Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions

Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

D. Panke

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781137363275
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores the interplay between formal rules and real world differences, questioning to what extent size-related capacities between states matters for the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations taking place in the United Nations General Assembly, an institution that strongly reflects the one-state, one-vote principle.

1

Introduction

Sovereignty is an important building block of the modern international state system and entails both internal and external elements (Krasner 1999). The external component refers to the mutual recognition of territorial entities (with a people and a government) as equal actors that are formally independent of each other (international legal sovereignty, Krasner 1999: 14–20).¹ During the twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries, the number of sovereign states increased from about 80 at the end of the nineteenth century to almost 200 states today.² Within the same period, the number of international organisations (IOs) and regimes increased as well (e.g. Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). Today, states cooperate at the regional and international levels on a variety of different policy areas within a series of sometimes overlapping regimes and IOs. International cooperation does not erode the external component of sovereignty but is rather an expression of the same. In line with de Vattel’s “Law of Nations” of 1758, the international legal system of today rests on the principle of the equality of states (Franck 1988, Kelsen 1966, Koh 1996, Raustiala and Slaughter 2002). This not only regulates bilateral relations between states but also means that sovereign states cannot be forced to join or cooperate in IOs or regimes. Moreover, most IOs are based on the principle of sovereign equality, according to which all member states have equal rights and equal weight in the policy-initiation, negotiation and decision-taking stages of an IO’s policy cycle.³

While states are formally equal in IOs and regimes without weighted voting systems,⁴ they are unequal in other respects, most notably in their population size or their financial and political capacities. For example, the current 193 member states of the United Nations (UN) that meet in the General Assembly all enjoy the same formal rights with respect to policy-initiation, negotiation and voting. However, microstates with less than one million inhabitants, such as Kiribati, Luxembourg, Tuvalu, the Seychelles, Brunei, Belize or Malta to name but a few, face regional powers with over 200 times their population, considerably more financial capacities, larger delegations, and significantly bigger and more highly differentiated governance apparatuses, such as the USA, China, India or Russia.

Against that background, this book addresses the following research questions: How do size-related capacity differences among sovereign states influence their activities and their chances of success within IOs that are formally based on the one-state, one-vote principle? What roles do different capacities play in a state’s active participation in multilateral negotiations as well as for their prospects of influencing the content of international policy outcomes? Are smaller states that grapple with limited capacities less active and less successful than bigger states, although they are formally equal?

In order to answer these questions, this book analyses negotiations within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). On the one hand, the UNGA is an institutional context in which the equality-of-states principle is strongly institutionalised, as microstates have identical rights and obligations to middle-sized states or regional powers. On the other hand, almost all of today’s sovereign states are members of the UNGA, and the size and capacity differences between the members are vast. Thus, the UNGA is an ideal testing ground for the role of capacities in the active and effective participation of states in international multilateral negotiations. Do capacity constraints mean that smaller states participate less actively in multilateral negotiations than bigger states with more capacities? To what extent does activity translate into success? Are smaller states with lower capacities less influential than bigger states, despite the manifestation of sovereign equality between states in the one-state, one-vote rule?

The book shows that size matters, but only to a certain extent. States with shortages in administrative and political capacities as well as bottlenecks of staff and financial capacities grapple most often and most seriously with the capacity demands of multilateral negotiations. As a consequence, they participate less actively than their better-equipped and usually bigger counterparts in all stages of an IO’s policy-making process. Bigger states do not just cover a broader range of items on the negotiation agenda than smaller states; they are also in a position to draw on a very broad range of bargaining or persuasion-based strategies and can afford to apply them vis-à-vis multiple actors at the negotiation setting and in various capitals. States that are more active have greater chances of influencing the content of policy outcomes. While being passive or fully absent from negotiations renders having influence over the content of resolutions less likely, the direct effect of capacities on successful resolution passage is rather limited. Ultimately, the prospects of successfully passing a resolution in a one-state, one-vote context do not depend on the amount of financial capacities that can be used as bargaining leverage (e.g. linkages to development aid, threats to discontinue budget contributions to the UN, financial side-payments) but mainly boil down to numbers. Being able to rely on like-minded countries in large regional or UN-specific groups is a great advantage when trying to reach the simple majorities necessary to pass resolutions, and this also provides a means for smaller states to compensate for at least some of their own capacity limitations.

