Since the 1990s, research on language policy has focused on examining and interpreting language policies within their historical, political, economic, social, and cultural contexts (Tollefson 2013). Globalisation has brought fundamental changes in many aspects of the nation-state, society, and individual lives, often challenging traditional values and social orders. The spread of English , facilitated by globalisation, has had a tremendous impact on nonāEnglish-speaking countries in Asia. The responses and struggles of these countries to the face of the rapid spread of English as the lingua franca have been studied in terms of identity (Tsui and Tollefson 2007), medium of instruction (Hamid et al. 2014), and education (Baldauf et al. 2012; Kirkpatrick and Sussex 2012). Tollefson (2013, 308ā9) argues that when national and cultural identities weaken and traditional forms of state decision-making collapse, people often turn to ethnolinguistic nationalism to protect themselves or to regain a sense of belonging. This has been the case in Japan, which hovers between a commitment to globalisation and a reassertion of patriotic nationalism .
Since the Japanese government acknowledged the impact of globalisation for the first time in a White Paper in 2001, 1 the governmentās approach to the teaching of English as a foreign language (TEFL) has been designed to ensure that the language of this new order that is a product of globalisation does not undermine the core identity of the nation and its people (Hashimoto 2009). In other words, Japanās promotion of English has been based on a negative view of globalisation , which it is feared will have unwelcome consequences such as large-scale immigration and greater use of languages other than Japanese within Japanese society. This reflects a persistent denial of the need to learn English in the name of resisting English imperialism (Tsuda 1993; Se 2015), but as Yasuda (2016) points out, such opinions tend to be based on the nationalistic view that Japanese language has been constructed solely by people whose mother tongue is Japanese.
In comparison to Japanās āEnglish education,ā which has been a hotly debated topic among Japanese people and has been extensively researched by scholars within and outside Japan for the past 30 years, Japanese language teaching for foreigners is a relatively new field. Japan has regulated the national language and formulated various policies on foreign nationals, but has not developed a language policy that defines the roles of languages, levels of proficiency , the individual right to access to languages, or the governmentās responsibility to support language learning. This lack of government initiatives has also been addressed in studies on Japanās multilingualism (Yasuda 2011; Carroll 2012). When there is no national language policy , other official avenues such the Course of Study for school education become binding forces in determining curricula. According to the Course of Study, Japanās TEFL paradoxically takes place within the broader framework of the promotion of Japanese language (Hashimoto 2013a). Or, as Liddicoat (2013, 208) puts it, learning to articulate Japanese ideas in Japanese language forms a necessary basis for the learning of foreign languages, and this requires an international audience for the dissemination of Japanās distinctiveness. One such international audience could be Japanese language learners, who are seen in a rather instrumental way as āJapanese language human resources ā by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) , as discussed in Chap. 3 of this volume. In other words, there has been a close relationship between TEFL in Japan and Japanese language teaching for foreigners.
More than a decade ago, Nye (2004) pointed out that Japanās weakness in languages made it difficult for Japan to exercise its soft power. He observed that Japanese language was not widely spoken around the world and Japanās English language skills ranked among the worst in Asia, which made it hard for it to attract international talent to universities when Japan began to face demographic issues brought about by the ageing population and its historical resistance to immigration (Nye 2004, 87). The situation has not changed since that time: the English proficiency of Japanese people has remained low (The Japan Times 25 March 2013; The Japan Times 28 March 2015), and Japanese language is spoken as an official or common language only in Japan, although it has been a popular additional language to learn in some parts of the world, particularly in Asia and Oceania. 2 Nye praised Japan, however, for its successful exchange programme that develops lasting relationships with key individuals, which is one dimension of public diplomacy. This was a reference to the so-called Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme that brings ā6,000 young foreigners each year from 40 countries to teach their languages in Japanese schools, with an alumni association to maintain the bonds of friendship that are developedā (2004, 109ā10).
In fact, the JET Programme provides an interesting example of the role of language in cultural diplomacy or as an aspect of soft power. The programmeāits official Japanese name is čŖå¦ęå°ēćč”ćå¤å½é幓ęč“äŗę„ [lit. project to host foreign youth who conduct language teaching]āwas introduced in 1987 as an MOFA initiative. Under the programme, ALTs (assistant language teachers, although the official title of the position in Japanese is å¤å½čŖęå°å©ę [lit. foreign language teaching assistants], rather than teachers) are employed by the government and sent to local public schools. This might well be a successful model for Japanās diplomacy from MOFAās perspective, as Nye observed, but various problems have arisen with the programme as a provider of native speakers of English to local schools (McConnell 2008; Hashimoto 2013b). In the internal budgetary review process in 2010, it was pointed out that the ambiguous relationship between language education and international exchange had resulted in an ineffective practice of accepting ALTs who did not possess language teaching qualifications, as well as in creating a gap between the provider (MOFA) and the recipients (local governments and schools) in terms of the selection of ALTsāMOFA sought diversity, while schools preferred ALTs from the UK and the USA (Hashimoto 2013b). The employment of unqualified English native speakers without Japanese language skills was a compromise that allowed Japanese teachers to retain control in the classroom (Aspinall 2013), but the concept of team teaching, which evolved under these circumstances as co-teaching by a non-native English teacher (Japanese national) and an ALT (native speaker of English), has presented problems for both Japanese teachers and ALTs, as it does not recognise either of them as independent teachers with their own skills (Glasgow 2014). This form of team teaching, however, has also been extended to Japanese language teaching overseas, as reported in Chap. 7 of this volume. The case of the JET Programme demonstrates that measurement of the success of exchange programmes designed to develop friendships requires careful examination, particularly where language teaching is concernedāit inevitably involves various players such as teachers, learners, parents, schools, communities, and local and central governments, and the power relationships between them.
The term soft power itself is appealing partly because its positive image allows subjective interpretations by governments. Nye (2011, 99) lists basic sources of soft power , including āculture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, a successful economy, and a competent military ,ā which Chitty (2017, 2) summarises as the standard categoriesācultural, economic, ethical, legal, military ,...