The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

Annalisa Coliva

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137326133
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Epistemologia in filosofia

This book explores the idea that self-knowledgecomes in many varieties. We "know ourselves" through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call "self-knowledge" isnot the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristicauthority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptualnecessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts.This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on theepistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such asinner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such astransparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well asexpressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative"pluralist" position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of thephenomenon and its resistance to any "monistic" treatment, to pose new andintriguing philosophical challenges.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Annalisa ColivaThe Varieties of Self-KnowledgePalgrave Innovations in Philosophy10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Annalisa Coliva¹

(1)

Department of Philosophy, Irvine, California, USA

End Abstract

The main and novel idea presented in this book is that self-knowledge—that is, our knowledge of our own mental states—comes in many ways. We have first-personal knowledge of our own mental states when, for instance, we are immediately aware of our occurrent sensations. By contrast, we have third-personal knowledge when, for example, we realise that we enjoy a given mental state by reflecting on our behaviour and by inferring to its likely cause. Even when distinctively first-personal knowledge is at stake, it must be kept in mind that we have a variety of mental states. For instance, we enjoy sensations, such as pains and tickles, which have a characteristic phenomenology, but also perceptions that have both a phenomenal and a representational content; we have propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, and these come in various fashions—that is, as dispositions and as commitments—hence, as the result of one’s own deliberations based on considering evidence for or against a given proposition or course of action. Finally, we enjoy emotions, whose nature still escapes philosophical consensus. Such a variety of mental states invites caution in propounding single, all-encompassing accounts of how we may know each of these types of mental state. In particular, although it is clear that sensations and at least some emotions have a distinctive phenomenology and can also be had by creatures who cannot self-ascribe them, it is more difficult to maintain that propositional attitudes have an intrinsic phenomenology which can distinguish wishes from hopes, say, or beliefs from acceptances, and so on. Perceptions too have their typical phenomenology, but they also provide a representation of the environment around the perceiver, or of her body, which is independent of the exercise of concepts, at least when “basic” perceptions are at stake. Hence, they can be enjoyed by creatures who are incapable of self-ascribing them. By contrast, for propositional attitudes as commitments, it makes sense to hold that they can be constituted at least in part by their very self-ascription, like when one deliberates by judging “I intend to do such and so” and there does not seem to be any room for the suggestion that one would thereby be tracking a pre-existing intention.

Even if one were convinced that first-personal self-knowledge is ultimately an epistemic relation between a subject and a proposition or a state of affairs, one should be open to the possibility that the methods whereby one gets to know in a first-personal way one’s own mind can vary depending on the kind of mental state at issue. Hence, one should be open to pluralism about the methods whereby we gain self-knowledge, which go from being inferential, or even based on simulative routines, when third-personal self-knowledge is at stake, to possibly a variety of means when first-personal self-knowledge is at stake, depending on the kind of mental state one would know in such a way.

However, as will become apparent, in the case of so-called first-personal self-knowledge, there is no real epistemic relation between a subject and a proposition or state of affairs. So, to talk of “knowledge” in this connection is somewhat a misnomer, brought about by habit—in particular, by the philosophical habit of using that term and of mistaking certain conceptual truths, which entrain, in appropriate conditions, the indubitability of one’s own psychological self-ascriptions, as in fact due to a peculiar epistemic relation holding between a subject and her own mental states.

Thus, the kind of pluralism propounded in this book is both a pluralism of methods when genuine knowledge of one’s mind is at stake—that is, when third-personal self-knowledge is at stake—and of “states”, as we may put it, for lack of a better term, when we are dealing with first-personal self-knowledge. Thus, in that connection, the term “self-knowledge” is in fact used as a shorthand for a set of conceptual truths which can be variously redeemed. Hence, in some cases, through a variety of methods, a state of knowledge of one’s own mind is obtained and expressed through the relevant psychological self-ascriptions. In some other cases, the relevant self-ascriptions (which in some cases may even be superficially identical to the ones which express third-personal self-knowledge) express a different and non-epistemic kind of state, which varies from merely showing or exhibiting one’s mind to bringing about the relevant first-order mental states.

