Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1948-51

S. Waldman

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137431523
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

This volume examines British and US attitudes towards the means and mechanisms for the facilitation of an Arab-Israeli reconciliation, focusing specifically on the refugee factor in diplomatic initiatives. It explains why Britain and the US were unable to reconcile the local parties to an agreement on the future of the Palestinian refugees.

1

The Palestine Factor in Anglo-American Post-War Middle Eastern Policy, 1945–48

Introduction

On one of the coldest days ever recorded in British history, 25 February 1947, in a month which saw minus degree temperatures, just 17 hours of sunlight and the freezing over of the River Thames, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told parliament, ‘The course of events has led His Majesty’s Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations … The Mandatory Power cannot go on for ever.’¹

Bevin added that the UN would have to decide whether Palestine should be a Jewish state, an Arab state or a Palestinian state, with safeguards for all communities.² Although his decision on Palestine had already been reached on 14 February 1947,³ it was not until April 1947 that London sent an official letter to UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie informing him of the verdict.⁴ This conclusion was reached after attempts had been made by London to bring about a diplomatic solution through the ‘Bevin Plan’. The plan had followed ‘round table’ discussions with Arab leaders in July 1946 and January 1947, as well as separate meetings with the Jewish Agency, although the Zionists boycotted talks in December 1946.⁵ The plan sought to bridge competing Zionist and Arab visions for the future of Palestine. Bevin was a trade unionist leader who had progressed to the Minister of Labour in 1940. Upon his appointment as Foreign Secretary in 1945, Bevin soon became a despised figure among Zionists and their sympathizers, who felt betrayed by the maintenance of the 1939 White Paper that severely restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine. The White Paper contradicted the Labour Party’s pledges to support the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine that had been renewed at ten party conferences including the last one in May 1945.⁶

Labour’s December 1944 conference adopted as policy a resolution that there should be a Jewish majority in Palestine, the voluntary transfer of populations and the extension of Palestine’s boundaries. The resolution emphasized as ‘irresistible’ the need for Jewish immigration in the wake of the ‘unspeakable’ Nazi atrocities.⁷ Bevin’s refusal to lift the White Paper led to charges that his policy was motivated by anti-Semitism and that he held conspiratorial views of Jews.⁸ Prior to being foreign secretary, Bevin was neither strongly committed nor opposed to Zionist goals. Upon taking up office, Bevin had to deal with greater difficulties in Palestine in the post-war period than when Labour was in opposition. Jewish passion for the creation of a Jewish state was high, mixed with both desperation and preparation for armed struggle against the British. Bevin also had to contend with the potential regional consequences of the Zionist demand for a state.⁹ Bevin furthermore believed that Jews, unlike the Arabs, were not a nation and therefore did not need a state of their own, even commenting that Jews should not ‘get too much ahead of the queue’ in the post-war period, despite having survived the Holocaust.¹⁰

Bevin, together with Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech-Jones, envisaged a unitary state with Jewish immigration permitted at a rate of 4,000 Jews per month for two years. Eventual independence would be granted, but only after a (suggested) five-year period of British trusteeship during which time both Arab and Jewish populations would be integrated under a central government.¹¹ Partition leading to a Jewish state in part of Palestine was not recommended, as it would be opposed by the Arab world and would not necessarily placate the Jews.¹² Bevin’s proposal was rejected by both Zionists and Arab leaders, who refused to discuss any proposals other than their own.

It had been decided by Britain that if the plan was rejected, the problem would be referred to the UN.¹³ The question of the future of Palestine put a great strain on Anglo-American relations in the period after World War II.¹⁴ Although both Britain and the US formulated their Palestine policies on the basis of Cold War strategic interests, there were considerable policy differences which brought the two allies into conflict. Britain, concerned about Soviet encroachment into the Middle East and the need to maintain Arab goodwill, was wary of US calls to allow Jewish immigration into Palestine. However, facing economic difficulties as well as intense US pressure, Britain resigned itself to retreating from Palestine. The US, under President Harry Truman, saw Jewish immigration into Palestine as a means to alleviate the problem of Jewish displaced persons in post-war Europe.¹⁵ This chapter evaluates US and British policy towards the question of Palestine during the final years of the Mandate in the context of the post-war strategic environment.

Britain and the Middle East: An easterly extension of the American continent?

