The Party Politics of the EU and Immigration

P. Odmalm

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137462510
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Campaigns & Elections
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores the changing nature of party competition in four West European countries. It pays special attention to how different ideological positions give rise to contradictory cues when parties engage with atypical election issues like the EU and immigration.

1

The Changing Nature of Party Competition

Party systems across Europe have become increasingly complex and volatile (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, 2010). New questions have emerged – with the attendant formation of ‘new’ parties – which have often come to challenge the status quo of party competition (Harmel and Gibson, 1995; Franklin, 1992). This change is said to manifest itself in the increased prominence of lifestyle, value and environmental questions that have taken the political conversations in a post-material direction over recent decades (Bomberg, 2002; Davis and Davenport, 1999; Knutsen, 1990; Inglehart, 1971). But this volatility also relates to those novel questions that have entered the party-political agendas and which do not always have an obvious dimensional fit or any equally obvious modes of framing (see e.g. Chong and Druckman, 2007; Rydgren, 2005; Taggart, 1995). And simultaneously, the party-electorate linkages show increasing signs of dissonance and friction (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009; Hobolt, 2008; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005), and parties are also said to be increasingly difficult to distinguish from one another. The behaviour of the voters has in turn echoed these developments and points to how competence and an ability to deliver seem to be more important than ideological proximity for their choice of party (Green and Hobolt, 2008; Holian, 2004; van der Brug, 2004).

These changes raise several pertinent questions for the political scientist. Does ideology matter in the political ‘game’ (Fukuyama, 1992)? Do parties offer a choice between different societal outcomes anymore (Stokes, 1963)? And, if so, are these choices significantly different from one another (Petrocik, 1996)? If one answers these in the negative, then this leads to an additional set of queries that need to be addressed. Should we have entered an era of visionary decline (Elff, 2007), what is it that then drives party conflict? And why are some parties still more likely than others to experience an internal ideological turmoil?

Electoral competition has previously been explained by the different spatial positions that parties occupy (Downs, 1957), the assumption being that these ideological location(s) would translate into specific – and different – policy solutions. Conflict has therefore tended to revolve around competing ideas of ‘the good society’. Similarly, the electoral dynamics that parties are subjected to (Deschouwer, 2013; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Adams and Merrill, 1999), and how they have responded (either pro- or re-actively) to certain exogenous ‘shocks’ (Adams et al., 2004; Budge, 1994), have also been put forward to explain the identified modes of party competition.

However, such explanations assume that the party-political landscapes have remained relatively stable, and that certain fault lines continue to be relevant for parties and electorates alike. But as increasingly noted, party systems appear to be in a state of flux (see e.g. Poguntke, 2012; Broughton and Donovan, 1999; Mair, 1989), and the political mainstream may therefore find that their traditional stances – and solutions – are no longer viable. These questions are of course important for the more general understanding of how party competition has evolved and changed over time, and, indeed, ‘parties’, ‘ideologies’ and ‘elections’ continue to be key topics for the comparative scholar (see e.g. Budge et al., 2001; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1987; Budge and Farlie, 1983; 1978; Rose, 1964). But they are equally important questions to address when trying to explain (and make sense of) how parties engage with, and negotiate, issues that often fall outside of the traditional dimensions of conflict. While much of the post-war period was characterised by uni-dimensional types of competition concerning the distribution, and ownership, of societal resources, this material cleavage is said to be less dominant today and subsequently also less relevant than it was, say, 40 years ago (Jansen et al., 2013). In parallel, however, a new set of issues have emerged, which are characterised by their more post-material nature (Kitschelt, 1988; Inglehart, 1971). One would, perhaps, expect these changes to have generated more room for conflict, given the plurality of cleavages that are now present, yet paradoxically, there also appears to be an increased level of agreement on certain societal outcomes (e.g. the continuation of the welfare state or protecting the environment). Therefore, what is said to have changed is how parties intend to achieve these mutually desirable goals. This suggests that party competition, at the very least, has been affected by these sociopolitical changes but possibly also that it has changed fundamentally. Where parties were previously more likely to put forward a set of competing visions, they can now be described to be more concerned with portraying competence, claiming ownership over particular issues and convincing the electorate that they are more capable than their opponent(s) are at delivering on these valence issues (Clark, 2009; Green, 2007; Bale, 2006; Stokes, 1963).

