European Glocalization in Global Context

R. Robertson, R. Robertson

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780230390805
• Topic: Sozialwissenschaften
• Subtopic: Landeskunde

This book consists of a collection of essays that deal with glocalization in Europe, including the idea of Europeanization as glocalization. The contributors deal with a range of topics including migration, media, football, beauty, Christianity, democracy and the European Union.

1

Europeanization as Glocalization

Roland Robertson

Introduction

Carol Gluck (2009: 3) has aptly insisted that as “words change, the world changes . . . but the world . . . also has the power to change words”. She goes on to say that “words are always in motion, and as they move across space and time, they inscribe the arcs of our past and present” (Gluck, 2009: 3). Furthermore, as scholars, “what we have in common is the injunction to follow our word to where it does its work” (Gluck, 2009: 3).

In this chapter I will follow Outhwaite (2008: 137) in attempting to do justice to a theory of European society by considering “the interpenetration of the local, the national and the global, in Europe and elsewhere”. At least implicitly Outhwaite is, I think, critical of those who have claimed to consider Europe globally. In any case, in spite of such pronouncements as “Europe in the Global Age” (Giddens, 2007), the actual, comprehensive analysis of Europe globally has barely begun. My tack is to consider Europe in the frame of glocalization – hence the title of this chapter (cf. Delanty and Rumford, 2005). However, I do depart from Outhwaite’s highly impressive European Society (2008), by decoupling the themes of Europe and modernity. In so doing I follow the increasing number of writers – notably anthropologists – who have come to regard the concept of modernity with some suspicion (e.g. Latour, 1993, 2013). To put this another way, a number of very important anthropologists have applied the methods and perspectives of anthropology – both cultural and social – to the so-called modern world. I contend that associating modernity with Europe is a classic example of Eurocentricity (Bhambra, 2007).

Eurocentricity and its offshoots

Bhambra is, however, only one of an increasing number of academics who have adopted anthropological methods – or, at least, an anthropological stance, to approach the so-called modern world. I think, for example, of Ulf Hannerz, Pnina Werbner (2008), Marshall Sahlins, Arjun Appadurai (2013), John and Jean Comaroff, among others. The binary that opposes modernity to “the primal” or pre-modern is steadily being eroded, as demonstrated by the increasing use of the concept of the in-between society (Robertson, 2014a). It is, however, not only anthropologists who have undone the all too easy distinction between the pre-modern and the modern (leaving out altogether the fast-fading notion of the postmodern) and contributed greatly to the abolition of the simple binary or overdone distinctions between regions and civilizations. A good example of this is the way in which our thinking about the Renaissance has been changed in the recent past, notably by Lisa Jardine (1998) and Jerry Brotton (1997) – the latter having made major contributions to the entire issue of the history of the mapping of the world in his work on cartography.

In addition I feel obliged to supplement Outhwaite’s plea regarding a global focus on Europe with my claim that this cannot be accomplished without giving due attention to the increasingly important issue of glocality and glocalization. It is my contention that the idea of the glocal enables us to focus more satisfactorily on Europe – or, for that matter, any other worldly unit, as opposed to the relatively simple plea for a “global approach”. In fact, this is what I seek to justify more fully during the course of this chapter.

In her review of a recent book on the French Revolution in global perspective (Desan et al., 2013), the British historian Linda Colley (2014) has remarked that the discipline of history is clearly a participant in the global turn. She has been particularly concerned to make the claim that North American historians are much more cosmopolitan than their European counterparts. Her main point is that European historians do not take a genuinely cosmopolitan approach to their studies, particularly studies of Europe itself.¹ One might also say that the same kind of contention is applicable to that which Edwards and Gaonkar display in their edited book Globalizing American Studies (2010), which is as glocal as it is global: the contributors illustrate well the ways in which the USA is treated differently by analysts in different countries, even though they approach their specific topics under a general rubric of American studies. This is clearly an example of glocalization (see also Pease, 2010). Colley’s mention of cosmopolitanism is somewhat ironic in the context of the present volume when one considers that, in the last few years, such authors as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens have made cosmopolitanism the major characteristic of Europe as a whole (Robertson and Krossa, 2012). Beck’s claim that we are experiencing, on a worldwide basis, what he calls a “cosmopolitanisation of reality” (Beck and Sznaider, 2006) raises very serious problems in this regard. The numerous contributions of Ulf Hannerz (e.g. Hannerz, 1992, 1996: 17–55 and 102–126) to the topic of cosmopolitanism have the great advantages of being truly global but not triumphantly so (see also Moyn and Sartori, 2013; Pollock, 2013).

