The Territorial Force at War, 1914-16

W. Mitchinson

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137451613
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

William Mitchinson analyses the role and performance of the Territorial Force during the first two years of World War I. The study looks at the way the force was staffed and commanded, its relationship with the Regular Army and the War Office, and how most of its 1st Line divisions managed to retain and promote their local identities.

1

The Pre-War Quest for Efficiency

In the years before the Great War, the TF presented the WO and the Regular Army with a huge and uncomfortable paradox. The small Edwardian army was designed and structured primarily to police the empire and to ensure law and order at home. Until 1906, there had been little consideration given to the idea that it might be required to serve in a Continental expeditionary capacity and, even when thought in some quarters was being directed towards that possibility, it was unofficial and unheralded. Home-based regular battalions were kept massively under establishment which meant that the two divisions supposed to be retained for the defence of the UK would be equally under strength. Therein, however, lay the paradox: the Regular Army was incapable of defending the UK without the assistance of the TF, but the regulars and the WO resented the money spent on the TF, which they believed was largely money wasted. This dilemma had profoundly influenced the relationship between the WO and the TF county associations since the force’s formation and was to continue to sour attitudes into the war years themselves.

Many regulars condemned the TF for a multitude of reasons. Some of the criticism was justified and readily apparent; other aspects had more to do with the traditional bias of the professional soldier towards his amateur would-be comrade in arms. To the regular, the average territorial was an individual who lacked personal and unit discipline, possessed few military skills, was usually too young to be of any use in the field, was short of endurance and had little sense of commitment. In other words, he lacked professionalism. In comparison to a regular soldier of some years’ service, the TF man did lack the polish and accumulated skills of the professional, but what many did possess was enthusiasm, a sense of duty, sometimes one of patriotism, a desire to belong to something he believed was useful, a willingness possibly to jeopardize relationships with his family and a readiness even to spend his own money to demonstrate a commitment to improve. Many hurdles were placed in his way by the often less than sympathetic authorities, but the remarkable thing was that despite the ridicule often heaped upon them, scores of thousands of TF soldiers were prepared to ignore taunts such as ‘dog shooters’ and ‘Haldane’s Horse’ and strove to achieve a level of military efficiency and stamina that was to come both as a surprise and an undoubted relief to the formerly disparaging regulars.

Even the TF’s founder and fervent supporter, Lord Haldane, harboured no doubts about the force’s limitations. He openly acknowledged that it could never achieve the same standards as the Regular Army ‘this side of . . . war’, an acceptance that was frequently reiterated by such eminent soldiers as Sir John French.¹ Given the drill requirements, the terms of service, the lower standards required in musketry tests and an attitude that was ‘almost arrogantly civilian’,² there were few who could disagree. It was for this reason that an intense debate raged within the force over how it could improve its image and effectiveness.

Articles addressing the issue of how to improve efficiency appeared regularly in journals, many of which followed a familiar format that identified a wide tranche of generic improvements.³ These included relaxed terms of service, the reinstitution of rewards abolished since the Volunteer days, a degree of flexibility in the regulations, a longer period of enlistment, frequent medical inspections, regular, local courses to impart and reinforce learning and an alteration in the required attendance at drills. An increase in officer establishment to provide at least three subalterns per company was suggested, as were the immediate payment of gratuities for fares to parades and the attachment of regimental officers to brigade or divisional offices to gain experience of staff work. Some of these suggestions were considered periodically and piecemeal by the WO, but among the supporters of the home army, there remained a sense of frustration and even betrayal.

The commitment of many, but certainly by no means all, commanders and soldiers to develop their skills and efficiency was apparent in the many articles and speeches written and delivered across the country. Lord Suffolk, OC III Wessex Brigade, was praised for having secured an adequate supply of good-quality horses; his battery officers were nearly all ex-regulars; and he had purchased the latest mark of correctors, some of which had not yet been issued even to regular batteries.⁴ In contrast to the efficiency of Lord Suffolk’s unit, in November 1913 the North Midland Mounted Brigade Transport and Supply Column did not possess a single officer.⁵ The CO of the London Divisions’ artillery summed up the problems facing his arm and offered some solutions in an article of 1912.⁶ There was, it was acknowledged, a distinct lack of knowledge about horses, drills and field gunnery in general among the crews of the batteries, but in the years following the formation of the new brigades, Colonel Lambart insisted, theoretical knowledge, fire discipline, riding and driving had all improved.

