A Rational Approach to Animal Rights

Extensions in Abolitionist Theory

Corey Wrenn

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137434654
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

Applying critical sociological theory, this book explores the shortcomings of popular tactics in animal liberation efforts. Building a case for a scientifically-grounded grassroots approach, it is argued that professionalized advocacy that works in the service of theistic, capitalist, patriarchal institutions will find difficulty achieving success.

1

Rationality and Nonhuman Animal Rights

The abolitionist departure

During my graduate studies at Colorado State University, I enthusiastically enrolled in a Nonhuman Animal rights philosophy seminar in the hopes of broadening my sociological knowledge of Nonhuman Animal issues in preparation for my upcoming dissertation work. In this course, we explored ethical theories and the various weak justifications employed to defend the human exploitation of other animals. We debated the role of cognition, capacity for suffering, and death as harm. We deconstructed the immorality of vivisection, speciesist agricultural systems, and exploitative relationships with companion animals. In short, we were taught that Nonhuman Animals matter.

Sometimes we discussed vegetarianism, but veganism was never seriously considered. This omission would come into sharp relief later in the semester when our professor generously treated us to a pizza party. I was shocked when a stack of pepperoni pizzas arrived to the classroom. The very same students who had for months nodded along to our professor’s lectures on the moral standing of Nonhuman Animals were diving into a dinner of pig’s flesh and curdled breast milk from dairy cows long since slaughtered for hamburger. Was I in the right room?

Not long after, our professor led us on a field trip to the Colorado State University (CSU) research “farm,” where a number of cows, sheeps,¹ and other animals were living under the “husbandry” of researchers and students. Along our tour, we met a fistulated cow. A gaping hole had been cut directly into her side straight through to one of her stomachs so that her digestion could be observed for research purposes. Despite having spent hours in the classroom studying the socially constructed and fundamentally arbitrary human/nonhuman divide, students could barely contain their excitement as they lined up for their chance to penetrate the restrained victim with their curious hands. The students laughed with each other, and many posed while their friends took pictures. In the classroom, students of Nonhuman Animal rights were learning to respect other animals as sentient persons. In the field, they were learning that it is acceptable to imprison, objectify, and violate other animals. More than acceptable, it can be fun.

At the end of the course, our professor offered the class some parting advice on where we might locally purchase “humanely raised” Nonhuman Animal flesh and other such products. This final lesson was understood as congruent with “rights” because Nonhuman Animals need not be protected from use and death, only especially egregious suffering. This protectionist conception of rights incorporates the suffering and death inevitably associated with the majority of Nonhuman Animal use. In other words, this perspective does not necessarily consider it problematic that cows, pigs, and other animals are killed for humans to consume. Killing becomes a problem only when Nonhuman Animals are not treated in a way that privileged humans – those who intend to kill and eat them – consider “humane.” The meaning of humaneness is, both in theory and in practice, extremely variable. Some might envision that humaneness entails providing access to grass and sunshine, while others might reject these as luxuries and consider humaneness as relevant only to the reduction of stress in the slaughter line. In any case, the inescapable fact that Nonhuman Animals are being used and killed is often divorced from any conception of humaneness.

In this sense, the status quo of Nonhuman Animal rights philosophy and practice is quite suspect. I share these examples to demonstrate the troubling disconnect that often exists between intention and practice in the social justice space. It is difficult to accept that eating pepperoni pizza, violating fistulated cows, and shopping for Colorado home-on-the-range “happy meat” is congruent with humanity’s moral obligation to other animals. But what accounts for this perplexity? How could students engage rational arguments at the seminar table, only to ignore or adulterate them when applied practically? According to ethicist Bernie Rollin (2006, p.166), it is relatively simple: human use of other animals is not going to end. Given this reality, ethicists should focus on improving the system to ease their suffering. The logic of welfare reform suggests that, given the magnitude of Nonhuman Animal suffering and the public’s supposed unwillingness to go vegan and reject speciesism full stop, reforms are the sensible and responsible compromise (Phelps, 2013, no pagination). With so few options at hand, reforms work to alleviate the suffering endured by billions in the here and now. These reforms are also thought to interfere with industry profitability and are presumed to increase public awareness about Nonhuman Animal suffering. Some posit that welfare reforms will eventually lead to an abolition of Nonhuman Animal use.²

