Science and the End of Ethics

S. Morris

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137499820
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Filosofia etica e morale

Science and the End of Ethics examines some of the most important positive and negative implications that science has for ethics. On the basis of strong scientific reasons for abandoning traditional notions of right and wrong, it endorses a new ethical approach that focuses on achieving some of the key practical goals shared by ethicists.

Part I

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The End (Demise) of Traditional Ethics

Chapter 1

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What Kind of Ethics Does Science Call into Question?

For an increasing number of philosophers, the picture of the mind revealed by science provides reason for denying the existence of moral truths. For these philosophers, the belief in moral truths is a peculiarity of human psychology that has no connection to anything real. The moral truths that most of us take to be obvious turn out to be deceptions played out by our own minds. In this chapter, I set out to specify the kinds of moral claims that I believe science provides reasons for rejecting. In the course of doing so, I hope to sort out several terminological ambiguities that have often made it difficult to understand what is at stake in the disputes between those philosophers who attempt to attack the legitimacy of traditional ethical notions and those who defend them. Before moving forward, a quick clarification of terms is in order. I use “science” here in the standard sense of the enterprise aimed at discovering natural laws behind both physical and social phenomena, and using such knowledge to understand the causes of such phenomena and to make testable predictions about them. By “moral truths,” I am referring to alleged facts—such as “Lying is wrong”—that are believed to be grounded by the existence of moral properties such as wrongness. Denying the existence of such facts does not commit one to denying that there are truths (in the broad sense) about statements that employ moral concepts. After all, the sentence, “If killing is immoral then killing is immoral,” is trivially true given a cognitivist understanding of statements employing moral terms.

External versus Internal Moral Realism

While it is more or less an accurate description of my position to say that scientific research indicates that moral realism is false, a quick qualifier is in order. As I mentioned in the introduction, my concern in this book is by and large limited to the rejection of moral realism only insofar as it assumes the existence of moral facts concerning human beings. Rather than qualifying the term “moral realism” in this way whenever I mention it, I use it, except where noted, to refer to the view that there are moral propositions (e.g., that certain actions are morally wrong) that hold true for people.¹ Even though the metaethical position I argue for is the rejection of a limited type of moral realism, it would nonetheless, if true, have a profound impact on ethics as it has been traditionally practiced. Since philosophers who write on ethics are typically concerned with explaining the nature of alleged moral facts that pertain to human beings and their actions, establishing that we ought to reject the existence of such moral facts would suffice to render moot much of the work carried out by ethicists.

The claim that science sheds doubt on moral realism is bound to generate strong opposition for various reasons. One source of opposition is likely to be that since our moral beliefs play such a central role in most of our lives and since many believe that the widespread acceptance of moral claims is what makes civil society possible, establishing that moral realism is false would have devastating personal and social consequences. I address this concern in chapter 7. Right now, I wish to address another reason—an even more pressing one in my view—that will lead many to oppose the kind of moral antirealism that I am proposing; namely, that attempting to refute moral realism on scientific or any other grounds is likely to be a doomed endeavor since there are so many different varieties of moral realism on the table. The basic issue here is that even if one were to provide a convincing argument as to why a particular notion of moral realism is untenable, there is likely to be an alternative notion of moral realism in the philosophical literature that is immune to this type of argument. As we shall see, due to the many different types of realist moral theories, it is somewhat difficult to determine what should count as a legitimate account of moral realism. In fact, even the very definition of “moral realism” is a source of disagreement among contemporary philosophers.

To keep things simple, let us use as a starting point what is perhaps the most basic understanding of moral realism found in the philosophical literature. According to this view, put forth by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, moral realism is captured by the conjunction of two theses: (1) moral claims are either literally true or false, and (2) some moral claims are literally true.² It should be pointed out, however, that some philosophers are willing to accept the truth of both of these theses even though they claim to reject moral realism. Fritz Allhoff, for one, believes that in addition to the two theses mentioned by Sayre-McCord, a moral realist is committed to the view that there is some mind-independent fact that makes some actions either right or wrong.³ A good way to understand the dispute between Sayre-McCord’s and Allhoff’s conception of moral realism is provided by Jesse Prinz, who distinguishes between external realism and internal realism. While the external realist holds that moral facts are mind independent in the sense that a claim like “stealing is wrong” can be true regardless of whether some agent accepts it, internal realists believe that a moral claim can only become factual once an agent accepts it as being true.⁴ From Prinz’s perspective, Sayre-McCord provides an accurate definition of moral realism and Allhoff is an internal moral realist.⁵ From this point on, I adopt Prinz’s distinction between internal and external versions of moral realism. The antirealist position that I argue for (also known as ethical or moral nihilism) rejects only the second of the theses mentioned by Sayre-McCord above. In other words, I do not deny, a la the noncognitivist, that statements making moral claims (e.g., agent A ought morally to Φ, where Φ stands for any particular action) have truth-values.⁶ However, I argue that all such statements—insofar as they concern human beings—are false.⁷ Strictly speaking, the kind of antirealism that I subscribe to is a type of error theory. Error theorists believe that while we can meaningfully engage in discussions about moral concepts, all normative moral claims—such as “Lying is wrong”—are false. The standard error theorist denies the existence of the property of wrongness that is needed to make the preceding statement true. In his view, the property wrongness has the same ontological status as the property phlogiston. Since the term “phlogiston” fails to designate anything real in the actual world, any assertion that an object has the property of containing phlogiston is false. Likewise, the standard error theorist holds that any assertion that a particular act has the property of being morally wrong or morally right—or that anyone is morally obligated to either do or refrain from doing a particular act—is false. Consistent with the particular type of moral antirealism that I am defending, the particular kind of error theory that I subscribe to holds that while moral properties may exist, such properties are never instantiated by—and, hence, are not applicable to—human beings or their actions.⁸ This would explain why all moral claims concerning people are false.

