Liberal Internationalism

Theory, History, Practice

B. Jahn

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781137348432
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Relations internationales

This study provides an original conception of liberalism that accounts for its internal contradictions and explains the current crisis of liberal internationalism. Examining the disjuncture between liberal theory and practice, it offers a firmer grasp on the historical role of liberalism in world politics.

1

Introduction

During the 1990s, liberal internationalism experienced a remarkable ‘comeback’ (Gardner 1990). The end of the Cold War was widely interpreted – by academics, politicians, and the media alike – as ushering in a new, and liberal, world order. The ‘triumph’ of liberalism over its main competitor(s) seemed to support its core assumptions of a progressive historical development toward the realization of individual freedom, prosperity, and domestic as well as international peace and cooperation (Fukuyama 1989). Liberalism, in short, seemed to be exceptionally in tune with the ‘global developmental processes’ which had finally swept it to the top and led to a liberal hegemony in the international system (Ikenberry 2006: 146).

This liberal hegemony in turn ‘opened up a vast potential for movement toward realizing the liberal vision worldwide’ (Richardson 2001: 2). Hence, George Bush Senior announced the arrival of a ‘new world order’ in which the ‘United Nations, freed from Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders’ (Bush 1991). This political vision involved the spread of democracy and respect for human rights to all states and peoples as well as an influential role for international organizations in the pursuit of these aims. Meanwhile, in the realm of economics, the neoliberal agenda entailed an expansion of capitalism into the closed economies of the past as well as deregulation, liberalization, and privatization of the world market more generally. In short, the largely unchallenged dominance of liberal actors, policies, and ideologies promised ‘freedom and a better life for all’ (Richardson 2001: 2). The historical validation of liberal theory in combination with the dominant position of liberal states (as well as NGOs and IGOs profoundly influenced by liberal ideas and actors) thus gave rise to a ‘period of massive and profound optimism’ (Sørensen 2000: 287). In the spirit of this optimism, liberal actors embarked on proactive foreign and international policies designed to realize these liberal promises.

Amongst these policies, democracy promotion played a prominent role. It was based on the liberal assumption that democratic rule is most conducive to the realization of the natural freedom of the individual (Mill 1998b) and that democracy is conducive to domestic and international peace (Doyle 1996). The spread of democracy thus promised respect for individual rights as well as peace. In practice, democracy promotion was pursued by a wide range of actors – states, NGOs, international organizations – and took a variety of forms. Democracy assistance usually entailed economic and political incentives for democratization as well as financial and technical aid for the consolidation of electoral processes. Yet, democracy promotion was also pursued through economic and diplomatic pressure such as conditional aid, widely used in relations with the developing world by states and international organizations alike (Carothers 2000: 185–9). Finally, and prominently, democracy promotion played a crucial role in a variety of military operations. The assumption that democracy provides a nonviolent way of managing and resolving domestic conflict and competition turned the establishment of democracy into a core aspect of UN peacekeeping operations during the 1990s (Paris 2004). And the pacific implications of democracy for foreign policy established democratization as a major goal of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, triggered at least in part by (real or assumed) security threats emanating from those states.

In the economic realm, liberal theories hold that the protection of private property, free markets, and free trade provide the basis for economic productivity and efficiency. Hence, liberal foreign policies aimed to spread free-market and free-trade practices throughout the international system. To this end, liberal states supported privatization, financial deregulation, and trade liberalization – often, but not only, through the development of international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO). More specific targets of these policies were states of the former Soviet Bloc in which a market economy needed to be established from scratch and Third World states in which the state engaged in market intervention or played an important role as economic actor. In all these cases, proactive liberal policies aimed to widen and deepen the realm of the market and the freedom of trade – through multilateral and bilateral policies.

Finally, liberal theories hold that the institutionalization of liberal norms provides a basis for cooperation and reform of the international system at large. With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of integrating liberal norms more prominently into the legal and institutional structure of the international system seemed to have arrived. This included a more vigorous protection of human rights through a reform of the UN Human Rights Council as well as calls for the practice and legalization of the principle of humanitarian intervention which ultimately led to the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect. As a major barrier to these efforts, the principle of sovereignty and its concomitant rights was to be linked to liberal credentials: this included suggestions for gradations of sovereignty (Keohane 2003), an elevated position for liberal actors under international law (Rawls 2001; Slaughter 1995) and in international organizations like the UN (Clark 2009).

