Secular Institutions, Islam and Education Policy

France and the U.S. in Comparative Perspective

P. Mattei, A. Aguilar

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137316080
• Topic: Éducation
• Subtopic: Politique d'éducation

Amidst claims of threats to national identities in an era of increasing diversity, should we be worried about the upsurge in religious animosity in the United States, as well as Europe? This book explores how French society is divided along conflicts about religion, increasingly visible in public schools, and shows the effect that this has had.

1

The New Challenges to the École laïque: Integrating Islam

On 11 November 2013, a series of five reports reflecting on the current state of integration in France was posted on Prime Minister Jean-Marie Ayrault’s website. The reports focused on how to incorporate multiculturalism into the French Republican model through initiatives such as incorporating diversity into French history, teaching foreign languages in school, and emphasizing the contributions of immigrants to French society. Among the justifications for a revised approach to diversity, the findings of a commission sponsored by Ayrault commented on the discriminatory effects of laïcité, writing: ‘It is important to reflect on the conditions of development of an inclusive and liberal conception of laïcité, of a communal laïcité, sensitive to both the contexts and consequences of its implementation’ (Boubeker and Noël, 2013). By advocating the development of a liberal and inclusive conception of laïcité, the report assumed that the current state of laïcité was illiberal, exclusive, and therefore a hindrance to integration.

The reports on integration and the implied critique of this national value immediately generated a backlash from the entirety of the political spectrum. Marine Le Pen called it a ‘declaration of war against the French’ (Rovan and de Royer, 2015), and French President and member of the Socialist Party (PS) Francois Hollande immediately distanced himself from the report. In a later interview with the original authors, they played down the critique that they attacked foundations of French identity or flawed ideas of equality. In fact, the authors of the report cited the non-radical nature of the report, stating, ‘These reports do not propose anything more than a transition from a republican model of laïcité to a liberal Anglo-Saxon model open to communalism.’

Similar reactions to critiques of laïcité are commonly found in French media. In September 2013, the Ministry of Education issued a ‘Charte de la Laïcité à l’École’ to help teachers reinforce secularism in schools (Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’énseignement supérieur et de la recherche, 2013). The charter bans pupils from boycotting classes for religious and political reasons. It also promotes total respect for the freedom of conscience. Article 12 states: ‘No student can invoke their political or religious convictions, in order to dispute a teacher’s right to address a question on the syllabus.’ The Charter was contested and criticized by various Muslim associations and activist groups. Emmanuel Todd is currently facing mounting criticism regarding his views that the 2015 Charlie Hebdo public demonstration effectively represented an ultraconservative and closed-minded approach with regards to religion.

The politicization of laïcité in the past thirty years demonstrates how it evokes mixed reactions, and sentiments, among lay and religious people, political elites and ordinary citizens alike. On one hand, it is invoked as a hopeful solution to social and political conflicts associated with an increasingly heterogeneous population. Laïcité serves as the method of integration for foreign-born populations and their French-born children (Kastoryano, 2005; Schnapper, 2007). As a result, French politicians and academics from all sides of the political spectrum assert the fundamental value of laïcité for French citizenship. On the other hand, it is increasingly seen by academics outside France as an instrument of aggressive secularism that limits individual and group freedoms.

The implications of the Ayrault report demonstrate that the ‘neutrality’ of laïcité often focuses on minority groups like Muslims, who become stigmatized and singled out from the rest of the population. Those who defend the principle of laïcité note the role it plays in maintaining an open and neutral public space, tolerant of all religious beliefs. Robert Badinter delivered a speech in Oslo in 2011, arguing that laïcité is the precondition for the creation of a neutral state that respects religious beliefs without explicitly favouring any of them. ‘Laïcité is the guarantee of human dignity of all people in the Republic,’ argues Badinter, citing Article 10 of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme de 1789 (Cerf and Horwitz, 2012). Patrick Weil develops this point in his scholarly work on citizenship (Weil, 2011); he suggests that the historical success of the French model of laïcité rests in the priority that the state has bestowed upon the protection of all individuals against the pressure of religious groups (Weil, 2005a). Laïcité regulates religion to protect the right of freedom of conscience, an individual right of all members of the community.

In an increasingly diverse France, the debate over how to interpret and implement laïcité has become one of utmost urgency. Despite this urgency, the debate has reached an intellectual blockage as rightly suggested by Michel Terestchenko in his book Un si fragile vernis d’humanité, contrary to other European countries (Terestchenko, 2005). Islam is the second religion in France, after Catholicism. Islam has doubled its followers from the end of the 1960s to 2007. There are 2.1 million self-reported Muslims (3.2 per cent of the population) and 800,000 practising Muslims (Joignot, 2012). Against these figures, in 1966 self-reported Catholics were 80 per cent of the population. By 2007, this number had decreased to 51 per cent. One of the central questions, for instance, in the contemporary public debates over the ban of the full hijab: ‘Faut-il permettre le port de signes religieux dans les écoles au nom de la liberté ou l’interdire au nom de la laïcité?’¹

Tariq Ramadan, an extraordinary observer and scholar, has stressed the religious fervour associated with laïcité and has called it the new religion of the state. Scott condemns laïcité as a discriminatory principle against Muslims, while Martha Nussbaum has deemed it illiberal and incompatible with individual liberty (Scott, 2007; Nussbaum, 2012; Ramadan, 2014). Conservative authors like Henri Pena-Ruiz have stressed the necessity of laïcité in an increasingly religious world (Pena-Ruiz, 2005, 1999). Academic discourse has taken an increasingly combative approach to argue for a change in the philosophy of laïcité rather than a specific policy change. A new generation of scholarship, led by Philippe Portier, has insisted on the need to transition away from combative rhetoric to allow for a more reflective and sustained approach on the implications of laïcité in contemporary France (Lagrée and Portier, 2010).

