Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, member states have delegated full authority on trade policy to the European Economic Community, the predecessor the European Union (EU). All trade negotiations thereafter were led by the European Commission upon a mandate from the Council. To ensure trade negotiations would not harm domestic interests, the member states installed control mechanisms, most notably through their membership in the Council. Despite their loss of policy-making competencies, national trade administrations continue to exist for the sole purpose of monitoring and controlling the European Commission as it negotiates on behalf of the member states. But how do these administrations function, and does their capacity matter when it comes to ensuring national interests are sufficiently defended?
Debates surrounding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have shown that the EUās current trade agenda has come a long way since Rome. Where the Common External Tariff was once the main policy instrument, regulatory issues that include behind-the-border measures have taken hold of the contemporary debate (Young & Peterson, 2006). Matters such as the manner in which chickens are prepared for the food market or the procedures used to test car emissions are increasingly interpreted as barriers to trade and can therefore become the subject of trade negotiation. This ādeepeningā of the trade agenda, however, has important implications for national trade administrations.
In addition to a growing need for regulatory and legal expertise, it has increased the number of ministries and societal actors affected by trade decisions. And these ministries are not restricted to the usual suspects. In May 2013, thirteen Ministers of Culture requested that the Irish presidency exclude audio-visual services from the negotiation mandate (Politico.eu, 15-05-Politico.eu, 2013). Most member states provide financial support to ensure local movie productions are not competed out of the market by Hollywood. Such financial support, however, distorts international competition and could thus be challenged in trade negotiations. But sanitary and phyto-sanitary rules can also act as trade barriers. Here, discussions pertain to the degree to which a measure intended to protect our health can act as a hidden trade restriction. Does a limitation on the use of hormones in beef address a genuine health risk, or does itārather convenientlyāfavour domestic over foreign producers? Is a restriction on the import of genetically modified organisms a hidden trade barrier, or is it a justified measure to protect our well-being? With a growing scope of regulations being considered trade barriers, the circle of actors with whom coordination may be due widens.
Furthermore, the TTIP is but one of many such agreements. Since Peter Mandelson became Commissioner for Trade in 2004, the bilateral agenda has risen in prominence (Elsig, 2007). It is an agenda that was pursued with equal rigour by his successor Commissioner Karel De Gucht (GarcĆa, 2013), andājudging by Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrƶmās strategy paperāis likely to be intensified in the years to come (Commission of the European Communities, 2015). Against this background, Matthew Baldwin, a former Director of Market Access in DG Trade, urged that āit is vital that Member States maintain their capacity to promote their interests (and arbitrate effectively between different national interests where necessary), question the Commission, and defend the line against third-country āincursionāā (Baldwin, 2006, 930). Unfortunately, we know very little about how national trade administrations actually function, and whether such capacity is really āvitalā to promote a member stateās interests remains to be seen. This book studies national trade administrations in the EU and examines the relationship between administrative capacity and the amount of control a member state can exert over the Commission during trade negotiations.
Recent studies uncovered substantial variation in national representativesā attempts to influence policy in Council meetings (DĆ¼r & Mateo, 2010a, 2010b; Naurin & Wallace, 2008; Panke, 2011; Tallberg, 2008). While such variation may not come as a surprise to many observers of EU politics, new questions about the causes behind these differences inevitably arise. Research has only just begun to scrape the surface. Sizeābe it political or economicāis the most straightforward explanation that comes to mind. But in a decision-making context where unanimity is the rule or where consensus is the norm, varying voting rights have only limited empirical purchase. Administrative capacity has often been suggested as an alternative explanation for the variation in member-state involvement (Beyers & Trondal, 2004; Haverland & Liefferink, 2012a, 2012b; Panke, 2010a, 2010b). Whereas many scholars attach some credence to the role of administrative capacity as a source of power, none have taken it as the central argument of their research. The main question of this book therefore is: To what extent does administrative capacity explain a member stateās control over the European Commission during trade negotiations?
This introduction aims to meet three objectives: to situate the research question in the wider literature, to present a summary of the central argument, and to elaborate the research design used to test the main hypothesis. The sections are structured accordingly. The introduction ends with a brief overview of the book.