On the other hand, it is also argued that welfare reform is ineffectual and may actually be aggravating speciesism. American Nonhuman Animal charities, in pushing for reform, often emphasize to exploiters the many business incentives of cooperation. Compliance with welfare reform can actually become profitable for industries. Indeed, many speciesist industries actually take the initiative in such reforms (Salvage, 2012). One Meat Science report concludes that while most people claim that they care about the welfare of other animals and many are heavy purchasers of higher “welfare” products, their animal consumption does not actually decrease (Grimshaw et al., 2014, p.444). Likewise, “welfare” labeling is frequently quite meaningless, thus confusing a concerned public and subsequently protecting industry profits (Leitch, 2013; Parker et al., 2013; Swanson, 2013; Wrenn, 2013a).

This process is not unique to speciesist industry. Many others capitalize on the public desire for ethical production by creating their own definitions of social justice in order to control business and create growth. Dauvergne and Lister (2013, p.2) call this “eco-business,” a form of corporate social responsibility that is

proving to be a powerful strategy for corporations in a rapidly globalizing economy marked by financial turmoil and a need for continued strategic repositioning. It is also enhancing the credibility and influence of these companies in states, in civil society, in supply chains, and in retail markets. And it is shifting the power balance within the global political arena from states as the central rule makers and enforcers of environmental goals toward big-brand retailers and manufacturers acting to use “sustainability” to protect their private interests.

Like “greenwashing,” “humane washing” can be good for business.³ Dairies, piggeries, egg production facilities, and slaughterhouses are able to curtail government interference and assuage consumer guilt with proactive humane labeling. Alarmingly, Nonhuman Animal rights organizations often facilitate this process, as the compromise can be mutually beneficial. The promotion of “humane”, “free range”, “cage-free”, and “pasture-raised” products creates an outward appearance of success and achievement for advocacy groups. This encourages public support for the cause, but there appears to be no consistent plan to abolish Nonhuman Animal use. In fact, some organizations, such as the Humane Society for the United States (HSUS), explicitly reject the need to pursue or achieve abolition (Pierleoni, 2011). Part of the reason for this resistance could be that achieving abolition would mean an effective end to many professionalized charity organizations. Nonhuman Animal suffering is a commodity that keeps both industries and non-profits in business (Wrenn, 2013a). A vegan world means PETA, HSUS, Farm Sanctuary, Mercy For Animals, Compassion Over Killing, Vegan Outreach, and many other donation-driven Nonhuman Animal aid groups would have to downscale considerably or perhaps even close up shop. In other words, the non-profit structure itself may be responsible for facilitating a reformist approach that often contradicts the interests of other animals. The continual manufacture of grievances as is necessary to perpetuate organizational inertia is a phenomenon known to characterize many social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, p.23).

The ideology of Nonhuman Animal rights activism has not gone without criticism. The perceived impotence of welfare-focused activism is the primary focus of Gary Francione, an influential participant in radical efforts to reform the modern Nonhuman Animal movement and a primary architect of the vegan abolitionist faction.⁴ Francione’s abolitionism prioritizes the advancement of Nonhuman Animal interests and firmly rejects any tactic that compromises those interests. This take on Nonhuman Animal rights theory and praxis insists that any meaningful action for other animals must include abolitionist tactics and an abolitionist goal. Indeed, the abolitionist position is highly critical of the professionalized approach that prioritizes reform and heavy moderation. The abolitionist critique is based on the belief that welfare advocacy not only falls short of liberationist goals but can actually impede them. Francione (1996, p.87) argues that welfare reforms have failed to create any significant improvement for Nonhuman Animals. They tend to be poorly enforced and minimally influential, and they ignore the systemic root of exploitation. Veritably, the system is often streamlined by welfare efforts. Animal exploitation becomes more profitable, more efficient, and more palatable to the uneasy consumer. Welfare reform, then, becomes a mechanism in the maintenance of Nonhuman Animal suffering and death. In reinforcing the notion that Nonhuman Animals are resources and property, regulation and protectionism become antithetical to achieving abolition.

