement.4 Yet, while drawing out cultural and religious commonalities that were diametrically opposed to Dutch rule, the local approach actually also demonstrated how unique responses to the Revolution were. Similar remarks can be made regarding the social groupings of the nation, whose motivations for participating, to a greater or lesser degree, varied according to circumstance.
In 2005 Els Witte contended that the only unifying factor among these disparate elements of the population was economic. By the late 1820s, the South Netherlands (i.e., Belgium) was being exploited as part of a protectionist policy defending the interests of the northern Protestants. The southern, largely Catholic , population contributed to 50% of the national debt despite being responsible for only 20% of itâa situation that affected all tiers of society. Only when faced with an economic crisis in 1829â1830, which resulted in high unemployment among artisans and labourers, were the conditions for revolution achieved. Other contributing factors, such as William Iâs decision to bring education under State control, much to the chagrin of the Catholic Clergy, similarly incited agitation, though not to the extent of provoking a wide-scale reaction.5 The concept of the nation-state requires society to come together on certain principles and accept the Stateâs power and control. The building of Belgium was on a politico-ideological basis of liberalism that opposed despotic rule. Only through extensive dissemination of journalistic critiques under the specific circumstances that were present in 1830 was a political consciousness mobilised across social and geographical divides. This demonstrated how nationalism was not a vital ingredient in the development of the liberal Belgian State, which Witte argues still lacked a unified identity beyond the 1830s.6
Theoretical works on the study of nationalism have tended to emphasise the fluidity in the formation of, and association with, an identity . Marnix Beyen and Maarten Van Ginderachter note that â[i]dentification is not a zero-sum game where one identity supplants the otherâ, rather that numerous, and often competing strands, allow individuals to identify with various groups at different times depending on the specific circumstances. The example used is that of Galicia where individuals considered themselves âGermanâ in opposition to, for example, their Czech coinhabitants, but otherwise professed profound regional ties that remained indifferent to strong nationalist pressure groups.7 Similar trends can be observed in Belgium, where entrenched regionalism prevailed despite elite-led, State-driven attempts at constructing nationality through vehicles such as language . This was partly because the masses did not identify solely with these constructions, rather transforming, appropriating, or inverting them to form their own concept of the nation.8
In many ways, the Flemish sub-nation that emerged in Belgium reflected the model of ethnonationalism, which valued ânaturalâ communities based on race, biology, common descent, language, and culture. This was opposed to the civic-nationalism espoused by the State that encouraged citizens to choose to be a part of a nation based on a shared system of beliefs.9 Given the diversity of the population and its motivations during the 1830 Revolution, it cannot be considered âethnicâ and required a move toward âcivicâ factors in the aftermath to construct a unified national identity. As Van Ginderachter argues, however, no individual falls fully into one category.10 Therefore the mĂ©lange between the two poles can go some way to explaining why regional and national identities continued to clash in Belgium from independence to the Great War, and why the State felt continuously bound to promote âcivicâ values that would draw the nation together.
In language and the army, the State believed it had a ready -made conveyance for nationalism. Following the idea of the French Revolutionary armies, the ability to inculcate a large cross-section of the nationâs youth with shared experiences, education, and values while under arms, and being commanded in a single language, was seen as the best method of breaking regional bonds in favour of a national identity.11 The idea that the army, through its system of national recruitment , was a âmelting-potâ from which a greater homogeneity might emerge, formed the basis of an article by Richard Boijen. In it, he established that a process of âFrenchificationâ characterised the early years to the point where Flemings, in both civilian and military life, accepted the position as second-rate citizens.12 This was despite their proportion of the population out-numbering Walloniaâs by two-to-one. It demonstrated an early degree of success in civic-nationalism, but was undermined by the awakening of the Flemish movement in the 1850s, which took on a much more aggressive ethnolinguistic character that grew in prominence over the course of the nineteenth century and that continues to this day.13
Other countries faced similar difficulties in the relationship between their armies and societies. As John Gooch and Douglas Porch have pointed out in their respective studies of the Italian and French armies, one way in which the authorities maintained the status quo in their favour during the nineteenth century was to utilise the citizen army as a tool to educate and transform societyâeven going as far as using it as the building block for a nation-state. For example, the countering of regional factionalism was at the heart of Manfredo Fanti âs failed drive to foster a sense of ItalianitĂ into the newly formed Italian nation in the 1860s.14 In France , by contrast, conscription and the idea of a nation-in-arms largely succeeded in forging national unity, bringing together men from various regions and social backgrounds. This, coupled with the ritualistic call up of successive conscript classes, solidified the respect for civic duty and the...