How Labour Governments Fall

From Ramsay Macdonald to Gordon Brown

T. Heppell, K. Theakston, T. Heppell, K. Theakston

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781137314215
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political History & Theory
• Index: Politics & International Relations

What similarities exist between the reasons for Labour losing office in 2010 and those behind why previous Labour governments were defeated? This edited volume provides a detailed historical appraisal which considers the importance of themes such as economic performance; political leadership and the condition of the Conservatives in opposition.

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Introduction

Timothy Heppell and Kevin Theakston

The politics of New Labour from 1997 to 2010 are seen, by its advocates particularly, as the great exception within Labour’s history. New Labour provided something that the party had never achieved before – a multi-term period in government. Victories at the general elections of 1997 (with a majority of 179), 2001 (a majority of 167) and 2005 (a majority of 66) enabled the party to govern uninterruptedly for 13 years. This was double the longest period of governance that it had ever experienced previously. That had been the six-year tenure under the leadership of Clement Attlee between 1945 and 1951, closely followed by the governments of Harold Wilson between October 1964 and June 1970. Advocates of New Labour took considerable pride in their era of electoral dominance and the comparison with Old Labour’s record (Blair, 2010; Campbell, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Mandelson, 2010). Between 1951 and 1997 Labour had contested 12 general elections and lost eight. Its defeats were, more often than not, substantial. The Conservatives secured three-figure parliamentary majorities in 1959, 1983 and 1987; three majorities of between 30 and 60 seats (1955, 1970 and 1979); and two majorities of between 15 and 30 seats (1951 and 1992). The electoral triumphs that Labour did achieve were less substantial. After losing office in 1951 its four victories prior to 1997 were, with the exception of 1966 (a majority of 97), narrow ones, with small single-figure majorities secured in October 1964 and October 1974. When Labour returned to office in March 1974 it was actually a minority administration.

The supposed triumph of New Labour was that it appeared to have challenged the assumption that the Conservative Party was the natural party of government (Bentley, 2007: 111). Labour MP Austin Mitchell, discussing what he called ‘Labour’s history of failure’, once described it as ‘the [twentieth] century’s least successful major party’ (Mitchell, 2000: 178). Indeed, in the 90 years since 1922, when Labour emerged indisputably as one of the big two parties in the British system (its leader either in government or heading the official opposition), it has been in government office for only 38 years (including the five years of the Churchill wartime coalition). In the year that Blair became Labour party leader, a group of political historians assembled by Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball published a book that evaluated the reasons for the Conservative Party dominance of twentieth-century British politics (Seldon and Ball, 1994). The year after Blair ceased to be prime minister, Simon Lee and Matt Beech suggested that the ‘Conservative century’, as Seldon and Ball described it, had been transformed to such an extent that New Labour now represented the ‘politics of dominance’ (Beech, 2008: 1). However, the unfolding economic crisis would challenge the Beech claim and undermine the governing credentials of the post-Blair Labour party under Gordon Brown. Commenting upon the end of New Labour in 2010, Andrew Gamble attempted to place New Labour within a wider historical context:

In the hundred years in which the Labour party has existed it has struggled to assert itself against a dominant Conservative party ... For a time New Labour appeared to have changed that, but with the election of David Cameron in 2010 and the repositioning of the Labour party under Ed Miliband, many think the more familiar pattern of British politics has reasserted itself, with the Conservatives regaining their dominant position. If this turns out to be so the New Labour era will stand out in ever sharper relief as the one instance when Labour gained the ascendancy over the Conservatives and held it for a considerable period, establishing itself as the governing party.

(Gamble, 2012: 492)

What factors explain why New Labour lost its status as the governing party, and are these any different from the factors explaining how and why previous Labour governments lost power? The following insight from Stuart McAnulla on pre-New Labour administrations would suggest that perceptions of economic competence were central:

A large part of Labour’s failure was perceived to be a result of the economic crises that had engulfed it each time it had been in power previously. On a number of occasions Labour governments had significantly boosted public spending on entering office only to be forced to reverse policies and make cutbacks when economic problems emerged. Historically, financial markets had tended to lack faith in Labour governments and its perceived economic failure disillusioned voters, usually helping precipitate a quick exit from government.

(McAnulla, 2006: 122)

Austin Mitchell (2000: 178–80) similarly identified economic performance as central to the failure of Labour governments but framed the problems as ‘an inability to manage the economy in such a way as to improve the lot and the living standards of the mass of the people’ and a crippling deference to economic and financial orthodoxies (and particularly the interests of the City). Labour governments usually came to grief, he suggested, defending finance capitalism and the exchange rate. In a broader sense, comparative political science studies also suggest that government survival in office can be causally linked to economic indicators. While acknowledging that governments affect economic conditions as well as being affected by them, Paul Warwick, in his analysis of 16 West European parliamentary democracies from 1945 to 1989, argues that socialist or left-wing governments are actually more vulnerable if their performance is poor in terms of their record on inflation rather than unemployment (Warwick, 1992, 1994).

