Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Psychology

Interpretations and Applications in Historical Context

Gavin Brent Sullivan

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781137456915
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This book highlights the importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings on psychology and psychological phenomena for the historical development of contemporary psychology. It presents an insightful assessment of the philosopher's work, particularly his later writings, which draws on key interpretations that have informed our understanding of metapsychological and psychological issues.

Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Psychology engages with both critics and followers of the philosopher's work to demonstrate its enduring relevance to psychology today. Sullivan presents a novel examination of Wittgenstein's later writings by providing historical detail about the uptake, understanding and use of Wittgenstein's remarks and method in psychology and related areas of social science, examining persistent sources of conceptual confusion and showing how to apply his insights in investigations of collectives, social life, emotions, subjectivity, and development. In doing so, he reveals the value for psychologists in adopting a philosophical method of conceptual investigation to work through and become more reflexive about prominent theories, methods, therapies and practices in their respective, multiple fields and thereby create a resource for future theoretical, empirical and applied psychologists. This work will be of particular relevance to students and academics engaged in the history of psychology and to practitioners interested in understanding the continued importance of Wittgenstein's work within the practices of psychology.

© The Author(s) 2017

Gavin Brent SullivanWittgenstein’s Philosophy in PsychologyPalgrave Studies in the Theory and History of Psychologyhttps://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-45691-5_1

Begin Abstract

1. The Relevance of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy to Psychology

Gavin Brent Sullivan¹

(1)

Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, Coventry, UK

End Abstract

One of the main difficulties in examining Wittgenstein’s philosophy from the perspectives of applied, empirical and theoretical psychologists is the need to understand the changes in his work over his lifetime. In this respect, the phrase “Wittgenstein’s philosophy” implies a body of work which has continuity and is potentially coherent and progressive. However, there are profound differences between Wittgenstein’s two main texts: the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, first published in 1921 as Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung and translated into English from German in 1922, and the Philosophical Investigations, which was posthumously published in 1953. Accordingly, many philosophers divide Wittgenstein’s work into two main periods—early and late—with radical differences in structure, style and method between these periods. For example, the Tractatus is written in a cold, logical style and in it Wittgenstein purported to have solved all of the problems of philosophy using a theory that laid out the pictorial relationship between language and reality. Further, the self is viewed in solipsistic terms and shrinks to a point where it is indistinguishable from reality (i.e., the limits of the self are the limits of the world; cf. further remarks on the relations between philosophy and psychology from the Tractatus in the following section and Tejedor’s, 2015, explanation of the meaninglessness of solipsism, idealism and realism). The analysis of logic and language initially allowed Wittgenstein to suggest limits of what could be thought and expressed in life. The Philosophical Investigations, in contrast, is more engaging in its examination of the problems of philosophy from the perspective of disentangling everyday misconceptions about metaphysical, epistemological and psychological concepts. It engages with the individual struggle to describe, express and explore our inner lives and the details, meaningful and otherwise, of our relations with—and the behaviour of—others.

Interpreting the impact of features of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy on psychology—such as the philosophy of science inspired by Wittgenstein’s early verification account of meaning—is difficult in part because it is indirect. The influence of his earlier work appears almost exclusively through the inspiration that it provided to the logical positivists, including Carnap, Schlick and Waisman. Although the logical positivist view of science and mind was taken up most conspicuously in psychology by behaviourists, there is little evidence of any direct reference to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus by psychologists. Moreover, while Wittgenstein’s experiments on the perception of music with the psychologist C. S. Myers were presented to the British Psychological Society in 1912, they do not speak to the influence of his early conceptual investigations (Monk, 1990). Accordingly, I will limit references to Wittgenstein’s early work to examples that reflect the extent of the changes with Wittgenstein’s later period of writing which began in the early 1930s and continued until his death in 1951. This stance contrasts with Harré and Tissaw’s (2005) view that “a good grasp of the doctrines of the Tractatus helps one to appreciate the sources and limitations of attempts to develop a computational psychology, inspired by Alan Turing’s (1950) brain-to-computer analogy” (p. vii). This is not to deny the value of engaging with the ideas of the Tractatus, but the focus in this book is on the implications of his later work for psychology.