Abolitionism is sometimes a vaguely understood position. Most advocates and organizations will identify as abolitionist; even the HSUS takes an abolitionist position on some issues. The reality of movement diversity, however, requires a more critical understanding of variation in position. Tactical preference is one means of disentangling abolitionism from professionalized reformist approaches. Abolitionism represents a small and marginalized radical faction within the larger Nonhuman Animal rights advocacy space. In addition to the goal of eventual abolition, this faction is identified by three factors: (1) a rejection of reformist tactics and a reliance on vegan education as the primary vehicle of social change, (2) its strict adherence to nonviolence, and (3) its recognition of oppression as an intersectional phenomenon. In other words, many large organizations that prioritize reform may self-label as abolitionist because they desire an end to speciesism, but this commonality in labeling is primarily a matter of semantics. While there is certainly overlap in goals and tactics among different entities in the movement, there is an identifiable difference in factional affiliation. In the larger context of social movement politics, abolitionism refers to a distinct radical faction identity. The division between hegemonic professionalized organizations that rely on reform and the anti-reformist radical offshoots that seek societal restructuring is a structural characteristic that is common to all social movements. As with any radical faction, the abolitionists tend to be overshadowed in the social movement space. Their voices are heavily suppressed, and their presence is often demonized. As will be explored in Chapter 2, much of this vilification results from the threat that radical groups pose to existing power relations. I argue that this exclusion may be rational for self-interested professionalized organizations, but it may be quite irrational in the grand scheme of liberation. With full acknowledgment that the abolitionist faction will not have all the answers and that it certainly acts irrationally in many ways itself, I will nonetheless argue that, with some modification, abolitionism can pack the greatest punch to speciesism.

The growing popularity of abolitionist activism in the Nonhuman Animal rights movement has manifested in an explosion of grassroots mobilization, internet groups, and websites. It is clear that these activists are having some sort of impact because professionalized welfare organizations and reform-minded advocates are beginning to countermobilize by reframing abolitionist messages as divisive or extreme, even labeling abolitionists as the enemies of Nonhuman Animal rights efforts (Best, 2012, p.301; Farm Sanctuary, 2012; HSUS, 2012; Joy, 2012; McWilliams, 2012; Pacelle, 2012). In one essay, Matt Ball (2012) of Vegan Outreach goes so far as to dismiss their critics as “loud, judgmental vegan-police types“ who are “dogmatic,” “arrogant,” unrealistic, not “psychologically sound,” “crazy,” “misanthropic,” “angry,” and “obsessive.” In Norm Phelps’ (2013, no pagination) publication Changing the Game, he suggests that abolitionists are more concerned about feeling ideologically “pure, honest, and morally superior to the world” than they are with practicing “responsibility for results.”⁵ He further characterizes abolitionists as self-centered “hobgoblins” who “sit on their hands” while Nonhuman Animals suffer. Again, as a radical faction with a radical approach, abolitionists are rarely embraced by movement leaders.

Reformers and protectionists like Phelps have reason to take notice. Marginalized though it may be, the abolitionist movement has blossomed since the mid 2000s, during which many activists, organizations, and even sanctuaries have adopted the position. Its influence has encouraged some activists to reject ineffective or otherwise irrational tactics favored in traditional Nonhuman Animal rights approaches. Many abolitionists deny the utility in reforms, the effectiveness of political lobbying in a society that still legally binds other animals as property, and the clarity of promoting “humane” foods, vegetarianism, Meatless Mondays, or other reductionist diets. Abolitionists argue that to achieve liberation, advocates must challenge speciesism and work for complete cessation of all animal use. They aim to achieve this incrementally through the promotion of veganism and societal attitude change.

