Most of our contact with other-than-human animals occurs, directly or indirectly on a daily basis, when we eat them, when we wear products that have been made of their skin, fur and bones, and when we use commodities that have been tested on them in laboratories and/or that contain products of animal origin. We keep them as pets, status symbols and aids or tools in our work. Less frequently, we seek out their presence in circuses , zoos and game parks , and use them for recreational purposes: we ride and race them, fish and hunt them. Some of us also study them, both in artificial (laboratory) and natural settingsâto learn more about them and about ourselves.
It is widely accepted among animal psychologists, ethologists and students of animal behaviour in general that we are only beginning to recognise the vast reservoir of shared properties and similarities between âusâ and âthemâ, not to mention the many superior characteristics and capabilities possessed by other-than-human animals. Differences between humans and other animals are differences in degree, not in kind. Other animals, too, are conscious individuals, many possessing even conative and cognitive abilities. Like humans, they have biological as well as conative interests and a life that can be better or worse for them; they can be harmed and benefited; and they deserve to be treated and given consideration in accordance with their particular characteristics.
Consciousness in Animals
In so-called Western society, the first real animal welfare movement was launched in the nineteenth century. Without an actual precedent, pressure groups were formed and systematic agitation conducted. Only a hundred years earlier, the general assumption among âWesternersâ had been that animals were only means to human ends and benefits. Human dominion was absolute. Animals lacked immortal souls , reason, language âin short, they lacked consciousness per se, and to talk of their mattering morally, let alone having standing relevantly like human beings, or even to consider the possibility, was absurd. Transformation of public opinion, growing condemnation of maltreatment of animals and enforcement of, if not the rights of animals, at least the duties of humans to animals, were probably influenced by three main factors, moral, scientific and material or economic.
I will limit my discussion here to occidental attitudes. Oriental (âEasternâ) religious or spiritual thought and teachings were the first proponents of animal protection, recognising some kind of âonenessâ that existed throughout âcreationâ. Despite the often vast discrepancies between theory and practice (which continue to puzzle theologians and anthropologists), respect for animals has a long history in oriental thought.1
Moral Influence
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, stress was laid on human stewardship and on human duties to God, in regard of his creation, rather than on animals being considerable in their own right. Theologians urged that unnecessary suffering or cruelty not be inflicted on animals, an appeal which left much room for debate over which forms of suffering or cruelty were or were not unnecessary. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the rise of the more secular utilitarian doctrine which advocated the maximisation of happiness and pleasure , and the minimisation of pain and suffering of all sentient beings, and which did not place special emphasis on human dominion over non-human nature. The writings of Jeremy Bentham , John Stuart Mill and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, Henry Salt , among others, contributed to a general reassessment of received opinion.
Scientific Influence
The Darwinian revelation of significant similarities in anatomy, physiology and intelligence between human beings and larger apes indicated a common ancestry. It served to establish that all forms of animal life, human life included, have evolved from a common root. Each species constitutes a twig or branch on the same evolutionary tree and many have a large number of characteristics in common, in addition to the shared abilities of feeling pain , hunger and fear. The implication was that the âdifferenceâ between humans and animals could no longer be viewed as one in kind but was revealed to be one in degree. We are not only like animals; we are animals. It was this disclosure of the genealogical relationship of animals to humans which arguably led to a decrease in animal abuse and some of its worst excesses, or at least caused some to reconsider their motives, beliefs and actions. Nonetheless, the discovery that humans are animals, too, has not done much to diminish belief in the possibility that humans are a unique species of animal. Consonant with this belief is the persisting view that human beings have unique value vis-Ă -vis members of other species .
Material or Economic Influence
The Industrial Revolution freed humans from economic dependence on animal labour. As animals became marginal to the process of production it may have become easier to take up a more indulgent attitude towards their welfare. An interesting parallel is furnished by the phasing out of slavery and child labour. Only when these practices became increasingly unviable economically and were finally abandoned, did the ethical case against these abuses gather momentum and public support, to the extent that the initial, economic reasons have now, in retrospection, been overshadowed by the humanitarian concerns.
Similar examples from the realm of human interaction can be cited as parallels to the other kinds of influence, moral and scientific. Thus, the belief that racial or sexual dominion or âstewardshipâ was God-given or God-ordained was challenged by the discovery that race membership and gender are not associated with inferior or superior qualities or talents. This, in turn, has contributed to a more widespread acceptance of the ideas of equality and of fundamental human rights . My main concern in this chapter lies with the scientific factor. The other kinds of influence will be reviewed in subsequent chapters.
