Metaphysics from a Biological Point of View

S. Boulter

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781137322821
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy & Ethics in Science

Many philosophers in the analytic tradition are now convinced that metaphysical questions are worth pursuing, but we still lack a convincing meta-metaphysics and methodology. This essay offers an account of how we should conduct our business qua metaphysicians.

Part I

On the Possibility of Metaphysics

1

A Return to Scholastic Metaphysics

Introduction

One of the most remarkable features of mid-to-late-twentieth-century analytic philosophy is the revival of interest in the traditional problems of metaphysics. It is true that philosophers never really abandoned metaphysics, at least in the sense that they never stopped making metaphysical claims of one sort or another. But it is undoubtedly the case that, at least officially, metaphysics was in very bad odour in mainstream circles prior to Kripke’s (1972) rediscovery of necessary a posteriori propositions. For ever since Hume consigned metaphysics to the flames, and Kant asked how synthetic a priori propositions are possible, philosophers had grown accustomed to the idea that no profit is to be had from metaphysical reflection as traditionally understood. Metaphysics, once the queen of the sciences, was exposed by these Enlightenment thinkers as an impossibility, and its practitioners, however well intentioned, deluded. The passage of time seemed to confirm this assessment, and the only matter of dispute was how one should react to the death of metaphysics. Some, Kant for instance, emphasised the tragic aspect of metaphysics’ calamities, for we cannot but ask metaphysical questions even when we know they cannot be answered (1965, p. 7). Others positively welcomed the demise of metaphysics as it was nothing more than a mask concealing a will to power that needed to be exposed for what it was.¹ Still others were more sanguine, maintaining that philosophy can get along just fine without metaphysics, either because philosophy has other business to attend to,² or because our legitimate metaphysical needs, if there are any, can be addressed by the sciences.³

But more recent history seems to corroborate Gilson’s claim that ‘metaphysics always buries its undertakers’.⁴ Although we have yet to see anything like a restoration of metaphysics to its former glory, it is now a burgeoning research area, showing all the signs of returning to rude good health. However, given the long period of neglect from which metaphysics is only now emerging, it is perhaps not surprising that philosophers in the analytic tradition are still collectively finding their metaphysical feet, particularly when it comes to meta-metaphysical and methodological matters.⁵ And, as we shall see in the next chapter, many still doubt there are any metaphysical feet to find. Thus contemporary metaphysicians find themselves in an exciting, but ultimately unstable position: Many of us are now convinced that metaphysical questions are worth pursuing, but we still lack a convincing story to offer our detractors about how we conduct our business qua metaphysicians. This book is an attempt to provide such a story.

And the core recommendation is this: Contemporary metaphysicians need not reinvent the discipline out of whole cloth. Much time and energy can be saved if we are willing to learn from the past masters, particularly the Scholastics. Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and Suarez, the leading figures from the golden and silver ages of Scholasticism, provide plausible answers to our meta-metaphysical and methodological questions if only we are willing to listen. They also have tenable answers to first-order metaphysical questions, answers that deserve to be seen as serious contributions to our ongoing efforts at metaphysical reflection.

This recommendation is hard for many to swallow. While it is often a sensible tactic in chess to retreat the better to advance, this is not a standard move in philosophical contexts. Moreover, like Hobbes, most analytic philosophers labour under the false impression that ‘the Schoolmen’ were purveyors of a ‘dark’ and ‘vain’ philosophy expressed in ‘insignificant Traines of strange or barbarous words’ about obscure metaphysical entities justified only by empty ratiocinations and verbal disputations carried out under the suspicious eye of an ever vigilant Church.⁶ It would take a book length study to explain how this gross caricature came to be so widely accepted amongst philosophers from the early modern period down to the present day.⁷ But whatever the history, the view is false. The Scholastics were highly sophisticated metaphysicians, logicians, epistemologists, cognitive psychologists and ethicists, and there is much to be gained by a sustained study of their work. And far from being monolithic defenders of the faith, who ‘resolve of their Conclusions before they know their Premises’, the Scholastics knew very well how to distinguish their theology from their philosophy. That there is a clear distinction between Scholastic theology and Scholastic metaphysics is not always appreciated. This is no doubt due to the fact that their metaphysical discussions are usually intertwined with theological discussions, and because they rarely developed metaphysical views for their own sake. But this is an accidental and not an essential feature of their metaphysical reflections. It is perhaps Suarez’s greatest contribution to the history of philosophy that he presented the fruits of Scholastic metaphysical reflection in a systematic fashion independently of any theological considerations in his monumental Metaphysical Disputations. That this was possible at all speaks to the fact that metaphysics had an independent life of its own even in the hands of theologians.

However, a couple of additional points are worth making in order to sweeten the suggestion that the Scholastics have much to teach us. First, although this book is a defence of metaphysics as traditionally understood and practised by the Scholastics, there is one important difference – the point of departure for metaphysical reflection. The great Scholastic metaphysicians were theologians first and foremost, and their metaphysical doctrines emerged in the course of their efforts to deal with theological problems. Theology plays no such role here. However, the sciences throw up problems that are structurally analogous to those tackled by the Scholastics. The account of metaphysics to be developed here is thus inspired by the meta-metaphysics and methodology of the Scholastics, but begins with problems emerging from the sciences rather than theology. The problems discussed in Part II are all drawn from reflection on the life sciences in particular, and so one can justly call this book an effort in metaphysics from a biological point of view. If anyone should baulk at this version of Scholasticism, it cannot be because it is compromised by theological commitments.