It may be helpful at this point to discuss the general structure of this chapter and to comment on the methodology I use. After a brief discussion of external realist theories, I consider in greater detail some of the more prominent or representative examples of internal realist (i.e., internalist) theories. The examination of internalist theories will be particularly helpful in highlighting the substantive differences that exist between the kind of error theory that I am endorsing and the type of moral realism that it opposes. From there I move on to discuss the notion of moral responsibility that plays a central role in the philosophical debates surrounding free will. Identifying the particular type of punishment and reward that is closely connected to this understanding of moral responsibility will allow us to better apprehend the main substantive disagreements that exist between what I consider to be genuine moral realists and antirealists such as myself. Through this analysis, I aim ultimately to show that a genuine moral realist theory is one that argues for the existence of moral properties that could justify the doling out of rewards and punishments on strictly retributivist grounds. The error theory that I advocate rejects the existence of moral properties that could justify retributivist treatment for human beings. Henceforth, I refer to the particular kind of moral realism I reject as “retributivist moral realism.” In line with this, my position can accurately be called “retributivist moral antirealism.”

A quick word is in order regarding the structure of Part I of this book (consisting of this chapter as well as chapters 2 and 3), which may strike readers as being somewhat unorthodox. A typical strategy for defending an error theory would be to begin by offering reasons for rejecting moral realism followed by a discussion of why attempts to defend moral realism in light of these reasons fail. The strategy I employ takes a somewhat reverse approach. Prior to providing arguments in favor of the error theory that I am proposing (the primary arguments for which appear in chapters 2 and 3), I consider and critique ostensibly realist accounts of morality that are taken by their authors to provide superior alternatives to error theory. While some may find it more appropriate to provide arguments for my error theory before considering opposing viewpoints, I believe that discussing the arguments in favor of my error theory may be a futile endeavor unless the reader first has a clear understanding of the particular error theory I have in mind. And in my view, the specifics of my particular error theory can best be conveyed by contrasting it with alternative perspectives. I alluded earlier to how the realist-antirealist debate in ethics is dogged by terminological ambiguities. I believe that contrasting my error theory with opposing viewpoints is perhaps the most effective way to both avoid getting bogged down in such ambiguities and to identify any substantive differences that hold between others’ views and my own. Another advantage of this strategy is that in the process of clarifying my error theory, I can simultaneously provide objections to some purportedly realist views that are alleged to provide superior alternatives to error theory.

With regard to the particular realist accounts discussed below, I neither take these to be exhaustive of the kinds of realist accounts one may provide in opposition to my error theory nor do I claim that these are necessarily the strongest realist alternatives to my view. My decision to discuss these particular realist accounts is due in large part to my belief that specifying the manner in which they are supposed to differ from error theories is an effective way of making clear the specifics of my antirealist position. That said, the realist theories that I critique in this chapter are among the more prominent and/or representative examples of internalist alternatives to error theory, and it is for this reason that the objections I bring against them should be of interest to those interested in debates concerning moral realism. I leave it to the reader to consider whether there are other alternatives to error theory that are stronger than those discussed below and whether any such theory can overcome the difficulties for moral realism discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

Before I move on to discuss internalist alternatives to error theory, it is worth mentioning that standard error theory is perhaps most starkly contrasted with the metaethical position known as “moral objectivism” (sometimes called “moral universalism”). According to this external type of moral realism, there are facts about whether certain actions are right or wrong and such facts do not depend on situational contexts such as societal norms or personal value systems. Moral objectivists hold that moral facts are mind independent since the existence of these facts is not contingent upon their apprehension by, or even the existence of, conscious beings. It does not seem a stretch to say that one of the clearest implications of error theory being true is that moral objectivism is false. Error theorists deny the existence of any mind-independent facts that could instantiate claims either of the rightness/wrongness of certain actions or of moral obligations that certain agents have to act in a particular way. In building the case for error theory in chapters 2 and 3, I thereby provide reasons for rejecting external moral realism in all of its variations.

