The British Expeditionary Force, 1939-40

E. Smalley

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137494207
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia militar y marítima

Between September 1939 and June 1940, the British Expeditionary Force confronted the German threat to France and Flanders with a confused mind-set, an uncertain skills-set and an uncompetitive capability. This book explores the formation's origins, the scale of defeat in France and the campaign's considerable legacy.

1

Introduction

For many people, the understanding of operations involving the British Expeditionary Force in France and Flanders can be summarized in the phrase, the fall of France, or even more succinctly in the single word Dunkirk. In reality this campaign retains considerable unrealized complexity. The BEF’s campaign of operations from September 1939 to June 1940 did not occur in isolation, nor did its consequences end with the French armistice on 22 June 1940. The inter-war British Army had long prepared for future conflict, even against a first-class enemy, yet failed to accurately anticipate the characteristics of combat in 1939–40. The campaign had a lasting legacy in that it led to fundamental changes such as an increasingly scientific approach to discipline and the transformation of operational command to a brigade basis. Paradoxically, misinterpretation of events led to a continuation of flaws, such as retention of tempo-sapping written orders and discretionary training within units. As a result, the events of this campaign intrinsically influenced the development and performance of the British Army throughout the Second World War.

This book explores the downfall of the Allied forces in France in 1940 and, in particular, reveals how systemic weaknesses within the BEF hampered operations and culminated in defeat and evacuation. In a military force, courage and confidence alone are not enough. Training is vital for preparing personnel for the demands of the battlefield; communications inform units how to function effectively; discipline ensures the collective good is placed before the individual; and the decision-making of headquarters and staff enables the Army to act in a coordinated manner. When added to the men and material available these factors unite to produce combat capability and, if successful, victory; this book investigates not only how the BEF was defeated, but why that defeat was largely self-inflicted.

Examination of the command, control and communication systems of the BEF shows the British Army’s total inability to identify and settle on a single effective approach within the critical areas of training, communications, discipline, headquarters and staff. Allowing unrestricted variation proved incompatible with consistent combat capability and detrimental to performance. The BEF deployed to France with no set training schedules, no standardized inspection mechanisms and no minimum capability requirements; these were considered internal matters and left to the discretion of each unit’s commanding officer. Depending on their age, training and previous postings, military arms, units and even individuals would reveal unshakeable, sometimes illogical, preference for particular communication methods during the course of the campaign. Disciplinary regulations which determined the legality of action and the level of judicial response were interpreted inconsistently and creatively; subsequent sentencing could range from the inexplicably lenient to the exceptionally punitive. Leeway given to those involved in headquarter operations had a ripple effect within the BEF as, at each level, unit discretion allowed the accommodation of additional unique procedures and preferences; variably qualified and experienced officers further compounded this myriad of approaches. Elite officers theoretically benefited from the opportunity to operate free from inappropriate, inflexible regulations, but, in reality, the lack of standardization created a world of uncertainty within which even competent officers could underperform through ignorance, complacency or lethargy. The argument that a metric standard in any area of army life was impossible to achieve due to the multitude of terrains, threats and equipment with which the British Army interacted was not sufficiently challenged during the preparatory eight months of Phoney War, when the BEF gathered to fight as one formation, in one theatre, against a single enemy.

By focusing on essential military practicalities, original and substantive additions to the current historiography are possible, along with contextualization of other academic works. Military communications and staff work have been largely ignored due to apprehension about complex details and uncertain commercial viability. This book, alongside Simon Godfrey’s recent work, has begun to correct this omission. Equally, original analysis in more familiar topics is possible through the historical equivalent of reverse engineering. Timothy Harrison Place and David French have identified continued training deficiencies throughout the 1940–45 period. These deficiencies did not suddenly materialize, but slowly developed from inter-war origins. Similarly, unease among senior officers about imperfect discipline within Britain’s conscript army, as revealed by Jonathan Fennell and Christine Bielecki, was replicated in the volunteer pre-war army and BEF.¹ Discipline was dependent on officer supervision, deployment duration and proximity to temptation, rather than their unique volunteer make-up; ill-discipline occurred accordingly. More critically, the wilful concealment and unofficial resolution of ill-discipline helps explain why a scientifically designed and monitored system, beyond the traditional regimental approach, was considered unnecessary pre-war.

Only by analysing British pre-war activity, both at home and throughout the Empire, selectively from the Great War, but especially from 1936 onwards, can the BEF be revealed as a product of inter-war development. Furthermore, since the chain of command is of critical importance, evidence is drawn from the highest level to the lowest rank; to protect against excessive breadth or obsessive detail, closest attention is paid to the most influential levels of command, namely those between the War Office and the infantry battalion. Inter-service issues and operations are recognized, especially as the Army was the Cinderella service of the inter-war period, always behind the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy in spending priorities. The lifting of the financially restrictive ten-year rule in 1932 fired the starting gun for reformers and conservatives to seek ideological control of the Army and the debate delayed definitive preparations for a continental expeditionary force until early in 1939. Such was the belated change in mind-set that the modest rearmament requirements of four regular divisions and a mobile division in April 1938 became aspirations for 32 fully equipped divisions in March 1939.² Against this background the findings of this book are made.