In a similar vein to Portier, we believe that an analysis of laïcité beyond value judgements, normative underpinnings, and a focus on explicit policy programmes and reforms in the public education system is much needed. As John Bowen boldly states, laïcité is politically useful precisely because it means something to everyone (Bowen, 2007). We wish to avoid the ideological debates regarding this provocative term, and reground laïcité in the policy and programmatic activities of the French state, in the corpus of French laws, and in the classrooms of the French Republic.

Laïcité: a short history of the principle

The modern debate over laïcité brings up an important question: what is laïcité? It is not secularism in the American sense. Unlike in the U.S., there is no inherent right to unlimited, unmediated liberty of religious expression in France. In the words of Jean Baubérot, noted historian of French laïcité, this agreement between church and state is called the ‘pacte laïque’ and results in an ‘imposed peace and the transition to a dominant and inclusive laïcité’ (Baubérot, 2000, 2004). Such a pact is non-negotiable and holds serious penalties if breached. Therefore, church and state are separate in the French system, but the church operates in a state-operated space under the ‘imposed peace’. The legal basis of laïcité rests on its 1958 constitutional guarantee and a series of laws passed at the turn of the twentieth century, with the most important being the sacrosanct 9 December 1905 law that officially separated church and state. However, laïcité is also strongly associated with French national values and a sense of French identity. According to a 2015 poll by the Institute of French Public Opinion, 71 per cent believe laïcité is the most important Republican principle, an increase of 41 points since 2008 (Institut français d’opinion publique, 2015). The clear link with identity politics makes the upholding of laïcité a critical priority, and a useful political tool for building up public sentiment. Recent political dialogue has voiced an underlying need to ‘protect’ laïcité from the threat of religious fundamentalism. Another 2015 poll by Le Monde and Ipsos reveals that 74 per cent believe laïcité is currently under threat, further underscoring the importance placed on preserving and protecting laïcité. The worry over laïcité and the role it plays in public opinion result in mixed and uneven definitions.

Laïcité is first a legal principle historically rooted in asserting the sovereignty and power of the state over the Catholic church. As astutely noted by Olivier Roy, laïcité is a series of laws and legislative acts that have direct policy implications (Roy, 2005). In 2013, Hollande created the Secularism Monitoring Centre to help set an official state interpretation of laïcité. According to this institution, laïcité guarantees ‘all citizens, whatever their philosophical or religious beliefs, to live together, enjoying freedom of conscience, freedom to practise a religion or to choose not to, equal rights and obligations, and republican fraternity’ (Observatoire de la laïcité, 2013). The Centre, the 1905 law, and numerous legal scholars clearly articulate the three core legal principles that form laïcité: liberty of individual conscience, equality of religious expression, and the guaranteed religious neutrality of the state (Messner et al., 2003, p. 40). The concept of neutrality serves as the guarantee for individual expression against undue religious expression. This idea of secularism protects individuals against the pressure from organized religious institutions, a common characteristic found in the history of church–state relations in France (Hazareesingh, 1994; Baubérot, 2000; Merle, 2005).

Laïcité is the legal relationship between the state and various cultes. The neutrality of the state, according to Valerie Amiraux, ‘structures a certain equality between faith communities’, but this equality does not apply between church and state (Amiraux, 2010). Religions do not, and have never had, absolute free reign in France during the twentieth century. The state actively intervenes in the affairs of religious cultes in order to preserve the free exercise of religion and, most importantly, the liberty of conscience guaranteed by Article 1. The state guarantees religious equality by asserting its dominance over the religious sphere. Therefore, laïcité also serves as a guarantor of individual rights through state policies that are meant to protect the neutrality of public spaces. Many modern debates regarding laïcité often diverge based on whether it regulates religion or guarantees individual expression, but in fact both are explicitly guaranteed in its overarching principles. The 1905 separation law is thus a negative guarantor of religious freedom, distinct from the positive guarantee found in the U.S.

