The Indian subcontinent achieved independence at the beginning of the second wave of democracy shortly after the Allied victory in World War II. While Pakistan failed to establish democracy even when the second wave was at its peak, Bangladesh became independent in December 1971 as the second wave ebbed and before the rush of the third wave which swept across the world from the mid-1970s (Huntington 1991). Bangladesh began its democratic journey under the Westminster system as soon as its founder, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, returned from prison in Pakistan and passed the Constitution in December 1972. Within three years, the democratic system was substituted by the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), which established a one-party authoritarian system. From 1975, the people of Bangladesh struggled to re-establish democracy in the face of a succession of civil and military autocracies that ended in 1990, at a time when the third wave of democracy was sweeping over most of the third-world countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Bangladesh restored democracy in 1991. By and large, the last part of the twentieth century was marked by the global triumph of democracy as an ideal system of government, with world power reaching a consensus to dispense with any form authoritarianism.1 The end of the Cold War and rise of the third of wave of democracy allowed for the expansion of democratic government to the former communist bloc and the non-aligned group of states and eliminated the rationale for tolerating autocratic practices worldwide (Magen 2009: 5–6). All over of the world, the numbers of democracies increased significantly. The exact tally varies depending on the criteria used to assess democratic consolidation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Wave_Democracy). By 2006, the number of democratic states in the world rose to 121 from forty in 1974 (Diamond 2008 cited by Magen 2009: 6). However, the majority of independent countries emerging from colonial rule could not achieve a reasonable degree of success in establishing liberal democracy.2 Bangladesh is a case in point.
Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign state on December 16, 1971, having fought a war of independence against Pakistan for the right to establish a true democracy—to build a country where people would enjoy civil and political liberties without suffering economic and social exploitation. The partition of British India in August 1947 gave birth to Pakistan but Bangladesh, which constituted its eastern province, would experience internal colonialism for the following twenty-three years until its dismemberment in 1971. Bangladesh is built on the premise of ‘Sonar Bangla’ (Golden Bengal)—a totally different polity that would ensure an economically prosperous, democratically governed society, free of exploitation and respectful of the rights of the people. The country made a spectacular stride toward establishing a democratic state within one year, adopting its Constitution in 1972 with a Westminster-style parliamentary form of government and the provision of an elaborate suite of fundamental rights and an independent judiciary. Article 11 of the Constitution unequivocally stated that “Bangladesh shall be a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of human person shall be guaranteed” (GOB Constitution of Bangladesh). The government held the first parliamentary elections the following year, 1973, in which the ruling Awami League (AL) party won a landslide and formed a government with Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as prime minister. Sheikh Mujib had been the chief architect of an independent Bangladesh, and at the advent in 1973 of parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model, there were high hopes that under his leadership the country could realize the spirit of the liberation war.3
At the very dawn of independence, Sheikh Mujib was faced with the gigantic task of restoring a war-ravaged economy and combating a declining law and order situation across the country, all with a very inexperienced and inept administration. Within months of winning a landslide victory, the AL was plunged into factional politics. A deep schism opened between militant youth leaders and the older moderate members who disagreed over the modus operandi of governance. In this spell of political listlessness, the personal discretion of Sheikh Mujib reigned over the entire machinery of government and thus weakened democratic institutions in the country at the very beginning of its democratic journey. Instead of accommodating dissenting views and showing tolerance, Sheikh Mujib preferred to exercise undisputed authority, demanding unconditional submission from all members. Any opposition to Mujib inside and outside Parliament was considered tantamount to sedition. The administration was managed by people who were close and loyal to Mujib, who placed his relatives in strategic administrative positions: “Many appointments were made on the basis of nodding acquaintance with Mujib or on the recommendations of his close friends. Some even took commission for a chit” (Mascarenhas 2013: 14). The Bangladeshi public, by and large, resented this nepotism and favoritism which opportunists and conspirators successfully exploited to their favor (Jahan 2005: 167–173). In 1974, the situation worsened due to rampant corruption, excessive price hikes of essential commodities, and terrible flooding. The civil and military bureaucracy proved inefficient to deliver services to the population or counteract corruption and lawlessness across the country. Far-left political parties vehemently criticized Sheikh Mujib and conspired to oust him from power. Anthony Mascarenhas observes:
Eight months after he had taken over as prime minister, the tide of popularity had begun to run out for Mujib. The great agitator, the champion of the people’s grievance, the beloved Bangabandhu on whom the most fulsome praise had been lavished, had now become the target of criticism from an outraged public. (Mascarenhas 2013: 19)
The situation was further worsened by a deadly famine in 1974 in which some 26,000 people starved to death according to an official government estimate, although “one scholar estimates 1.5 million deaths as a reasonable estimate” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_famine_of_1974, retrieved on September 24, 2016). Whatever the true figure, this claimed a heavy toll on the popularity of Sheikh Mujib. The people of Bangladesh felt ashamed, insulted, and demoralized as a nation since this famine was not due to a food crisis but rather maldistribution and mismanagement. The scarcity of food was due to corrupt and inefficient management in the nationalized public sector (Jahan 2005: 167). Faced with growing starvation, every village heard stories about fantastic smuggling and profit being made from the illegal shipment of rice and jute to India (Lifschultz 1979; Mascarenhas 2013). The Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) launched a vigorous movement to bring an end to the regime, collaborating with other left-wing parties to take up arms and fight an underground insurgency to oust the AL from power. The JSD leaders openly denounced the AL as more corrupt and much worse than the Pakistani leaders ever were (Mascarenhas 2013). The top brass of the pro-left leadership, including Major M.A. Jalil and JSD founder A.S.M. Abdur Rab, as well as innumerable activists, were imprisoned (Huq 1985).4 Sheikh Mujib, increasingly desperate at the deteriorating situation, conceded to suggestions by the AL militant youth leaders to introduce the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Bill in 1975 in order to consolidate his power absolutely. This amendment replaced the parliamentary system with a presidential one, introduced a monolithic one-party system under the BAKSAL, and concentrated all political power in the hands of the president. Lifscultz observes the painful tragedy of the once-revered leading architect of Bangladeshi independence overturning parliamentary democracy and emerging as a dictator in a one-party system (Lifschultz 1979: 87).