The book covers the pre-war system used by the BEF until it was transformed beyond recognition. This varies from topic to topic and, accordingly, the following chapters replicate this diversity. In training, a completely new system was rapidly introduced, but too late to influence the BEF and its thought processes; the change is acknowledged, but not expanded on in this book. The traditional method of using Royal Military College Sandhurst and Royal Military Academy Woolwich to train and commission new officers was replaced almost immediately in autumn 1939 with more numerous, high-turnover Officer Cadet Training Units (OCTU). David French has shown that civilians with similar social backgrounds to the pre-war officer corps could access OCTU and subsequently gain commissions into the new conscript army merely by making a positive impression on senior officers.³ Similarly, Jeremy Crang has explored how OCTU trained personnel and, as a result, discovered that ‘OCTU commanders were able to develop their own syllabus and so there was little uniformity of practice’.⁴ This illustrates how individualism was perpetuated through the various army training systems of the war. In contrast, the headquarters and staff chapter reveals the equivalent change to the staff system did impact on the BEF and remained in operation for the duration. The January 1940 decision to reopen the Staff College with a shorter, wartime course removed long-serving officers from the Franco-Belgian border for training in divisional staff duties before reassignment to UK-based units; the BEF did not benefit. Subsequent modifications, especially those incorporated within an extended post-1945 syllabus, such as the internationalization of students and directing staff, are briefly reviewed to constructively demonstrate how this institution could have improved in the inter-war period.⁵

The complexity of operations is divided into four main themes – Training, Communications, Discipline, Headquarters and Staff. Training refers to what military capability the Army wanted to achieve, how it attempted to get there and whether it was successful. Training could range from a handful of low-ranking individuals participating in repetitive drill to basic tactical training with a battalion’s vehicles and support weaponry to a complex and expensive operational manoeuvre at corps level. The bigger the exercise the less frequently it occurred and the more likely participants could be ignored or take unofficial shortcuts. Training could be prescriptive, with a defined objective, or a practical test of theoretical speculation. Only through experience could errors in procedure be discovered, capability installed and skills refined.

Communications are the two-way transfer of information, encompassing front-line to rear-echelon, the length of the chain of command and finally lateral conveyance within command levels. Methods range from technologically advanced wireless communications to technologically devoid human runners and carrier pigeons; they also vary in format from unequivocal type-written orders to unintentional rumours. Effective information distribution is linked to communication reliability, but poorly used communications can lead to information overload and a loss of tempo. Communication methods usually work within a portfolio of options, thereby providing system resilience; however, the failure of one method or unit can lead to cascade failure in others.

Discipline is far more complex than merely enforcing army regulations and sending rule-breakers to courts-martial. It involves the maintenance of proper subordination in the Army through self-control, obedience, orderliness and capacity for cooperation; all of which become unnatural characteristics under pressure and in combat. An individual’s morale is integral to discipline because it enables orders to be obeyed and acted upon. Group mentality is equally critical because it allows both collective strength and collective weakness. The only difference between the best and the worst performers, in terms of ill-discipline, is the scale. Ill-discipline ranges from civil crimes, inevitable in any large group, to military specific technical infringements to unofficial offences unbecoming of service personnel. In addition to the military justice system with its numerous sentencing options, the British Army operated an unofficial in-house disciplinary system where NCOs, officers and regiments settled matters before involving the official system.

Headquarters and Staff deals with the personnel, procedures and headquarters that combined to form the Army’s command capability. It examines how officers, both individually and collectively, learned and retained knowledge of how staffs functioned and how responsibilities were divided between the various headquarters. Through discussion of training manuals, Staff College teaching, regimental experience and imperial postings, this chapter explores how military problems were addressed and decision-makers assisted within the Army.

The sequence of chapters is designed to assist understanding of this complex campaign. The campaign overview provides a foundation of information on the BEF which enables comprehension of intricate arguments contained within the thematic chapters. Unlike the thematic chapters where the primacy of the argument overrides all other factors, in the overview the narrative is key, thereby allowing the inclusion of material which is helpful to understanding. Training is the first thematic chapter because of its fundamental importance to individual and collective performance. Ever-present themes of variation and complacency are perhaps strongest in the area of training, as is the impression that the BEF was the product of inter-war thinking and not a start-up army created from scratch without established views and experienced personnel.

