Management and Culture in an Enlarged European Commission

From Diversity to Unity?

C. Ban

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781137316462
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores how the European Commission faced the challenge of enlargement. Based on extensive interviews, the work provides a lively and readable picture of life within the Commission, exploring how thousands of newcomers were recruited and socialized and how they changed the organization, including its gender balance.

1

The Forces Shaping Organizational Culture: The Status Quo Ante

Introduction

A central assumption of this study is that culture matters and that the interaction between the existing culture and efforts to change that culture is circular. On the one hand, both changes in the formal systems and the arrival of new staff members can change the culture. On the other hand, cultures tend to be stable and selfprotecting, and so they are likely to shape the way the organization reacts to pressures for change. One study of the previous attempt at administrative reform, led by Jacques Santer, concludes that its failure “stem[med] from the inability of the President and his team to change the organizational culture of the Commission” because of “internal resistance to change” (Cini, 2002: 1). The Kinnock reforms, which built upon Santer’s efforts, were explicitly designed to change the management culture of the Commission through reshaping the “systems and structures of work, functional relations, and management” (Kinnock, 2004: 8).

To untangle the effects of both enlargement and reform on the culture, we need to start with a baseline, that is, with an examination of the culture and management style prior to both changes. Previous research going back for 30 years provides us with a rather consistent image of a Commission-wide culture as well as of separate subcultures within specific Directorates General (DGs) (see Abélès et al., 1993; Bellier, 1994, 1995; Abélès and Bellier, 1996; Cini, 1996b, 2000; McDonald, 1997, 1998; Shore, 2000, 2007) and the statements of my respondents, in describing the culture, were very much in agreement with their findings, which indicates considerable stability of culture. Indeed, although the Commission has clearly evolved since its early days, described by Coombes in 1970, there are definitely aspects of the culture that date to that formative period.

This chapter approaches the culture of the Commission as it had evolved up until the early 2000s by analyzing the key forces that shaped its culture: the organization’s mission and functions, the increasing number of member states represented in the European Commission (EC) staff, the organization’s structure, its formal personnel and administrative systems (and informal routes around them), and its leadership. Each of these forces played a role in shaping an organization that had many strengths but also serious management problems. Those forces played out at the level of the full Commission but also contributed to the differences in culture across the component parts of the EC.

European Commission mission and role conflict

The EC is often described, especially in the press, as the EU’s administrative or executive branch, but the analogy to the bureaucracies of national government does not do justice to the complex roles played by the Commission. First and foremost, it is the policy initiator in the EU policy system, actively developing policy proposals and sometimes mobilizing support for new policies, an obviously political role. Further, in most policy areas, it is the only European institution charged with drafting legislation, which then must be approved by both the Parliament and the Council of Ministers (Edwards, 2006). In only a limited number of policy areas does the Commission play an administrative or executive role, for example, enforcement of competition policy (somewhat broader than US antitrust policy) and distribution of financial support for economic development and agriculture. The Commission also frequently represents the membership as a whole in international negotiations, on subjects from trade to the environment, and in international organizations. Finally, the Commission plays a critical normative role, as it is seen as the guardian of the treaties and of the acquis communautaire (i.e., the total body of Community law, directives, and formal procedures). This includes a positive role, assisting member states in identifying solutions to potential problems, but it also may require the Commission to investigate infringements of the law by member states, which can lead to an enforcement role, sometimes through the European Courts.

While the Commission is extremely active in making policy, it plays only a limited role in implementation, which is generally the responsibility of the member states, which are required to pass legislation “harmonizing” national law with EU law and then to implement these laws, with the EC playing only a coordination and oversight role (Hofmann and Türk, 2006). One practical impact of that division of labor with the national governments is that the Commission is quite small in comparison with most national governments, with only 21,000 staff members (of a wide range of types) as of April 2004, just prior to the enlargement (European Commission, 2004a).

A second impact of the Commission’s active role in the formulation of policy is that it is what has been termed a “politicized bureaucracy” (Christiansen, 1997). There is an inherent conflict between its political roles, which require it to be actively engaged in battles over policy, and its role as an apolitical administrator. Structurally, those roles reflect the separation between the College of Commissioners, providing the political leadership, who are appointed through a political process that begins with nomination by their national government and who serve for fixed terms, and the officials working in the services and DGs, selected through a highly competitive process and, for the most part, with long-term career security.

This role conflict is far from new. Writing over 40 years ago, Coombes (1970: 234) described the multiple and sometimes conflicting roles of the Commission, simultaneously acting as a bureaucracy fulfilling what he termed an “implementative” function, while in other situations it acted as an “initiating, goal-setting body” providing political leadership in developing EU policy. Hooghe (2001) conceptualizes this conflict in terms of principal–agent theory, in that the Commission worked to protect and expand its role as an independent actor, leading and initiating policy, while others, both internally and in the member states, would prefer it to play the role of agent, efficiently implementing, overseeing, and managing policy set elsewhere.

