The Evolution of Ethics

Human Sociality and the Emergence of Ethical Mindedness

B. Fowers

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137344663
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

In this ground-breaking book, Aristotelian and evolutionary understandings of human social nature are brought together to provide an integrative, psychological account of human ethics. The book emphasizes the profound ways that human identity and action are immersed in an ongoing social world.

Part I

Evolved Human Nature

Introduction

A revolutionary reconceptualization of human morality is emerging from the fruitful intersection of two significant intellectual developments. After centuries of moral philosophy shaped by assumptions that morality is best understood through highly abstract, rationalized, and impartial prescriptions for correct behavior, there is growing interest in the principle of psychological realism. Many thinkers have taken up Flanagan’s (1991) suggestion that a minimum requirement for a moral philosophy is that it should be possible for ordinary humans to follow its precepts. A stronger form of psychological realism will incorporate common sense, intuitive moral responses, human motivational structure, self-interest, ingroup interests, and partiality. The second major trend dovetails with psychological realism. Evolutionary scientists now recognize that an adequate understanding of evolved human nature¹ must account for the importance of morality. Clearly, a proper understanding of our evolved nature is enormously valuable for fashioning a psychologically realistic ethics, and a psychologically realistic ethics can enhance moral education and moral action.

To develop a psychologically realistic account of human morality, we need to begin with two basic motivational questions. First, why are humans so ethically minded? Humans have a very strong, rapid, and automatic inclination to see one’s own and others’ actions as right or wrong, good or bad. Second, why do we care so much about right and wrong and good and bad? Why do humans devote so much time and energy to questions of ethics, which are so difficult to resolve, instead of a simpler, more ostensibly profitable focus on effectively pursuing pure self-interest? Some see this passion as an indicator that moral viewpoints are simply expressions of emotion and preference, but there are very good reasons to see human ethical-mindedness as much more than simple affective expression.

A good moral psychology must be able to explain the depth and power of human ethical-mindedness and why morality plays such a large motivational role for humans. In this book, I present a theory of natural ethics that explains why morality is so central to our species and outlines how we can fashion a psychologically realistic ethics.

I argue that the processes through which one becomes a human person and acts with any degree of success require us to be responsive to a set of ethical questions. I show how these ethical questions arise in seven key domains of human sociality: attachment, identity formation, imitation, cooperation, social norms, intergroup relations, and status and hierarchy. I argue that human ethical-mindedness is the response to the ethical questions at the core of each of these seven domains of sociality. We are compelled to respond to questions regarding the duration and depth of human altricity (dependence on a caregiver/protector), the requirements of forming an individual identity, the power of high fidelity imitation, the deep mutual interest in cooperation, the authority of social norms, the influence of ingroup/outgroup identification, and the vitality of status interests. Individuals, dyads, and groups can fare better or worse in these domains. That is, attachments can be secure or insecure; groups can be trusting and cooperative or mistrustful and exploitive. Because we are capable of faring better or worse, and these domains of activity are central to our nature, humans are the kind of beings that care deeply about how our lives shape up and how we interact.

If this perspective is correct, then our evolution bequeathed us with a set of vital ethical questions, and good answers are necessary to live well as human beings. My central thesis is that fully understanding human ethics requires a firm grasp of our evolved biological nature and that a full comprehension of our biological nature is equally dependent on recognizing that we evolved to become ethically minded beings.

Evolutionary Science and Human Morality

Among the many ways to understand human nature, evolutionary theory stands out as the most well-reasoned and scientifically well-grounded explanation. Many people prefer other understandings of our nature, but there are compelling arguments and overwhelming evidence for human evolution. Because I see accumulated evidence and reasoned argumentation as the best foundations for adequately understanding the kind of beings we are, I rely on evolutionary theory as the best account of the emergence of our nature. As with any area of inquiry, there remain areas of uncertainty and disagreement about specific aspects of our evolution, to which I allude as they arise.

One of the fascinating aspects of the evolutionary account is the increasing clarity that humans evolved what Darwin called a “moral sense.” In a celebrated passage, he said, “I fully subscribe to the judgment that . . . of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important” (Darwin, 1871/2010, p. 40). I suggest that this moral sense developed because our evolution has confronted us with unavoidable questions about how it is best to live and about how we should treat each other. Of course, this does not mean that we always reason and act morally. If “moral behavior” were causally determined by our evolved nature, the complete lack of agency would disqualify the behavior as moral. Human life is the process of fashioning answers to the moral questions that evolution bequeathed us. For better or for worse, we live those answers in our everyday activities, whatever we might say or believe. This book explores some of those questions and some possible answers.

