Around the world, much attention has been focused on the strained relationship between Islam and the West. Throughout the twenty-first century, the intensification of information dissemination made possible by the globalised, modern media has further worsened this relationship. Since 11 September 2001, when international news stations through satellite and cable television broadcasted the collapse of the twin World Trade Centre towers, âIslamic terrorismâ has been incessantly portrayed and monetised by world media. This has exacerbated misplaced understandings of Islam, by obscuring the immense diversity within the Muslim world. As a consequence, distinctive developments of Islamist social transformations all over the globe have been uncritically lumped together as âIslamic revivalismâ or âIslamic fundamentalismâ or âIslamismâ.
Prominent religious historian Karen Armstrong through much of her work has argued that the rise of âIslamismâ is in fact a backlash against the hegemony of Western secularist modernity imposed on the Muslim world (2000, 2014). Armstrongâs concern about the social consequences of the misunderstanding towards the Muslim world is not new. It resonates with Edward Saidâs (1979) critique of Orientalism. In this vein, many remarkable scholars have resisted this misapprehension and successfully unpacked the complexities of very diverse Muslim societies, organisations, and individuals (see Esposito 1992; Esposito and Voll 1996; Lapidus 1997; Hefner 2000; Hirschkind 2001, 2004; Mahmood 2011; Bayat 2007, 2010, Hadiz 2016). These scholars have offered the world a more heterogeneous version of Islamism that arose as a social consequence of ânon-Islamicâ developments such as secularism, modernity, democracy, and global capitalism, which has fundamentally challenged the basic assumption that there is an inherent incompatibility between âIslamâ and the âWestâ.
Before the shocking image of terrorism-dominated global perceptions of Islam, there was another kind of Islamism that had been rising steadily. There has been a visible presence of Islam in the financial sector, particularly emerging as Islamic banking. It is not much discussed by Western media and certainly not at all framed as a global spectacle, yet it is perhaps more effectively integrated into the Western model of a modern society. The dynamic expansion of Islamic banking since the 1970s has enabled Muslims to participate in the global markets of capital and commodities (Kuran 2004; Tripp 2006), which has been argued as a way for Muslims to adapt to modern capitalism. The proponents of âIslamic economicsâ instruct Muslims to refrain from excessive consumption associated with Western capitalist consumer culture, providing guiding Islamic principles to engage in modern economic practices (Kuran 2004; Siddiqi 1992; Khan 1995).
A closer look into the literature suggests that, as radically different as how both these Islamic developments are responded to by the âWestâ, they are social responses towards the same issue. They are both the social consequences of being a Muslim in an increasingly globalised world, and they are, in fact, indirectly linked to each other. Studies have revealed how market practices and consumption among the Muslim middle class have brought market-oriented venues to the forefront of the discussion regarding Islam and the West (Yavuz 2004; Boubekeur 2005). Such venues, from halal food to Islamic fashion week, have propagated and monetised post-Islamist lifestyles. There is a sense of belonging, and Islamic collectivity is shaped by the shared consumption practices of an ummah.
The emergence of a Muslim middle class is a phenomenon that surfaced in Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, and India and also in the UK and Australia (see Sandikci 2011). It informs us of the links between middle-class Muslims all over the world with the broader and more secular socio-economic developments. The growing Muslim middle class connects their Islamic principles with consumption habits (see Wong 2007; Nasr 2009), which was a social consequence of âneoliberal economic restructuring programsâ (Sandikci 2011, p. 250), opening up Muslim markets for global brands by building a halal shopping experience.
Significantly, Muslim countries with increasing Islamist movements were also the countries that experienced an increase in wealth (Sandikci and Ger 2002; Wong 2007; Nasr 2009). Vali Nasr, dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, and senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings Institution, proposed in his book Forces of Fortune (2009) that the Middle East should liberalise via middle-class consumerism and that democratic transformation would inevitably ensue. Nasr (2009) argued passionately that Western powers are capable of providing powerful stimulus for this transformation, and that their engagement with the Middle East must focus on encouraging Middle Eastern economies to open up to direct foreign investment, trade, and the free flow of goods and resources that will be followed by local entrepreneurship and commerce (pp. 255â256). He also put forth Turkey as an example of how âcommerce has both shackled state power and softened Islamâs hard edgesâ (Nasr 2009, p. 250), which, to him, proves that a Muslim country can simultaneously be democratic, open to global commerce and capital, with a budding middle-class consumer market and a better balance between the state and society. Muslim consumers, who were as conservative in values as they are liberal in their market practices, would be, as Nasr believed, the strong modernising force in the region. Notably, the country that Nasr has described as democratic is being led by the Erdogan regime accused of stifling domestic dissent, press freedoms, and more seriously, of hard-line tactics against Kurdish insurgency and abetting the rise of the neighbouring Islamic state. 1
In the case of Egypt, centralised market-driven economy that had stagnated under President Mubarak led to the 2011 revolution that resulted in his overthrow and a takeover by the pan-Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, technology-based multinationals that had come to Egypt to expand their businesses (Kamel 2013) contributed to the creation of âopportunity spacesâ for ordinary Muslim citizens to be part of the civil unrest. However, in 2013, elect President Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood was removed by Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, which shows that more civic participation does not ensure a more stable democracy. In fact, developments in Turkey, Egypt, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which have all seen the emergence of their own new Muslim middle class, seem to be heading in different and even contradictory directions. Thus, linking market forces with the growth of democracy in Muslim countries must be done with caution, if not at all.