When psychologists have drawn upon Wittgenstein’s work, it has almost exclusively been from the second period. Social constructionists such as Shotter and Harré, for example, draw heavily on the second period and it is arguably the most heavily contested application of Wittgenstein’s work in psychology. Wittgenstein’s later work has had the most impact on psychology, mainly through the work that it has inspired such as Kuhn’s (1962) account of science and “paradigms” (see Sect. 1.3). From a historical perspective, initial references to any of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work by psychologists are extremely difficult to find. The first substantial reference appears to be Eleanor Rosch’s exploration of categories in the 1970s (Hergenhahn, 2001) and subsequent applications of Wittgenstein’s remarks about family resemblance concepts in the context of cognitive science (Rosch, 1987; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). However, this type of application of Wittgenstein’s ideas to develop theories in psychology is just one example of the type of limit that any Wittgensteinian philosopher or psychologist should impose on him or herself. It can also distract from the broader point that accounts of work in psychology that accord with or draw upon the “Post-Investigations” works are increasing (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004). The aim of focusing on the last of Wittgenstein’s writings is to take advantage of new interpretations which suggest that there is a “Third Wittgenstein” (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004). On this view, we need to consider seriously the implications of Wittgenstein’s (1979) notes from work in the last two years of his life which were eventually published as On Certainty.

A crucial clarification here is to distinguish between writing about psychology from the perspective of philosophy and problems that arise in the activities of psychology; that is, in the sense of conducting experiments, carrying out psychotherapy, researching a phenomenon or being trained in the theories and methods of the discipline. Accordingly, Sect. 1.1 begins with an examination of Wittgenstein’s status as a philosopher in order to address reasons that have been used by some psychologists to reject Wittgenstein’s later work as relativist and obscurantist (i.e., as anti-science). A more balanced picture emerges when contemporary views of the relationship between philosophy and science as continuous are examined and contrasted with Wittgenstein’s position that philosophy and science are quite separate practices with relative autonomy. Section 1.2 introduces the problems that attended Wittgenstein’s early view of the relationship between philosophy and psychology. An extended account of Wittgenstein’s (1953) remarks on metamathematics, mathematics and set theory explains the “entirely analogous” problems with psychology (p. 232). This is used to clarify the way in which Wittgenstein highlighted the limits of experimental method and the enduring conceptual problems in psychology in the now well-known remark that the “confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by its being a ‘young science’; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings” (p. 232). By insisting, almost in an aside, that the issue is “rather with certain branches of mathematics. Set theory” (p. 232), Wittgenstein provides a basis for further comparisons of psychology and mathematics not captured in the critical remark: “For in psychology, there are experimental problems and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusions and methods of proof)” (p. 232). Many psychologists are now aware of Wittgenstein’s admonition: “The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the means of getting rid of the problems which trouble us: but problem and method pass one another by” (p. 232). But this should be seen as much more than a call to improve psychology’s methods because it is Wittgenstein’s game analogy of the relations between philosophy and psychology that provides an alternative position. This position, moreover, still has a “meta” status in the sense that it appears to be “above” or at the very least is “about” psychology, offering a general survey of the practices of psychology from the perspective of a mid-20th century philosopher. This section also addresses the contradictory nature of many theories in psychology and examines now historical remarks about transformations of the “subject” in psychology (i.e., from subject to object and back) which appear to be consistent with the spirit of Wittgenstein’s remarks. Section 1.3 explores seemingly fragmented and opposed positions in psychology and the way in which these oppositions stem, in part, from attempts within the discipline to build comprehensive and “complete” theoretical accounts. Analysis of this issue centres on the supposed contrast between a “new paradigm” positions and ongoing tensions between critical and mainstream psychologies. These considerations lead to the question of what it means to attain a comprehensive Wittgensteinian surview of a particular area of language and whether it provides the basis for psychologists to connect with Wittgensteinian philosophy to achieve new understandings of their work in psychology.

