Submission and Subjection in Leviathan

Good Subjects in the Hobbesian Commonwealth

M. Byron

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137535290
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

Leviathan invests the sovereign with nearly absolute power, and that vast sovereign has drawn the reader's eye for 350 years. Yet Hobbes has much to say about subjects as well, and he articulates a normative conception of a good subject.

1

State of Nature

Abstract: Hobbes asserts that in a state of nature there is neither justice nor injustice, and then a few pages later explains in some detail the applicability of justice in a state of nature. To explain away the appearance of contradiction, I adapt Martinich’s distinction between the primary and secondary states of nature: rather than his view, according to which the primary state of nature abstracts from all law and even from God’s existence, I contend that only atheists occupy the primary state of nature. The primary/secondary distinction turns on submission: those in the primary state of nature submit to nobody, whereas those in the secondary state of nature submit to God but no civil sovereign. This account explains how we might conceive of a situation where the concept of justice lacks application without running afoul of Hobbes’s theism and the normative scope of the laws of nature.

Byron, Michael. Submission and Subjection in Leviathan: Good Subjects in the Hobbesian Commonwealth. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. DOI: 10.1057/9781137535290.0005.

1.1 Justice in a state of nature

At the end of chapter 13 of Leviathan, Hobbes draws this consequence from his account of the state of nature: “To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice” (EW 3, 115; 13.13). The concepts of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no application in this state of nature. Here Hobbes seems to think of justice and injustice in terms of law. Justice presumably includes acts in conformity with law, and injustice the opposite. So conceived, a situation without law can have neither just nor unjust acts: the concept of justice simply would not apply. This state of nature is lawless because in it there is no “common power” to enforce law. It seems, then, that this concept of justice does not apply in a state of nature.

Just a few pages later, Hobbes discusses injustice in a state of nature. When one renounces or transfers a right to something, then one is “OBLIGED or BOUND not to hinder those to whom such right is granted or abandoned from the benefit of it; and that he ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make void that voluntary act of his own, and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE” (EW 3, 119; 14.7). Correlatively, justice seems to be a matter of fulfilling one’s obligations and duties, thereby respecting the rights of others. We commit injustice when we fail to keep our covenants, for example, which violates the third law of nature. And though the passage just quoted omits mention of law, Hobbes places it in his first chapter on the laws of nature and before introducing the commonwealth. It seems, then, that because there is law in the state of nature, the concept of justice does have application after all.

Our initial puzzle, then, is whether justice does or does not apply in a state of nature. Hobbes seems to contradict himself when he says both. But we should attribute a contradiction here only as a last resort. Hobbes built his political philosophy on the idea of a state of nature, and it would be odd indeed if he contradicted himself in laying the very conceptual foundation of his political philosophy. If we wish to understand his moral and political philosophy, both of which crucially involve the state of nature, we should be motivated to find a coherent interpretation of it. As Hobbes seems to generate the contradiction employing three concepts – justice, law, and the state of nature itself – we might distinguish senses of any of these terms in order to avoid the appearance of a contradiction. Only one of the three looks promising, however. We do not find any textual basis for distinguishing senses of law just here, as Hobbes seems to be referring only to the laws of nature. If we read Hobbes as deploying different concepts of justice in the two passages, then we could avoid the appearance of contradiction, as the “justice” absent from the state of nature in the first passage would be distinct from the “justice” present in the state of nature in the second. And some commentators, such as Barry (1968), remark on apparently distinct senses of justice in Leviathan. In one sense, justice involves obeying the law, and in another respecting rights. Hobbes does not offer any textual cues that he means justice in distinct senses, and moreover some laws of nature (such as the third concerning covenants) in fact command us to respect rights. Such a connection threatens to undermine the idea that Hobbes has distinct senses of justice. In any case distinguishing states of nature will turn out to provide a superior interpretation.

1.2 Distinguish states of nature

1.2.1 Temporal distinction

One way to resolve the apparent contradiction would be to suppose with Kavka (1986) that Hobbes has in mind two different temporal aspects of a state of nature. Kavka observes that in the first passage, where he denies that justice has application, Hobbes focuses on the war of all against all, but in the second (and in the reply to the Foole in chapter 15) he articulates the conditions under which covenants must be kept. “This suggests that Hobbes’s claims about morality in the state of nature may vary according to the aspect of that condition which he is emphasizing (or thinking of) – its warlike present or its potential for transformation by agreement into a peaceful future” (Kavka 1986: 352). Kavka describes these two aspects respectively as an “unadulterated state of nature,” which is the war of all against all, and as an “attenuated state of nature,” which is rooted in a hope for a common power (meaning a civil sovereign, and ignoring the existence of God).