The fundamental problem was, however, that between 1908 and 1912 the London batteries had managed a mere 2 days’ practice on land ranges and for 30 months had enjoyed none at all. Furthermore, there was virtually no opportunity to practise tactical manoeuvre or joint schemes with the infantry or yeomanry. Lambert suggested that the current system of voluntary attendance by officers should cease, that a TF School of Artillery had to be established for majors and captains and urged that if any officer claimed business commitments prevented him from attending its two-week course every two years, he should resign his commission. There were few within the TF artillery who would have disagreed with Lambert’s vision for the future, but resistance to allow significant change (other than a complete disbandment of the TF artillery and the money saved spent on a smaller number of regular batteries) continued from the WO.⁷ Even the Army Supply Corps (ASC) campaigned for reform. The ‘permissive organization’ of the 14 Divisional Transport and Supply Columns (DT&SC) was believed to be causing difficulties for their administration and equipment supply. The officer in overall command of the TF ASC wanted DT&SC to be either all mechanical or all horsed transport as the evolving mixture of vehicles was adding to the corps’ already substantial problems of recruitment and retention.⁸

Regulars tended to assess the efficiency of the TF by observing the auxiliary at camp. This was resented by some TF members because a large proportion of soldiers arrived for the annual training physically unfit and possibly not having attended the preparatory evening drills. Furthermore, recruits tended to enlist just before camp and thus would be lacking even basic training. Based on the evidence noted at camp, the Inspectors’ reports were thus usually critical of just about every aspect of TF soldiering. One of the major and most frequent criticisms was the poor attendance for the full period of training, but the number of men who could remain for the entire two weeks depended upon the attitude of employers. Some held more enlightened and sympathetic approaches to allowing their employees a full fortnight off work, but the often low attendance and its implication for efficiency was useful ammunition for the opponents of the TF to fire in Parliament. But to the soldiers, especially those who lived in the industrial slums, held mundane jobs in unhealthy working conditions and whose personal prospects seemed far from rosy, camp, and especially camp on the coast, offered a period of enjoyment, relaxation and bonding. To his commanders, it was an essential opportunity to assist in the process of developing and consolidating unit morale and cohesion.⁹

The WO was generally against allowing divisional camps.¹⁰ This was partly because it involved enormous administrative cooperation between several county associations over, for example, local holiday patterns, the hire of sufficient horses, problems for the ASC companies in supplying such numbers spread over many sites and solving the difficulties of getting permission for land use from an inevitably large group of landowners and farmers. It was also because there was a genuine belief that company training was the most effective way of making units efficient. Brigade camps were organized when possible because they gave the opportunity for senior battalion officers to work and learn together, but for day-to-day training, battalions usually led discrete existences. The WO wanted the bulk of the instruction to concentrate upon improving the command and leadership abilities of company officers and NCOs, as well as the basic skills of the ordinary ranker.

For the infantry, which constituted two-thirds of a division’s personnel, the emphasis lay on musketry, route marching and drill. All GOC Divisions knew what their command was tasked to do and where it would be deployed should the TF ever be embodied. Whether they were to be part of Local Forces and used as coast defence, or in a mobile capacity as part of the counter-attacking Central Force, fitness and musketry were considered to be paramount. There was little opportunity during drill nights to do other than weapons’ and general drills so fitness and stamina had to be built at other times. Many men would not have been overly enthusiastic about sacrificing their cherished Saturday afternoons for the sake of tramping round local streets so there had to be other incentives. Range practice was a popular pastime for Saturdays but given the shortage of ranges, practice rounds and travel costs, it was not always possible. One alternative was sport, which not only helped to build unit identity and teamwork, but also encouraged fitness. Territorial sports meetings, gymnastic displays and longdistance marching competitions, especially between the London battalions, were regularly covered by the press and did much to foster healthy inter-unit rivalry.

As they were not responsible for the actual training of their men, the county associations relied upon the WO to supply units’ rifles. The much-derided standard of TF musketry was the result not so much of a lack of enthusiasm of its members, but more to do with the lack of available ranges, the tardy acceptance by the WO that it should pay for an increased number of yearly practice rounds and the poor quality of the rifles allocated to units. Ever keen to economize, and in the same way as it refused to supply TF artillery with the modern 18-pdrs and 4.5" howitzers, the WO was reluctant to spend on providing the TF with the Short Lee Enfield rifle used by the regulars. The consequence was that TF infantry battalions and supporting units were still in possession of the Long Lee Enfield, most of which had been inherited from the Volunteers. These largely obsolete weapons had been converted to take the Mark VII cartridge but still had a bolt which had never been designed to cope with the heavier charge of cordite. Furthermore, the long barrel was prone to mud blockage, and the weapon frequently jammed after ten rounds of rapid fire. This fault was dramatically and fatally illustrated by the London Scots on Messines Ridge in October 1914.

