I
No serious study on the problematic of individual and individuality in modern Chinese literature can dismiss Jaroslav PrĆŻĆĄekâs pivotal essay in this regard, i.e., âSubjectivism and Individualism in Modern Chinese Literatureâ (1957). In this essay, PrĆŻĆĄek takes the emergence of representations of individuality to be characteristic of modern Chinese literature. By âsubjectivism and individualism,â PrĆŻĆĄek refers to âan emphasis on the creatorâs personality in art and a concentration of attention on the artistâs own life,â so that the artwork âdoes not document objective reality but rather reflects the authorâs inner life and comprises descriptions of analysis of his own feelings, moods, visions and even dreams.â
1 Through a socio-political reading, PrĆŻĆĄek draws the following conclusion, which is not unfamiliar to Chinese Marxistsâ historical understanding of modern Chinese literature:
In my view, the growth of these features in the literature of a given period may serve as an important indication of certain changes in the social structure in which it arises and is not seldom the sign of the individualâs emancipation from traditional views in the sphere of philosophy, religion or ethics, or even of actual revolt against the inherited social order. In the case of Chinese literature of the period referred to above, I should say that the measure of these features is one of the symptoms of the emancipation of the individual from feudal traditions, the braking of all those fetters restricting the freedom of the individual in the old society, whether in family or in public life.2
Despite or because of PrĆŻĆĄekâs focus on socio-political elements underlying modern Chinese literature against the backdrop of the drastic historical transition from the so-called ancient China to modern China, and, despite or because of his emphasis on the influence of social changes on literary writings, he points out that there is a close connection, a certain continuity in terms of literary history, between modern Chinese literature (epitomized by works during and after the May Fourth Movement) and some ancient Chinese literary works in the Qing dynasty. PrĆŻĆĄek argues, for example, that Shen Fu (1763â1810)âs Six Chapters of a Floating Life (Fusheng Liuji) shares some features of subjectivism and individualism with modern Chinese writers, for we find in Shen Fu âthe direct avowal of individualityâand of and individualistâalmost without reservations, an avowal which links Shen Fu with the authors of that new revolutionary epochâ and ânot with the old, strictly regulated spirit and literature of feudal times.â3
No matter whether PrĆŻĆĄekâs effort to establish an implicit historical continuity between modern and ancient Chinese literature in terms of âsubjectivism and individualismâ4 might not be justifiable, what he means by âindividualityâ seems to indicate a transparent relation between the writer and the text, where the latter is understood as expressive of the formerâs intentions, emotions, feelings, etc. In this reading, what is underestimated is the ways in which âindividual(ity)â is configured in modern Chinese literary works, which is quite different from asking whether these writers tend to write on their alleged âinner selfâ or the âoutside world.â By configuration of the individual, I refer to the literary practiceâincluding rhetoric strategies, narrative forms, formalistic settings, etc., but not limited to what is usually called âliteratureââthrough which an individual is constituted into an individual, with whose socio-political implications as a resulted effect of literature rather than its given or predetermined factor. Configuration is used thereby in contrast with representation, which entails a particular relationship between literature and the referent, namely that which supposed to be precede literature. Moreover, I use the term âconfigurationâ in order to partly maintain Eric Auerbachâs explication of the term âfigure,â etymologically derived from the Latin âfigura,â which, in medieval literary texts such as Danteâs Divine Comedy, maintains the concreteness of a character while through itself pointing to something yet-to-come, something beyond wordliness: âVirgil in the Divine Comedy is the historical Virgil himself, but then again he is not; for the historical Virgil is only a figura of the fulfilled truth that the poem reveals, and this fulfillment is more real, more significant than the figura. With Dante, unlike modern poets, the more fully the figure is interpreted and the more closely it is integrated with the eternal plan of salvation, the more real it becomes.â5 Twisting Auerbachâs observation, we might say that, as the âhistorical realityâ of âfigureâ in Dante is confirmed rather than annulled in this âvertical connectionâ with a divinity beyond this world, literary configurations of the individual in modern Chinese literature, against a cultural-historical backdrop in which those socio-political institutions that constitute the condition of possibility in Europe for the invention of the modern individual are yet to be realized, entail a reversed literary image, namely, that the concreteness of the individual is not supported or promised by a divine order that precedes it, but inspired and animated by an exploration of order, a societal, worldly order.
But as Lydia H. Liu argues, insofar as neologisms concerning âsubjectivism and individualismââsuch as âziwoâ (self), âgerenâ (individual), and âgeren zhuyiâ (individualism)âare often regarded as self-sufficient evidence for a general claim about the characteristic of modern Chinese literature, we must address the âtranslingual practiceâ between English and Japanese, between Japanese and Chinese, in order not to âforecloseâ the concepts about âindividual(ity)â as âan established fact or as one of those timeless motifs.â6
Let us look at an essay to which PrĆŻĆĄek pays attention, an essay that is of utmost importance for the âliterary revolutionâ during the New Culture Movement.
7 In âHuman Literatureâ [Ren de wenxue], Zhou Zuoren sheds some light on the importance of individual(ity) with a voice that might well remind the reader of the discourse of evolutionism prevalent during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.