Many thinkers recognize that evolutionary science can fruitfully explain human morality and have provided evolutionary accounts of ethics (Boehm, 2012; Joyce, 2006; Krebs, 2011; Wright, 1994). These well-intentioned efforts by highly respected evolutionary scientists have fallen short, however, due to the lack of well-reasoned ethical theory. They explain that actors benefit other people because it enhances the actor’s evolutionary fitness (capacity for successful reproduction). Unfortunately, a relatively weak grasp of ethical theory leads these authors to simply restate common moral beliefs in evolutionary terms. For example, near the end of his book, Krebs (2011) concludes that “moral people possess the qualities that induce them to go about the long-term business of surviving, reproducing, and propagating their genes in fair and altruistic ways” (p. 258, italics added). Although he gives us some reasons to believe that fairness and what he calls altruism can be observed, he has nothing whatsoever to say about why such actions are moral, only that they have putative evolutionary value. Krebs is not unique in the poverty of his ethical theory; this problem is endemic.

The weakness of ethical theory in extant versions of evolutionary ethics is apparent in three ways. First, they give no argument for why morality is defined by other-benefit. They simply adopt this common-sense view, usually without comment. Second, they do not explain how a morality based in instrumental benefit to the self is not reducible to simple selfishness. Many of them say explicitly that morality really is selfishness masked by the illusion of moral justification. Third, virtually all of these authors explain human behavior as causally determined, which eliminates the possibility that individuals choose to act morally or immorally. These authors’ failure to address agency means that they are not discussing morality at all because if one’s behavior is causally determined, how can it be considered moral or immoral? Although there is much to be said for fairness, altruism, and related concepts, we need a more sophisticated ethical theory for a useful understanding of human morality. Aristotle provided an ethical theory with abundant resources for explaining and guiding moral actions.

Aristotle’s Ethics

There are many ethical theorists from which to choose for the project of strengthening evolutionary accounts. However, many of these theorists’ views are so abstract and hyperrational that they present a very poor fit to an evolutionary understanding of humans. In a more promising direction, Haidt (2001) has appropriated David Hume’s view that morality is based on intuitions rather than logical premises, providing a better fit with evolution. Others (Foot, 2001; Hursthouse, 1999; MacIntyre, 1999) have attempted to find guidance in Aristotle’s (1999) ethics. Although Hume’s views have much to offer, I draw on Aristotle’s ethics because the latter is more comprehensive in focusing on the good life as a whole and in recognizing intuitive and deliberative decision making as well as innate and cultivated aspects of morality. The exploration of philosophically informed evolutionary ethics is just beginning, and it is sensible to investigate a variety of moral philosophies; this inquiry into an Aristotelian approach is just one such effort.

Many psychologists and philosophers draw on Aristotle, Plato, and the Stoics in exploring ethics. In contrast to most modern ethical thought, which assumes that ethics provides guidance about right action defined by treating others properly, the core concept of ancient Greek ethics is the good life. Although they famously disagreed with each other, ancient philosophers agreed that the best kind of life was one in which an individual developed his² fullest potential as a human being. Because they saw humans as social beings, they argued that cultivating the best in oneself is not only good for the actor but also naturally includes contributing to society and treating others well. A hallmark of ancient Greek ethics is an integration of self-interest and interacting ethically with others because living well as a human requires treating others well. I show how this integration allows us to overcome the acute and overblown modern tension between self-interest and moral behavior that is also rampant in evolutionary ethics.

There are remarkable similarities in accounts of human evolution and Aristotle’s ethics that help us to see how much common ground there is between individual and group interests. It turns out that evolution has finely tuned us to foster cooperative, fair, and orderly relations with others because those relationships are also central to each person’s well-being and reproductive success. The recognition that mutual benefit is more prominent than antagonistic individual interests is central to Aristotle. This integration is a very important difference between his ethics and contemporary intuitions about the need to sacrifice one’s interests to act morally that most evolutionary psychologists have unreflectively adopted. I highlight these theoretical differences throughout the book to help readers avoid importing popular contemporary moral intuitions into the argument.