It is fair to say, however, that although by now a lot of philosophers working on self-knowledge—particularly on first-personal self-knowledge—are aware of the limitations in scope of their preferred accounts¹ and therefore are at least implicitly committed to pluralism about self-knowledge (particularly of methods but perhaps, in some cases, of both methods and states), they have been reluctant to embrace it explicitly.² For some reason, which seems mostly to reveal a monistic prejudice, they seem to think that if their preferred theory has only limited application, it is not interesting (or not interesting enough). Subject to a craving for generality, which, as said, is likely due to a deep-seated monistic prejudice, they often attempt to extend their preferred theory of self-knowledge to mental states that are, after all, resilient to the treatment, thus ending up weakening their own accounts.³ Sometimes, in this vein, they realise that the attempt to generalise their preferred accounts stumbles, in particular, against the asymmetry between first- and third-personal self-knowledge; as a consequence, they are led to denying it or to making it a difference in degree rather than in kind.⁴ Or else, they tend to consider of limited philosophical interest and significance the kinds of self-knowledge they knowledgeably do not account for. Thus, you find theorists mostly interested in first-personal self-knowledge who downplay the importance of an inquiry into third-personal self-knowledge, typically on the grounds that it would not be especially interesting from an epistemological point of view.⁵ Conversely, those who offer an account that works mostly for third-personal self-knowledge, and who realise that they cannot fully account for first-personal self-knowledge, insist on the irrelevance of the latter particularly to personal development vis-à-vis the importance of the former.⁶ Hence, the implicit bias towards monism can have various effects, going from leading one to the pursuit of generality at the expense of credibility, to the denial of structural differences between first- and third-personal self-knowledge, or, finally, to being chauvinist with respect to those forms of self-knowledge one admittedly cannot account for.

Therefore, the present book unashamedly buys into pluralism about self-knowledge. It does so by first presenting in some detail the plurality of mental states we enjoy and their intrinsic differences. It then defends the existence of a deep asymmetry—that is, an asymmetry in kind and not merely in degree—between first- and third-personal forms of self-knowledge. It then reviews several theories of first-personal self-knowledge, discussing their various pitfalls but also accepting those kernels of truth they have, when they have them. In the last chapter, they are put at the service of a pluralistic account of self-knowledge, both of methods, in particular when third-personal self-knowledge is at stake, and of states, since, as anticipated, in many cases of so-called first-personal self-knowledge, the relevant psychological self-ascriptions do not depend on, and do not express, the obtaining of a genuine epistemic relationship between a subject and her own first-order mental states, as it were.

In the second chapter, titled “Varieties of Mental States”, we introduce the variety of mental states we enjoy. We explore and propose a systematisation of the complex geography of the mental. We first distinguish between sensations and perceptions, by reference to the fact that only the latter have correctness conditions, while allowing that their contents, at least in the case of “basic” perceptions, may be entertained also by creatures who do not possess the concepts necessary to their canonical specification. We then move on to propositional attitudes and distinguish between beliefs, desires and intentions as dispositions and as commitments. Whereas the former may be independent of judgement and may well be unconscious, the latter depend on judging either that P is the case or that P would be good to have or do (in light of one’s further goals). For such a reason, these mental states may also be called “judgement-dependent” propositional attitudes. Moreover, they constitutively involve the ability to accept criticism or of being self-critical if one does not live up to them. Afterwards, we consider the complex case of emotions. As is well known, there are, nowadays, a number of different and competing accounts, which range from identifying emotions with sensations to equating them with evaluative judgements or with perceptions of values or finally with felt bodily attitudes. It will be argued that none of these theories seems entirely satisfactory, although a detailed treatment of each falls beyond the scope of this book. It will be claimed that if this is the case, it is really tempting to consider emotions as sui generis mental states, sharing some features of other mental states while not reducing to any of them. On this view, common sense would, after all, be right in considering emotions to be different from all other mental states and in grouping them under one special category.

In chapter 3, titled “Varieties of Self-Knowledge”, we turn to the characteristic traits of first-personal self-knowledge—namely, so-called “transparency”, “authority” and “groundlessness”. At first approximation, transparency amounts to the idea that subjects who possess the relevant concepts, as well as being rational and possessed of normal intelligence, are such that when they enjoy a given mental state they are immediately in a position to self-ascribe it. Authority, in contrast, has it that subjects’ psychological self-ascriptions are correct, at least in the normal run of cases. Finally, according to “groundlessness”, subjects’ psychological self-ascriptions are not based on the observation of their own mental states or on inference to the best explanation starting from their own observed behaviour and possibly further aspects of their own psychology. In fact, each element in this triad admits of different readings and in the chapter we go to some length in discussing them. Furthermore, their domain of application has to be properly limited and we spend time showing how that should be done. The key idea defended in this chapter is that transparency, authority and groundlessness are not contingent but necessary and a priori aspects of what goes by the name of first-personal self-knowledge. For massive failures at this kind of self-knowledge would display either the lack of the relevant psychological concepts or failures at rationality. Rationality, in this connection, has to be understood in a “thick”, rather than in a “thin”, sense. The latter amounts to the idea that we are critical reasoners insofar as we revise our propositional attitudes and goals on the basis of countervailing reasons. However, I agree with several philosophers (Christopher Peacocke, Dorit Bar-On and Quassim Cassam, just to mention a few) who, contra Sydney Shoemaker and Tyler Burge, do not think that self-knowledge is necessary for being critical reasoners. If that is the notion of rationality one has in mind, then lack of self-knowledge will not make one necessarily irrational. Yet we also have a thick notion of rationality, according to which making certain psychological self-ascriptions and behaving in ways which run systematically against them would impugn the idea that we are confronted with a normal subject, up to the point of rendering her pronouncements onto herself irrelevant, a mere flatus vocis devoid of any significance, if not of meaning altogether. These characteristic traits of first-personal self-knowledge will also be defended against possible objections stemming from recent findings in cognitive sciences and from scepticism about knowledge of the content of our own propositional attitudes deriving from the endorsement of semantic externalism. For instance, several studies in cognitive science tend to show that we do not have knowledge of our own character traits, that we are bad at affective forecasting—that is, at figuring out how we would actually feel if some relevant change happened to our lives—and, finally, that we are really poor at identifying the causes of our decisions and further behaviour. None of this, however, shows that we never have essentially first-personal self-knowledge. Rather, it shows that its scope is limited and does not extend to our deep-seated and future dispositions, or to the causal relations among our various mental states, which are known, if and when they are, in a third-personal way. Yet all this is compatible with the fact that we have essentially first-personal knowledge of a wide range of mental states, such as our sensations, perceptions, basic emotions and propositional attitudes as commitments.