It should be made clear that, in what follows, the concept of the global is firm but flexible, in the sense that, on occasion, global refers to the world as a whole; although sometimes it refers to Europe as a continent. The same flexibility applies to the concept of the local. In other words, that which is indicated as being local may well be a very large “unit” within an even wider context. Globality and locality are relative terms.

This chapter is largely concerned with the applicability and fruitfulness of applying the concept of glocalization to Europe. My argument in this respect is that Europe is particularly suitable for such. This is principally because, throughout its history, Europe has been clearly marked by many fragmentations and shifting territorial boundaries. Because the territorial mosaic of Europe has been so fluid – often violently so – this makes it a particularly suitable site for the application of a concept that seeks to overcome the strong – but, I maintain, meaningless – contrast between the global and the local. Of course, the fissures within Europe have not merely been territorial they have also frequently been ethnocultural. The expansion of the European Union since the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989; more specifically, the issue of East, Central, and South-Eastern European countries, as well as those in the Baltic area, have to be considered. The inclusion of ex-Soviet countries, including the former East Germany, has given a particular gloss to the overall consideration of Europe, not least its susceptibility to analyses deriving from the theme of glocalization. Moreover, the eastern limits of Europe have been in continuous dispute or uncertainty for hundreds of years, and at this time of writing the uncertainty about the limits of Europe are of particular relevance in terms of the geopolitics and geoculture (Hannerz, 2009) of the border regions. In addition, this has not merely been an empirical, historical issue, but one that is also of great analytic and theoretical concern. For example, one has only to refer to the great and growing controversy concerning Orientalism (Irwin, 2006).

At the present time of writing, summer 2014, the European scene is particularly complex and volatile, although these features of contemporary Europe should not be exaggerated within the context of the overall history of the continent. There is much continuing controversy about the EU’s Eurozone, the fallout from its crisis of 2008–2012, the largely subsequent rise of anti-immigrant, right-wing movements across the continent, and a significant number of national controversies concerning membership in the European Union.² The present “turbulence” in Europe (Giddens, 2014) is being greatly exacerbated by Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the closely related problem of the boundaries of Europe centred upon the crisis in Ukraine. At various points in recent years many European nations have expressed their doubts about the viability of the European Union. In fact, support for the European Union is at an all-time low. At the present time much of the external threat to the EU arises from the seemingly aggressive (or, perhaps, defensive) behaviour of Russia; including the European and US fear that Putin is on the verge of annexing other previously Soviet states, particularly those in the Baltic area (as well as Transnistria, the Russian-speaking portion of Moldova, and even Moldova itself). As will be seen in the Epilogue, Putin’s apparent Eurasian ambitions further complicate the overall situation. As of late July 2014, the ability of Ukraine to maintain its territorial integrity seems to be fading, with the apparent possibility that the eastern part of that country will separate.

It is against this backdrop that this introductory chapter – as well as the Epilogue – is being composed. It should also be said that this is a period when there are a number of potential breakaway movements or territorial entities within the states of the European Union. A few examples may suffice. Perhaps most visibly, the cases of Scotland and Catalonia are evident, with a referendum pending in September 2014 within Scotland concerning its claim for independence from the London-dominated United Kingdom, but certainly not from the EU. In the somewhat parallel case of Catalonia there has been a long-standing desire to gain independence from Spain, the same being true, again within Spain, of the Basque people; although the aspirations of the latter crossover into France. In the case of both Spain and the UK there are quite a large number of less conspicuous moves in a similar direction. Indeed, the same kind of development has been happening in most parts of Europe, with some movements inside particular nation-states being linked to parallel movements in other EU countries. For example, there have been some actual or putative alliances between the Celtic components of Britain, Spain, and France.