1.1 The research question and the argument

What roles do size-related capacity differences between states play in international negotiation contexts that institutionalise the principle of sovereign equality?

This book uses the UNGA as an empirical case to answer this question, as it is the ideal testing ground for the effect of different capacities on states’ conduct in international negotiations and their prospects for success. The UNGA incorporates an interesting antagonism: On the one hand, it is the least likely setting for capacity differences to matter because it is the principal organ of the UN that most strongly expresses the principle of state equality. All states, no matter how big or small, enjoy the same rights across the policy-initiation, negotiation and decision-taking stages of the UNGA’s policy cycle. Each state has the right to act as a sponsor and table a draft resolution, each state has access to and the right to speak during negotiations in the various committees of the UNGA, and each state carries the same weight when it comes to decision-taking in the General Assembly. On the other hand, the UNGA represents a most likely context for capacity-based inequalities to impact participation and success rates, as it is the IO with the most encompassing membership worldwide, where microstates, such as Tuvalu or Kiribati, face regional powers which have more than 1,000 times their financial capacities, such as China or the USA.

In order to shed light on the role of size in multilateral negotiations, this book examines the following questions: Are institutional rules effective equalisers between bigger and smaller states in international negotiations or are the former more active and more successful due to their superior capacities? Can small states punch above their weight and if so, under which conditions? Under which conditions are bigger states more active and more successful in multilateral negotiations?

Similar to the UNGA, most IOs and international regimes are based on the one-state, one-vote rule, whereas their member states differ de facto in regard to the resources they can draw on. Thus, multilateral negotiations are inherently games that unequal actors play. However, more often than not they do so in an institutional environment that is designed to formally treat all states as equals. This book distinguishes between active and effective participation in the policy-initiation, negotiation and decision-taking stages of a policy cycle. On this basis, it studies the roles of size- and non-size-related capacities for the active participation of states in the UNGA’s policy cycle as well as their effects on influence in the UNGA. It provides a series of insights into the relationship between formal institutional rules and real-world size differences between states for other IOs and regimes as well.

This book demonstrates that the active participation of states in the policy-initiation, negotiation and decision-taking stages of a policy cycle should not be treated as a given. In fact, there are considerable differences in the participation patterns between states. Some states, such as the Central African Republic, São Tomé und Príncipe, Kiribati or Liberia, are hardly active during policy-initiation, negotiation and decision-taking in the UNGA, although participation rights are an expression of their sovereignty. At the same time, other states, for example, Germany, Great Britain, South Africa, Chile or Canada, are considerably more active. Based on a multilevel analysis, this book argues that differences in the frequency of participation are, to a considerable extent, caused by capacity differences. Without a national position, diplomats cannot actively engage in multilateral negotiations. Yet national positions regarding an issue on the negotiation table do not just exist naturally but must be formulated by states in the first place. This, however, requires financial means as well as staff capacities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, beside political and administrative as well as ideational capacities. Bigger states with large ministries and budgets can afford to develop and pursue national positions across a wide range of items on the negotiation agenda. As a result, these states tend to participate more actively in the UNGA’s policy cycle. By contrast, smaller states face more capacity bottlenecks and tend to formulate fewer national positions, which are often accompanied by delays. This in turn reduces the ability of their diplomats to participate actively in the whole range of items on the agenda in the policy-initiation, negotiation and decision-taking stages of the UNGA. Moreover, due to slimmer diplomatic missions, smaller states are often unable to cover all meetings, whereas bigger states can not only afford to be present at all negotiations but might even be in a position to assign more than just one diplomat to an issue. Thus, smaller states tend to struggle much more with capacity limitations than bigger states and are therefore less active in multilateral negotiations – even when the negotiations are formally structured in a manner that expresses state equality. Yet smaller states can compensate for at least some of the size-related difficulties, for example, if they systematically create institutional memories to increase the speed of domestic position formation and have well functioning ministries. In addition, smaller states that are willing to re-allocate additional resources to UN affairs – either because they place a high priority on international affairs in general or because the government is responsive to an active civil society – struggle less with swiftly developing national positions for a broad range of issues, and participate consequently more actively throughout the policy cycle of the UNGA.

