Reassessing Egalitarianism

J. Moss

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137385987
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

Through an analysis of the different dimensions of equality, this book provides a critical introduction to recent philosophical work on egalitarianism, discussing the central questions associated with each of the major debates about egalitarian justice.

1

The Value of Equality

1.1 Introduction

Equality is the central value for egalitarians. It is the value that defines and distinguishes egalitarianism from other political theories. However we understand the metric of equality – whether as comprising people’s preferences, resources, or capabilities or as a mixture of opportunities and outcomes – any answer will assume that equality matters in some way. Why equality matters is a conceptually distinct question from the issue of which metric of equality is best or whether disadvantage caused by personal irresponsibility is a permissible reason to allow inequalities. However, if equality is the central value for egalitarians, then why it is of value should be an obvious starting point for any discussion of egalitarianism – and that is the subject of this chapter.

Equality has been valued for a range of reasons: because it promotes good health, reduces suffering, is part of a fair society, is how we treat people with respect, or is an ultimate value, like freedom. These and other arguments for equality raise the separate question of how to categorize the different types of arguments for equality. Of the several reasons to value equality mentioned a moment ago, all locate equality’s value in relation to other values and hence raise the issue of how important equality is if it is used to support other, more important values. There are three broad ways in which the value of equality could be categorized. Equality could be valued intrinsically, in virtue of its own independent value. This is the strongest valuation of equality but also the most difficult for egalitarians to defend. It is difficult to defend because very few political values are justifiable without reference to some other, more fundamental value.¹ The obvious alternative to valuing equality intrinsically is to value it instrumentally because it contributes to or is necessary for some other valuable outcome. Some of the typical examples of valuing equality seem to fit this mold, especially the concern with excessively unequal distribution of income and wealth or the concern that inequality leads to poor health outcomes. A third type of valuation is to understand equality as not merely an instrumental value but nonetheless as deriving its value from its relation to other important values – what I call constitutive value. Moreover, equality’s defenders also support equality for a range of personal and impersonal reasons. There is a clear sense that equality has a direct personal benefit if it achieves gains in people’s health or welfare. But it might also be valuable because of its impersonal effects, such as making justice more widely achievable.

Clarifying which type of valuation is being used is obviously important philosophically, but it is important for other reasons as well. One reason is that each of the arguments for valuing equality is open to different objections. Valuing equality instrumentally increases the likelihood that a principle of equality will be overridden by a more important value, such as freedom. Intrinsic egalitarians, in contrast, face the objection that they have misunderstood the real concern for the disadvantaged, which is not to make people equal but to help the worst-off or give people enough of what they need.² Such criticisms also imply that this misunderstanding leads to unpalatable and absurd consequences, such as the idea that intrinsic egalitarians will have to “level down” the better-off to achieve equality. The leveling down objection occupies an important place in this debate, and it is discussed in more detail below. The objection concerns what some nonegalitarians think is a logical consequence of valuing equality intrinsically. Some argue that if equality really is important, there is something good about leveling down the well-off even if it does not directly benefit the worst-off.

These ways of valuing equality seem to present us with stark alternatives: either equality is valuable in and of itself, which is hard to establish, or it is valuable only because it has other good consequences. But even if equality is to be valued “merely” because of its instrumental features, this does not mean that there is not a very strong reason to promote equality. Equality might be strongly instrumentally necessary for the peaceful operation of social institutions and just outcomes.³ But even setting this important point aside, we should not be too easily won over to this neat valuation of equality as either instrumentally or intrinsically valuable. The conceptual language in which to describe equality’s value is richer than understanding equality as either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable in a straightforward way and allows a more nuanced assessment of how we should capture the value of equality. One thing we should also note here is that it is not the concept of equality alone that faces this problem. For instance, how we value freedom also faces a similar set of difficulties. Is freedom valuable because it leads to other important goods being realized, or is it just valuable in and of itself?