The Literature
The relationship between administrative capacity and a member stateās ability to exert control has attracted cursory attention in three different research traditions. The Principal-Agent model, Comparative Public Administration, and Negotiation theory each recognised the importance of the question but, due to their respective foci, refrained from providing compelling answers. This book aims to contribute to each of these traditions, as will be explained below.
Principal-Agent Model
The Principal-Agent (PA) model studies hierarchical contractual relations. It has seen many applications in the study of international organisations in general (Dijkstra, 2015; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, & Tierney, 2006; Lyne, Nielson, & Tierney, 2009) and of the EU in particular (Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017; DĆ¼r & Elsig, 2011; Pollack, 1997). In the latter context, the PA model is used to analyse both the delegation of authority from the member states (as the principals) to the EU (as the agent) as well as the power struggle between the two. The principal(s) seeks to ensure the agent does not shirk whereas the agent tries to pursue its self-interest. For that reason, the model puts great emphasis on the role of control mechanisms.
By now a plethora of such mechanisms have been identified and subjected to empirical study: the selection of the agent (Delreux, 2008), reporting requirements, budgetary cuts (Weingast & Moran, 1983), procedural mechanisms (Mccubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987), and the ratification procedure (Delreux & Kerremans, 2010) are the most common examples. Scholars have refrained, however, from studying the conditions that trigger the use of these instruments.1 Especially in comparative settings, research has mostly mapped the range of available legal and procedural instruments through which the principal can exert control (Damro, 2006; Epstein & OāHalloran, 1999). For my objectives it is crucial to understand the factors that trigger the activation rather than the availability of control. Control mechanisms are created equally for all member states. Member states differ, however, in terms of how likely they are to invoke these instruments. Administrative capacity can be an important factor to explain this probability (Moe, 1987).
A second problem with the PA model is the limited comparative research of individual principalsā attempts of control. Studies of the EUās external negotiations generally focus on single member states to make more general statements regarding the balance of power between the national and supranational (Da ConceiĆ§Ć£o-Heldt, 2011; Kerremans, 2004). In other words, we have knowledge only of those member states that became vocal in the process, but not of the position and behaviour of other member states. Nevertheless, recent research has started to differentiate between the relations member states (as principals) share with an international organisation (as their agent). That research is still largely exploratory or theoretical (Dijkstra, 2015; Graham, 2013; Kleine, 2013a, 2013b). This book will push the agenda further through a comprehensive empirical study of twenty-two member states. However, in order to achieve this, insights need to be gleaned from other empirical traditions.
Comparative Public Administration: National Administrations in EU Policies
Comparative Public Administration presents a fruitful alternative when inquiring into the relationship between administrative capacity and a member stateās behaviour within the Council. While this sub-field of Public Administration is developing strongly, the majority of research is still descriptive in nature, focusing on three or fewer cases (Fitzpatrick et al., 2011) and struggling with the development of generalisable findings (Pollitt, 2011). In the context of the bookās research ambitions, it is important to note that the literature has mapped the diversity in administrative models to coordinate a national position. Of these applications, the most important works to date are two large edited volumes providing a detailed description of the national coordination procedures in European member states (Kassim, Peters, & Wright, 2000; Kassim, Menon, Peters, & Wright, 2001). More sector-specific work ensued, mapping coordination processes in the member states with regard to environmental policy (Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Schout & Jordan, 2005), health policy (Greer & Martin de Almagro, 2012), and chemicals regulation (Haverland & Liefferink, 2012a, 2012b). The few studies that exist on national trade administrations in the EU are either too old (Hayes, 1993) or focus on a single member state (Falke, 2005). But this is not the biggest issue.
Whereas many studies have compared and analysed changes in the domestic coordination processes (Dimitrova & Toshkov, 2007; Johansson & Raunio, 2010; Schout & Jordan, 2005, 2008), few have analysed the consequences of such variations in terms of the effects on EU policy-making. Or as Goetz stated, āIn the study of th...