Media Evolution on the Eve of the Arab Spring

L. Hudson, A. Iskandar, M. Kirk, L. Hudson, A. Iskandar, M. Kirk

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137403155
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Media Evolution on the Eve of the Arab Spring brings together some of the most celebrated and respected names in Arab media research to reflect on the communication conditions that preceded and made the Arab uprisings possible.

P A R T I

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Social Change and Political Culture

C H A P T E R 1

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Arab Media, Political Stagnation, and Civil Engagement: Reflections on the Eve of the Arab Spring

Mohamed Zayani

THE NEW ARAB MEDIASCAPE¹

The advent of the information revolution has been generally heralded as a promising development and a flattening factor,² providing new opportunities for communication, participation, and deliberation. In the Arab world, however, the effects of the information revolution prior to the Arab Spring were not obvious. Clearly, the changing Arab media ecology brought in new dynamics, expectations, and opportunities. From the ubiquity of pan-Arab satellite television to the ever-expanding Arab blogosphere to the increasing popularity of interactive programs and the rise of social media, Arab audiences have been arguably better informed and more engaged. For some observers, the accessibility of information and the ease of communication have further contributed to the inclusion and politicization of Arab viewers in an authoritarian region.³ For years, the Arab world has been experiencing a disjuncture between the liberal and potentially democratizing impulse of Arab media, on the one hand, and the stagnant political culture and immutable political structures that characterize much of the Middle East, on the other hand. Whence the conundrum: what can possibly be expected from a rejuvenated and dynamic media that emanates from, is sponsored by, thrives within, and serves the interests of inherently authoritarian systems?

Three broad lines of analysis are often invoked when it comes to the relationship between media and politics in the prerevolutionary Arab context. The first view is enthusiastic about the potential of Arab media. It emphasizes the irreversible course of the information revolution and the invigorating impact of Arab media.⁴ The second view stresses the limited political role that the Arab media plays. It sees in the media, pseudo participatory dynamics that give the illusion of change while placating demands for real change.⁵ In this perspective, the Arab media is not necessarily advancing democracy; if anything, it is having a counter effect, serving more as a substitute for real politics than as an instrument of change.⁶ The third view is more cautious about what the media can bring about, noting its remarkable contribution and vibrant dynamics while highlighting its structural limits and inherent constraints.⁷

While these lines of analysis help tease out the political implications of Arab media, they tend to be prescriptive and often narrowly focused on pinpointing an outcome of sorts. What I would like to do is eschew the discussion on the consequences of media altogether and resist the temptation to concretely delineate or quantifiably measure their democratizing impetus. Rather than examine the “effects” of the media changes in the Arab world or attempt to measure their pre-Arab Spring “impact,” I propose to map out more subtle dynamics. These probings will be constructed around theoretical distinctions that are drawn from communication and political theories that will deepen our understanding not so much of the implications of the evolving Arab media, but of its workings and dynamics. Of particular interest is “political participation” and “civic engagement” in a region historically marked by nonparticipatory structures of governance and the relevance of media in this process.

In what follows, I present a short overview of notable changes and noteworthy developments in the Arab media ecology up to 2010. I examine how these media developments contributed to the consolidation of an increasingly felt Arab public opinion, the emergence of a more encompassing public sphere, and the advent of a more active civil society. A critical examination of the opportunities and limits of these prominent arenas of engagement that have received considerable attention in scholarly and policy circles will help redirect attention away from formal channels of civil activism to informal spaces of civic engagement. The idiosyncratic relationship between media, public opinion, the public sphere, and civil society in the Middle East points to an interesting—though unduly analyzed—slippage between three interrelated categories: “audiences,” “publics,” and “citizens.” It is in the intersection between these three categories that one can locate media-induced changes.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION

Over the past two or so decades, the face of Arab media has changed dramatically. Whereas in the past media used to be a state monopoly spewing a monolithic and hegemonic discourse, the Arab mediascape grew to be a complex sphere teeming with competing media outlets, platforms, agendas, players, sponsors, and stakeholders. One of the manifestations of the prevalence of a liberalized transnational Arab media over traditional state-controlled media is the ease on censorship. Control over the flow of information and the expression of opinion became looser and press laws more relaxed. The increasing access to communication technologies in fact undermined vertical structures of control and provided new outlets for the free expression of opinion and views. In its most pointed manifestation, this overture took the form of a satellite revolution, leading to a plethora of channels, genres, and programs and providing a wide variety of voices, perspectives, and discourses that compete for the attention of Arab audiences in a predominantly oral culture.