In a second step, the book examines the nexus between active and effective participation. It shows that more active states have more opportunities to make their voices heard and also exert– ceteris paribus – greater influence over the content of resolutions than states that tend to remain silent throughout the policy cycle. Bigger states have the advantage of being able to afford higher participation levels and, therefore, exert influence more easily. Due to their superior capacities, bigger states are able to cover a broader range of agenda items and apply more strategies overall vis-à-vis a multitude of actors at the negotiation table and in various capitals, meaning that they have an important comparative advantage over smaller states. Everything else being equal, bigger states are in a better position to exert influence over the policy content of a greater number of resolutions than smaller states. While activity is very important, it does not determine outcomes. Most crucially, the negotiation strategy used must fit the situation, and the state in question must possess the required strategy-specific resources. Both elements are influenced by the institutional rules in place. Most notably, in a one-state, one-vote context, interactions take place in the shadow of voting. Thus, numbers count and states are only effective via bargaining strategies if they are indeed in pivotal positions. This is increasingly likely if a state belongs to a big coalition and rare if it is on its own. Since the overwhelming majority of smaller states belong to the G77 or the Non-Aligned Movement, as the largest groups in the UNGA they can use in-group logrolling to maximise their influence. At the same time, financial power, such as being a major contributor to the budget of the IO, or economic means, such as development aid payments, do not constitute an important element of bargaining leverage in the one-state, one-vote setting of the UNGA. As a consequence, bigger states are not per se more successful than smaller ones when it comes to resolution passing on the basis of bargaining strategies. In the UNGA, small and big states alike are most influential if they use persuasion-based strategies that are backed up with good factual, technical and legal expertise and if they work through regional or UN-specific groups instead of being alone. While smaller states cannot punch above their weight on the whole range of issues, they can be very effective for selected resolutions that they prioritise highly and for which they adjust their capacity allocation accordingly.

In sum, size-related capacities, such as staff numbers or budgets, are important in multilateral negotiations but only to some extent. Smaller states have fewer means to participate actively in the different stages of a policy cycle than bigger states. Thus, they tend to be silent more frequently than bigger states, which express national positions more often and in regard to a greater number of international norms on the UNGA’s agenda. Nevertheless, institutional rules matter. They operate as equalisers between smaller and bigger states but not in regard to active participation. In regard to effective participation, however, equalising institutional rules do not eliminate, but at least reduce, some of the effects of size-related asymmetries.

1.2 Contributions to International Relations research

This book makes five distinct contributions to IR research.

First, while we know much about the activities and the influence of bigger states in international negotiations,⁵ smaller states are less often and less systematically in the spotlight of research.⁶ Consequently, we know little about the effect of capacity differences between microstates, middlesized and regional powers on negotiation behaviour and outcomes. This is unfortunate insofar as the majority of the sovereign states in our current international system are rather small in terms of their financial capacities and their populations. Even in the widespread one-state, one-vote multilateral negotiation systems, bigger states have larger budgets, more staff in their foreign ministries back home, and bigger delegations at the negotiation table, while smaller states can run more easily into capacity shortages. Thus, this book conducts a systematic comparative analysis of how states of different sizes engage in multilateral negotiations that are formally structured according to the principle of state equality. What capacity-related obstacles do smaller states face in these settings and to what extent do these obstacles impact their negotiation behaviour and the negotiation outcomes? Under what conditions do capacity differences come to the fore and how can they be mitigated? Are some states better at using available resources than others and if so, why? Can small states punch above their weight and how? Do bigger ones punch below their weight and when? In answering these questions, this book makes a contribution to our knowledge about the role of small states in international negotiations.