1.1 A Brief History of Relations Between Wittgensteinian Philosophy and Psychology

One of the difficulties for psychologists interested in the relevance of Wittgenstein’s work to their specific theoretical, empirical and practical endeavours is attaining an understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in relation to the tasks of psychology. Some psychologists include Wittgenstein’s later philosophical work as the “proto-postmodernist” basis (Holzman & Morss, 2000) for what has been called postmodern psychology. Gergen’s (2001a) variation is to use Wittgenstein as philosophical support in advocating new forms of psychological practice to be adopted in a postmodern context. Gergen describes three modernist themes as central sustaining features of what he calls traditional but which can also be described as mainstream psychological science: “emphasis on the individual mind, an objectively knowable world, and language as carrier of truth” (p. 803). While the basis for these arguments in Wittgenstein’s philosophy—and the alternative practices to those of traditional psychology that controversial figures such as Gergen advocate—will be explored through a wider range of positions and arguments in the following chapters and sections, for the moment it is important to examine whether, how and why Wittgenstein’s later philosophy has been linked to and identified by some as postmodern (e.g., Hergenhahn, 2001), consider the impact that has had on engagement with his philosophy by psychologists and examine some of the features of modernist thought that Wittgenstein opposed.

Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy and Postmodernism

Given that most histories of psychology begin with Descartes’ modernist philosophy (e.g., Thorne & Henley, 2001), it is surprising that these histories devote no space to Wittgenstein as a major critic of Cartesian philosophy. Those accounts (especially in psychology) that do examine Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Cartesian philosophy tend to focus on the problems of dualism rather than supporting features of modernist philosophy largely established and exemplified by Descartes which include an emphasis on the individual as the basis for certain knowledge about the world, faith in the ability of science to progress understanding of humanity, and an overarching position for philosophy as the “queen of the sciences”. In the introduction to the Passions of the Soul—which is widely thought to have been written by Descartes himself—a framework is outlined for philosophy as well as its application to physics and all other sciences:

But just as when an Architect has laid all the foundations and raised the main walls of some great edifice no one doubts that he can carry his plan to completion, because they can see that he’s already done what was most difficult. (Descartes, 1647/1989, p. 12)

The commentator on Descartes’ work added that experiments need to be conducted in order to complete this plan. In this respect, Descartes’ speculative accounts and examples of the operations of the emotions or passions demonstrate his conviction that philosophy could establish the basis for truth, objectivity and progress.

In striking contrast, Wittgenstein (1980a) remarked in Culture and Value: “The edifice of your pride has to be dismantled. And that is terribly difficult work” (p. 26). Although it is clear from other remarks in Wittgenstein’s work that he was talking about his own susceptibility to comments from others that he was the world’s greatest philosopher (Monk, 1990), the more relevant point is that Wittgenstein was always critical of what his philosophy could achieve; in short “the self-scrutiny demanded by such a dismantling of one’s pride is necessary, not only to be a decent person, but also to write decent philosophy” (p. 366). In this case, the edifice could arguably be taken to mean the results of modern philosophy and theory construction; in short, the pride of “modern man”. Thus, in contrast to the certainty and self-belief of Descartes’ philosophical remarks, Wittgenstein (1953) argues for an approach which appears to tear down the achievements of modernist philosophy:

Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand. (p. 48)

On the surface, this resembles Derrida’s notion of philosophy as the deconstruction of conceptual binaries used to understand the world as well as a rejection of certainties recognized by philosophy and progress achieved through science (Staten, 1984). Garver and Lee (1994), for example, defend Wittgenstein against the view that he was committed to the renewal of philosophy, not its termination. Comparing the later Wittgenstein and Derrida, Garver and Lee (1994) argue for several points of commonality in their attack on modernist philosophy: “Derrida and Wittgenstein agree in giving prominence to nonfactual discourse, expressive language, and metaphor, in contrast to formal argument, logical analysis, and categorical semantics – and, too, in contrast to ‘forms’ or ‘ideas’ or other phenomenological givens” (p. x). Staten (1984) goes further and sees Wittgenstein’s later work from the “transitional” period of the Blue Book (i.e., from the later or second period of Wittgenstein’s work) as developing “a consistently deconstructive standpoint” (p. 1) that precedes and parallels Derrida’s deconstruction.

This is ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. The Relevance of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy to Psychology
• 2. A Wittgensteinian Stance on Psychological Methods, Objectivity, Ontology and Explanations
• 3. Wittgenstein’s Influence and Impact in Areas of Psychology
• 4. Concluding Remarks: Wittgensteinian Philosophy and the Future of Psychology
• Back Matter