This conflict played out not only at the macro level of the Commission as a whole but at the level of individual managers, many of whom identified themselves as policy entrepreneurs: In the status quo ante, it was clear that they saw working to develop new policies and to shepherd them through the complex policy process as the most important and most interesting parts of the job, for which they would be rewarded and promoted, while management was seen as less interesting and less valued – to be delegated to others wherever possible.

This conflict, then, was directly reflected in the organizational culture in two ways: the lack of a consistent approach to management and the devaluing of the very concept of management. While many aspects of organizational culture are learned within an organization through formal training or through more or less systematic socialization processes, the Commission prior to reform was characterized by a marked diversity of management styles, with no attempt to set norms or to require management training even to ensure understanding of and utilization of the formal management tools that were in place so, for example, some managers simply ignored the required performance appraisals of their staffs. Further, there was a tolerance of a wide range of styles. Those who had considerable work experience in their home country prior to entry were likely to bring with them the assumptions about both effective and appropriate management styles, leading to considerable diversity and occasional conflict.

Abélès and his colleagues (1993) detailed a conflict that they characterized as the choice between “the absence of management . . . and the misuse of management” (Abélès et al., 1993: v). They noted the increased interest in management theory since the 1973 enlargement, with both the British and the Danish seen as advocating “clear, rational procedures” to end what they perceived as “anarchy” within the Commission (Abélès et al., 1993: 78). This was not always well-received. A number of previous studies have reported that, for many mid-level and even senior managers in the Commission, there was active hostility both to the word “management” and to what were perceived as Anglo-American management theories or fads (Abélès et al., 1993) and a rejection of the idea that management was an important part of their job. The preferred role was focused on mission, that is, on the role of policy entrepreneur, and on excellence professionelle (professional competence), that is, on substantive knowledge and on skill in working through the complex policy process. In contrast, gestion (routine management) was not seen as “intellectually demanding or rewarding, and [was] consequently not held in much esteem” (Stevens and Stevens, 2001: 182).

Sectoral structure: Silos and fiefdoms

The role of policy entrepreneur was so valued in part because policy making in this system is highly complex, much more so than in most national governments, requiring coordination within the Commission, with the other EU institutions, with national and regional governments, as well as with organized interest groups. It requires patience, persistence, and finely developed political skills. Peters (1992a) described the policy-making process within the Commission as characterized by fragmentation into narrow policy fields and by close connections between the Commission and national bureaucracies in those fields. He portrayed policy making, thus, as a series of nested “games” or venues for policy contestation, functioning at three levels: between the EU and national governments, among the European institutions themselves, and between DGs within the EC.

The formal structure of the Commission is designed to reflect the specific policy fields, so the DGs mirror national ministries, with, for example, DGs responsible for agricultural policy, for environmental policy, for transportation policy, and so on. In addition, services provide horizontal support and coordination functions. As of the late 1990s, there were 24 DGs as well as 21 other services (Peterson and Shackleton, 2002), a number that was reduced by Prodi and has continued to fluctuate. This structure made it relatively easy to build policy networks with both interest groups and national governments but was frequently criticized because of the tendency of the DGs to become “semi-autonomous actors” (Cini, 1996a: 129) or even separate fiefdoms, with no real hierarchical authority and poor horizontal coordination (Hooghe, 2001; Shore, 2010).

Weak presidents, who defined their role as merely coordinating meetings rather than pushing for a Commission-wide agenda, reinforced this tendency for internal turf battles. As Kassim (2011: 7) points out, previous presidents lacked formal resources, which limited their “ability to keep colleagues in check, to orchestrate coherent policy programmes, or to manage the house effectively.” The weakness at the center fostered competition, particularly when DGs were pursuing conflicting goals, and, coupled with the intense drive of people committed to pushing through their own policies, led in some cases to a macho style of management, outspoken and even aggressive, where being willing to do battle for the cause could, at times, shade over into outright bullying.

The separation between different DGs was also exacerbated by formal policies and informal norms that inhibited movement across DGs or services. Historically, the tendency was for officials to make their careers within a single DG, with horizontal movement the exception. As a result, many pursued what was called “asparagus careers” in which people moved up while staying in a narrow field (see Abélès et al., 1993). Further, individual officials were responsible for specific dossiers and pursued them independently, rather than working in teams (Cini, 1996a), and sometimes avoided cooperation with other DGs. At higher levels, managers were protective of the policy areas for which they had responsibility and fought to maintain control, contributing to competitive relations within and across DGs, to turf battles over both policy and resources, and even to DGs acting as “self-governing statelets” (Hooghe, 2001: 23).