Traditionally, egalitarians have understood equality as part of a bigger set of claims about social justice.⁴ This valuation is echoed in the modern debate, where many of the most important arguments about why equality is valuable have occurred either in relation to discussion of another philosophically important value or in the context of a specific issue such as health. But in order to see that, we need to appreciate the kinds of reasons often advanced in favor of equality. As we will see, ultimately equality is important because of the broader role it plays in securing the conditions for living in a just society. In what follows, we explore the recent debate about why equality matters. This involves discussing some of the contexts in which equality is important – because it increases self-respect, for instance – but the main task is to understand the types of arguments that have been given for equality’s value.

The importance of equality

One way of getting a sense of equality’s value is to understand the types of advantages that are said to derive from having a more equal society. For instance, equality is often defended on the grounds that it is essential for promoting respect. In this sense, respect as used in egalitarian contexts often means what Stephen Darwall calls “recognition respect,” where an individual or society gives appropriate weight to some important fact about a person and then regulates individual or institutional conduct in light of that fact.⁵ When we grant someone recognition respect, we might do so by recognizing that she is owed respect because she is a person and has a unique moral status. In an institutional context, this might lead to people having equal rights to certain goods or forms of treatment. As the next two chapters show, achieving an equal distribution of important goods involves determining which metric of goods best suits the framework of justice. Many critics of inequality have pointed to how political and social practices fail to show people respect where significant inequalities exist. For instance, Elizabeth Anderson argues that many egalitarian political movements have objected to the demeaning stereotypes surrounding the disabled and other politically oppressed groups.⁶ Welfare recipients, for example, often complain that the institutions with which they interact, as well as society in general, treat and regard them as citizens of inferior status. Receiving unemployment or parenting benefits is often said to have a stigma attached that generates disdain from others in society and may lead to discrimination in relation to other goods, such as jobs and housing. One of Anderson’s major complaints against luck egalitarianism – a view that puts personal responsibility at the forefront of theories of justice – is that it subjects such citizens to demeaning and intrusive judgments about whether they are willing and able to look for work. Anderson speculates about what it would be like for benefits to the unemployed to be determined by inquiring of persons whether their disadvantage – disability, unintelligence, ugliness, or lack of marketable talent – is their fault or just a matter of a lack of natural talents. She asks us to imagine a letter, such as the following, from the State Equality Board that comes with the benefits to the naturally disadvantaged:

To the stupid and untalented: Unfortunately, other people don’t value what little you have to offer in the system of production. Your talents are too meager to command much market value. Because of the misfortune that you were born so poorly endowed with talents, we productive ones will make it up to you: we will let you share in the bounty of what we have produced.⁷

As far-fetched as this scenario is, Anderson’s point is that treating people with respect should not involve being overly intrusive or forcing them to admit failings that they cannot help. Stigmatizing differences in status might also be manifested through cultural means – for instance, where a legitimate cultural practice is ridiculed or its participants forced to defend it against harmful attacks. Anderson claims that equality of the conditions of people’s freedom is essential for respecting people in society and, as such, ought not to be overridden by a concern with making sure an account of personal responsibility is at the forefront of a theory of justice.