The training chapter shows why the pre-war army rejected a standardized approach, highlights the process by which this policy was reversed and provides exploration of why both varied and substandard training remained. Obligated to perform the role of imperial policeman, the inter-war British Army avoided establishing a formal metric because of the varied terrain and tactics it confronted globally; hostile terrain occasionally required antiquated tactics, the Army lacked an OFSTED inspectorate to enforce standards and senior officers were considered sufficiently well versed in military principle to command independent of interference. However, a metric would have standardized rarely seen procedures, for example, air re-supply of ground forces was variously considered routine, impossible or unnecessary in different parts of the Empire. Despite UK-based units having different levels of manpower, instructors and equipment, most commanders, lacking a common training aim, independently concluded that a relatively undemanding combination of rank-and-file basic training, drill and cheap, objective-focused Training Exercise Without Troops (TEWTs) were the best way of maximizing theoretical capability with limited resources. This combination denied officers genuine experience of command in the field, hampered understanding of war’s unpredictability and prevented practical procedural and equipment problems being identified. Furthermore, with limited expectations, innovation or pressure to achieve, enthusiasm for vigorous training drained from units, leaving a tick box culture which all ranks sought to get through as quickly and easily as possible; training quality and outcome were almost afterthoughts. Whilst Sandhurst prioritized excessive drill and regimental tradition, post-commission tactical training was carried out by unqualified, unsupervised, often disinterested officers liable to fall back on their own Great War training; the process varied and the outcome, inevitably, was inadequate. Staff College is largely covered in the headquarters and staff chapter, but is featured here to demonstrate how even elite institutions frequently bypassed tricky topics, for example the implications of air warfare.

As the War Office slowly realized the magnitude of training deficiencies, it endeavoured to overcome them through the dissemination of multiple documents and, in the process, gradually developed a British Army metric standard. Pre-war promotion of vague training principles transformed into critical language and prescriptive schedules for formations up to division strength. However, information was frequently misdirected and officers entrusted with new guidelines were the same complacent trainers who had both independently and collectively failed already. To confuse matters, GHQ was established outside of Army Council control, creating two competing centres of authority, neither in tune with the other. Metric enforcement was variously overseen by the Commander-in-Chief, War Office staff, the Staff Duties and Training branch of GHQ, and unit commanders. Individually and as a whole this system fundamentally failed; a deficiency in time, authority and willingness to interfere, or a combination of all three, undermined all metric enforcers. Variation occurred at all levels, with good commanders utilizing all available opportunities to make a difference and give their unit an edge over others who followed the easy option in training topic and intensity. Handicapped by commitments to flawed frontier defences, illusory war zones and political distractions, the BEF training effort paled in comparison to the practical, progressive, complex, tempo-sustaining training carried out in Phoney War Germany. British Army operating procedures were only truly standardized with the introduction of battle drills in 1942, by which time the unpredictability of commander-led training had left the Army craving minimum standards it could rely on in combat.

Communications are integral to the accumulation of information, the coordination of decision-making, the implementation of capability and ultimately, overall performance. The content of communications ranges from the legacy of the Great War, such as the continuing acceptance and reliance on cable-based communications, to the disintegration of BEF communications during the campaign’s combat operations. Furthermore, the development of a portfolio of communication techniques during the technologically transient inter-war period, combined with the establishment of this portfolio in France over the prolonged Phoney War, was deemed worthy of a stand-alone starter chapter. Both communication chapters have been kept together to allow analysis to seamlessly continue into the events of May 1940, where so many of the seeds of catastrophe came to fruition. BEF communications facilitated the associated command and control system; foreknowledge of the collapse in communications aids the explanation of underperformance and failure in other areas of the BEF.

Communications examines how the British Army’s evolutionary inter-war development of a system sufficient for Great War combat failed through under-resourcing and lethargy, leaving the BEF with communications unresponsive to its needs and insufficiently resilient to the dangers it faced. Half-hearted army aspirations to improve flexibility, diversity and the ability to operate on the move, combined with a deep-seated fear of unreliability, the determination to continue top-down control and passive acceptance of adequacy resulted in theoretical capability becoming increasingly out-of-kilter with practical reality. Whilst the inter-war High Command visualized battles fought exclusively with wireless, many combat units within the Empire were still using visual signalling, human runners and even carrier pigeons. Differing equipment combined with the personal preference of the originating officer meant communication techniques and usages varied between theatres, arms, commanders and units. Whilst many pre-war communication hindrances were beyond the control of individual officers, the BEF compounded these with several self-inflicted and easily rectifiable system flaws. Fear of system misuse led to rigid BEF procedures involving excessive paperwork, the continued use of written orders and the restricted use of particular communication methods. Designed to protect the system, in reality these rules hampered efforts to introduce the use of abbreviations, disinclined units to diversify their communication pathways and, ultimately, failed to protect the system from being corrupted; common sense dictated message prioritization be left to the originator, but allowed unscrupulous officers seeking information or resources to leapfrog more worthy, rule-abiding competitors. Although the Phoney War system as a whole proved satisfactory, information transfer failures were commonplace and staff frequently sought face-to-face contact to bypass the system. When intense operations commenced, cascade failure of communications occurred much sooner than previously acknowledged and could not be recovered; unnecessary communications failure heavily contributed to the BEF’s defeat in France in 1940.

The area of Discipline has ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Timeline
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Campaign Overview
• 3 Training
• 4 Communications: Prelude to Collapse
• 5 Communications: Collapse
• 6 Discipline
• 7 Headquarters and Staff
• 8 Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index