All these political plans were inspired by, and in accordance with, the one or other liberal theory. And yet, in practice, liberal actors often failed to live up to these theoretical expectations, while liberal policies failed to achieve their aims or led to highly paradoxical outcomes. Though liberal states occasionally used humanitarian arguments to justify particular interventions – in the case of Kosovo in 1999, for instance – they did not actively pursue the legalization of humanitarian intervention. Though peacekeeping operations aimed to appease local conflicts through the introduction of market democracy, the latter often – for example in Angola, Cambodia, and Liberia – failed in its pacifying mission and sometimes even exacerbated conflicts (Paris 2004). Though democracy promotion successfully helped establish electoral systems in many states, like Russia, these often serve decidedly illiberal policies (Zakaria 1997). Though the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan successfully replaced authoritarian with democratic regimes, these did not enhance the level of domestic and international security (Nash 2006; Rubin 2006a, 2006b). Though the spread of free trade and market economies certainly increased prosperity amongst some groups, it was accompanied by increasing poverty for others. And though liberal economic policies do engender economic growth, they also generate serious economic and financial crises. Though liberal actors aim to promote peaceful international relations, the post-Cold War era has seen them continuously embroiled in wars. Though liberal actors promote respect for human rights, they also prominently violate those rights, for example in Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib. Though liberal actors are committed to the rule of (international) law, they are widely judged to break that law and undertake illegal wars, in Kosovo and Iraq, for example.

In short, even a cursory glance at the post-Cold War era shows that liberal foreign policies frequently failed to achieve their goals and that liberal actors often failed to act in accordance with liberal principles. And it is partly this disjuncture between liberal theory and practice and the patchy or contradictory achievements of the latter that led observers to conclude that the rise of liberalism at the beginning of the 1990s had, by the end of the decade, already turned into a demise. Certainly, the optimism of the early 1990s that the international system could now be remade in accordance with liberal principles and would thus fulfill the liberal promises of respect for individual rights, prosperity, and peace world wide gave way to much more cautious assessments and policies. The establishment of market democracies in other countries was now recognized as a difficult, complex, and slow process which required long-term commitments (Jahn 2007b) and led Donald Rumsfeld to announce ‘we don’t do nationbuilding!’ Similarly, the promotion of democracy now seemed to require a transformation of the political culture, civil society, judicial system, media, and so on in target societies as well as a considerable period of ‘consolidation’ (Diamond 1996). By 1999, WTO policies were widely seen to exacerbate poverty, inequality, and – through the TRIPS agreement – even to endanger the health of large sections of humanity and thus generated a period of systematic protests on the streets, ushered in by the ‘battle of Seattle’, as well as diplomatic resistance on the part of affected states. In sum, the optimism of the early 1990s was gone, and with it the readiness of liberal actors to engage in widespread ‘missionary’ foreign policies.

Hence, by the end of the 1990s the heyday of liberalism was gradually coming to an end – a process that was subsequently accelerated by the terrorist attacks in September 2001. Liberal states turned from the expansive goal of ‘enlargement’ and began to concentrate again on the ‘defense’ of domestic or intraliberal achievements. This gradual demise of liberal optimism stands in stark contrast to the at-times triumphalist assumption of the early 1990s that history had finally caught up with and validated liberal theory and practice. Indeed, by the end of the 1990s and even more so after 2001, the historical developments did not appear to unequivocally validate liberal theory any longer. Moreover, this ultimately very short heyday of liberal internationalism seemed to fit right into the general fate of liberalism in international affairs – which is by most accounts characterized by repeated ups and downs, by periods of exalted expectations and embarrassing failures.

And yet, liberalism, even at a low ebb, undoubtedly continues to play a tremendously important role in world politics. Liberalism is a defining feature of many of the most powerful actors in world affairs – from liberal states through international organizations set up by these states and largely operating within a liberal ideological framework to private companies and NGOs. The world economy is largely structured in accordance with liberal principles. And liberal norms – from human rights through to free trade – provide a general reference point for international politics. This crucial role of liberalism in world politics thus calls for analysis: for an explanation of the mixed results of liberal policies, of its contradictory role in world politics, and hence also of the nature of liberalism itself.