Prinz’s Sensibility Theory

A common maneuver among contemporary philosophers interested in defending moral realism against the challenges posed by error theories is to argue that while such theories pose serious difficulties for external versions of realism (e.g., objectivist accounts of morality), an internalist account of realism is less susceptible to the threats posed by error theories. It is not my aim to provide a synopsis of the various versions of internal realism found in the philosophical literature. It suffices for the purposes at hand to restrict the present discussion to a few theories that are representative of the internalist approach. The internalist accounts I discuss are particularly relevant since their authors argue explicitly that they constitute superior alternatives to error theory. One version of internal realism that has been garnering increased attention of late is known as “sensibility theory.” Proponents of this view tend to argue that while moral properties are real, they are secondary qualities as opposed to primary qualities. Whereas primary qualities like shape can be said to exist independently of anyone’s perception of them, secondary qualities, such as color, only exist insofar as there is a mind to perceive them. For sensibility theorists—and for moral realists generally—moral facts (e.g., stealing is wrong) are instantiations of moral properties (e.g., moral wrongness). Likewise, moral properties from this point of view can be said to exist insofar as they are instantiated by an event or by an agent. For a sensibility theorist like Prinz, values and moral facts are real even though they cannot be understood without reference to the subjective states of agents. In his book The Emotional Construction of Morals, Prinz follows in the tradition of David Hume, who believes that our value judgments are ultimately the product of emotional responses as opposed to acts of cognition involving external facts about the world that we come to apprehend either through direct perception or through reasoning. According to Prinz’s specific version of sensibility theory, which he calls “constructive sentimentalism,” moral facts come into being through our sentiments, which he understands to be dispositions to experience certain kinds of emotions. Emotions, in turn, are to be understood as consisting of physiological responses to a variety of “concerns” that have to do with the essence of human well-being. Prinz explains the relation between sentiments, emotions, and concerns as follows:

Anger represents offense . . . Fear represents danger . . . Happiness represents achievement or attainment . . . Emotions are defined by the concerns they have the function of detecting, and those concerns can be defined in non-emotional terms. Now contrast this to sentiments. Liking provides a good example. Liking is partially constituted by a disposition to happiness, but liking does not represent achievement or attainment. Liking is also a disposition to sadness, as when you lose an object you like . . . Because liking does not manifest itself as any single emotion, it cannot represent any single concern. (2007, 85)

For Prinz, moral judgments are basically expressions of a sentiment of either approval or disapproval toward a particular object. A key element of Prinz’s view is that in addition to a particular moral judgment expressing one’s feelings, it also expresses the fact that the object of the judgment causes one to either disapprove of it (in cases where one judges the object, action, or agent to be morally bad) or approve of it (in cases where one judges the object, action, etc., to be morally good). This idea is captured in Prinz’s account of what it is to make a judgment about wrongful action: “A judgment that Φ-ing is wrong is true if and only if Φ-ing is the object of a sentiment of disapprobation among the contextually salient individual(s) (usually the speaker)” (2007, 180). In stating all of this, Prinz is subscribing to a type of “moral relativism.” While the moral relativist agrees with the moral objectivist that moral facts exist, the relativist diverges from his objectivist opponent in maintaining that these facts are determined not by some mind-independent feature of the world but rather by human beliefs. While some moral relativists believe that moral facts are determined by the prevailing attitudes of the society within which one lives, others believe that moral facts are determined by an individual’s own attitudes, even if these should diverge from the standard views of one’s society (this latter view is frequently referred to as “subjectivism”). It is apparent that the constructive sentimentalist account of moral realism favored by Prinz falls into the subjectivist camp. From his perspective, it is only in virtue of how a particular object produces reactions in a particular individual that moral facts come into existence. If I say that “stealing is wrong” in a way that honestly reflects my current sentiments, then this statement is true insofar as I make that utterance. Prinz’s rejection of moral objectivism follows from his account of moral judgments. The nonobjectivist element of his moral position is manifest in his view that there is no moral criterion (be it mind independent or otherwise) that could determine whether one moral perspective is superior to another.

Having covered the basic elements of Prinz’s account of morality, we can now ask whether it constitutes a preferable realist alternative to error theory. Richard Joyce denies that Prinz’s constructive sentimentalism offers a viable alternative to either error theory or moral objectivism. Joyce’s primary criticism of Prinz’s view is that it lacks the resources that are necessary in order to allow it to serve in the kind of capacity that we expect of a legitimate account of morality. As he puts it, “The worry is . . . that Prinz’s relativism may not have the kind of authority that we would wish of morality, in which case these relativistic properties [that give rise to moral facts according to Prinz] may simply not be viable contenders for the constituents of the moral realm” (2009, 515). From Joyce’s perspective, the problem that Prinz faces in basing moral facts in our responses to secondary qualities in objects is that such qualities “do not, in any obvious way provide demands at all” (515). Joyce continues by asking, “If we cannot make out how a property can be construed as making a practical demand, then what business have we identifying that property with moral rightness and wrongness?” (516).

One way to interpret Joyce’s criticism of Prinz is...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction: The Failure of Traditional Ethics
• Part I   The End (Demise) of Traditional Ethics
• Part II   The End (Goal) of Traditional Ethics
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index