To a significant extent these phenomena are linked to a long-standing concern with regionalization within Europe (Buttner, 2012). In fact, Buttner has connected the issue of “mobilizing regions” specifically to the theme of glocalization. At the same time, we are now witnesses to considerable “official” concern with what some political elites call localization, this being but part of a more or less globewide valorization of “the local”, more specifically the local community (Robertson, 1997). This concern with the local has – at least in the case of Europe – arisen largely because of the sense that far too much legislation has been unilaterally imposed from the EU centre in Brussels. This proclaimed eagerness to localize has been a prominent feature of the current British Coalition government’s programme. There is some irony in this, particularly at the nation-state level, in that the very ideology of localization (Hines, 2000) is, for the most part, being imposed upon localities by national governments, most clearly in the UK. This way of combining the “global” and the local might well be called imposed glocalization. Ritzer’s (2004; Andrews and Ritzer, 2007) concept of grobalization might well be relevant in this case, although I have reservations about his general approach to globalization.

Other regions, such as the island of Corsica (long a part of France), have had much older claims to independence; while there have been long-standing and conspicuous right-wing political parties such as the Front National in France, the Freedom Party (FPO) in Austria, and others elsewhere that have agitated for the same. Much more recently we have witnessed the rise of the overtly neo-Nazi Golden Dawn Party in Greece; the racist, authoritarian Jobbik Party in Hungary, as well as the latter’s dominant governmental party, Fidesz; the Our Slovakia Party (whose members wear Nazi-style uniforms); the Freedom Party in Ukraine; the Alternative für Deutschland; the Vlaams Belang Party in Belgium (that has Nazi roots); the Five Star Movement and the Northern League, both in Italy; the Danish Peoples’ Party; the Finns Party in Finland; the Swedish Democrats; and the Freedom Party in the Netherlands. We should also include the Right Sector Movement in Ukraine that certainly has very authoritarian tendencies, even, possibly, Nazi tendencies. This has been a major target of Putinists in Russia and Eastern Ukraine. There are also the British National Party, the English Defence League, and, of course, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The latter is particularly significant because, by the early summer of 2014, it had controversially and ambiguously more or less entered the mainstream of the British political scene.

One must also mention the relatively left-wing Eurosceptics, the Dutch Socialist Party also being anti-immigration. A few of the anti-EU movements on both the left and the right have joined forces to create transnational, anti-EU alliances. However, it should be emphasized that those on the left of this tendency are strongly opposed to discrimination on the basis of race or religion. In effect, these groups are forming a kind of European Tea Party “paralyzing the European parliament in much the same way as ultra-conservative Republicans have paralyzed Washington” (The Guardian, 2014: 8–9). Much of this extremism has been intensified by what is regarded in some quarters as the problematic and threatening presence of many thousands of Muslims in a number of European countries. In fact anti-Muslim sentiment has been amplified by a number of “terrorist” incidents in the UK, Spain, and elsewhere. Generally there has been a spurt of authoritarian right-wing movements all over Europe as well as in countries and other continents, such as the election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India.

It should be emphasized, however, that there has been a worldwide crystallization of left-wing movements, notably the Occupy Movement that strongly opposes contemporary capitalism, increasing inequality, the growing strength of large corporations, and the global financial system. This movement, as with most other contemporary movements (cf. McDonald, 2006), began in the USA as the Occupy Wall Street Movement, using the slogan “We are the 99%.” This has spread to virtually every region of the world. However, as with most such movements the programmes or policies have varied from country to country – and with greatly varying degrees of success. Apparently the Occupy Movement was inspired in part by movements in the Iberian Peninsula as well as the Tea Party and the fast-fading Arab Spring. Here again we find a great deal of variation under the global umbrella of Occupy, with these local variations constituting examples of glocalization.