Yet, explaining the modes of competition on some of these ‘new’ sources of conflict continues to be difficult to do. The European Union (EU) and immigration ‘issues’ are in many ways indicative of the changes that have taken place regarding party competition (see e.g. Breunig and Luedtke, 2008; Harmsen and Spiering, 2004; Hooghe et al., 2002; Faist, 1994). They have not only contributed to this state of flux but have also added further complexity to an already complex situation of trying to understand party systems and party placements (Benoit and Laver, 2007). It somewhat relates to the delicate balancing act that parties need to perform when these questions develop into contested ‘issues’. Both areas are of frequent electoral concern, media frenzy and sustained challenge by, particularly, the populist radical right (PRR) (see e.g. Hampshire, 2013; Hayton, 2010; Boswell and Hough, 2008; Hunger, 2001; Mudde, 1999; Karapin, 1999; Freeman, 1997; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), which often means that there is ample room for the political mainstream to get it electorally ‘wrong’. But they are also questions that pose internal difficulties for parties since there is not always any obvious ideological lynchpin to hang their position(s) on (see also Spies and Franzmann, 2011). At the same time, parties have also struggled with a growing sense of ideological crisis as the political conversation has shifted from ‘visions’ over to ‘competence’ (and occasionally back again). Should certain questions thus fall outside of the so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’ dimensions of conflict, then they may very well give rise to intra-party, as well as inter-party, tension as parties attempt to get the new calculus right. The adopted party stances are usually categorised along a ‘Europhile – Eurosceptic’, or ‘Liberal – Restrictive’, continuum (see e.g. Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2013; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002), but such classifications may not necessarily lend themselves to be equated with the positions that parties hold on either of these ‘old’ or ‘new’ divides (Smith, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2007). A mismatch is therefore likely to develop between the ‘issue’ and the ‘ideological’ positions that parties have, and one that can be traced back to the multifaceted nature of both issues. But if this is the case, then what would drive electoral conflict and competition on the EU and immigration ‘issues’? Since parties are usually motivated by office-, policy- or vote-seeking objectives, they also tend to respond to those questions that will allow them to achieve such aims (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, 2010; Green-Pedersen, 2004; Karp and Banducci, 2002). Given how saliency levels and the electoral ‘threat’ of the PRR have witnessed a significant incline across many West European states (Ennser, 2012), a reasonable assumption would thus be that the party attention paid to both issues would show a similar development. But although parts of the mainstream have continuously campaigned on an EU and/or immigration ticket, others have not. Due to their ideologically ambiguous nature, issues of dimensional fit and societal impact should be likely to emerge, and mainstream parties may therefore struggle to identify the most appropriate frame to use (Helbling et al., 2010; Chong and Druckman, 2007). Furthermore, should one accept the multidimensionality of the political space, then this may very well subject parties to a set of conflicting ideological ‘pulls’ (Odmalm, 2011) as they attempt to establish and internally negotiate this frame. For centre-right parties, the tension involves weighing free-market ideals against national sovereignty/value conservatism, whereas for the centre-left, it concerns notions of welfare state/labour market protectionism pitted against ideals of international solidarity and human rights (Hinnfors et al., 2011; Bale, 2008). Should parties frame the EU and/or immigration according to the ‘wrong’ stream, it is likely to bring unwanted attention and criticism, from their mainstream as well as from their more radical competitors, and thereby detract attention from parties’ core competencies and electoral priorities (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm, 2008). But such discrepancies may not necessarily be a problem should ideology, indeed, be ‘dead’ and should the role of parties have shifted from ‘popular vehicles of representation’ to ‘competent implementers’ (see e.g. van Biezen, 2012; Petrocik, 1996; Katz and Mair, 1995; Schattschneider, 1960; 2009). However, if parties struggle to accommodate their issue position/s with their overall ideological orientation, then this would suggest that the death of ideology is, perhaps, exaggerated and that it still continues to play some form of role in political life and discourses.

This book therefore sets out to investigate these complicated relationships by adopting a comparative perspective. More specifically the focus is on those mainstream actors that occupied the Belgian, British, Dutch and Swedish party systems between 1991 and 2010. The period in question includes several key developments and events where parties should have been subjected to increased (re)framing pressures, and one would therefore expect these strains to also be reflected in their respective manifestos. On the one hand, the EU witnessed numerous ‘critical junctures’ that have come to affect its original raison d’être (e.g. the signings of the Amsterdam and Maastricht Treaties; the establishment of the single market; Schengen taking effect; the further enlargement eastwards becoming a tangible, and later, a de facto reality; the introduction of the Euro; and the ‘Community’ tag being replaced by the ‘Union’ ditto) (see further Bache et al., 2011; Cowles and Smith, 2000). And on the other hand, immigration pressures were building up, the PRR was becoming increasingly credible as an electoral challenger and the prevailing philosophies of integration were being challenged (see e.g. Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2011; Mudde, 2007; Bevelander, 2004; Breugelmans and van de Vijver, 2004; Vink and Meijerink, 2003; Geddes, 2000; 2003). The choice of cases, and the time frame covered, will thus be particularly illuminating for further probing how the political mainstream has tried to engage with, and negotiate, two of the most contested areas in contemporary European politics.