However, we would argue that parties lose office for more complex reasons than simply the performance of the economy. After all, John Major won an election for the Conservatives in the teeth of recession in 1992 and then lost office in the midst of an economic boom in 1997 (Sanders, 1993, 1999; Denver, 1998). Much of the political science literature on cabinet stability and government survival/termination focuses on modelling the specific attributes of the political actors and party and parliamentary factors in coalition situations, or on the disruptive effects of a range of critical ‘events’ and challenges arising in the external environment of government (such as political scandals, party factionalism, leadership struggles and clashes, intragovernmental policy disputes, wars and international crises, deteriorating relations with interest groups or clientele groups) (Browne et al., 1984, 1986). We share that focus on political and party factors and on the impact of ‘events’, but are not attempting an exercise in statistical modelling or game theory. Accordingly, this book takes an historical approach and aims to assess and compare the ways in which the different periods of Labour governance in Britain were brought to an end with election defeat or eviction from office in 1924, 1931, 1951, 1970, 1979 and 2010. It is concerned with understanding how and why these evictions occurred and the specific and particular factors that lay behind each of Labour’s exits from government, and with the general factors and issues that might run across time. A distinction may be drawn between external factors that contributed towards the decline and fall of Labour governments (which may have been beyond the control of Labour as a party of government, and would have undermined any party of government irrespective of its political persuasion) and internal factors specific to Labour over which it did have some control, and therefore, arguably, culpability might be attached to the party. While the importance of economic competence and the impact of economic crises will be evaluated, other key questions will also be considered. For example, do Labour governments suffer from poor leadership and succumb to Cabinet splits or party revolts? Do they inevitably lose the trust of the electorate? Do they invariably run out of ideological steam and fresh ideas?

A key inspiration for this project was a book edited by Anthony Seldon entitled How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Power since 1783, which was published as the Conservative Party under John Major was on the brink of being removed from office after four successive terms (Seldon, 1996). In examining the fall of ten periods of Conservative governance over the last two centuries, the book picked out nine frequently recurrent factors: failure of leadership and a negative image of the party leader with the electorate; confusion over policy direction; manifest internal disunity; party organisation in the country being in disarray; depleted party finances; a hostile intellectual and media climate; the electorate’s loss of confidence in the government’s capacity for economic management; a strong feeling of ‘time for a change’; and, finally, a revived and credible opposition. The argument was that rarely is any one of these factors alone strong enough to account for the defeat of Conservative governments – it is the combination that proves decisive, and the heaviest defeats that the Conservatives have suffered usually see more of the factors in evidence.

Although the aim of this book is to start an equivalent assessment of the factors that contribute to the fall of Labour governments in the twentieth century, our analysis will not replicate that of the Seldon book. This reflects the development of other interpretative models on governing failure that Seldon did not engage with. For example, similar assessments have been developed by Norton (1996: 234–44), Evans and Taylor (1996: 131–3) and Heppell (2008), with the final two models offering insights that were specific to the degeneration of long-serving governments.

However, before assessing these differing models, it is worth noting that they are all in some way influenced by the statecraft model advanced by the late Jim Bulpitt, which considers the methods used to win office (the politics of support) and then govern competently (the politics of power) (Bulpitt, 1986: 19–39). The statecraft model has the following dimensions, which, although listed sequentially, are evolving simultaneously (Hickson, 2005: 181). The first dimension of statecraft refers to party management – is the incumbent party leader able to present a united front to the electorate at election time, and, once the leader is prime minister, will the parliamentary party show the loyalty and discipline necessary to facilitate effective government? The second dimension of statecraft refers to what Bulpitt called political argument hegemony. In effect, this means ensuring that the party has acquired and can sustain dominance over the political agenda. Bale describes this as the ‘struggle to establish a particular version of commonsense’, so that the incumbent party is perceived to be the more plausible party in terms of policy solutions (Bale, 1999: 14). The third dimension of statecraft is whether the party, when in government, can demonstrate competence through its policy choices (Bale, 1999: 14). The fourth dimension of statecraft relates to electoral strategy. This is clearly not last in the sequence for a party that is in opposition and is seeking office, but for an incumbent party of government seeking another mandate this is when its party management, its dominance of political debate and its governing competence are either reaffirmed with another mandate or rejected, leading to the loss of office (Bulpitt, 1986: 21–2).

There is a clear overlap between the loss of the statecraft criteria (party management, political argument hegemony, governing competence and electoral strategy) and the factors that are identified in the models put forward by Norton, Evans and Taylor, and Heppell. Norton argues that for any party of government there are problems that can be grouped into three headings. First, there are problems that the party of government will face that would be problems for any party of government irrespective of its political persuasion. Norton suggests that this embraces the ‘gap’ between the expectations of the electorate and the resources available to government. This creates the conundrum that the electorate expects national governments to address problems, even though the capacity of national governments to do so is compromised by the fact that economic and political power has been flowing to multinational organisations and supranational institutions (Norton, 1996: 235–6). Second, there are problems specific to the party itself, or what might be described as intra-party factors. These relate to questions of competence; issues which may create an impression of party disunity; question marks surrounding leadership credibility; and concerns about the organisational apparatus of the party. Third, there are problems that relate to how the party of government compares with the opposition, or what might be described as inter-party issues. Here Norton argues that we need to note the existence (or not) of a renewed, competent, unified, well-led and organisationally secure opposition party (Norton, 1996: 234–44).