Second, although the UNGA is the institution with the broadest membership worldwide comprising more than 190 states, it has not received much scholarly attention in the last decade (for exceptions, see the vote-for-aid literature by Alesina and Dollar 2000, Dreher et al. 2008, Kegley and Hook 1991, Wang, 1999).⁷ The scarcity of up-to-date scholarship on negotiation dynamics and outcomes of the UNGA is not only surprising against the background that it is the largest IO in the world but also because UNGA resolutions, while not being legally binding,⁸ express collective interests and thus legitimise or stigmatise certain conduct.⁹ In addition, UNGA resolutions constitute – as soft law – part of the international legal environment and are thus not only reference points in many multilateral negotiations within and outside the UN umbrella but also initiate binding conventions and inform the content of hard law. This book sheds light on the blind spot since it provides up-to-date insights into the negotiation dynamics and outcomes of the UNGA. It distinguishes between active and effective participation across the different stages of a policy cycle. On this basis, this book shows how states engage in policy-initiation, negotiation and decision-taking stages, detects and explains participation patterns, and links active engagement to states’ prospects of being successful in this multilateral context. To this end, it advances a multimethod approach, combining more than 160 interviews with six in-depth case studies and the quantitative analysis of a unique database on active and effective participation in the UNGA.

Third, there is a broad literature on multilateral negotiations that points to the importance of capacities (e.g. Odell 2000, Plantey 2007, Zartman and Rubin 2009). Yet most studies do not systematically analyse the effects of varying types of capacity differences: First, on the states’ prospects of actively participating in negotiations and, second, on success in multilateral negotiations that rest on the one-state, one-vote principle. This book adds to our understanding of the importance of different capacities for active and successful participation in international negotiations. To this end, it distinguishes between financial, political and administrative, and staff and ideational capacities. The book subsequently examines which capacity demands and constraints states face when attempting to actively negotiate and influence outcomes on the international level. On this basis, the book analyses how different capacities impact active participation in negotiations as well as states’ prospects of influencing and successfully passing negotiation outcomes. Are some states better-equipped than others to ensure that their voices are heard during negotiations? Do capacities matter all the way down and influence not only the extent to which a state actively participates in negotiations but also its prospects for success? In answering these questions, this book sheds light on the role of capacities in negotiation activities and the related prospects for success of microstates, middle-sized states and regional powers.

Fourth, the book provides an important theoretical innovation in shedding new light on how the construction of national negotiation positions back home influences the ability of delegations to actively participate in multilateral settings. Some scholars of IR exogenise national interests and take them as given (e.g. Lake 1999, Waltz 1979). Second image and also some constructivist approaches of IR, however, view national positions as endogenous by looking at the role of the domestic electorate, the media, interest groups, lobbyists or party politics (Finnemore 1996, Knopf 1993, Lehman and McCoy 1992, Mo 1995, Odell 2000, Paarlberg 1997, Putnam 1988). While these studies examine how national positions are constructed domestically, they do not analyse the timing of when national positions are developed nor do they inquire into the possibility that capacity shortages might even prevent the development of national positions altogether. This book presents an important theoretical innovation by starting from the assumption that national interests need to be constructed in the domestic arena before a state can actively participate in international negotiations. This requires that MFAs, sometimes together with governments or line ministries, formulate the national positions. To this end, they need to analyse the domestic, regional and international implications...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The United Nations General Assembly: Formal Equality and Size Differences
• 3. Theory
• 4. Empirics I: Active Participation
• 5. Empirics II: Effective Participation in the UNGA
• 6. Conclusions
• Appendix
• Notes
• Literature
• Index