Much of the contemporary radical, right-wing tendency can be viewed in the frame of the theme of populism. In fact, Kennedy (2010: 182–184) deals briefly with this issue in the context of his discussion of “working-class cosmopolitan urbanism”. The mere demand in a number of countries for referenda is one indicator of the rise of populism. The latter is, of course, difficult to separate from racist, anti-immigrant, and nativist movements – at least in the contemporary period. A great deal has been written about populism but I will not dwell on this debate here. Suffice it to say that populism involves actual or putative political leaders appealing to what might well be called the lowest common denominator; seizing upon, fusing, and aggregating widespread complaints and grudges concerning the threat to, or demise of, what are conceived of as traditional and/or local values and identities. Such values and identities are often regarded as being a consequence of the actions of the “political establishment” – a favourite phrase of UKIP in Britain.

In fact, populist movements draw upon and strategically amalgamate grudges, grievances, and complaints from all across the political– ideological spectrum. For example, UKIP draws much of its support from disaffected and disillusioned working-class, traditionally Labour Party, citizens, and even from “despised” ethnic minorities. In the case of the latter there is the “drawbridge” phenomenon that involves scrambling to demonstrate allegiance to the host country and keep potential or actual newcomers out. Undoubtedly, many of the controversies about immigration derive from the Schengen Agreement that was initially signed in 1985 by (a mere) five nations well before the European Union formally existed. The Maastricht Treaty in a sense consummated the principles that were indicated by the original Schengen Agreement. This latter agreement involved the abolition of internal European border controls so that individuals or groups could move freely without having to show passports. Schengen has been substantially extended and is now at the centre of numerous disputes concerning migration within the EU. The Maastricht Treaty accelerated the move towards the goal of making the EU an “ever closer union”.

One salient feature of the presence and rise of racist and/or populist movements has been the scapegoat phenomenon. As in many other parts of the world – including China, France, Australia, the USA, and yet others – at any point in time particular peoples have been blamed for the stresses and strains in a particular society, the most prominent – not to say tragic and egregious case – being the European Jews in the 1930s and 1940s (Robertson, 2014b). Of course, the European Holocaust was not concerned solely with the extermination of the Jews. It included, as other victims, Gypsies and Roma, as well as left-ideological opponents. In any case, Gypsies and Roma have frequently been conflated into one category of scapegoat and often further collapsed into or combined with the category of Travellers. Antagonism towards the Turks in Germany has not been confined to their Muslimism. In fact, the fusion of Turkishness and Muslimism in itself indicates the ways in which religion, ethnicity, and cultural tradition have been conflated Soysal (1995, 1998) has characterized this kind of societal presence as a form of post-national membership across much of Europe.

Even though I am particularly concerned with Europe – or specifically at this point with respect to the European Union, or what I call here institutionalized Europe – it should not be forgotten that the history of Europe has been replete with fissures, secessions, and utopian expectations. These phenomena have, of course, been the cause of numerous wars. In fact, institutionalized Europe, mainly in the form of the European Union, was largely inspired by the desire to overcome these, but particularly the rise of the Nazis and the horro...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Acknowledgements
• Notes on Contributors
• Prologue
• 1. Europeanization as Glocalization
• 2. Forms of the World: Roots, Histories, and Horizons of the Glocal
• 3. The Glocalizations of Christianity in Europe: A Global-Historical Perspective
• 4. European Television Programming: Exemplifying and Theorizing Glocalization in the Media
• 5. Glocalization Effects of Immigrants’ Activities on the Host Society: An Exploration of a Neglected Theme
• 6. From Football to Futebol: A Glocal Perspective on the Influence of Europe on Brazilian Football (and Vice Versa)
• 7. Exploring the Glocal Flow of Beauty: From Euro-America to the World?
• 8. Glocalization and the Simultaneous Rise and Fall of Democracy at the Century’s End
• Epilogue: The Provincialization of Europe?
• Index