There are many different ways to understand the best kind of life for humans. I rely on Aristotle for several reasons. The first is that his account of the good life is premised on understanding humans as natural, physical beings who must fashion a way to live well in the practical world. That is, Aristotle’s moral philosophy is realist in that he grounded ethics firmly in human nature, making it an excellent starting point for a natural ethics. Second, I see Aristotle’s account as the most comprehensive theory of the good life. His Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1999) has been a touchstone of Western ethical discourse for over two millennia. Third, Aristotle provided excellent resources for transcending modern ethical conundrums that follow from the contemporary overemphasis on individual autonomy and strategic action. Fourth, his ethics also address a key contemporary concern about substantive ethics by providing an account of how to live well without prescribing a single form of the good life, leaving room for many forms of the good life. This diversity is essential because humans pursue multiple goods, not just one overall good. Moreover, the evident diversity in ways of life requires a capacious ethical theory. Finally, the explosion of contemporary scholarship on Aristotle’s ethics can assist us in this exploration. I introduce Aristotle’s theory of the human good in Chapter 1 and explore its implications in Chapter 10.

It will be useful at this point to introduce some terms about the good life used throughout the book. I use a variety of terms to refer to the ends or aims we humans pursue. Goals are relatively concrete aims that can be achieved when a desired state of affairs is obtained. Philosophers use the term “good” to refer to broader, more abstract aims that people seek but can never attain once and for all. For example, knowledge is a good that can never be completely achieved. In contrast, one can have the goal of learning about attachment theory or blood chemistry to increase one’s knowledge, thereby concretely pursuing the good of knowledge. I use terms such as “aim” and “end” generically to refer to goals or goods. When I use the phrase “characteristic human goods” or “natural human goods,” I am referring to the goods that our evolution has primed us to pursue (e.g., belonging).

My appropriation and interpretation of Aristotle is, of course, debatable, and other scholars will argue for other ethical starting points. I welcome them to the conversation because vigorously exploring different understandings of the good life is essential to the good life for human beings.

Aristotle built his understanding of what is good for humans on what has been called the “function argument,” wherein he defined a good instance of a thing as one that fulfills its function excellently. Thus, a good knife is one that is sharp and properly shaped for its cutting function. A good eye is one that sees well. By the same logic, a good human is someone who fulfills human functions excellently. As complex beings, humans have more than one function, and I explore seven domains of human social activity in Part II. Broadly speaking, Aristotle saw the functions of human beings primarily in terms of our rational and social nature, meaning that the human good will be found in acting rationally and in concert with others. This book is focused on the social nature of humans, and I argue in Parts II and III that a good human life is comprised by natural social goods such as friendship, belonging, justice, and social order. When one is consistently experiencing these goods, one is flourishing as a human being.

With more or less explicitness, contemporary explorers of human flourishing have adopted the function argument and sought insights into the good life through understanding human nature. These thinkers have found it very difficult, however, to maintain a clear and informed focus on both human nature and human excellence. There is an unfortunate tendency to emphasize one side of the biological/ethical integration and shortchange the other side. The primary purpose of this book is to hold both of these points of reference firmly in view and explore their convergence in a practical theory of natural ethics.

Human Sociality and the Necessity of Ethics

Because the topics of human nature and flourishing are extremely broad, I have narrowed my focus to the social nature of humans as a significant, but relatively manageable, domain of inquiry. Although I have to make some assumptions about human rationality or behavioral flexibility, I must leave an in-depth exploration of these topics for a later time.

It is a central fact about humans that we are intensely social creatures. The capacities to coordinate our behavior with others, pass on knowledge, and form cooperative, norm-based social groups have conferred tremendous fitness advantages. These capacities made it possible for ancient humans to migrate across the globe, live in a vast array of habitats, form complex, productive divisions of labor, develop cumulative cultures, and fashion highly elaborated ethical theories. Because sociality has been so central in human evolution, “fitness should be correlated with the evolution of perceptual, affective, and cognitive mechanisms that support the development and maintenance of group membership” (Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kagt, 1989, p. 694). Evolutionary psychologists study many ways that evolution has shaped our cognitive architecture, particularly the adaptations that have made us such intensely social animals.

Part II of the book is devoted to exploring specific ways in which sociality is central to human living and flourishing, of which I give three brief examples here. The lengthy dependency of human children requires an intense and formative period of attachment to caregivers that sets a pattern for personal identity and deep attachment throughout life (Chapter 3). I argue that the centrality of strong, enduring attachments gave rise to the good of friendship as an important component of flourishing. Our ancestors also evolved an imitative capacity that is astonishing in its scope and intricacy, facilitating the avid learning of complex skills (Chapter 5). I make the case that the centrality of learning in human l...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• Part I Evolved Human Nature
• Part II Human Sociality
• Part III Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index