The rise of pan-Arab media has given Arab public opinion an added relevance, though one that is hard to pinpoint prior to the events of the Arab Spring. Whom this public opinion reflects upon, what its relevance is, and how potent it is likely to be—all these issues remain largely undetermined and understudied. Broadly speaking, there are three prevailing theories about the political existence and relevance of Arab public opinion prior to the Arab Spring: the tendency to dismiss it altogether as mythical, the tendency to celebrate it as omnipotent and liberating, and the tendency to view it as submissive and therefore largely ineffective. A brief discussion of these three views can help capture the subtle dynamics and intricacies of Arab public opinion.

The first view considers Arab public opinion a fictional creation—a figment of the imagination, so to speak. In the absence of democratic institutions and genuine political openness in the Arab world, publics are disempowered and public opinion is politically irrelevant. For Laurent Murawiec, the authoritarian nature of Arab governments precludes a public opinion.⁸ If there is no Arab public opinion to speak of, it is in large part because unorchestrated public dissent and demonstrations are hardly ever tolerated in the Arab world. Not surprisingly, discontent tends to be focused not on domestic matters but on international issues. The second view, which is diametrically opposed to the first view, places considerable faith in the Arab street. The weight of a legacy of defeat, a prevailing sense of helplessness, and a lagging sense of resentment over the immutability of Arab authoritarianism all combined to instill a strong sense of alienation that makes the specter of a popular uprising inevitable if triggered. Although peculiar in many ways, a number of revolutions in the Middle East such as the Iranian revolution, the Palestinian intifada, and the Cedar revolution have given credence to this view. In this perspective, the Arab street could be a liberating force in the face of Arab governments’ inertia. However, the view that advocates the potency of Arab public opinion is more often than not dismissed as being out of touch with reality.⁹ The third view holds that Arab public opinion exists as a submissive force with little power or leverage. Arab governments are skillful at consolidating authoritarianism either through repression or by manipulating the public into submission. The expectation that there could be a consequential public uprising in the Arab world is unrealistic. As such, protests are controlled, demonstrations are moderate, and revolutions are unlikely.

While useful, these clearly delineated characterizations should not obscure the proclivity of Arab public opinion to change. In fact, Arab public opinion is far from being a static or rigid category. A key force that is making Arab public opinion more relevant, particularly after September 11, is the media. In the absence of genuine forms of participation and solid democratic institutions in the Arab world, the media is faced with few serious rivals in shaping public opinion. The latter has been gathering momentum, becoming more public, more vocal, and more felt. While perhaps not fully pronounced and certainly not decisive, public opinion is becoming an important factor. With the advent of satellite television and access to the Internet, censorship is waning and enlisting the masses is becoming a political reality. The new Arab media is playing an important role in constructing, representing, and relaying the views of an expanding segment of the Arab public in the Arab world, and also in the diaspora. The liberalization of the media, the accessibility of information, and the increasing ability of previously disenchanted voices and discourses to find their way to media are giving a new relevance to public opinion—so much so that Middle East politics are becoming hard to dissociate from Arab media and Arab public opinion. With the increase of tension and the proliferation of crises in the Middle East, the battle for the hearts and minds of Arabs expanded to include international players and Western powers with stakes in the region.

The emergence of a vibrant Arab mediascape and a pan-Arab audience has not only consolidated Arab public opinion, but has also made it increasingly restless, at times even providing an outlet to express contempt for governments and serving as a source of political anxiety. However, the Arab governments’ traditional loss of monopoly over public opinion did not necessarily transform public opinion into a crucial or effective force. If anything, such a development set counter-dynamics into play, leading Arab governments to invest more heavily in media in an attempt to regain control over public opinion. What the evolution of the Arab media scene did is increase the realization on the part of ruling elites and entrenched regimes in the Arab world of the importance of Arab public opinion and the need to exert an added influence over what Arabs think in an age marked by the intensification of the flow of information. Although emboldened by media, Arab public opinion was for years a discrete influence in the face of the Arab governments’ determination to reassert their hegemony over their subjects.

TOWARD AN ARAB PUBLIC SPHERE

The amorphous nature and uneven presence of Arab public opinion, coupled with the difficulties associated with attempts to delineate it and measure it, led to alternative conceptions of public participation and engagement. Discussions about the relationship between media and public opinion have been reframed within the theory of the public sphere in r...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction: Publics, Imaginaries, Soft Power, and Epistemologies on the Eve of the Arab Uprisings
• Part I Social Change and Political Culture
• Part II New Genres and Literacies
• Part III Global Effects
• Part IV Evolution of Media Theories
• About the Authors
• Index