The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations

Emil Kirchner, T. Christiansen, K. Jørgensen, Philomena B. Murray, Emil Kirchner, T. Christiansen, K. Jørgensen, Philomena B. Murray

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780230378704
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Handbook provides a comprehensive range of contributions on the relations between the EU and Asia - two regions undergoing significant changes internally yet also developing stronger relations in the context of an emerging multi-polar world. It collates some 40 contributions from various disciplines by contributors from throughout the world.

Section 1

Conceptualising and Contextualising EU–Asia Relations

1

The Historical Relations of Europe and East Asia – From Partnership to Post-colonialism

Stefan Kirchner^*

Abstract

This chapter, while not claiming to be a definitive account of all relations between Europe and East Asia to date, explores the economic, political and territorial power dynamic between these two regions, from their earliest economic interactions to the breakdown of European colonial rule and the rise of Chairman Mao. Through an analysis of ‘power relations’ and ‘balance of power theory’, this chapter considers the relations between parts of Europe and East Asia from the 16th to the 20th century, detailing the extent and nature of these relations, and concluding that power was distributed both equally (1500–1750) and unevenly (1750–1890s). This created a divergence between the two regions post-1800; in other words, Europe’s rise and China’s (temporary) demise.

Introduction

There is broad scholarly agreement that between 1500 and 1800 the regions of Europe and East Asia were similar in terms of standard of living, economic prosperity, access to resources and political institutions. Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) attributes this to innovative processes of promoting internal growth in both regions; Jacques (2009) refers to strong domestic institutions and the promotion of cultural norms which created stability and harmony in the respective areas. By 1850, however, these once comparable regions had become radically different, diverging¹ from one another both socio-economically and politically – and undoubtedly in Europe’s favour.

Given the intensity of Europe–East Asia economic and political interaction from the 16th century onwards, it is useful to consider their relations as a variable for this divergence, or, in other words, to examine how the European presence in East Asia may have prompted, or forced, a different economic and political course for countries such as China than might otherwise have been the case. Indeed, Europe’s² expansion into East Asia, primarily through trade, resulted in a powerful European economy with a thirst for more wealth and political influence. While Japan was able to make the necessary economic and political adjustments to manage Europe’s rise, China’s domestic political weakness and agrarian-based economy led to severe exploitation from the Europeans. Given this sustained interaction and ensuing manipulation from the Europeans towards the Chinese, the question becomes: to what extent did relationships between Europe and East Asia affect this divergence in socio-economic and political standards? Through analysing power relations and using balance of power theory as a frame of reference, we shall argue that relations between East Asia and Europe were a significant, yet not the sole, factor in this divergence. We shall contend that the last 200 years have perhaps been an aberration in East Asia’s overall balance of power; how certain states, such as China, were too weak to resist; and how Europe took advantage. We will also see what we can learn for EU–Asia relations today.

The scholarly literature largely stems from a European perspective and is frequently divided as to the rationale for the ‘divergence’ – ranging from Malthusian population factors,³ the trappings of overseas exploitation by the Europeans, and the strength of European institutions and technology (Wallerstein, 2011). Those scholars from the East Asian perspective, such as Malefakis (1997) and Bin Wong (1997), depict an over-reliance on viewing the divergence through a ‘Western’ or ‘European’ lens – that is, focussing purely on historical European perspectives, such as the Industrial Revolution, rather than looking at domestic Chinese phenomena, such as the challenges in commercialising the Yangzi Delta. Whichever factor (or set of factors) is the root cause, the end result contributed to the rise of European economic power, sparking a divergence which continued and had strengthened by the 1890s, with European free trade imperialism leading to informal governance and colonialism.

In charting the course for this chapter, it must be emphasised that attributing events to specific dates is a point of contention in the literature, and for this reason we will settle on three broad periods of analysis. The first, 1500– 1750, amounts to an era of partnership between parts of Europe, principally Portugal, Spain, Holland and England, and parts of East Asia, primarily China and Japan. In this period, economic power was balanced equally between the two regions, with East Asian produce, in the form of spices and tea, being paid for with European silver and bullion, promoting economic growth in each region and resulting in overall stability. Europe, partly through this lucrative trade with East Asia, developed the necessary capital and technical capability to fuel the Industrial Revolution, while China, on the other hand, was initially uninterested and distrustful of foreign intervention and then gradually fell behind Europe in terms of economic development.