The models advanced by Evans and Taylor, and also by Heppell, are designed to address the specific circumstances that face long-term administrations. Evans and Taylor suggested that there was a clear comparison between the degenerative tendencies that were undermining the Major administration after 1992 and the circumstances that undermined the Macmillan/Douglas-Home administration in the period between 1961 and 1964. In constructing their framework for analysis they acknowledged that they were inspired by the musings of Alan Clark on what he called ‘the destruct factors’ in a Sunday Times article in late 1993 (Clark, 1993). ‘All recent history shows that party government declines in effectiveness with the passage of time’, argued Clark, noting that ‘economic conditions’ and ‘government mishandling’ of the economy can play a part, but placing most emphasis on the ‘vicious circle’ of political failures and mistakes (Clark, 1993). Evans and Taylor constructed a list of six indicators that were seen as symptomatic of degeneration. First, there was obsessive sensitivity to press criticism. Second, there can be high levels of mutual suspicion among party elites. Third, there can be a gravitational pull towards the loftier domain of foreign policy and high politics, and away from the mundane low politics of intractable domestic problems. Fourth, there can be inclination towards making concessions in policy development, with the rise of trade union power being cited as a dominant example when applied to the early 1960s. Fifth, there can be a gulf between the mindset of the parliamentary backbench of the party and its own frontbench, as ministers come to identify with their departments and prefer bureaucratic politics over party politics. Finally, the party can develop an inability to think and act strategically, and can become guided by the short term and tactical positioning (Evans and Taylor, 1996: 131–3).

As the Brown government began to experience governing difficulties, so Heppell (2008) sought to develop the Evans and Taylor model to compare and contrast the falls of the Conservatives in 1964 and 1997 with New Labour. This comparative historical approach sought to determine the extent to which New Labour was demonstrating comparable symptoms of governing degeneration. Here it was argued that there were six symptoms of degeneration for a party in government. First, it is undermined as the appropriateness of its policy objectives and its reputation for governing competence become questioned, especially in the sphere of economic management. Second, it suffers from increasingly negative perceptions of leadership credibility that undermine its electoral appeal as a governing party. Third, it experiences increasing levels of ideological division (manifesting itself in terms of both parliamentary rebellion and public disagreements showcased through the media) as the party becomes gripped by mutual suspicion and recrimination. Fourth, it finds its ethical conduct questioned by accusations of abuse of power as allegations of sleaze and corruption engulf it. Fifth, it is unable to avoid culpability for past mistakes and withstand the ‘time for a change’ argument. Finally, it struggles to adjust if faced with an increasingly unified, electorally appealing, politically renewed and credible main opposition party.

Within this model the analysis addresses two questions. Is there evidence to suggest that any of these degenerative tendencies are in existence; and, if any of them do exist, will this lead to electoral rejection? That is to say that this degenerative model is not a list of symptoms that are of equal value. Rather, it is the interrelationship between the degenerating symptoms that is crucial. The first stage within this model is to assess whether the governing party has lost credibility in terms of the first four symptoms – governing competence, leadership credibility, ideological division and abuse of power. The second stage relates to assessing whether the party of opposition can exploit any questioning of the governing party in relation to the above factors. Is the opposition sufficiently remodelled to enable it to make political mileage out of the degenerative symptoms that are becoming evident? Can it create a narrative that establishes the ‘time for a change’ argument? Thus, the degenerative model reflects the importance of the opposition, but also notes the centrality of competence. In other words, if a long-serving government is degenerating with respect to leadership credibility, ideological division and abuse of power, it has the capacity to withstand these degenerating symptoms if it can still retain governing competence.

What becomes apparent from these analyses and models developed by Seldon, Norton, Evans and Taylor, and Heppell is that they seem largely to relate to the Conservative Party studies literature. This reflects the fact that the Conservatives have been in government more often, and for longer, than Labour. However, while no historical comparative evaluation exists explaining why respective Labour governments have fallen, it does not mean that explanations for the fall of individual Labour governments have not emerged. Indeed, every time Labour has lost office there have usually been plenty of explanations, claims and scapegoats – often coloured by ideological and factional infighting in the party as it settles into, and eventually looks for a way out of, opposition. For example, the immediate aftermath of defeat in 1979 saw the publication of What Went Wrong: Explaining the Fall of the Labour Government, edited ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Fall of the First MacDonald Government, 1924
• 3. The Fall of the Second MacDonald Government, 1931
• 4. The Fall of the Attlee Government, 1951
• 5. The Fall of the Wilson Government, 1970
• 6. The Fall of the Callaghan Government, 1979
• 7. The Fall of the Brown Government, 2010
• 8. Conclusion
• Index