Such analyses have variously been undertaken, most recently by G. John Ikenberry (2009, 2011) and Georg Sørensen (2012). Both authors argue that ‘the current dilemmas and tensions’ have their roots, at least partly, ‘in the unresolved intellectual and political tensions within liberalism itself’ (Ikenberry 2011: 282). Tensions between commitment to the rule of law and the use of power politics, between liberal political and economic principles and interests, between its domestic and international conduct have informed, and led to inconsistent, liberal policies during the 1990s and are partly responsible for their mixed outcomes. What is more, it is the very ‘success of the liberal project’, its hegemony after the Cold War, that is at least partially responsible for this crisis (Ikenberry 2011: 225). And yet, the identification of these internal contradictions of liberalism does not lead to their resolution. With regard to practice, ‘neither liberal Restraint nor liberal Imposition contains durable solutions to the world order challenges faced by liberal states’ (Sørensen 2012: 3). With regard to its historical role, we are still left with two contradictory conceptions of the current world order: one that conceives this order as liberal on account of the overwhelming power (political, economic, normative) of liberal actors, institutions, and practices; and another that holds that a liberal world order will only come into being once liberal principles are generally, or universally, realized – that is, it remains ‘a project to be realised’ (Young 1995; Sørensen 2012: 3). And hence we are still confronted with two competing conceptions of liberalism – one based on power and the other on the realization of liberal principles – that call for a ‘rethinking of the liberal project’ itself (Sørensen 2012: 6).

Hence, while it is frequently recognized that ‘an examination of the plight of liberal internationalism must shift to the flaws and limitations of liberalism itself’ (Hoffmann 1995: 160), and while these are widely described, they have, so far, not been integrated into a conception of liberalism. This book thus aims to provide a conception of liberalism that accounts for its internal contradictions and core dynamics and thus provides the basis for a clearer assessment of liberalism’s role in history as well as for the challenges facing liberal policies today. Though this sounds like a tall order, there is in fact an analytical approach specifically designed to explore the structure of concepts such as liberalism. This approach, an immanent critique, begins with the internal contradictions of contemporary conceptions of liberalism and then reconstructs the dynamics that have led, historically, to their production. It requires three core moves which inform the structure of this study. It is, first, necessary to establish the internal contradictions of liberalism in its contemporary manifestations. These, secondly, have to be traced back to their historical origins in order to recover the dynamics by which they came to constitute liberalism. On this basis, it is possible to formulate a comprehensive but preliminary conception of liberalism. Thirdly, it needs to be established in how far this ‘historical’ conception of liberalism is able to account for liberal theory and practice in the contemporary world.

The various incarnations of liberalism, as we have seen above, appear as so many disjointed pieces of a puzzle. In order to produce a general and broadly consistent picture of liberalism in world affairs, these pieces have to be assembled. For such an assembly to be successful, however, it makes sense first to take stock of the separate pieces and to investigate the rationale of their fragmentation. I will therefore begin in Chapter 2 by providing an overview over the range of liberal international theories and their relationship to (domestic) liberal theory as well as to other, especially realist, theories in International Relations. The chapter shows that liberal theory is divided into a variety of different strands: distinguishing between political, economic, and normative issue areas as well as its historical and contemporary, domestic or intraliberal and international, and theoretical or normative and practical or empirical dimensions. These distinctions, I will show, serve to provide fairly coherent conceptions of liberalism by avoiding some of its parts and making sense of others. On closer inspection it turns out, however, that the contradictory aspects of liberal thought and practice do not fall neatly onto either side of these divides. Traditional approaches thus generally tend to grasp only part of liberalism and fail to provide a satisfactory account of its systematic tensions and contradictions.