In some respects, they constitute a ‘usual suspects’ list in the EU and immigration literatures. The ambivalent relationships that the British and Swedish parties have had with the former have been extensively covered (see e.g. Crowson, 2011; Archer, 2000), whereas the more Euro-friendly situation in the Low Countries has tended to receive less attention (although see e.g. Abts et al., 2009; Hylarides, 2001). Equally, a substantial body of literature exists that references these cases and their respective approaches to immigration and/or integration (e.g. Shain, 2008; Boswell, 2003; Page Moch, 2003; Castles and Miller, 2003; Castles and Davidson, 2000). As such, they show a high degree of variation not only regarding their ‘party-based Euroscepticism’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005) but also in terms of the sources and composition of newcomers, and in the levels of conflict that the immigration ‘issue’ has endured (see e.g. Roggeband and Vliegenthart, 2007; Rydgren, 2002; Castles and Miller, 2003).

Since it first emerged as an ‘issue’ in the post-war period, the British party politics of the EU has witnessed significant positional shifts, whereas in Sweden, a more stable domestic/foreign policy dilemma came to dominate political debates and served to split the party system into (fairly even) pro- and anti-camps. In Belgium and the Netherlands, conversely, the EU managed to remain a largely uncontested issue for a remarkably long period of time. The immigration ‘issue’ shows similar levels of variation. In terms of flows and types, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands form a postcolonial cluster, which is juxtaposed by Sweden who has had higher numbers of asylum seekers and family reunification migrants. And the way that it has played out during elections differs remarkably. While the British and Dutch parties have come to adopt an increasingly confrontational approach, immigration has rarely registered as an election issue in neither Belgium nor Sweden. Some of these cases also experienced the sudden rise – and equally sudden success – of various types of PRR challengers, but this has come with quite different responses from the mainstream players (see e.g. Norris, 2005; Mudde, 1999; 2004; Perlmutter, 1996; Betz, 1994). Although there have indeed been instances where mainstream parties have tried to co-opt or even outdo these ‘threats’ (Britain, the Netherlands), there have also been signs that point in the opposite direction when they have not deviated from the official party line on, for example, asylum and family reunification (Sweden), or where the reductionist position has been largely redundant since this was already the consensus understanding (Belgium).

That said, systematic comparisons have been scarce and studies tend to adopt either a binary-study or a case-study approach (be that either country or ‘issue’). Studying the four countries in tandem, and using the same analytical lens, allows for an assessment of whether the EU and immigration – as party-politically relevant issues – are dependent, or largely independent, of the above externalities. While these factors are likely to have had some form of effect on how the mainstream has chosen to engage (or not) with the two ‘issues’, the book’s main emphasis is on their ability to handle and negotiate these conflicting ‘pulls’, and whether any similarities found can help us to understand the changing dynamics of party competition in Western Europe. The empirical data are based on a novel way of coding party manifestos, and a substantial set of qualitative interviews (conducted with MPs and party strategists), which are invoked to address the following questions: has the political mainstream resolved the ideological strains that are likely to emerge when competing in multidimensional party spaces? If not, has this resulted in a higher frequency of ownership claims being present in their party manifestos?

The key findings suggest that competition has become increasingly dependent on processes internal to the parties themselves rather than being a reaction to particular cues in the external political environment. At the same time, however, the issues’ ideological uncertainties have been likely to increase levels of indecisiveness regarding what strategies to pursue, and when to make the EU and/or immigration a top election priority. The role of ideology may have changed but perhaps not in the desired way. Rather than offering clarity and a firm directional steer, it has instead added to the complexity and nuance of an already complex political context. This further helps to explain the identified party behaviour, which increasingly stresses competence and a successful track record of delivery.