This kind of reversal to authoritarianism is not unique to Bangladesh. In fact, a large number of democracies that emerged from internal or external colonialism in Africa and Latin America during the third wave of democracy failed to consolidate their democracies (Magen et al. 2009; Haynes 2001). Before independence, nationalist leaders organized liberation movements against colonial powers and spoke of Western values of democracy such as liberty, equality, and popular participation. But following independence, many questioned whether the liberal values the same leaders had espoused were in fact more of a tactic for gathering mass support than a true commitment to liberal ideology. The people of these countries witnessed a sharp contrast between what was promised and what actually came about after independence. This is what David Beetham (2006) describes in the guide to good parliamentary practice published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) as the ‘paradox of democracy.’ Another commentator makes the observation that their initial experiments with western style constitutional government were soon discarded in favor of either a one-party system or military dictatorship (Jahan 1987: 95). Moreover, popular nationalist leaders realized that liberal democratic values such as liberty, equality, and participation were mutually conflicting and ran counter to their political interests, which led them to revert to authoritarianism for their political survival (Jahan 2005: 1–3). However, Sheikh Mujib’s experiment with the BAKSAL was crushed before it could be given a trial by the August coup of 1975 staged by Lt. Col. Abdur Rashid and Lt. Col. Farooq Rahman.5 Sheikh Mujib and most of his family were brutally assassinated on August 15, 1975 and thus brought the end of the first phase of Awami League rule (1972–1975).6
After Sheikh Mujib’s assassination, Bangladesh underwent prolonged military and pseudo-military rule, led in succession by Generals Zia and Ershad until 1990. This period was characterized by a plethora of successful and abortive military coups and countercoups; the rise of civil and military authoritarianism, and mock democracy under the presidential system of government; intermittent attempts to restore a democratic system through elections that were farcical and rigged; political institutions subservient to the whims of the chief executive; and ineffective Parliament—to mention but a few. Democracy was restored after a tremendous mass uprising in 1990 (Lifschultz 1979; Mascarenhas 2013).
From 1972 to 1990, the Bangladeshi Parliament, when it existed, was constituted through flawed elections designed to legitimize the regime and serve the desires of the chief executives and autocrats, be they military or civil. Each parliament suffered a legitimacy crisis, since none of them were elected democratically or attained public confidence. Any supremacy of Parliament over the executive was too much to expect during this period in Bangladesh.7 Parliament was ever prepared to approve whatever resolutions the executive had brought before them.
From the election of the First Parliament in 1973 to the end of military rule at the close of 1990, all four parliamentary elections (1973, 1979, 1986, and 1988) were flawed under the politicized Bangladesh Election Commission (EC) (Tim Meisburger, asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/OccasionalPaperNo11FINAL.pdf) that set out to manipulate elections in favor of the incumbent government by exerting influence on constituencies through government machinery at the field administration level.8 In order to prevent election rigging by the ruling party, the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, made in the run-up to the 1996 parliamentary elections, institutionalized the unique system of non-party caretaker government (NCG) election oversight. Under the new system the party government had to cede power to an interim, unelected NCG, usually headed by the Chief Justice, ninety days before an election to ensure a level playing field for all political parties to contest elections (Arafat Kabir 2015). The system gained public confidence at home and abroad and worked well for years; power changed hands in four successive elections held in 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008. “In four electoral contests, the caretaker government ensured that political foxes did not guard the electoral hen houses” (Landry 2016). The EC was perceived as neutral and unbiased, and the electoral process was believed transparent and credible. The voter list was considered reliable following a comprehensive voter registration exercise. As a matter of fact, the whole election management reached such a level of excellence that it was held up as a model for other emerging democracies. These elections were believed to be ushering in a new era for making the transition to an effective democracy (Arafat Kabir 2015).
After the fall of the military dictatorship in 1990, subsequent parliaments popularly elected under NCGs were expected to be institutionalized, assert their supremacy over the executive, and hold it to account for its actions and policies—as is parliament’s role in the Westminster model.9 However, that remained a dream for Bangladesh. Of all the problems that thwarted true democracy in the country, the most fundamental challenge was successfully holding credible and participatory parliamentary elections. In addition, other challenges Bangladesh confronted in its journey toward establishing a democratic system since its independence may be summarized as:
- 1.holding free, fair, and credible elections to Parliament by an impartial EC;
- 2.lack of continuity in constitutional rule;
- 3.lack of enforcement of the rule of law;
- 4.lack of resources to make Parliament independent of the executive;...