In order to put the pieces of the liberal puzzle back together again, I will return in Chapter 3 to the historical origins of liberalism and the work of John Locke. Locke provides an exposition of liberal principles that explicitly theorizes the constitutive and dynamic relations between them, and I will use his work to formulate a preliminary conception of liberalism that integrates its main dimensions. Locke’s work is particularly suited to this exercise because it is located at a critical historical juncture: at a time when ‘liberal’ ideas and interests had begun to emerge but had not yet consolidated into a coherent world view or become embodied in political institutions. Locke’s work addresses both these problems: he provides a systematic account of these ideas and interests and he works out how they might be realized in a contemporaneous ‘nonliberal’ environment. While the former gives rise to an explicit theorization of the relations between, and the co-constitutive nature of, the different dimensions of ‘liberalism’, the latter introduces a dynamic of fragmentation into liberal thought and practice. Liberalism, the Lockean work suggests, is both an ideology and a practice (indeed, the former arises from the latter and reconstitutes it). In order to test the validity of this conception of liberalism, the chapter ends by providing a brief sketch of the historical emergence and subsequent development of liberalism which, I will show, indeed broadly follows the trajectory outlined by Locke.

The remainder of the book picks up different pieces of the liberal puzzle in contemporary world politics and investigates whether, and the extent to which, these pieces can be assembled following the Lockean conception of liberalism. Chapter 4 provides an exposition of two core liberal theories focusing on political institutions: the democratic peace thesis and the democracy transition paradigm. These approaches provided the theoretical framework for a variety of democracy promotion policies that played a prominent role in the post-Cold War era. Yet, instead of leading as expected to democratization and pacification, these policies often contributed to the rise of ‘illiberal democracy’¹ and even, on occasion, to violent conflict. These failures can be traced back to a narrow focus on political institutions inspired by theories largely reducing liberalism to political institutions. In contrast, I will show, the Lockean framework accounts for both the successes and the failures of these policies – and it does so by highlighting in particular the foundational role of economic organization for the development of liberal political cultures and institutions.

Hence, Chapter 5 provides a brief account of the general assumptions of liberal economic theory and of their role in development theory and the economic strand of the democracy transition paradigm. These theories inspired, I will show, liberal economic policies during the 1990s, in general, as well as development policies and some democracy promotion policies, in particular. Again, however, the results of these policies provide a rather mixed picture – with prosperity rising in some quarters and poverty in others, with economic and financial booms followed by serious crises, and with successful transitions to capitalism accompanied or followed by a decline in political liberalism and, on occasion, a rise in violent conflict. While liberal ‘political economy’ does, as the term suggests, recognize an intimate link between the economic and political dimensions of liberalism, it tends to overlook the equally intimate link between the domestic and international sphere and its constitutive role for liberalism. International or global liberal economic policies thus often undermined the prospects of domestic liberalization and contributed to mixed results. Again, however, the Lockean conception of liberalism makes the constitutive role of the international/domestic divide for the development of liberalism explicit and thus provides an explanation for the contradictory outcomes of liberal economic policies.

Chapter 6 introduces normative liberal theories. These theories hold that the spread and institutionalization of liberal norms provide the basis for a realization of liberal principles like tolerance, individual freedom, distributive justice, and prosperity, as well as cooperation and peace. Inspired by these assumptions, policies designed to protect and spread respect for human rights – prominently in the form of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect – and to reform international institutions and international law were widely advocated. Often, however, this advocacy was not particularly vigorously followed by action – and where it was, the outcome frequently fell far short of the aims. More often than not, political and economic interests seemed to trump or shape (with detrimental consequences) the commitment to realize liberal norms. While normative liberal theories may view these interests as compatible with, or even an integral part of, liberalism, they fail to recognize what the Lockean theory makes explicit: namely that these particular political and economic interests play a constitutive role for liberal norms themselves, which explains their pervasive role in frustrating normative projects (actively or passively).

On the basis of this analysis, in conclusion, the pieces of the liberal puzzle can finally be assembled to provide a conception of liberalism that integrates its major dimensions and accounts for its diversity both across space and time. This conception has profound implications for liberal theories, liberalism’s role in history, and liberal policies. It shows that contemporary liberal approaches tend to provide only a partial conception of liberalism and thus, while offering excellent analyses of particular aspects, fail to grasp the core dynamics of the whole. The diversity of liberal thought thus tends to offer choices within liberalism r...