Equal Opportunity and the Case for State Sponsored Ectogenesis

Evie Kendal

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137549877
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

Ectogenesis refers to the artificial gestation of a fetus outside the womb. Despite certain advantages for women's reproductive liberty, feminist groups remain divided regarding this technology. This book argues that reproduction imposes unjust burdens on women, and thus the ideals of equal opportunity demand continued research into ectogenesis.

1

Promoting Equal Opportunity through Ectogenesis

Abstract: Kendal addresses various threats to equal opportunity arising from women’s reproductive capacity, including inequalities between men and women, women and other women (including the fertile and infertile) and between heterosexual and homosexual individuals. She posits that ectogenesis represents a necessary addition to the current suite of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) available in fertility care.

Keywords: ARTs; assisted reproductive technologies; gender discrimination; infertility; sexual equality

Kendal, Evie. Equal Opportunity and the Case for State Sponsored Ectogenesis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. DOI: 10.1057/9781137549877.0005.

As discussed in the Introduction, there are various physical, social and economic burdens associated with pregnancy and childbirth that can disadvantage women, thus highlighting the need to explore alternative methods of procreation. From an equal opportunity standpoint it must be recalled that while society as a whole benefits from the reproductive labour of women, the risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth are borne by the individual woman alone. This unfair distribution of risks and benefits leads Smajdor to claim that there has been ‘a conceptual failure in medical and social and ethical terms to address the pathological nature of gestation and childbirth and to tackle the health problems it poses from a justice perspective.’¹ Although there are certain social and financial restrictions that impact both men and women in their reproductive endeavours, these are often distributed unequally to women’s disadvantage. In this chapter I will explore various threats to equal opportunity arising from women’s reproductive capacity, including inequalities between men and women, women and other women (including the fertile and infertile) and between heterosexual and homosexual individuals. I will also posit that ectogenesis could redress several of the biologically based inequalities related to gestation, childbirth and parenthood.

Promoting equality with men

In her article ‘In Defense of Ectogenesis,’ Smajdor notes: ‘Pregnancy is a condition that causes pain and suffering, and that only affects women. The fact that men do not have to go through pregnancy to have a genetically related child, whereas women do, is a natural inequality.’² Many would argue that this is simply natural biology and that it is therefore counterintuitive to consider it a form of sex-based inequality. I maintain that this perspective fails to recognise that modern medicine is premised on fighting against our nature and biological shortcomings, particularly our ‘natural’ susceptibility to disease and the inevitability of death. While ageing and growing infirm may also be considered ‘natural’ biological events, the goal of modern geriatric medicine has long been to increase life expectancy and reduce the impact and occurrence of age-related chronic conditions, such as incontinence, sensory loss and neuro-degeneration.³ There is no compelling reason to relegate pregnancy and childbirth to the realm of inescapable biological difference, while medical science still strives to dominate other aspects of human biology. As Firestone rightly asserts, ‘the “natural” is not necessarily a “human” value. Humanity has begun to outgrow Nature: we can no longer justify the maintenance of a discriminatory sex class system on the grounds of its origin in Nature.’⁴ That women must submit to greater risks than men in order to achieve the same goal of having biologically related children is an example of sex inequality, regardless of the fact this inequality originates in Nature. I propose that while no one can be directly blamed for such an inequality, deliberate attempts to forestall or prevent the development of equalising alternatives can be considered ethically questionable. As Helen H. Lambert argues, ‘If a particular sex difference is incompatible with important aspects of social equality, we should argue for compensatory measures, independent of biological causation.’⁵ Furthermore, were ectogenesis to fail to become a viable alternative to pregnancy, I argue there would still be just cause to consider pregnancy and childbirth as unfairly disadvantaging women, even when no other avenue for perpetuating the species were available. In this case, other ‘compensatory measures’ would need to be taken to promote equality.