Drawing on more grounded data on the struggles of student, youth, and womenâs organisations, Asef Bayat (2007) argued that there are new Islamist social movements that seek to âmake their religion compatible with desired notions of democracyâ (p. 108). He explained that these newer Islamist social movements are based on loosely defined networks that push for democratic change. Rather than militant groups determined to establish Sharia-based regimes, the intelligentsia is using âWesternâ technology and education to push for democracy all the while rejecting its superiority over Islamic moral values.
In a sense, it was the Muslim middle-class way of saying no to what they considered their excludersâtheir national elites, secular governments, and those governmentsâ Western allies. They rebuffed âWestern cultural dominationâ, its political rationale, moral sensibilities, and normative symbols, even though they shared many of its featuresâneckties, food, education, and technologies. In contrast, those who enjoyed and prospered under the modern socioeconomic and cultural conditions of globalization, if they were not secular, adhered to a different kind of Islam, the so-called moderate Islam, or more precisely, âpassive pietyâ. (Bayat 2007, pp. 6â7)
Bayatâs study was particularly exceptional, because he showed an irony behind Iran and Egyptâs lack of a democratic transition. Resistance towards a theocratic authoritarian regime in Iran had taken a secular form, whereas resistance towards a secular authoritarian regime in Egypt had taken a religious form. His was also distinctive because of his thorough consideration of citizensâ everyday politics, which had allowed a detailed account of the individuals and groups behind this resistance. The middle class resisting and coexisting with authoritarian regimes is a middle class that consumes Western products while rejecting its ideals. Profoundly, his contribution links Islamist movements with secular ideals in a way that does not place them in a dichotomy between the West and the rest.
It is prudent to focus and augment awareness regarding the multicultural nature of the contemporary Muslim world and its relationship to broader, secular social settings that include heterogeneous citizens in a plural society. It is necessary to pay careful attention towards this diversity, complexity, and their place in history when considering the possibility for democratic developments. Taking the Indonesian case, Robert W. Hefner, professor of anthropology and director of the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs (CURA), Boston University, proposed in the introduction of his book Civil Islam (2000) to rethink how setbacks in the achievement of democracy relies heavily on local cultural resources.
Now even âthe Westâ was understood to be diverse in its cultural genealogies. With this recognition, there was a parallel expansion of interest in the variety of cultures within which democracy can work. What conditions encourage tolerance and democratic participation? Can human rights take hold in cultures whose concepts of personhood differ from those of liberal individualism? Can democracy tolerate or even benefit from the energies of public religion? Questions like these showed that, for students of comparative politics, the conditions of democracyâs cross-cultural possibility had become the order of the day. (Hefner 2000, p. 5)
In studying the Indonesian example, Hefner argues that proponents of civil Islam, those who believe that Islam is compatible with democratic values, were a key part of the amplification of a Muslim and Indonesian culture of tolerance, equality, and civility (2000, p. 218). Resonating with Bayatâs (2007) new Islamist movement, Hefnerâs (2000) civil Islam specifies âIslamismâ. Both studies rely heavily on the context within which these movements were formed, highlighting how they have owed their formation to modern institutions as well as a familiarity, if not tension, with Western culture. Most importantly, this âIslamismâ is not incompatible with democracy. More accurately, it develops its own kind of desired democracy by adapting products originating from the very Western culture they may as well be resisting. This adaptation can be related to the core values of adherence to revelation and less related to autonomy and self-determination (Mardin 1995, p. 290 in Hefner 2000, p. 214) as well as being instrumental in rebuffing Western values (Bayat 2007). Thus, it is imperative to support these findings with an investigation of the middle class that has enabled democratic developments. Furthermore, studying the Muslim middle class could also inform contextual democratic developments.
By taking the Indonesian case, the largest democracy with a majority Muslim population, this study centres on a country that has too often been overlooked in debates regarding Islam today. Much less studied than countries in the Middle East, Indonesia can potentially advise us on the shaping of a Muslim society in a plural, democratising country. By investigating commercial television, identity, and the middle class, this book provides a case that is substantial in informing us on the complexities, diversity, and nuances that may destabilise the monolithic notion of âIslamismâ.
Locating the Muslim Middle Class: Demographic and Regional Changes
The âmiddle classâ that is studied here refers to the social class that had benefited from the developmentalist social transformations during the authoritarian New Order period (1965â1998), 2 allowing the upward mobility of the expanding middle class. Since early 1990s, a new middle class had taken shape in cities all over Indonesia. They may have similar levels of occupation, soc...