A related but different concern is that inequalities of income and wealth make it more likely that some will be subservient to others.⁸ This is a traditional theme of egalitarian thought going back at least to the early English political movement, the Levellers.⁹ Individuals who have vastly superior wealth may be able to dictate conditions of employment to others, influence the political process, set social agendas, or take advantage of scarce opportunities or resources otherwise unavailable. In commenting on whether his view of justice is egalitarian, one of the reasons that Rawls gives for why equality is valuable is that it does not involve some people being considered inferior by others and, importantly, by themselves.¹⁰ Domination may or may not lead to feelings of inferiority on the part of those dominated. But insofar as it does, it introduces an extra dimension of harm because of its effect on the resilience and sense of self of those whom it affects. Attitudes of deference and servility may be damaging psychologically to those who internalize them and may produce attitudes in the dominators that are “great vices,” as Rawls puts it.¹¹ For Rawls, a person’s self-respect will be diminished when the institutional structures of society do not recognize important facts about people or groups of people and do not treat them as equal citizens.¹² For instance, where people are discriminated against because of their race, denied political rights because of their particular culture, or subjected to demeaning stereotypes, they are treated as publicly inferior. Here, the value of addressing inequalities of wealth and power derives instrumentally from how doing so contributes to the goal of giving individuals control over their lives. Inequality is bad not just because it is not part of what a proper democratic society ought to look like but because of the pernicious effect it has on dimensions of individual lives. On these accounts, whatever else it may be, equality is instrumentally good if it contributes to eliminating practices that treat people in disrespectful ways. But for Rawls, as we will see, equality is also good in itself wherever society makes use of fair procedures.¹³

Egalitarians also claim that high levels of inequality, especially in regard to income and wealth, may greatly increase the likelihood that some groups in society will increase the suffering of the poor. Referring to equality, Rousseau famously asserted that with regard to wealth, “No citizen shall be wealthy enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself.”¹⁴ Where wealth in particular is more evenly distributed, people might have access to better health care, afford decent accommodations, or be employed in better jobs. Richard Wilkinson reports that in the United States and Canada, states that have more inequality show a tenfold difference in homicide rates.¹⁵ The case for more equal societies is bolstered further by evidence about the impact of inequality on likelihood of voting, increased levels of stress, lack of cooperation, and health.¹⁶

One prominent reason for preventing inequality relates to the claims now made concerning the importance of health inequalities. A number of authors have developed an impressive body of research on the relationship between equality and a range of poor health and well-being outcomes. Much of the literature on the social determinants of health, as it has come to be known, has identified inequality as a major contributor to poor health outcomes. This is not simply the claim that poverty and deprivation are bad for one’s health.¹⁷ A large body of empirical evidence now points to the link between inequality across a range of indicies (work status, control at work, income) and poor health outcomes. Especially in relation to income inequality, it is claimed that it is not just the overall level of income and wealth in societies that matters for health outcomes but how that wealth is distributed. For instance, Michael Marmot’s now famous Whitehall studies of British civil servants show a correlation between the grade of the civil servant and mortality and morbidity rates.¹⁸ Each grade in the service does worse in terms of health outcomes than the one above it, yet none are in poverty. Allowing for genetic factors, age, and so on, Marmot’s study points to the inequality between the different levels of civil servants as contributing to the difference in health outcomes. Others, such as Wilkinson, have posited strong correlations between inequalities of various types cited earlier. One example concerns the lack of trust and fraternity in very unequal societies. According to Wilkinson and Pickett, levels of trust are higher in countries with greater income equality.¹⁹ They cite a number of studies which suggest that income inequality affects the level of trust in society. Where there is less trust, people are less willing to cooperate, are more reluctant to volunteer, and generally treat others with less respect.²⁰ If this research is accurate, its meaning in the context of this discussion is that more egalitarian societies do better than less egalitarian ones in terms of certain types of health outcomes. It also provides an interesting further argument for equality. At first glance this looks like a straightforwardly instrumental argument: equality is important because it leads to better health outcomes. But as we will see, research on the connection between inequality and health might also be understood as showing that equality is part of what makes for a just society in a more substantial way.

One of the areas in which the demand for equality has been strongest is in relation to politics. Ensuring that each citizen’s views can be represented through equal voting rights or the ability to run for office and participate in the political process is at the core of modern democracies. While I do not here consider these kinds of demands in any detail, note that this demand for equality is a type of equal consideration that has other forms closer to the modern debate concerning egalitarianism. The de...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  The Value of Equality
• 2  Equality of What?
• 3  Egalitarianism and Responsibility
• 4  Global Egalitarianism
• Conclusion: Assessing the Prospects for Egalitarianism
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index