The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in the Western Balkans

Gianluca Passarelli

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9783319973517
• eBook ISBN:
  9783319973524
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the process of presidentialisation of political parties in the Western Balkans. The Western Balkan countries deserve to be analysed in a comparative perspective due to their distinctive features in terms of processes of democratization, forms of government and institutional assets, the presence of social cleavages (religious, linguistic, ethnic), and, of course, the nature of political parties which differs from other European cases, especially in terms of origins, organization and structure. However, Western Balkan political parties do show certain similarities with other West European cases where power is centralised and held by the parties' leadership. The book ultimately attempts to test whether and to what extent the influence of institutional variables affects the level of presidentialisation of political parties, also considering the parties' organization features.   

© The Author(s) 2019

Gianluca Passarelli (ed.)The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in the Western Balkanshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97352-4_6

Begin Abstract

The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Montenegro: A Limited Semi-presidentialism

Zlatko Vujović¹ and Nikoleta Tomović²

(1)

University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia

(2)

University of Donja Gorica, Podgorica, Montenegro

End Abstract

1 Introduction

Even though Montenegro represents a semi-presidential political system with the president possessing weak power, political parties in Montenegro are under strong influence of the process of their presidentialisation. The presidentialisation of political parties does not represent only a direct product of institutional influence on the political system, as Montenegro has never had a presidential system.¹ Montenegro’s semi-presidential system is closest to the president-parliamentary type. Analysing the statutes of six dominant political parties, it is evident that “the power of presidents of political parties in Montenegro is very important” (Vujović and Tomović 2015: 177). The strong power of presidents to appoint the members of relevant party executive bodies and party members who are candidates for holding positions in the Parliament, as well as in the government, is noticeable. Party presidents in most Montenegrin parties control decision-making processes within the party. Aside from prerogatives which originate from the party’s statutes, party leaders possess significant power through informal methods of influence.

The analysis of the statutes of six political parties reveals that none of them can be assessed as full democracy examples, as long as party presidents hold significant power. Party presidents are dominant figures, which is why intra-party disagreements usually lead to the creation of new parties.

In this chapter, we analyse the impact of two variables on the process of presidentialisation of political parties in Montenegro: (1) constitutional structure (constitutional constraints) and (2) the impact of a party’s genetic. We will argue that party presidentialisation is possible even in the cases where the constitutional constraints are not very influential, thanks to the increased impact of the party’s origin.

The long domination of the transformed Communist Party, the lack of institutionalisation of the party system, a high degree of volatility within the electorate opposed to government, along with the absence of intra-party democratisation processes, work in favour of the political parties’ presidentialisation trend in Montenegro. The dominant DPS is founded on the strongly designed position of the party President, whilst other parties mimic its model, and some of them even go significantly further (SDP, SNP), granting greater powers to their presidents than those held by the DPS President.

2 Constitutional Structures and Party Presidentialisation in Montenegro

In its modern history, since 1990 Montenegro has had two Constitutions. The Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, adopted in 1992, was the constitution of one of the two federal units of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The same constitution was in force even when the FRY transformed into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. The second Constitution was adopted in 2007, one year after Montenegro restored its independence. Both Constitutions defined Montenegro as a democracy with a parliamentary power system. The executive power is shared by the President and the government. The presidents have a limited scope of powers even though they are directly elected. The power is concentrated in the hands of the government, i.e. the Prime Minister. The President of the state does not have authority to dissolve the parliament unilaterally, except in the case of parliament previously shortening its term. The government carries out all of the country’s internal and external policies. The Constitution recognises that the executive is represented by the government of Montenegro.

The Montenegrin Constitution gives the President the authority to “command the armed forces” but solely “based on the decisions of the Defense and Security Council”—the collective supreme command, which significantly limits and relativises the President’s role. The President coordinates the activities of the collective supreme command—the Defense and Security Council. This three-member body, made up of the President of the state, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament, makes decisions on command of the armed forces and is solely authorised to declare a state of emergency. In this respect, the Head of State and the President of the Parliament within a limited scope and in a specific area participate in a certain way in the exercise of executive power. The President of the state proposes a candidate for Prime Minister position who should obtain majority support for himself and his/her cabinet in the Parliament. This authority can give the President a special place in a situation where there is no clear winner of elections.

The Montenegrin Constitution does not prescribe that the President remain politically neutral. In practice, it is evident that all three Montenegrin post-Communist presidents retained their party functions (as President or Vice-President) and were active participants in political life. The newly elected Montenegrin President, Milo Djukanović, is the President of the DPS.

During the first (1990–1997) of the two democratic transitions (Darmanović 2015: 17), the absolute power of the DPS was still unique at that time, and the party President held the position of the State President. The second round of the presidential elections in 1997 included the then-President of Montenegro, Momir Bulatović, a former DPS President who had just lost his majority within the DPS, and the Prime Minister, who took control of the DPS, although he was not its President. The winner of t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in the Western Balkans
• The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Croatia: Institutional Change Matters
• The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Serbia: Influence of Direct Elected President
• The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Mitigated Presidentialism
• The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Macedonia: The Role of Ethnics
• The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Montenegro: A Limited Semi-presidentialism
• The Presidentialisation of Parties in Slovenia: Leaders and Parties
• The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Albania: Parliamentary Constraints
• The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Kosovo: Institutional Limits
• Back Matter