Units relied on Field Service Regulations for guidance and trained for offensive and defence operations, but the greatest obstacles to achieving efficiency and capability within the TF were, to the regulars, the apparent lack of means to improve the quality of leadership and command, the depth of military knowledge and the poor discipline. The first two issues could be addressed, business and commercial affairs permitting, by the provision of courses and by extending schemes by which TF officers could be attached for a month at a time to regular formations. The issue of discipline was a different matter, and something few regulars could understand. In the more exclusive units, there was little difficulty in men of similar social standing and education and who worked together in the same office meeting as officer and private in the evenings. ‘Good sense and tact’ was applied,¹¹ and several units simply ran their companies along the house system with which most of the members would have been familiar. Among many of these men there was a reluctance to accept a stripe. Inspectors frequently accused TF NCOs of lacking the ability to command their men and of shying away from ordering rather than asking their men to perform a task. In the class units, that did not matter a great deal because there was an innate willingness not to let down or embarrass the NCO. Small unit esprit and morale were crucial to efficiency and cohesion, and, similarly, in those companies which drew their men from the same factory or mill, there was little difficulty in translating the discipline of the shop floor to the drill hall. It involved not only respect, and possibly deference, but also depended on personal relationships based on mutual confidence and trust. General Sir Ian Hamilton noted that relationships between officers and men who were also employers and employees were always ‘open and cordial’,¹² but others, some even from TF units, believed that efficiency could be jeopardized by an over familiarity between officers and other ranks. The success of a unit, therefore, might well have depended on the officers achieving a utilitarian balance between encouraging and ordering their men. This was even more important in units where officers lacked commitment or in those where the other ranks did not know their commanders. Because soldiers could leave the TF relatively easily, discipline had to be particularly tactfully disbursed. Yet, despite the fact that fining a man or dealing with him harshly could lead to his and possibly his comrades’ resignations, there was a generally held belief among the regulars and even among some TF themselves that unless a sterner and more traditional form of discipline was exercised, efficiency could never be attained.¹³

This was a significant dilemma for all TF platoon, company, battery and battalion commanders. One means of addressing the problem was to try to improve recruitment and retention both by making annual camp enjoyable as well as instructive and by making attendance at evening drills attractive. The Oxfordshire Hussars made no bones about creating a ‘holiday atmosphere . . . in the interests of recruiting’ and aimed at achieving ‘no ambitious standard of military training’.¹⁴ Other units were not quite so blatant, but their aim was similar. Reminiscences frequently portray camp as a relaxing holiday, as the ‘jolliest week of my life’ and how, when it was all over, the soldiers missed the days of ‘unbroken good-fellowship’.¹⁵ In the attempt to maintain and sustain the camp bonding, units encouraged sporting activities, smoker evenings and developed drill hall facilities into something resembling a club. County associations put considerable effort into the construction of new drill halls, but many were forced to retain and improve those inherited from the Volunteers. The best, such as those at Bunhill Row and Davies Street, were excellent but for the less exclusive battalions companies, ambulances and batteries, the facilities could be basic. Dispersed companies used outstations, which could range from schools and mechanics institutes to industrial premises, where there was no bar, no snooker table and often not even changing facilities. The GOC South Midland Division claimed none of his division’s drill halls had ‘adequate accommodation and recreational’ opportunities for the other ranks.¹⁶

Recruitment was a constant worry to all county associations and their unit commanders. Even at its peak in 1912, nationally the TF was still almost 17% under establishment, and no matter how many schemes and plans were mooted and run, until the outbreak of war the force was unable to achieve establishment. Many artillery and engineer units were full, but with the exception of a very few companies and battalions, the infantry always struggled to secure and retain an adequate number of recruits. The WO allowed recruitment bounties and gradually introduced certain separation allowances and payment of some out of pocket expenses, but it was never enough to attract sufficient of those young men who felt they simply could not afford to become a member, the many who preferred to watch or play football on Saturday afternoons, those who wanted to spend what little holiday allowance they had with their family, or to convert the men who objected to the TF on political grounds. Once individuals had enlisted, however, the units had to try to retain and mould them into efficient soldiers. Units with a rapid and regular turnover of personnel would have found establishing a sense of cohesion that much more difficult than those which had not only a history but also a tradition of long service and of family membership.

Like the Volunteers before them, sons often followed fathers into the TF. The Langhams of the Cinque Ports Battalion, the Shepherds of the Fifeshire Battery and the Pritchards of 2nd East Lancashire Field Ambulance had established almost a dynasty of officers, while the Bassinghams in the LRB and the Yates in 5/South Staffordshire offered a strong degree of continuity among the other ranks. RSMs often came to the units as time-served regulars of the same regiment but some NCOs served for very long periods of time at first in the Volunteer and then subsequently in the TF battalion. Men such as these were the backbone of any unit and by their length of service were able to influence and enthuse many of the younger recruits with a sense of esprit, regimental tradition and duty. TF battalions may have had the advantage of locality and often of familiarity, but the bond of efficiency and trust had to be forged in the men’s own time for which (except for camp) they received no pay, and in buildings which might offer only the most spartan of facilities. Official reports frequently noted that the loss of possible overtime earnings was a signific...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. The Pre-War Quest for Efficiency
• 2. The Territorial Force and the War Office
• 3. Mobilization Training and Embarkation
• 4. Acclimatization and Training Overseas
• 5. The Infantry’s Experience of Battle
• 6. The Experience of Other Arms
• 7. Command and Leadership
• 8. Drafts and the Loss of TF Identity
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Formation and Unit Index
• General Index
• Index of Individuals