Kavka contends that the laws of nature apply in both, albeit differently: in the attenuated state of nature the main clauses apply and people must seek peace, and in the unadulterated state the qualifying clauses apply and people must defend themselves. So Hobbes’s first law of nature, for example, includes a main clause: “And consequently it is a precept, or general rule, of reason that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it. ….” In the following sentence, Hobbes characterizes this main clause as containing “the first and fundamental law of nature, which is to seek peace, and follow it.” According to Kavka, this clause applies to those in the attenuated state of nature. On the other hand, the qualifying clause advises, “... and when he cannot obtain it [peace], that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.” And two sentences later, Hobbes recaps this clause by observing that it includes the right of nature, “which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves” (all quotations in this paragraph are from EW 3, 117; 14.4). Kavka thinks that this clause applies to people in the unadulterated state of nature.

Kavka’s proposed solution to the puzzle about justice in a state of nature fails for two reasons. First, it does not resolve the apparent contradiction, as it does not show how Hobbes could consistently claim both that there is and that there is not injustice possible in a state of nature. Kavka holds that the state of nature is a single state, but that Hobbes considered it from two standpoints. If we focus on the present, the state of nature is the war of all against all. If we focus on the future, the state of nature allows covenants based on the hope of a common civil power. From the former standpoint, justice has no application in a state of nature, from the latter it does. Because the state of nature is still just one state, Kavka’s two standpoints interpretation seems no less prone to apparent contradiction than the original text.

Second, Kavka’s notion of an “attenuated state of nature” does not explain how justice has application in the state of nature. Hobbes clearly states that injustice is impossible without a common power. He does not refer to the “hope” for a common power, but rather to its real existence and deployment. Kavka’s “attenuated state of nature” includes no common power, and by Hobbes’s line of reasoning can thus have no law, and thus no injustice, despite his claim that the laws of nature do apply. So this proposed solution to the apparent contradiction will not serve. Given Kavka’s interpretation, it is unclear how Hobbes might justifiably claim that justice has application in the state of nature.

1.2.2 Primary and secondary states of nature

Martinich (1992) takes seriously Hobbes’s compositive method, which aims to proceed deductively from definitions and thereby to justify the commonwealth. In the passage where Hobbes asserts that injustice has no application in the state of nature, he has not yet introduced law. “But, according to the compositive method that Hobbes is following here, the state of nature is being considered in isolation (or abstracted) from all laws, including the laws of nature. Since there is no law, there can be no injustice” (Martinich 1992: 76). Martinich dubs this conceptual moment the “primary” state of nature, and he observes that in the primary state of nature even God is absent. “... [I]t is precisely because the common power of God is absent from the primary state of nature that there is ‘no law’ at all and ‘where no law, no injustice’ ” (Martinich 1992: 76). Crucially, the absence of God allows Martinich to explain Hobbes’s remark that in this state of nature there is no common power, and thus no law or injustice. This explanation represents an advance beyond Kavka’s approach.

When in the next chapter of Leviathan Hobbes discusses the laws of nature, he employs an alternative conception of the state of nature. For if law genuinely exists there, so must a law-giver and common power, namely God. Martinich labels this the “secondary” state of nature: in it, we still have no civil sovereign, but we recognize the common power of God and the laws of nature that God has prescribed, and so are able to apply concepts of justice and injustice relative to those laws. “Consequently, justice and injustice exist in the (secondary) state of nature, because there is a law, established by a common power, namely, God” (Martinich 1992: 79).

Martinich’s distinction has the advantage over Kavka’s of explaining away the appearance of contradiction. By distinguishing conceptual rather than temporal moments in Hobbes’s argument, Martinich can avoid attributing a contradiction to Hobbes. Abstracted from all laws whatsoever, including the laws of nature, the primary state of nature does not allow application of the concept of injustice. But when we “add in” God and consider the secondary state of nature from the standpoint of the laws of nature, we may apply the concept of injustice, as Hobbes does when he remarks that injustice paradigmatically includes failure to keep covenants. Another advantage enjoyed by Martinich’s reading is its straightforward connection to Hobbes’s formula, according to which the absence of a common power entails the absence of law, which in turn entails the absence of justice.

One concern regarding Martinich’s distinction emerges from the observation that it has no basis in the text. Although Hobbes does seem to have two distinct ways of conceiving the state of nature – one involving justice and the other not – that cannot, on pain of being ad hoc, be the only evidence of a primary/secondary distinction. Leveraging Hobbes’s compositive method helps to some extent, as Hobbes generally did aim at composition from most abstract to most concrete. So it makes some sense to identify the initial discussion of a war of all against all as a state abstracted from all law, and the subsequent discussion of the laws of nature as a distinct state that includes both God and God’s laws.