8 Published in 1918, âHuman Literatureâ contains a paragraph where Zhou Zuoren makes use of the metaphor of âtreeâ to construe what he means by âhumanismâ:
What I call humanism is not charity as referred to in such common sayings as âhave pity and commiserate with the people,â or âwide generosity and relief of distress among the masses.â It is rather an individualism of basing everything on man. The reasons are: First, within humanity, a man is just like one tree in a forest. If the forest thrives, the single tree in it will also thrive. But thriving of the forest depends on the thriving of each single tree. Second, the individual loves humanity because he is one unit of it and because of its relationship to him.9
According to Zhou Zuoren, humanism starts with the individual, and, âto be able to discuss humaneness, love of humanity, one must first have acquired the qualifications of man and stand in the position of man.â10 As we shall see, the metaphor appropriated here is nothing new for contemporary critics who debated on the relationship between the individual and the society (or the state) in modern China.
But it is precisely in the paragraph in question that we encounter that which cannot be easily reconciled with PrĆŻĆĄekâs general claim on âsubjectivism and individualism.â Without delving into the details of Zhou Zuorenâs argument, let us take a brief look at the metaphor that he uses. Indeed, as we shall see, the metaphor is a tricky, if not pervert, twist of the metaphor of organism frequently appropriated by discussants for explicating the relationship between the individual and the state, a way of thinking partly borrowed from the current German thoughts on the organic state. Not only does Zhou Zuoren substitute âhumanismâ or âhumanityâ for the state as what is contrasted with the individual, more importantly, he reorients the metaphor toward the direction of an individuality that is conceptually independent of its opposite, whether it was the state or humanity. Unlike the metaphor of organism, where the relationship between the individual and the state is often analogized with that between cell and organ, Zhou Zuorenâs metaphor implicitly but decisively destabilizes this organic relationship of interdetermination.
What this seemingly trivial twist of the metaphor of organism reveals for our concern is as follows: for the investigation of configurations of âindividual(ity)â in modern Chinese literature, it is to beg the whole question if we only search for representations of âsubjectivityâ (in PrĆŻĆĄekâs sense) or expressions of âpersonal feelings,â not because they are not representations of individuality, but because they become so thanks to the presupposition of a particular understanding of the individual that renders representation possible in the first place. PrĆŻĆĄekâs approach, in this regard, for all its contributions to the study of modern Chinese literature studies, is insufficient for interpreting the twists and turns in Zhou Zuorenâs âHuman Literature,â let alone other literary works. These are several crucial questions that PrĆŻĆĄekâs argument fails to consider: by twisting the metaphor of organism, how does Zhou Zuoren associate the definition of the individual with the revolution of Chinese literature? What role does literature play as regards the relationship between humanity and individuality? These problems will function as the thread of thought for my reexamination of Zhou Zuorenâs essay in the next chapter.
But let us put aside Zhou Zuoren metaphor for a moment. In order to approach the problematic of individual(ity), first and foremost we have to take a look at the unstable relationship between the English term âindividualâ and its Chinese rendering, âgeren.â In the following, I first focus on the implications of the term âindividualâ as it is used in the intellectual history of European thoughts, and then I discuss the particular ways in which Chinese critics in early modern China employed it as they deal with the problem of âgeren.â My aim is not to show the (lack of) correspondence between the term âindividualâ and the term âgeren,â but rather to delineate how elements of translatability and untranslatability in the process of stabilization and valorization of this correspondence may give rise to possibilities of approaching âindividual(ity)â in literature in different ways.
II
Let us start, or start again, with the question that any reader stumbling upon this work may expect it to appear on the first page: What is âindividualâ? According to the definition in OED, the English term âindividualâ as a noun designates firstly âa single human being, as distinct from a particular group, or from society in general.â11 But there is no apparent connection between âindividualityâ and human being in the logical definition of âindividual,â according to which an individual refers to âa thing which possesses properties peculiar to itself and which cannot be subdivided into other things of the same kind; spec. any of the entities occupying the lowest level of a system of classification; a member of a class or species.â Indeed, the seemingly diversified meanings of âindividualâ are not independent from each other. Raymond Williamsâs investigation here is quite important, who offers a meticulous historical account of the development of the term.
According to Williams, âIndividualâ is derived from the Latin word âindividuus,â which, appeared first in the sixth century, is a negative form of the term âdividereâ; in turn, âindividuusâ is a translation of the Greek word âatomos,â designating that which is not cuttable or divisible. Along with this Democritic doctrine of atomism, where âindividualâ is supposed to be a fundamental particle, is the strand of Platonism that emphasizes the indivisibility of being.12 Among the earliest definitions of the term âindividuus,â Boethiusâs is worth mentioning: âsomething can be called individual in various ways: that is called individual which cannot be divided at all, as unity or spirit (i); that which cannot be divided because of its hardness, such as steel, is called individual (ii); something is called individual, the specific designation of which is not applicable to anything of the same kind, such as Socrates (iii).â13 The first meaning has a lot to do with the doctrine of trinity in Christianity, and is continued in the seventeenth century, when, for example, Milton wrote in 1641 on dividing âthe individuall Catholicke Church into severall Republicks.â14 Relatedly, the third meaning has its theological implications as the problematic of âindividuationâ constitutes one of the most heated themes in scholasticism.15
The second meaning of âindividuus,â which at first glance seems awkward, is associated with the âatomâ in physics after the seventeenth century. âThe decisive development of the singular noun [individual] was indeed not in social or political thought but in two special fields: logic, and, from C18, biology.â
16 In the next century, Williams continues,
alike in biology and in political thought, there was a remarkable efflorescence of the word. In evolutionary biology there as Darwinâs recognition (Origin of Species, 1859) that âno one supposes that all the individuals of the same species are cast in the same actual mould.â Increasingly the phrase âan individualââa single example of a groupâwas joined and overtaken by âthe individualââa fundamental ord...