The Ethics of Subjectivity

Perspectives since the Dawn of Modernity

E. Imafidon, E. Imafidon

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137472427
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Through the works of key figures in ethics since modernity this book charts a shift from dominant fixated, objective moral systems and the dependence on moral authorities such as God, nature and state to universal, formal, fallible, individualistic and/or vulnerable moral systems that ensue from the modern subject's exercise of reason and freedom.

1

From Chaos to Order: The Role of the Self in Hobbes’ Moralism

Francis Offor

Introduction

In this essay, an attempt is made to extrapolate from Hobbes’ political theory, his views on morality, as espoused in his seminal work, Leviathan.¹ Hobbes’ goal in Leviathan was not primarily to evolve a moral theory, but because the socio-political situation that precipitated his theorizing was beginning to defile all known rules of morality, it becomes imperative to examine the place of morality in his philosophical construct. Besides, the book Leviathan also detailed Hobbes’ physicalist outlook, which greatly influenced his interpretation of human actions on the basis of materialism. Hobbes’ concern and enthusiasm for science underscore his belief that everything that happens can be accounted for by the law of motion. For him, “knowing” and “willing” are merely the appearances of subtle motions and they underlie our desires and aversions, which ultimately define our concept of good and evil. Morality is thus not hinged on some reality beyond the reach and control of men, as was often held by his predecessors – particularly before Descartes. Rather it is a product of human social dwelling, a creation of social actors.

It is with this strong background in science that Hobbes approached the discipline of philosophy, whose main task for him, is to understand bodies:² most especially the processes through which they were generated. Bodies for Hobbes are either natural or artificial. Natural bodies are made by God, while artificial bodies are made out of nature by man. Thus, man played a dual role in Hobbes’ political philosophy: first, as part of nature (a created body), and second, as a creator. This is the reason Hobbes’ exploration in Leviathan started with an assessment of those universal natural qualities of man as part of nature. From there, he extended his analysis to a consideration of what it will be like, for men with distinct natural qualities to live and interact with one another, and then extrapolated the logical consequences of such interaction. At this level of existence, there is no obligation for men to respect others and simpliciter, no morality in the traditional sense of goodness and justice. It is the rather unfortunate consequences arising from this form of co-existence which gave no room for morality and necessitated the construction of a body politic where moral precepts and rules were eventually instituted. When they transited from this natural state of war to that of organized society, men started to become moral creatures. This emphasizes further that morality, in the Hobbesian sense, is a creation of the self for the sake of social order and peace. We concluded by re-examining Hobbes’ central arguments upon which he built his ideas of morality, and of a social contract which would produce a society in which social peace could be enhanced, but found these arguments to be inconsistent in terms of coordination, systematization and methodology. However, to draw our extrapolations more sequentially, we begin by looking at Hobbes’ depiction of human psychology, as this is the first crucial step to understanding more explicitly his entire theory of a “state of nature,” devoid of moral laws, and of a political society in which moral precepts and laws are instituted and employed to achieve social order.

Hobbes’ amoral conception of man

We describe Hobbes’ account of man as “amoral” because it lacks any religious or moral presuppositions. Hobbes’ examination of man as one physical animal, started with an analysis of those universal natural qualities which play a pivotal role in the determination of man’s actions. One of such qualities is passion. As he puts it in the Leviathan:

For as in the middle of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him, yet he is well assured that part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea ... , so also though we perceive no great unquietness in one or two men; yet we may be well assured that their singular passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation.³

For Hobbes, the different interpretations people give to different things and situations are due to the fact that they construe such situations from the different angles of their passions. The passion then becomes the propeller of the human person because it pushes man towards those things that afford him pleasure, and draws him away from those things that cause him displeasure. Those things that afford man pleasure or delight, Hobbes calls “desire,” while those that cause him displeasure he refers to as “aversion.”

The moral implication of Hobbes’ analysis here is that there is nothing that is absolutely or objectively good or evil, since what is good and what is bad is based on our appetite or desire, implying further that there is no common rule for what is good and what is evil. As he explains in Leviathan:

Whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire; that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate, and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man ... .⁴

If the above opinion is anything to go by, it therefore follows that man, in the opinion of Hobbes, does not have a static essence, since his passions can change over time; neither is he constrained at any time to act according to any moral rule. Man is therefore not inherently good or evil, but essentially an activity, or dynamism; but this dynamism is not in any way propelled by moral standards. Therefore, even when a man decides out of his own will to take a course of action, the choice of action that results is not prejudiced by any moral standard or law. Put differently, even when an action is taken by a being who is able “either to will to do or to will not to do something”⁵ the “being” in this context is still able to choose between doing and not doing a particular thing. But this freedom of choice, which the voluntary agent has, does not in Hobbes’ view obliterate the fact that the concrete choice of a particular course of action, made by an agent, is not driven by existing moral precepts or standards, but by desires and aversions, powered by passion. So, instead of assigning a role to morality in the determination of man’s actions, Hobbes ascribed such a role to passion. Hobbes, however, argued that, since passion either drives one towards what is good, or repels one from evil, it tends towards particular private interest. He also identified another quality in man, which always points towards what is universally necessary. This quality is called “reason.⁶ ” In the dealings of men with one another, however, reason and passion are bound to conflict, since they tend towards separate interests. But because the passion of men is commonly more potent than their reason, it remains the motive power of all voluntary actions.