The second period, broadly 1750–1890s, was characterised by deeper asymmetries in the Europe–East Asia relationship, precipitated by three strategic factors: the breakdown of indigenous political structures in East Asian countries, the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the rise of the opium trade, specifically in China. This allowed European countries, such as England and Holland, to flex their economic and political power in new and important ways. Europe increased its volume of overseas trade and geographical reach across Southeast and East Asia, and its creeping colonialism swung the balance of political power increasingly towards the West. This resulted in a number of colonial wars across Asia, carried out by a range of European powers (with the notable additions of France and Germany).

The third period, 1900–1940s, depicts the eventual breakdown of these informal rule empires, with new powers, such as Japan (with the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945), and perhaps more importantly the US and Russia, emerging in Asia. In spite of a waning European influence in Asia during the post-colonial phase, Chinese attempts to regain power relations from Europe and the US were still unsuccessful, largely due to the economic and political legacy of the Hundred Years of Humiliation.⁴

Lastly, given limitations on space, we have decided to focus solely on East Asia, with China and Japan at the forefront and parts of Southeast Asia incorporated only to demonstrate the scale of activity in the region. China and Japan provide the most salient case studies for our three-stage structure, which is best characterised as: partnership, protectorate and post-colonialism. Furthermore, China is the oldest continuous civilisation and cultural pivot of East Asia and, due to its historic relationship with European states, it provides a useful counterpoint for a deeper analysis of the mutual power dynamic.

Balance of power relations

In assessing the historic relations between Europe and East Asia, we need first to disaggregate specific ‘states’ from each of the two regions, look at how they interacted with one another at a bilateral level and then analyse how this impacted on the overall balance of power in both regions.

Within the international system, Kenneth Waltz (1979, chapters 1–4, 6) outlines two enduring characteristics: ‘anarchy’ (no over-arching authority) and ‘relative capacity’ (power). Waltz stipulates the action (self-help or cooperation) which states must assume in order to exist under anarchy, safeguard their interests, retain their ‘power’ and ensure their ‘survival’. Once survival has been achieved, states may seek to rewrite the rules of the international system to extract more power and ultimate hegemony. To counteract this, Waltz advances the balance of power theory, which explains how a coalition of states can act as a counterweight to any one state acting in a hegemonic manner.

Applying Waltz’s theory, we can observe some important parallels in terms of the historical relations of Europe and East Asia. Further case studies will be analysed through the course of this chapter. However, as an example, from 1500 to 1750, Europe, largely in the shape of Portugal, Holland and England, was indeed attempting ‘to ensure [its own economic] survival’ (Waltz, 1979) by taking decisive action to create and expand trade links with East Asia. England ultimately emerged as the leading force, with other states, such as Holland and Spain, forming a coalition behind it in order to prevent ultimate English hegemony and ensure power distribution. During this phase, both England and the coalition exerted economic (and therefore non-territorial) forms of power over parts of East Asia, largely by extracting the trade produce (tea and spices) to fuel their internal economic growth – to be used as the basis for their subsequent political influence. China, in particular, also benefited from this arrangement, driving its economic growth while still maintaining political authority (European countries were restricted to economic activity in designated coastal zones, such as Canton, while the Ming and Qing dynasties were predominantly focussed on land-based affairs and were centralised in Peking).

Having explored how power relations and balance of power can help to inform our understanding of the Europe–East Asia relationship, we shall now look in more detail at the empirical evidence for how power has been distributed.

1500–1750: Europe–East Asia partnership and equal distribution of power

Asia . . . was a world of highly articulated societies, with strong state systems commanding well-organized military forces and, in many areas, with populations far denser than those of Europe. Most Asian societies were secure in their identities and traditions because of their long-established urban centers and their highly developed literary and religious cultures.

(Malefakis, p. 177)

During the early 16th century, East Asia was still largely sheltered from European contact: Japan was considered too isolated from the rest of the world and China was still wedded to its ‘tribute’ system – one which restricted contact with foreign embassies to ‘narrow trade routes sanctioned only by the imperial courts’ (Wills, 2010, p. 17). By the middle of the century (1550s), China’s suffocating tribute system, in particular, had gradually faded away and various forms of foreign contact were increasing. This was partly due to a general preoccupation of Chinese central government with land-based affairs, leaving space for foreign influence in the coastal regions, but also due to an increased Chinese desire for foreign trade in silver to act as fuel for their economy (paper currency was running out and therefore a greater onus was placed on securing silver, which was previously lacking in the Chinese economy and was now plentiful in Europe due to its increased trade with South America from the 16th century onwards).

