Introduction
Derrida notes on many occasions the impact Heideggerâs work had on his own, even once claiming that he could not have written anything without Heidegger.1 As such, my investigation into translation and the relation with the other, begins with an examination of Heideggerâs thinking on language. In this chapter I do three thingsâfirst, I set out the role of language in Heideggerâs work through an exegesis of some of Heideggerâs most pertinent texts on the theme. Second, I demonstrate the manner in which translation in many senses operates as a hodos or âwayâ into the task of thinking. Finally, I ask whether Heideggerâs thinking of difference is radical enough or whether his thinking remains trapped in some way in a thinking of the same; a question that will return in subsequent chapters.
I begin with the account of language in Heideggerâs seminal Being and Time (1927). Here I mark the relation between the truth of Being and language as apophansis. I note in particular the manner in which Heidegger sees writing and repeatability as a threat to the revelatory power of language and the implications of such a view for translation. Between the publication of Being and Time in 1927 and that of the âLetter on Humanismâ in 1947, Heideggerâs thinking underwent a âturnâ or Kehre. This turn, as Heidegger is at pains to point out in that latter work; is not a radical departure from Being and Time but rather a development of his thinking. Key to this development is a deeper engagement with language and its relation to Being. It is no coincidence that many of Heideggerâs texts from the 1940s deal with translation and so, in the second section of this chapter, I examine Heideggerâs extended translation of the Anaximander fragment. In the last section I examine what Heidegger terms the essence of languageâSayingâand its relation with man as a co-belonging. I claim that while Heidegger consistently emphasizes the as yet âunsaidâ of Saying, he falls short of positing an âunsayableâ and that this has radical implications for the translatable and untranslatable.
Language in Being and Time
In Being and Time Dasein, âthat entity that each of us is,â is described as Being-in-the-world, which is a unitary phenomenon. In order to analyze this unitary phenomenon Heidegger examines the âconstitutive items in its structureâ which are not to be understood as contents subsequently pieced together, but rather as aspects occurring simultaneously within the whole. These âconstitutive itemsâ are the worldhood of the world, the âwhoâ of Dasein and Being-in as such. Within the structure of Being and Time, the principal analysis of language takes place in the broader context of the âBeing-in as suchâ (Division One, Chapter Six).2 Here Heidegger describes the âthereâ of Daseinâs Being-there (or âthere-Beingâ, Da-sein) as state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen) and discourse (Rede). These three existentialia, or conditions of Daseinâs existence, are co-constitutive and co-occurring. For the sake of space I will focus here on the accounts of understanding and discourse without dwelling on state-of-mind. I will then illustrate the relationship between discourse and the possibility of truth as unconcealment.
Ordinarily when we use the word âunderstandingâ we tend to mean âbeing ableâ or âcompetentâ to do something or âbeing a match for it.â However, for Heidegger this kind of understanding is derived from primordial or existential understanding where that âwhich we have such competence over is not a âwhatâ, but Being as existing.â3 As an existentiale understanding is a mode of Daseinâs very Being. Dasein, as being-there is always already in a world, this world is disclosed to Dasein as significant and as its (Daseinâs) potentiality-for-Being. This disclosedness of the world is existential understanding which has the structure of projection. âProjectionâ (Entwurf) here means that Dasein, in its Being, is always âthrowingâ possibilities for its Being ahead of itself.4 These possibilities are on the one hand described by Heidegger as definite and on the other hand as purely possible.5 While this may at first seem contradictory it is essential to grasp these two characteristics of the possible together. Since Dasein is Being-in-the-world and the world is always already disclosed to Dasein in a particular way, then Dasein âhas already got itself into definite possibilities.â6 Dasein either lets these possibilities pass by or âseizes upon them,â this is the modality of Daseinâs Being. Nonetheless, since Dasein is thrown into a world in which other entities already are, and which has already been disclosed in a certain way; these possibilities are pre-structured. There is a ârangeâ of possibilities in terms of what can be disclosed to Dasein at any given time. Daseinâs possibilities are different today than they will be a century from now. What will remain the same, however, is Daseinâs existential structure of Being-possible. The possibilities that Dasein throws ahead of itself can subsequently be âseized uponâ and appropriated but within understanding itself, they remain only possibilities. Understanding then, as an existentiale, is the mode of Daseinâs Being in which âit is its possibilities as possibilities.â7
âSightâ, âlightâ and âshowingâ play important roles in Being and Time and many of the descriptions of Dasein emphasize the ability to âseeâ that which is. Daseinâs ability to engage with its environment and the things it finds there in a meaningful way is described as Umsicht generally translated as âcircumspectionâ or literally âaround sight.â8 Understanding too is described as a type of âsight,â although this is neither âjust perceiving with the bodily eyesâ nor âpure non-sensory awareness of something present-at-hand.â9 Rather, understanding allows Dasein to âseeâ entities as meaningful through their network of involvements in the world within which Dasein finds itself. Understanding, as which Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities, has its own possibility of developing itself in interpretation. Interpretation is the manner in which understanding appropriates the possibilities it had previously projected: interpretation is the manner in which understanding âbecomes itself.â10
The relation between interpretation and understanding is perhaps best understood in terms of what Heidegger calls the âfore-structureâ and the âas-structureâ. Understanding acts as a tripartite fore-structure made up of fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. Fore-having (Vorhabe) is an understanding of the background network of involvements of that which we wish to interpret. Fore-sight (Vorsicht) is an understanding of how to approach the entity in question. Fore-sight âtakes the first cutâ at what was understood in fore-having in a definite way. An interpretation of an entity has always âalready decided for a definite way of conceivingâ the entity in question and this way of preconceiving is what Heidegger terms fore-conception (Vorgriff).11 It can either be drawn from the entity itself or it can force the entity into concepts that do not belong to its way of Being, in either case it reflects Daseinâs anticipated understanding of how the interpretation will terminate.12
Interpretation, emerging out of existential understanding is not the process of âthrowing a significationâ over something present-at-hand but rather the âlaying outâ of the involvement of something initially grasped through understanding. It is through interpretation that the âasâ structure is made explicit. We âunderstandâ a room when we enter it, interpretation brings particular things within the room âcloseâ to usâseeing the vacant chair as a possibility to be grasped (and sat upon). Further, interpretation feeds into understanding modifying and developing our background understanding through experiences of improving things or putting them to rights.13 This circular movement of background understanding to interpretative articulation and its subsequent return to a background understanding is not, argues Heidegger, to be understood as a vicious circle. Rather, this hermeneutic to-ing and fro-ing provides the positive possibility of knowing and the disclosure of meaning: âonly Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless.â14 But what exactly is meaning for Heidegger? As understanding, Dasein projects possibilities ahead of itself which are then articulated by interpretation. These possibilities are projected upon meaning which is to be understood as the intelligibility of an entity, its disclosure to Dasein. Since Dasein alone has the form of Being which is a disclosive Being-in-the-world, and since only Dasein has the mode of Being as understanding; then only Dasein can reveal the meaning of an entity. Meaning ...