Nationality: Culture, communication, and management style

It is, of course, obvious that the EC staff is very diverse, as officials come from all the states that are members of the EC. Indeed, one of the central issues raised by students of management in international organizations is how one manages effectively in a multinational environment in which backgrounds, languages, communication styles, and assumptions about management all differ (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997; Dowling and Welch, 2005). Yet, as Kassim (2008: 67) reports, “there is still surprising [sic] little research on the Commission as an international administration . . . and how it responds to challenges comparable to those faced by other international organizations.” Research on nationality within the EC, particularly by political scientists, has concentrated on the extent to which hiring and promotions are based on nationality, at all levels, especially senior management (Wille, 2007; Spence and Stevens, 2006) and on differing attitudes towards the role of the Commission (supranational versus intergovernmental) or on the extent to which officials, who have taken an oath that they will not take orders from any country, nonetheless, see their role as representing the interests of their home country (Hooghe, 2001; Ellinas and Suleiman, 2012).

My focus in this study is, rather, on organizational culture, including the ability of people with disparate backgrounds to work effectively together and to forge a common culture and a sense of commitment to the goals of the organization. To understand how that culture has evolved requires an understanding of the cultural values around nationality in place prior to the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, and an analysis of how the organization has adapted over time to successive enlargements and to the subsequent arrival of officials from additional countries. We also need to address issues of language, both of the politics of language choice and of how the organization copes not only with cultural pluralism but with the challenges of communication.

Life in an international environment: A culture of cosmopolitanism

EC policy requires that the staff reflect the population of Europe, not just in overall numbers but also within individual DGs and directorates. Even within individual units, dominance by a single nationality is frowned upon, so almost all parts of the organization are amalgams of people from across the EU. The resulting cultural values, mentioned very commonly, are those of tolerance, of the need to understand others’ viewpoints, and of compromise, which go to the heart not only of day-to-day life within the organization but of the method of decision making in most policy areas. Many of those I interviewed mentioned how much they enjoyed and learned from encountering people from different nationalities and saw as very positive the organization’s openness to outsiders and newcomers. There is, however, a minority who are clearly uncomfortable with the current level of diversity, and who invoke memories of an earlier time when there was more consistency of values and a more “cozy” feeling within the Commission.

The norms in support of what Suvarierol terms “everyday cosmopolitanism” shape the selection process, which is based on a highly competitive and multistage test (known as the concours or the competition) and which favors those who have already studied or worked abroad, speak several languages, and thus are likely to adapt easily to life in the EC (Suvarierol, 2011; Ban, 2010a). The final stage of the concours is an oral examination, and those who have conducted these examinations tell me that an applicant who articulates too strongly a nationalist position would not be likely to pass.

Cosmopolitan values are further reinforced by socialization of new staff. Staff who joined prior to the 2004/2007 enlargements do not consistently report participation in formal orientation, and some report a quite difficult early adjustment, but several discuss the strong norm that, to fit in, one must learn to give up some of one’s national reflexes and to identify with their institution instead. One senior official (who entered in 1989) described this process of socialization in some detail:

What is remarkable about the Commission is the degree to which it has established a culture. The key part of the culture is that we do have a very high degree of common understanding at the level of the staff on what the priorities and objectives of this European Union is and the Commission as its executive arm . . . . And you can see it in the staff when they come in. They come in with all of their profound knowledge of their own country, and probably like me, I think that most people say, “Hmm, I will go to Brussels and they will know about my country before I am finished.” And very quickly, within a very short period of time . . . , you can see that they develop a new set of reflexes. And the national reflex, what’s in the national interest, weakens and weakens until it virtually disappears with a lot of people, and the Community interest, as we call it – with a capital C – suddenly takes over to the point that people realize that it is a faux pas to use as even an example . . . something that comes from their own country. So a French person for example who wants to make a political point will do their utmost not to say “for example in France.” They will say “for example in Germany or Italy.” . . . [O]nce you’ve caught it, the problem with working in a multi-cultural environment disappears.

Of course, within the Commission, rounding of the individual cultural sharp edges does not mean that people either lose their national cultures or are unaware of those of their colleagues. In fact, use of cultural stereotyping to explain others’ behavior is quite widespread, although some try to resist the oversimplification and cultural determinism that such stereotyping entails. Suvarierol describes the role and use of nationality in everyday life, in social life, in humor, and as an excuse or “explanatory factor for incomprehensible behaviour” (Suvariorol, 2007: 132). So nationality does play a role in informal in...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. The Forces Shaping Organizational Culture: The Status Quo Ante
• 2. The European Commission and the Process of Enlargement
• 3. The Kinnock Reforms: Preparing for Enlargement, Changing Culture?
• 4. The Outsiders Come In: Self-Selection, Selection, and Socialization of Entry-Level Staff
• 5. Fitting In or Standing Out? The Arrival of Managers from the New Member States
• 6. Nationality and Region: Why They Matter Less than Expected
• 7. Gender: Why It Matters More than Expected
• 8. Language, Culture, and Management: The Impact of Enlargement on Language Use in the Commission
• Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Index