The foregoing analysis of man’s psychology would have no serious implications if men lived alone, but when men live together in the form of groups, our understanding of their individual psychology becomes important in explaining not only their conduct towards one another, but also the general causes of their actions. This is why, after treating man in isolation, Hobbes then postulates a multiplicity of men, deducing a relationship that develops among them given their psychological make-up. This group-life and interpersonal relationship is assumed to exist in a natural setting, which Hobbes refers to as the “state of nature.”

The pre-moral “state of nature”

Hobbes’ pre-political state of nature is devoid of all the restraints of morality and law associated with society. Humans in the Hobbesian state of nature live as wild savages roaming the woods and fields like animals. They have no religion, no system of duties, no legitimate marriages, no morality or any code of law – and yet, each man is equal to every other. Equality here does not mean that all men possess the same degree of physical strength or quickness of mind, but is to be understood in the sense that, by and large, an individual’s deficiencies in one respect can be compensated for by other qualities.⁷ According to Hobbes:

Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body and of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the differences between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can there upon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he.⁸

It is this natural equality of all human beings that provides the basis for the war of “every man against every man” in the state of nature. Hobbes’ explanation is this: since humans are naturally equal, this natural equality produces in men an equal hope of attaining their ends. Therefore, nobody resigns himself to making no effort to attain the end to which he is naturally impelled on the ground that he is not equal to others. And so, there is competition. But because of mutual mistrust and the fact that everyone seeks his own conservation, every man seeks a means of outdoing the other man. Consequently, “if any two men desire the same thing which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies and in the way to their end ... endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.”⁹

In this constant flux and reflux of warring individuals, civilized existence becomes an impossibility. In an often-quoted passage in the Leviathan, we are provided with a list of those characteristics of civilized living lacking in the state of nature. In such a condition writes Hobbes:

There is no place for industry because the fruits thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no instruments of moving and removing such things as required much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.¹⁰

The fact that these qualities of civilized living are lacking is a reflection of the dearth of laws, morality and other codes of conduct in the Hobbesian state of nature. Given the conditions in the state of nature – which lacks such institutions as morality, law and government that would regulate human conduct and engender social order, coupled with man’s possession of the right of nature, which enjoins him to do whatever he considers best conducive to preserving his own life – it follows that the state of nature must necessarily lead to war. For Hobbes, therefore, there is no sin in man or any sin done by man in the state of nature, because there is actually no common rule or code for good or bad that people recognize. The passions of men are not in themselves sin, neither are the actions that follow from these passions. In the “war of all against all,” therefore, the actions of people cannot be considered good or evil, just or unjust, because there is no objective morality by which actions can be so classified.

Hobbes’ presentation of the “state of nature” is not an arbitrary intrusion into his philosophical system, but a deduction from his consideration of the nature of man and his passions. It is man’s passions, according to Hobbes, which drive him to define good and evil in his own private, indifferent and inconstant ways. If, therefore, a number of men are placed in close proximity to one another, as in the state of nature, then these private definitions are bound to lead to disputes, controversy, and at last war, since there are no laws or moral codes to regulate their conduct. Moreover, every man in the state of nature still, as was said earlier, retains the “right of nature” to do whatever action he judges most conducive to maintaining his own life, even if this extends to taking the life of another person. In Leviathan, Hobbes defines the “right of nature” as:

The liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life and consequently, of doing anything which in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means there unto.¹¹

Liberty here is defined by Hobbes as the absence of external impediments, and as a right of nature: it is the freedom to act according to one’s own judgment and reason. Consequently, freedom is not to be subjected to the judgment and reason of others. Liberty is the unli...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction: Modernity, Ethics and the Subject
• 1  From Chaos to Order: The Role of the Self in Hobbes Moralism
• 2  Kants Contribution to Moral Evolution: From Modernism to Postmodernism
• 3  The Moral Agent: Bradleys Critique of Hegels Evolutionary Ethics
• 4  Reflections on Kierkegaards Inwardness and Ethics of Subjectivity
• 5  Nietzsches Sovereign Individual and the Ethics of Subjectivity
• 6  A Case for Foucaults Reversal of Opinion on the Autonomy of the Subject
• 7  The Ethics and Politics of Self-Creation in Foucault
• 8  Jacques Derrida on the Ethics of Hospitality
• 9  Karl Poppers Contribution to Postmodern Ethics
• 10  Open Standard, Open Judgment and Value Revision in Karl Poppers Moral Philosophy
• 11  Navigating Feyerabends Moral Philosophy: From Boundaries without Values to Values without Boundaries
• 12  Outlines of Jacques Lacans Ethics of Subjectivity
• 13  Ayn Rands Ethics of Rational Selfishness
• 14  Habermas Ethics of Intersubjectivity
• 15  Levinas Meets the Postcolonial: Re-thinking the Ethics of the Other
• 16  Rortys Contribution to Postmodern Ethics
• 17  Human Conversation and the Evolution of Ethics in Kitchers Pragmatic Naturalism
• Selected Bibliography
• Index