It is not necessary to attempt to classify pregnancy as a ‘disease’ in order to make its potential eradication a medical issue, as this would be a move that would likely alienate many feminists and fail to achieve the goal of improving conditions for pregnant women. The parasitic nature of the fetus and the physical burden of gestation on the individual woman are sufficient grounds to justify research into less physiologically demanding means of procreating, without the need to categorise pregnancy per se as a state of ill-health. Rather than denigrating pregnancy, I argue there is a need to address the health inequalities posed by reproductive difference, including pregnancy-related illness and injury. This is especially relevant when considering how large a portion of the human population are susceptible to these particular afflictions, and that alternative technologies, such as ectogenesis, may soon be available that could alter our fundamental assumptions regarding human reproductive destiny. I agree with Smajdor’s assertion that such a radical re-evaluation of biological roles is currently hindered by the steadfast cultural belief in the ‘necessity of women for gestating and nurturing society’s children,’ which she claims is ‘so entrenched in our consciousness that we fail to recognize that we could change the situation.’⁶ I believe this lack of imagination serves as an obstacle to ectogenesis research and impacts how pregnancy and childbirth are viewed in society.

When considering the hostility that may attend the advent of ectogenesis technology, Gregory Pence notes that all reproductive technologies have met with some disapproval at the outset, with the doctors responsible for performing the first artificial insemination even being labelled as ‘perverts’ by some social groups. He also notes that providing pain relief in childbirth was initially condemned by many religious institutions, including the Catholic Church, in what may seem to be a deliberate attempt to perpetuate women’s suffering as a result of their biological difference.⁷ Even now medical practitioners may be forced to defend their support of pain relief in childbirth amidst claims that such interventions defy the will of the God, or do not constitute a medical necessity for insurance purposes.⁸ While many advances in reproductive technology meet with fierce social disapprobation, Firestone notes that those that reaffirm traditional, male-dominated social structures are often met with less opposition than those intended to ease women’s burdens in procreation. For example, artificial insemination using sperm from a woman’s husband has traditionally been considered more acceptable than artificial insemination by donor, particularly if the recipient does not conform to the conventional nuclear family structure (often determined by the absence of a ‘father figure’ for the resultant child, as in the case of lesbian couples or single women). For Firestone, the development of full human ectogenesis is a necessary step in securing gender equality, through alleviating women’s suffering in pregnancy and childbirth and challenging ideals of ‘male supremacy’ and the sanctity of ‘the family.’⁹

Although some of the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth have already been discussed in the Introduction, there are others that are also relevant to this debate. For example, in order to have their own biological children, women must be willing to take risks with their mental health that are not trivial. The emotional strain of pregnancy is well documented and among researchers there is increasing interest in the aetiology of postpartum depression, and the more severe postpartum psychosis, with some studies indicating a sevenfold increase in the number of psychiatric admissions occurring in the 30 days following childbirth.¹⁰ Although the causes of both these conditions are unclear, there is reason to believe there is a direct link between the metabolic and hormonal changes caused during pregnancy and childbirth, and the onset of psychiatric symptoms.¹¹ Even among women who will not fall prey to these conditions, pregnancy and childbirth are known to cause significant emotional and social upheaval, in addition to the risk of short- and long-term physical damage. It should not be dismissed that childbirth is often used as a measure to describe the worst pain imaginable.¹² That this pain is considered women’s ‘fate’ shows a shocking lack of concern for women’s welfare. When discussing the frequency with which women are denied effective pain relief in labour, the American Congress of Obstetrics and Gynecology notes: ‘There is no other circumstance where it is considered acceptable for an individual to experience untreated severe pain, amenable to safe intervention, while under a physician’s care.’¹³ The psychological trauma associated with the physical experience of childbirth, in addition to the hormonal changes brought on during this time, places strain on gestational mothers that i...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction: The Need for Ectogenesis
• Background: The Story Thus Far
• 1  Promoting Equal Opportunity through Ectogenesis
• 2  Protecting Equal Opportunity from Ectogenesis
• 3  Providing Equal Opportunity to Ectogenesis
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index