A great virtue of Martinich (1992) is its correction of a tendency stretching from Strauss (1942) through Nagel (1959) to Gauthier (1969), Kavka (1986), and Hampton (1986), of neglecting the importance of religion generally and God in particular to Hobbes’s argument in Leviathan. Part of that correction begins in the discussion of the state of nature and the role God plays in it, as the common power who enforces covenants. Less clear is why, in Martinich’s view, Hobbes needs to mark just this primary/secondary distinction: Martinich’s idea of the primary state of nature turns out in his own view of it to be impossible, and all of the work of justifying the commonwealth seems to be done from the standpoint of the secondary state of nature.

According to Martinich (1992: 92), our obligations under the laws of nature apply to everyone, all the time, and are created by God’s irresistible power. In light of such a view, what would motivate Hobbes to entertain a conceptual moment abstracting entirely from God? It is odd indeed to think that Hobbes, whom Martinich considers a relatively orthodox Christian, would have built his political philosophy on definitions that made human beings in any respect conceptually prior to or independent of God. Moreover, if Martinich is correct, the laws of nature obligate everyone at all times. So it follows that, necessarily, we are obligated by the laws of nature (where the modality is de dicto and not de re). But even precision with modality leaves a problem for Martinich. If, necessarily, everyone is obligated by the laws of nature, then it would seem that no conceptual moment could be characterized as Martinich’s primary state of nature, as no conceptual moment could be prior to our being obligated by the laws of nature. And if not, then justice would necessarily have application in the primary state of nature after all, undermining the primary/secondary distinction.

Martinich might point out that a merely counterfactual connection between God and justice is informative: if God did not exist, then there would be no justice. The truth of this counterfactual does not entail God’s non-existence, and so it might be more palatable to Hobbes. This counterfactual might be true even if its antecedent is impossible (indeed, most standard semantics for modal counterfactuals guarantee its trivial truth in that case). And for Hobbes, that connection is indeed informative (I develop this point in Chapter 3). But it seems to be a mistake to invoke a state of nature in which God does not exist in order to explain how justice does not apply in a state of nature. Note that Hobbes claims that in a (primary) state of nature justice has no application, not merely that it would have no application were there no God. The truth of the latter counterfactual is insufficient to warrant Hobbes’s modally more robust claim.

Moreover, if the obligations imposed by the laws of nature apply to us necessarily, and if God must exist to create those obligations, then God must be conceptually prior to those obligations, a result that undermines Martinich’s conception of a primary state of nature without God. Hobbes writes, “Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.” Martinich is thus committed to holding that a situation in which people are not obligated by the laws of nature is as conceptually impossible as God’s non-existence. In that case, a primary state of nature in which there is no law is no less impossible. And thus the primary state of nature so defined cannot account for Hobbes’s claim that in a state of total war there is no injustice: for Martinich, the necessary obligations imposed by the laws of nature entail that justice has application, even in the most extreme state of nature.

We should observe that this argument is grounded in an incompatibility claim: the primary state of nature as it must be conceived to account for Hobbes’s claim that justice has no application there is incompatible with the idea that the laws of nature are necessarily obligating. Martinich, in virtue of his commitment to necessary obligation, thus undercuts the usefulness his own notion of the primary state of nature. It is that commitment that is inconsistent with a primary state of nature, because if, necessarily, we are always obligated by the laws of nature, then the primary state of nature as Martinich conceives it is impossible. I will challenge that commitment shortly in order to rehabilitate and slightly reconceive the idea of the primary state of nature. By giving up the idea that the laws of nature obligate necessarily we will open logical space for a primary state of nature without legal obligations. And by revising the definition of the primary state of nature to accommodate God’s existence we will avoid offending against Hobbes’s Christian commitments.

1.2.3 A spectrum of states of nature

Where Martinich suggests two states of nature, Lloyd conceives of indefinitely many such states, from the radical war of all against all to social and political situations that are very nearly commonwealths. The basis for Martinich’s distinction is conceptual abstraction from God and the laws of nature: in the primary state of nature, we consider people without reference to God, and in the secondary state of nature we consider them with reference to God. Lloyd’s spectrum instead embodies the range of social relations according to how much scope each situation allows for private judgment of goods.

Lloyd’s approach to our initial puzzle about the applicability of justice in a state of nature embodies her view that reciprocity is the key to understanding Hobbes’s argument. “Reciprocity suggests a test for discerning whether one’s actions comport with the Law of Nature, namely, that the agent imagine herself on the receiving end of the action she proposes to perform and consider whether from that vantage point she would fault the action as unreasonable” (Lloyd 2009: 16). Not only does Hobbes, in this view, hold that the laws of nature are justified by reciprocity, but so in fact is the r...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  State of Nature
• 2  Laws of Nature
• 3  Obligation
• 4  Subjection
• 5  Sovereigns
• References
• Index