Rightness as Fairness

A Moral and Political Theory

Marcus Arvan

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137541819
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Filosofia politica

Rightness as Fairness provides a uniquely fruitful method of 'principled fair negotiation' for resolving applied moral and political issues that requires merging principled debate with real-world negotiation.

1

Ethics for the Twenty-First Century

This book argues that a new moral theory, Rightness as Fairness, is superior to existing theories. However, in order to argue this effectively, we need standards for theory comparison. When should we judge one moral theory to be superior to another?

Section 1 of this chapter argues that moral philosophy currently lacks any method for reliably distinguishing what is true about morality from what merely ‘seems true’ to some investigators but not to others. Section 2 then argues that the following seven principles of theory selection adapted from the hard sciences are the best method available for reliably accomplishing this, and thus, for comparing moral theories:

Seven Principles of Theory Selection

1.Firm Foundations: theories based on common human observation – or observations that are taken to be obvious, incontrovertible fact by all or almost all observers – should be preferred over theories based on controversial observations that may seem true to some investigators but not to others.

2.Internal Coherence: all things being equal, and subject to Firm Foundations, theories with fewer or no internal contradictions should be preferred over theories with more.

3.External Coherence: all things being equal, and subject to Firm Foundations, theories cohering with more known facts and observations should be preferred over theories cohering with fewer.

4.Explanatory Power: all things being equal, and subject to Firm Foundations, theories explaining more facts and observations should be preferred over theories explaining fewer.

5.Unity: all things being equal, and subject to Firm Foundations, theories unifying disparate phenomena, showing how they have a common explanation, should be preferred over theories providing more fragmentary explanations.

6.Parsimony: all things being equal, and subject to Firm Foundations, theories that successfully explain phenomena with fewer facts or entities should be preferred over theories explaining the same phenomena with more.

7.Fruitfulness: all things being equal, and subject to Firm Foundations, theories solving more existing theoretical or practical problems should be preferred over theories solving fewer.

Next, Section 3 argues that these principles strongly support founding moral philosophy on the following instrumental conception of normative rationality:

Instrumentalism: if one’s motivational interests would be best satisfied by ɸ-ing, then it is instrumentally rational for one to do ɸ – that is, one instrumentally ought to ɸ.

Section 3.1 shows that instrumentalism enjoys virtually universal acceptance in everyday life and the history of philosophy, thus satisfying Firm Foundations. Section 3.2 shows that an instrumentalist moral philosophy also promises, all things being equal, to better satisfy the other principles of theory selection than alternatives. Section 3.3 then systematically compares instrumentalism to prominent alternatives, showing that an instrumentalist moral philosophy promises to best satisfy all seven principles of theory selection.

Finally, Section 4 defuses several possible concerns. Section 4.1 addresses the concern that instrumentalism can at best explain that it is prudent to obey moral norms, not their status as moral norms; Section 4.2 then responds to the concern that instrumentalism is not obviously true; and Section 4.3 addresses the concern that instrumental arguments for moral behavior cannot succeed given clear conflicts between morality and prudence.

1 Distinguishing truth from seeming truth

This book’s introduction referenced several episodes from the history of science. First, I gave the case of ancient Greek cosmology, where some theorists argued that everything in the world is made of air, others that everything is made of fire, others that everything is made of water, and so on. Second, I discussed early-to-mid-twentieth century psychology, where some psychologists (Behaviorists) argued that all human behavior is the result of reward and punishment, others (Instinct Theorists) argued that all human behavior is the result of instincts, others (Freudians) that all human behavior is the result of interactions between subconscious drives, and so on.

Although some of these theories have been found to contain element(s) of truth,^1–2 we nevertheless look back at them mostly with bemusement. After all, instead of deriving the theories in question from careful observation and experiment – as mature sciences now do – the above theories were based on little more than what ‘seemed true’ to particular investigators. It seemed to Thales that everything must be made of water because water can change, to Anaximander that everything must be the ‘boundless’ because the universe can have no end, to Anaximenes that everything must be air, as in his view only air could explain things like fire, and so on.³ Similarly, it seemed to Behaviorists that all behavior must be the result of reward and punishment, to Instinct Theorists that it must be the result of instincts, to Freudians as though it must be the result of subconscious sexual drives, and so on.

However, this is plainly no way for an epistemically responsible discipline to function. For what ‘seems true’ and what actually is true can be, and often have turned out to be, very different things. For instance, it seems true (and was believed for millennia) that the sun revolves around the earth. Similarly, it seems true, and was widely believed by Newtonian scientists, that space and time must be absolute, rather than relative to observers. And it even seems true to some people today that human beings could not have evolved from primates. Yet all of these ‘seemings’ are false. The sun does not revolve around the earth; space and time have been empirically demonstrated to be relative to observers;^4–7 evolution is highly confirmed, and so on.

Because what ‘seems true’ and what is actually true can be very different things, mature sciences have insisted that their practitioners obey rigorous evidential standards: standards that reliably distinguish truth from ‘seeming truth.’ The most basic of these standards is that of common observation. The sciences insist that theories not be based merely on what ‘seems true,’ but rather on the basis of observations and experiments that anyone can verify/replicate.⁸ Anyone can, in principle, run experiments on gravity, biological cell functions, and so on, to test whether existing theories make true predictions. Or consider cholesterol-lowering drugs. It does not merely ‘seem’ as though these drugs lower cholesterol. Their cholesterol-lowering properties have been demonstrated repeatedly in rigorous, controlled experiments and observational studies.