The primary emphases of abolitionism make it particularly congruent with a rational approach to Nonhuman Animal rights. Rationality is defined as an adherence to reason, critical thinking, reflexivity, and skepticism. Rationality requires a given idea to stand up to scrutiny, and that scrutiny must be ongoing to prevent ossification or stagnation. To withstand scrutiny, a rational idea must be based on evidence. It is not rational, therefore, to streamline speciesist industry if advocates want to achieve abolition. Nor is it rational to construct an alternate ideology that is as fixed and frozen as the problematic ideology it replaces – advocates must build a theory that values evidence and reflexivity with the goal of establishing the most effective approach to ending Nonhuman Animal use. To accomplish this, advocates would be wise to apply the tenets of the scientific method. A theory or tactic must be valid and reliable to some extent, and it must be open to critique. It cannot reliably resemble “truth” or “fact” until it can consistently hold up against attempts to discredit or disprove it.

The need for a strong methodology in advocacy efforts is a major point from which a new abolitionist theory might diverge from Francione’s work. His version of abolitionist theory might seem more rationally consistent and evidence-based than competing theories of regulation and protection, but the rigidity of his approach is concerning. Change-makers should consider that regardless of how sound a given theory may appear to be, no theory ought to be exempt from evaluation. This includes abolitionist theory. Reason and critical thinking must be at the heart of outreach.

One example of this rigidity is seen in Francione’s position on secular theory. Responding to grassroots calls for skepticism and flexibility from within the abolitionist faction, Francione posted a series of short essays on his website, Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach. In these essays, he asserts that secular abolitionists are “jumping on the New Atheist bandwagon” led by “political reactionaries” such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens (2012a). He continues: “The idea that an abolitionist must be an atheist is as absurd as the position that an atheist cannot be an abolitionist.” Francione’s objections might not be surprising, given that even his relatively rational theory is greatly influenced by Jainism (specifically in his references to ahimsa and nonviolence) (Francione, 2009a).⁶ One of his administrators, Linda McKenzie (2012), furthers this notion by suggesting that abolition should entail the “rejection of the institutions that maintain [ ... ] inequality.” She references secular abolition in specific (“reactionary New Atheism” as she calls it) as a guilty party. Secular abolitionism is framed as “discriminatory,” “militant,” “right-wing,” misanthropic, and “completely at odds with the progressive values of abolitionism.”

It is unlikely that secular abolitionists would insist that advocates adopt atheism; personal belief systems are not necessarily relevant to the advancement of other animals. What rational abolitionists do insist on is that advocates adopt an evidence-based approach to Nonhuman Animal rights, something that is fundamentally congruent with the progressive values of abolitionism. McKenzie is right to state that abolitionism must entail the rejection of institutions that maintain inequality, but she is wrong to overlook the institution of religion as one of the most powerful perpetuators of discrimination and exploitation. Rational abolitionism calls for a separation of personal beliefs, ideologies, spiritualties, superstitions, and any other ultimately irrelevant assumptions from Nonhuman Animal rights activism. Francione states that a concern for the plight of other animals “[ ... ] can come from any source – it can come from theistic sources [ ... ], spiritual sources [ ... ], or wholly atheistic and non-spiritual sources.” Again, rational abolitionism is not concerned with anyone’s personal beliefs. Rather, it is concerned with how those personal beliefs encroach into what ought to be secular, evidence-based claimsmaking on b...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Rationality and Nonhuman Animal Rights
• 2  Irrationalities in Welfarist Organizational Pathways
• 3  Rational Advocacy and the Logic of Persuasion
• 4  Reconciling Gender and Rationality
• 5  Problematizing Post-Race Ideology
• 6  The Case for Secular Activism
• 7  Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index