The second sweetener is the primary thesis of this introductory chapter, namely, that the fall of traditional metaphysics at the hands of Hume and Kant is not unrelated to developments in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theology. Understanding the history of how Scholastic theology directly contributed to the fall of metaphysics as traditionally understood goes some way to explaining why Scholastic metaphysics is worth revisiting. Several key lessons emerge from this (necessarily brief) historical study: First, that Hume and Kant’s critiques of metaphysics do not apply to metaphysics per se, but only to the metaphysical systems of their Early Modern contemporaries; and second, that the motivations that lead to the novelties of the Early Modern systems are theological, have little to do with philosophy per se and so need no longer act as constraints upon our own ongoing efforts at metaphysical reflection. Thus, a metaphysics shorn of these particular theological influences would be untouched by Humean and Kantian considerations. Finally, surprising as it sounds, such a metaphysics is more readily discerned amongst the early and middle Scholastics than amongst contemporary analytic metaphysicians, many of whom still labour under the influence of Carnap and Quine. The irony is that Carnap and Quine betray the influence of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theology more so than an Aquinas, and so it is to the latter rather than the former that one ought to go for insights into the nature of metaphysics. Making good this claim is the primary business of this chapter.

Whatever happened to metaphysics?

The Ancient Greek philosophers happily engaged in metaphysical reflection, as did the Scholastics and the greats of the Early Modern period. But Hume and Kant convinced us that metaphysics, as traditionally understood, is not possible. This raises an obvious question: Why did philosophers of the calibre of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz – to name only a few luminaries – believe that metaphysics was worth pursuing, only for this view to fall so decisively from favour? What philosophical discoveries led to the negative assessment of the viability of metaphysics we find in Hume and Kant? These are not idle historical questions. Understanding the fall of metaphysics helps situate the question of the necessity and possibility of metaphysics in its proper context, allowing one to appreciate clearly what assumptions lie behind the Humean/Kantian consensus, assumptions that remain quietly at work in many quarters to this day.

As with all historical explanations of complex phenomena, the correct account is bound to be multifaceted, making appeal to a variety of explanatory factors. I want to focus on just one such factor, although I think it played a central part in our story. Unearthing this explanation requires an excursion into the unfamiliar and at times forbidding territory of the Middle Ages. But the excursion is worth the effort. For what emerges from such a study is that the targets of Hume and Kant’s original critiques were primarily the rationalist, deductivist metaphysicians of the Early Modern period whose approaches to the discipline were significantly different from those adopted by Aristotle and the Scholastics. So our historical question can be made more precise by asking why metaphysics in the hands of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz is a rather different creature from that found amongst the Ancients and the Scholastics. Understanding the transition from the metaphysics of the Scholastics to the metaphysics of the Early Modern period proves crucial to an understanding of the fate that eventually befell the queen of the sciences.

The picture I am offering, in a nutshell, is as follows: With the Ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle, and with the early and middle Scholastics, we find metaphysics in good health. The discipline has a purpose within philosophy as a whole, it has a generally agreed methodology and there is a general consensus that its questions are well formed and that warranted answers can be provided. However, this framework operated with certain modal assumptions, the most important of which is that reality displays forms of necessity of a non-logical variety. For theological reasons to be discussed later, this assumption was challenged in the late thirteenth century. Subsequently, metaphysicians, both Late Scholastic and Early Modern, continued to prosecute the original metaphysical project while accepting a distinct doctrine regarding the nature of necessity. This led to the adoption of forms of rationalism that had never been seriously entertained in Scholastic circles, and the result was the systems we associate with Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. Perhaps not surprisingly, these systems eventually came under severe, and largely warranted, attack. But the only alternatives to rationalism visible at the time were either to give up on metaphysics altogether, as Hume suggests, or to radically reconceive the discipline, as does Kant. But all parties to this dispute adopted the modal assumption foreign to the original framework employed by traditional metaphysicians. And, up until Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, most philosophers in the orthodox cannon have followed suit. The suggestion then is that it remains to be seen if there was anything amiss with metaphysics prior to the adoption of the theologically supported modal assumptions. I will be arguing that there was in fact nothing amiss with such a metaphysics. And as the suspect modal assumptions are no longer taken for granted, the option of revisiting the original project is open to us. I believe it is an option we should thoroughly explore.

I begin with a sketch of the general metaphysical project as traditionally conceived. In the first instance this means providing a clear picture of the formal objects of metaphysical reflection, i.e., those aspects of reality taken to fall within the domain of metaphysics as opposed to any of the other theoretical sciences. But just as important for present purposes is to be clear about the nature of the knowledge metaphysicians traditionally sought. As was the case in all the theoretical sciences, the goal towards which the metaphysician was working was the provision of certain and infallible knowledge of the formal objects of the discipline. But, according to Ancients and Moderns alike, the possibility of certainty depends not just on our cognitive ability adequately to track reality, but also on the modal nature of the object of knowledge. In particular, it was held that certain knowledge or scientia is possible only of those features of reality that ‘cannot be otherwise’. These ‘eternal and necessary truths’, the aeternae et necessariae veritates, were the goal of metaphysical reflection.

In the next section I go on to show how theologically imposed changes to attitudes regarding the modal nature of reality brought about a radical restriction of the range of items with the modal features required to ground the possibility of certainty. This in turn had methodological implications that constrain how one can proceed with one’s metaphysical reflections. As we shall see, if metaphysicians continue to accept that certainty is possible only of those things which ‘cannot be otherwise’, and they continue to accept the theologically motivated views on modality, then only three approaches to metaphysical reflection are open:...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• Part I On the Possibility of Metaphysics
• Part II The Turn to Biology
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index