The book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 maps the changing nature of the societal cleavages and what consequences these changes have had for party competition. The chapter’s final section discusses the novel coding scheme that is used for the manifesto analysis and qualifies its approach in relation to the existing datasets – the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). This section also provides further details on the interviews that were conducted. Chapter 3 offers an historical overview of the relationships that each case has had with the EU and immigration – from the post-war years up until the late 1980s – and highlights some of the key sources of contestation that both areas have tapped into and that, to some extent, continue to fuel the debates today. Thus, it ‘sets the scene’ for chapters 4 and 5, which in more detail examine how the political mainstream has engaged, negotiated and competed on these issues during the increasingly politicised period between 1991 and 2010. These analytical and empirical chapters discuss party competition in the multidimensional space (Chapter 4) and the changing modes of party competition (Chapter 5). Finally, chapter 6 relates the book’s conclusions to the broader implications they have for studying the party politics of the EU and immigration.

2

Competing in Multidimensional Party Spaces

Numerous attempts have been made to classify parties along some form of left-right continuum using either party publications; expert judgements or voters’ self-placements to identify these locations (Budge, 2000; 2001; Gabel and Huber, 2000; Giljam and Oscarsson, 1996; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1987). While it has become a standard vocabulary in the field, the meaning of ‘left-right’ is said to be so diverse that it is ‘multifaceted at best, elusive at worst’ (Arian and Shamir, 1983: 139). This elusiveness stems from prevailing discrepancies regarding the essence of the party-ideological space (Huber and Inglehart, 1995). The literature is thus characteristically divided on the topic. Some suggest that a ‘new’, post-material divide has come to supersede the ‘old’, material cleavage (Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Inglehart, 1997; Knutsen, 1990; 1995a; 1995b; see also Clark and Lipset, 1991), while others consider the key change to be the meaning of these ‘left-right’ divide(s) (Jahn, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006). And while a further grouping has come to accept the existence of multidimensional dimensions, they also disagree on the nature – and salience – of these divisions (Linhart and Shikano, 2009; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; van der Brug, 2004; Evans et al., 1996; Daalder, 1984; Budge and Farlie, 1978). However, what the above camps appear to be in agreement on is how a majority of the West European polities were structured around disagreements for much of the post-war period, especially regarding the remit of state involvement in the economy. Parties on ‘the left’, for example, tended to favour higher levels of collective ownership, taxation and labour market regulation compared to parties on ‘the right’ (hereafter labelled the State Interventionist (SI) – Free Market (FM) axis).¹ Later on, these differences came to relate to certain lifestyle choices, the nature of democracy and/or to state-individual relationships (Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Inglehart, 1971), but have increasingly come to connect with issues of national identity (due to growing immigration pressures) and sovereignty (due to EU membership/further integration) (Hooghe et al., 2002). Yet, levels of conflict also appear to have subsided, particularly relating to certain economic issues, as parties on the left have begun to accept the (occasional) benefits of the market economy (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Kitschelt, 2004). These developments are not only a concern for the interested scholar but have also come to affect the dynamics of party competition (Clark, 2009; Hobolt, 2008; Dalton, 2002; Budge et al., 2001). On the one hand, the inter- and intra-party relationships have changed as the political conversation is said to have shifted from ‘visions’ to ‘competence’ (Green and Hobolt, 2008; Holian, 2004) and, on the other hand, the party-electorate linkages have come under increased strain caused by the increased diversification of actors, issues and modes of competition (Mair, 1989; 2008).

What, then, has happened since Lipset and Rokkan (1967) famously found the societal divides to have become ‘frozen’ around four central cleavages (church/state, centre/periphery, urban/rural and owner/worker)? Inglehart (1971; 1990; 1997; 2008), for one, has suggested that increased levels in economic affluence and increased levels of physical security have had an impact on voters’ values, which, in turn, have come to influence their electoral priorities. Once the basic – material – needs were met, the associated values would then be replaced by higher order – and non-material – concerns of, for example, social equality, personal freedom(s) and quality of life issues. By identifying this development, Inglehart offered a causal link between the electorate’s changing values and their changing political behaviour. These ‘new’ preferences would then not only be reflected in a different ranking of issues but also in an electoral demand for ‘new’ parties. The ‘silent revol...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Acknowledgements
• 1. The Changing Nature of Party Competition
• 2. Competing in Multidimensional Party Spaces
• 3. (Almost) Contesting the EU and Immigration (1945–1990)
• 4. ‘Pulled’ or ‘Pushed’? Increased Ideological Uncertainty on the EU and Immigration ‘Issues’
• 5. The Changing Modes of Party Competition (1991–2010)
• 6. The Death of Ideology, or Ways of Dealing with an Increased State of Flux
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Interviews
• Index