Furthermore, some theorists take the rise of content externalism to be incompatible with at least authoritative self-knowledge regarding one’s current propositional attitudes, for, if externalism is correct, a subject may think of being thinking a water thought, say, when she is in fact entertaining a thought about twater, due to her actual causal connections with an environment in which lakes, rivers and seas are in fact filled in with XYZ, rather than H₂O. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that externalism is correct. Let us further suppose that our subject is actually thinking a twater thought, unbeknownst to her. Still, she would seem to have essentially first-personal access to it, even if she may be wrong about its actual content. Hence, she would still have transparent access to the fact that she is entertaining a thought, rather than a hope or a wish; and her access would still be groundless—that is, it would be based neither on observation nor on inference. Finally, she would still be authoritative with respect to its seeming or apparent content. (Some theorists would call it “narrow content” and would happily acknowledge its existence alongside with “wide content”, but we need not take a position about it here.)

In keeping with the characteristic aspects of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy series, the volume then presents and critically discusses various accounts of such privileged self-knowledge that have been proposed, with special emphasis on contemporary versions of each of these theories. Hence, in the fourth chapter, titled “Epistemically Robust Accounts”, we start by considering the inner-sense account of self-knowledge. This model tends to equate self-knowledge with forms of knowledge based on outer observation, though granting a subject’s privileged access to her own mental states. In particular, its contemporary versions, due mostly to David Armstrong and William Lycan, claim that we have a reliable inner mechanism that “scans” our first-order mental states and produces the corresponding second-order ones. The chief objection will be that the model presupposes a crude form of reliabilism that severs the constitutive connection between self-knowledge, rationality and concepts’ possession.

We then turn to inferentialist accounts of self-knowledge. The inferentialist model tends to assimilate self-knowledge to knowledge of other people’s mental states. Recently, it has been taken up and partially re-fashioned by Alison Gopnik, who has developed a “theory-theory” account. Within the first 4 years of life, children acquire and develop a little theory of the mind, which they apply to both themselves and others, in order to (self-)ascribe mental states starting from the observation of overt behaviour (or other “inner promptings”). Her views have given rise to a heated debate, at the interface of philosophy of mind, psychology and neuroscience, between supporters of the theory-theory approach and partisans of so-called “simulation” theories, such as Alvin Goldman and Robert Gordon. According to simulation theorists, who are otherwise divided on many issues, knowledge of other people’s mental states is not based on the application of a theory but on the simulation of the other person’s point of view, which gives rise to a psychological ascription based on what one oneself would feel and think if one were in the other person’s shoes. These views are exposed and critically examined. The main objection against the inferentialist account is that it implausibly assimilates first-personal self-knowledge to knowledge of other people’s mental states. Furthermore, it runs the risk of providing a circular account of self-knowledge and it succumbs as soon as one tries, like in Quassim Cassam’s recent version of it, to make it transcend its proper domain of application. The main criticism against simulation theories, in contrast, is that they are in fact unclear about how we would get knowledge of our own minds, on the basis of which we should then gain knowledge of other people’s mental states, and risk falling back onto other, problematical models of self-knowledge (such as the inner-sense model). Simulation theorists, in particular Gordon, also ha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Varieties of Mental States
• 3. Varieties of Self-knowledge
• 4. Epistemically Robust Accounts
• 5. Epistemically Weak Accounts
• 6. Expressivism About Self-knowledge
• 7. Constitutive Theories
• 8. Pluralism About Self-knowledge
• Backmatter