Although Confucian scholars of the late Ming Dynasty ‘were ill at ease with a society that was increasingly commercialised, urbanized and tolerant of unconventional behaviour’, the late 16th and early 17th century saw increased Chinese contact with foreigners, and particularly the Portuguese. This initial trade with Europeans represented ‘ . . . an age of commerce in maritime [ . . . ] Asia, in which indigenous rulers and elites, traders from all around the Indian Ocean, Europeans, and Chinese were active participants’ (Wills, 2010, p. 16). The Portuguese seizure of Macao in 1557 is heralded as the beginning of European influence in East Asia. Despite a number of failed attempts throughout the 16th century to control maritime routes across the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, China and Japan, the Portuguese finally managed to create a trade route stretching from Goa via Malacca and Macao to Japan and then back to Goa.

Indeed, the Portuguese set the trend for overseas trade, followed by the Spanish (in the Philippines), the Dutch (in Malaya, Ceylon and Japan) and then the English (in the Indian subcontinent and China). The Dutch and the English not only followed suit but heeded the failures of the Portuguese and developed the financial institutions (joint stock companies) to make overseas trade a national enterprise. This resulted in the formation of the Dutch United East India Company (or Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) and the English East India Trading Company (EIC).

The VOC and the EIC were arguably the most effective trading tools of their time. During the early 17th century the Dutch set up the VOC, and although they achieved remarkable success in developing trade links and informal rule over modern-day Indonesia, and owned the European monopoly in trade with Japan, they were eventually overtaken by England in the early 18th century. In effect ‘the English [EIC] would relegate the Dutch [VOC] to a secondary status’ (Linton, 1997, p. 78) due to both the 30 Years’ European Wars, in which the Dutch particularly suffered, and the rise of the EIC. The EIC was vastly superior in terms of organisation and commercial focus, centred on the trade of tea as opposed to the Dutch focus on the increasingly fragile spice trade.

This VOC and EIC joint stock company ‘enabled the promoters of overseas enterprise to ally with and draw upon the far more powerful and better-financed field of domestic capitalist agriculture’ (Cell, 1997, p. 447), giving birth to the economic practice of mercantilism (‘the economic doctrine in which government control of foreign trade is of paramount importance for ensuring the prosperity and military security of the state’⁵). In this regard the strong internal growth experienced by individual European states from the 1600s onwards served as a springboard to enable the accumulation of capital from the ‘New World’ of Asia and South America. This form of capital-intensive trade was only made possible through an acceptance in European markets of a long wait for returns on investment – in other words, substantial periods of time stretching up to two years before European markets could capitalise on the long maritime voyages bringing produce from Asia and South America back to Europe.

During this period, European states created strong domestic institutions, such as in the fields of non-distortionary pricing systems, common law and property rights (North and Weingast, 1989), providing the incentives to stimulate income per capita and growth. Pomeranz (2000) refers to this as a ‘capital-intensive path’, which Europe was able to further bolster through increased trade with the New World. This was in stark contrast to East Asia (Japan and China), which emphasised a ‘labour-intensive path’ (Pomeranz, 2000, p. 13) – that is, small-scale rural output which was self-sufficient but rarely maximised or re-invested. Such an approach provided little incentive for Chinese farmers to produce more than was needed for basic survival, leading to low domestic growth and a country unable to compete with Europe.

In balance of power terms, European states realised that, to survive politically, a country had to protect its own overseas commerce while denying opportunities to competitors as far as possible; ‘in effect, Mercantilism amounted to a policy of protectionism’ (Cell, 1997, p. 448), where pockets of overseas trade, in countries such as China, became powerful assets to be fiercely defended by Euro...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• Notes on Contributors
• List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Section 1: Conceptualising and Contextualising EU–Asia Relations
• Section 2: The Comparative Dimension of EU–Asia Relations
• Section 3: The Political Dimension of EU–Asia Relations
• Section 4: The Economic Dimension of EU–Asia Relations
• Section 5: The Institutional Dimension of EU–Asia Relations
• Section 6: The Global Dimension of EU–Asia Relations
• Section 7: China in EU–Asia Relations
• Section 8: Bilateral Relations between the EU and Asia
• Conclusion
• Index