Though governed by a series of laws and constitutional guarantees, laïcité as a normative principle is fraught with numerous political exemptions and unclear legal interpretations. Laïcité was first legally established through a series of laws at the turn of the twentieth century, with the 9 December 1905 separation law achieving a canonical place in its legal interpretation. This law establishes three principles of laïcité: liberty of individual conscience equality of religious expression, and neutrality of the state (‘Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État’, 1905). Most scholarship only emphasizes the 1905 law, neglecting the other bases of its legal standing. Its most important guarantee comes from the 1958 constitution, which fails to define the precise legal ramifications of laïcité. Additionally, various exceptions to laïcité can be found in contemporary France. Religious education still occurs in Alsace-Moselle because it was not part of France when the 1905 law was enacted, Similarly, the French state funds approximately 90 per cent of Catholic churches, 50 per cent of Protestant churches, and 10 per cent of synagogues. In addition to the funding places of worship, the French state also funds religious private education, with the large majority going to Catholic schools. (Bowen, 2007, p. 32)

As with any legal principle, the interpretation of its legal corpus is left to the legislative and judicial bodies of the French state. Its interpretation by lawmakers and other political actors gives laïcité a political dimension that relies on its immediate cultural context. The policy of laïcité is subject to the political and social ramifications of a time period. Given the complex and contradictory corpus of laws and court rulings, the laïcité de l’État is ultimately a state policy used to achieve a particular social or political goal that might not necessarily be laïque in the legal sense. In the words of a former Minister of Religion, ‘The state could be laïque in principle but clerical in reality’ (Méjan, 1960).

The idea of neutrality as a stable normative value also needs to be reframed in a political sense. Laïcité as neutrality is a relatively new legal interpretation emerging in the 1950s and 1960s. Historically, laïcité was defined as ‘not religious or ecclesiastical’ according to its original definition in the Littre Dictionary and not as ‘neutral’. In having a non-religious connotation, laïcité is juxtaposed against religious influence and beliefs. For the first part of its history, it was the power mechanism through which to counter and control the Catholic church. Current debate has centred on the concept of neutrality, a concept that some legal scholars argue was not the intent of the original 1905 law.

The influence of legislative bodies in the interpretation of laïcité is particularly influential, and indicates how public opinion plays a critical role in its interpretation. The 2004 ban on religious symbols in schools was in direct contradiction to a 1989 ruling by the Conseil d’État, France’s highest administrative court that determined the headscarf was compatible with laïcité.² Chapter 4 explores in detail this policy discontinuity in relation to the interpretation of religious freedom in schools. Although laïcité is widely and fervently endorsed in France, its ramifications have been subjected to different emphases over time. Laïcité is not a monolithic principle, but rather has different undercurrents that resurface at different points in time under different circumstances. President Chirac and the Stasi Committee that he created played a key role in breaking the established consensus on the interpretation of laïcité. Far from being a concept ossified in time, laïcité is a living and malleable concept. Likewise, Sarkozy’s quest to transition Islam en France to Islam de France warranted direct state intervention in the affairs of the Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM). Chapter 2 argues for the malleability of this concept, one of our central arguments, by looking at how multiple definitions of laïcité contributed to the rise of French Islam in the contemporary France.

Laïcité and education: an extended history

Noted historian Emile Poulat states that ‘Our laïcité has one history but two memories’ (Poulat, 1987). Both defenders and critics of laïcité construct two different remembrances of a complex and tumultuous divisions between church and state. For the entirety of French political history after the revolution, the role of religion and the extent of its influence has been the subject of intense political and philosophical debate. Laïcité was meant to dismantle completely the influence of the Catholic church in French politics and to prevent its influence from affecting both state and citizen.

The establishment of the French public education during the Third Republic was the mechanism through which laïcité would be instilled as a republican value in the nineteenth century. Through this new education system, the holy trinity of French values – liberty, equality, and fraternity – would replace the Catholic holy trinity as a method of identity. Debates during the late Third Republic focused on how far to promote Republican identity in schools and how much to exclude religion from the public sphere. This debate is best characterized as a debate between centralism, the philosophical underpinnings of the state, and centralization, the process of organizing a modern nation (Prost, 1968). As will be discussed later, the exact role of Republicanism in the education system was a great subject of debate, namely due to the limitations it would place on other key liberal values like freedom of expression. The historical role of schools as a method of secular identity earned the school system the nickname La Laïque.

The history of laïcité as a legal principle begins with the French Revolution. The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man guaranteed the freedom of conscience in order to break the political power of the First Estate over the French government. Citizenship becomes entirely detached from its religious ties to the Church. Article 10 states that Nul ne doit etre inquiété pur ses opinions, meme religieuses, purvou que leur manifestation ne trouble pas l’ordre public établi par la loi. While such reforms were also meant to create an ethically independent citizen, they were first and foremost designed to rebase the sovereignty of France its new government and not in Rome. Laïcité was thus a political method to reasse...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The New Challenges to the École Laïque: Integrating Islam
• 2 Faire l’Islam Laïc: The Makings of French Islam
• 3 The French Republican School: l’École Laïque and Its Historical Origins
• 4 Policies towards Religion in French Public Schools, 1989–2004
• 5 Rising Education Inequalities in French Schools
• 6 The Post-2004 Ban and the Integration of Muslim Students: The Limits of a Narrowly Legalistic Approach
• 7 Cultural and Religious Conflicts in the History of American Schools
• 8 Assimilation and Educational Achievement of Minority Groups in the U.S.
• 9 Secular Institutions between Policy and Politics
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index