Consciousness in Animals
The extreme position that animals do not matter morally at all is due to RenĂ© Descartesâs description of them as ânatural automataâ or âself-moving machinesâ (Descartes 1976: 61, 63, 66). It is not altogether clear to what extent Descartes subscribed to the views that influenced this extreme moral stance. If his ideas have been misrepresented, this was due to his contradictory, and often vague, remarks. What is certain is that he based his arguments on a fundamental difference between human beings and animals, though even in this regard, his reference to âmen (having) an absolute empire over all the other animalsâ (63, emphasis added) could be interpreted as implying that the difference, however significant, is not fundamental. It would appear, however, that Descartesâs dualism commits him to the former view. Whether or not and to what extent it was Descartesâs view, the extreme position characterised here involves a denial of minds , inner life, sensation and consciousness in animals. Animal behaviour can be explained without reference to conscious states. Insofar as they are not thought of as conscious, there is nothing to be taken into account, morally speaking. Consequently, we are free to treat them as we like. Their cries and squeals are mechanical noises, nothing more. The mechanism as a whole, the body, is without feeling.
Although monist views like behaviourism and (reductive) materialism have also been responsible for our generally indifferent and often callous attitude towards and treatment of animals, they could be construed to be or have been responsible for much the same kind of treatment of human beings, since they concern all bodies and, hence, all minds . It seems that dualism , with its insistence on the exclusive possession by humans of an immortal soul, has wreaked greater havoc. Of course, one can be a dualist and nonetheless acknowledge minds or souls in animals. The Buddhist idea of transmigration of souls and the Greek notion of metempsychosis apply to human as well as non-human life. There is an inherent contradiction in denying animals souls , considering that âanimalâ literally means âensouledâ. Aristotle sees the soul as the fundamental and distinct formal cause or source of the living body, whether human or non-human. Anticipating evolution , he argues for the evolutionary continuity and âgraduated differentiationâ of all life in De Anima and Historia Animalium (Aristotle 1928â1952).
Cartesian dualism equates animals (and bodies ) with machines or automata which operate in accordance with physiological laws and whose motions follow physical and mechanical principles rather than originate in an immaterial mind . Moreover, it posits the separate substantial existence of minds, the centres of (self-)consciousness , thought and language . Consequently, (Cartesian) dualism is ultimately committed to denying animals consciousness , cognitive and conative states (thoughts , beliefs , preferences , intentions , desires , emotions and wills), andâmore radicallyâeven sensations. Descartes (1976: 65) does say that âsince they have eyes, ears, tongues and other sense organs like ours, it seems likely that they have sensation like usâ. Elsewhere he speaks of âtheir fear, their hope, or their joyâ, but claims that they are âwithout any thoughtâ (64). Yet, he fails to clarify how âfeelingâ or âsensationâ could possibly be accounted for without reference to consciousness , and âhopeâ without reference to âthought â.
Well, are animals conscious? Are they capable of having sensations, feelings and conscious experience? To say that it is contrary to common sense to deny this and to cite behavioural evidence in favour of animal consciousness is not sufficient. A hardcore Cartesian dualist is not denying facts about animal behaviour. An automaton (Greek: âself-moving thingâ; Websterâs dictionary: âmachine that is relatively self-operatingâ/âcreature who acts in a mechanical fashionâ) can behave âas ifâ it were in pain . What is denied is that these facts are best understood or explained by reference to consciousness . Nor will it do to enumerate certain contradictions in Descartesâs own writings, for example, when he says in a letter in June 1633: âI have dissected the heads of various animals in order to ascertain in what memory, imagination, etc., consistâ (Descartes 1970). Paradoxically , Descartes is both trying to understand mental faculties here through an examination of animal biology while yet denying that animals have any moral significance whatsoever. However, merely pointing to this contradiction is insufficient here.
What is required in making a case for animal consciousness is a combination of factors. One might begin by citing reasons for the rejection of the Cartesian claim that possession of language , linguistic ability, is essential to possession of consciousness. The commonsense view acknowledges the existence of pre-linguistic consciousness . Indeed, it is not clear how language could develop in the absence of pre-linguistic consciousness. Suppose babies and very young children were, prior to their acquisition of language, not conscious of anything. How, then, could they be taught a language? Such instruction is possible only if the learners are conscious recipients who can hear, see, touch and/or feel. Now, if young children need to possess such consciousness in order to be able to learn a language at all, how could animals plausibly be denied consciousness? Certainly not on the grounds of the lack of an ability to learn (a human) language: some humans lack the potential for language acquisition, owing to internal or external incapacitation, but are they therefore not âconsciousâ? Did Mowgli only acquire consciousness after he was âdiscoveredâ? This suggestion is hardly plausible or defensible, unless ...