Moral philosophy, however, does not obey the standard of common observation. Rather than insisting that moral theories be based on facts that virtually everyone recognizes to be true, moral philosophers commonly base arguments and theories on premises that ‘seem true’ to some but not all. For example, utilitarians tend to argue that happiness is the only thing of intrinsic value,⁹ yet many others doubt utilitarian premises. Kantians argue that it is not happiness but our humanity or ‘rational nature’ that has intrinsic, unconditional value.^10–16 Yet Kantian premises do not seem true to others—among others, those who question Kantian analyses of practical rationality and moral psychology,^17–21 as well as moral pluralists, to whom it seems that there is no sole thing of intrinsic value, but rather many different things.^22–23 Still others have attempted to base moral philosophy on ‘self-evident’ moral judgments or intuitions.^25–28 For instance, following Moore, Bambrough writes,

My proof that we have moral knowledge consists essentially in saying, ‘We know that this child, who is about to undergo what would otherwise be painful surgery, should be given an anaesthetic before the operation. Therefore we know at least one moral proposition to be true.’²⁹

Unfortunately, these types of claims do not seem obviously true to everyone, either. Moral skeptics^30–32 and anti-realists³³ think morality is far from self-evident. Nor, apparently, does morality seem self-evident to the would-be child-torturer, who might think there is no reason at all why a child undergoing an operation should be given anesthetic. Further, as we see as far back as Plato’s dialogues (where many characters repeatedly express skeptical doubts about morality^34–35) and in recent studies indicating that people commonly express less ‘objectivity’ to moral claims than nonmoral claims,³⁶ moral skepticism of varying degrees is common.

Similar problems plague other approaches to moral philosophy. Some theorists argue that moral philosophy should respect the ‘face value’ of moral language, moral experience, or moral practices.^37–41 Yet many others deny this. For one, moral anti-realists often argue that whatever the face value of moral language or practice may be, moral facts do not exist.³³ Indeed, ‘non-cognitivists’ such as expressivists⁴² and quasi- realists⁴³ hold that while the face value of moral language may appear realist, these appearances are illusory: moral language merely expresses emotional or evaluative attitudes. Finally, other theorists contend that moral philosophy should be based on none of the above, but should simply draw ‘our settled beliefs and convictions’ about morality into greater coherence.^44–47 Yet the problem with coherence-based approaches to philosophy are well known: settled beliefs and convictions, no matter how coherent they may be, may be systematically mistaken.⁴⁸ People once had settled beliefs and convictions that the world is flat, that Earth is the center of the Solar System, and so on – and yet all of these settled beliefs and convictions turned out false.

Now again, individual theorists sometimes claim that they have finally discovered a reliable method for distinguishing genuine truth from ‘seeming truth.’ G.E. Moore famously argued that moral philosophy must be based on our moral intuitions ‘to possibly pretend to be scientific,’⁴⁹ Kant argued morality must be derived from pure practical reason,¹¹ and so on. Yet, in every case, the methods these theorists defend for distinguishing truth from seeming truth are considered by other theorists or nonphilosophers to not be obviously true.

This is an unfortunate situation. It is bad epistemically because there is no clear, established, known-to-be-reliable method for distinguishing when moral philosophy is getting at genuine truth, as opposed to what merely ‘seems true’ to this or that theorist. It is bad practically because, to the extent we lack such a method, it is difficult to make a compelling case to the public – to our students, friends, and other nonphilosophers – that moral philosophers actually understand morality. Why should the public trust moral philosophers when we defend such a wide variety of views about morality without any known-to-be-reliable method for distinguishing which view is correct?

Some might suggest that this is just the nature of philosophy – that unlike the sciences, which are based on commonly observable facts, predictions, and experiments, all we have to go on in moral philosophy are how things ‘seem’ to us (and, of course, arguments based how things seem). Perhaps. But I will now argue that we can do better.

2 Seven principles of theory selection

Moral philosophy clearly cannot be based on precisely the same methods as the physical sciences. The sciences test descriptive hypotheses – about gravity, cell growth, and so on – against measurable observations. Moral philosophy cannot, however, be tested against predictions of how the world behaves – for moral philosophy is not concerned with describing the world, but with what ought to be: with how people ought to behave. Sciences, in a word, are descriptive, moral philosophy normative. Yet although moral philosophy deals with a different kind of phenomena than the sciences, the sciences utilize several reliable methods for distinguishing truth from ‘seeming truth’ that can, and should, be extended to moral philosophy.

2.1 Firm Foundations

Let us begin by thinking about what distinguishes epistemically respectable sciences from ‘pseudoscience.’ As we saw earlier, modern science insists, above all else, that theories be based on common observation: on observational facts that virtually everyone recognizes as such. Physics and chemistry are founded on common observation of ordinary objects and substances. We all see tables, chairs, people, water, and air – and modern physics and chemistry make predictions about how th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  Ethics for the Twenty-First Century
• 2  The Problem of Possible Future Selves
• 3  The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative
• 4  Three Unified Formulations
• 5  The Moral Original Position
• 6  Rightness as Fairness
• 7  Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism
• 8  Evaluating Rightness as Fairness
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index