In a paper written in March 1946, the new Labour Prime Minister Clement Atlee argued that Britain should now be viewed as an eastern extension of a strategic area which was the American continent rather than a separate power looking eastwards. Attlee maintained that air forces and bases were now required rather than a naval strategy for the maintenance of the Mediterranean route to India.¹⁶ Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin did not agree with this world view. He was concerned that it would damage British prestige and hurt the security of the Mediterranean route of the Empire.¹⁷ The Chiefs of Staff (COS), apprehensive about the consequences of a British evacuation from the region, supported Bevin. Specifically, they argued that Atlee’s position risked the Soviets replacing Britain in the area and the subsequent loss of British influence in the region. This would then lead Egypt to question whether to allow Britain to have bases around the Canal Zone.¹⁸

The debate led to a reformulation of how the COS positioned the Middle East in terms of their global strategy. Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, for example, wrote a paper shortly after being appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in June 1946, which argued that while the Middle East and Mediterranean were important for the launch of an offensive, the region was also vital, because if Britain’s defence was limited to the British Isles alone, an attacker would be unimpeded by danger to its own front. The Middle East’s oil and the potential for the Soviets to have bases in the area were also highlighted.¹⁹ Not only was the Arab Middle East the source of energy and commodities that were fundamental for Britain’s post-war economic recovery where a withdrawal could interrupt the oil supply from Iraq, but the region was also the gateway to and centre of Britain’s communications with its global imperial interests. As such, the COS viewed Britain’s presence in Egypt and Palestine as fundamental to the defence of the whole Middle East.²⁰

Meanwhile, at the close of World War II, Bevin wanted Britain to maintain its Great Power position by leading a Euro-African ‘third world force’ which would be a significant actor on the world stage, independent of the US and Soviet Union.²¹ Treaties with Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan would provide sovereign status but with mutually advantageous ties that bound them to Britain so as to maintain British power from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean.²² Bevin envisaged plans for the economic development of the Middle East to raise the living standards of ‘peasants not pashas’. Not only would this undermine the arguments of radicals and communists in this strategically vital region, but it would also create a productive area which would help Britain’s economic growth.²³

However, this ambitious foreign policy objective was tempered by Britain’s financial circumstances. Britain’s post-war economic and currency crises had started from Truman’s decisive Lend Lease cancellation, and Britain’s subsequent need for a US$3.75 billion US loan that eventually led to the British acknowledgement of US dependency.²⁴ During World War II, the British Foreign Office was adamant that Britain’s role as a Great Power as well as its ‘World Wide Mission’ should be maintained, but because of Britain’s weakened condition, US support was needed. So while Bevin commented that ‘I’m not going to have Britain barged about’, the Foreign Secretary soon awoke from his delusions of grandeur. Realizing that Britain did not have the resources to act on its own, he turned to the US. ‘Financial weakness’, Bevin finally conceded, ‘has necessarily increased the need to coordinate our foreign policy with that of the only country which is able effectively to wield extensive economic influence – namely the United States’.²⁵ However, in the eyes of the British foreign policy makers, all was not lost. Although Britain would be a junior partner in its alliance with the US, it would possess infinitely more experience. Britain could therefore harness and guide US power for its own foreign policy orientations.²⁶

The decision to refer Palestine to the UN was taken despite protests by the British COS as well as Secretary of Defence Albert Alexander.²⁷ Palestine was of significance because Britain feared that, if forced from the Mandate, its position in Suez, Egypt and the region would be challenged. Palestine was also crucial to the defence of Egypt.²⁸ Palestine’s importance was heightened by the breakdown in negotiations with Egypt in December 1946, leading to the COS insistence that, with the evacuation of British forces (excluding the Canal Zone), Britain had to station troops in Palestine whose airbases were also needed for imperial communications.²⁹ Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine threatened to unearth a power vacuum which, it was feared, would be filled by the Soviet Union. This could materialize through the establishment of a Jewish state which would become a bulwark for Bolshevism as a result of far left elements already in Palestine and through ‘communist indoctrinated immigrants’.³⁰ Britain was also anxious about the possible establishment of an Arab Palestinian state, as it could be dominated by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem who had collaborated with the Nazis during World War II.³¹ Worse still, a Jewish state in Palestine threatened the goodwill of the Arab states whose military bases the British army required. The loss of Arab goodwill not only threatened to result in Soviet dominance in the Middle East, but also to communism spreading to other traditional areas of British dominance such as India, Burma, Malaya and Africa.³²

Meanwhile, Britain was seeking to redraft and negotiate the terms of treaties with several Arab states. Although the revised Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was signed in March 1948, there were difficulties redrafting treaties elsewhere. In January, rioting crowds prevented amendments to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty from being made. With the impending withdrawal from Palestine, the importance of relations with Egypt intensified and increased the necessity of bases in the Suez Canal, the status of which was also being negotiated.³³

Some scholars have argued that the decision to leave Palestine was really due to Britain’s expectation that the UN would redetermine the terms of the Mandate rather than recommend its abolition, especially as observers would not support partition because a Jewish state could precipitate a civil war. Instead, the UN would give Britain either a clear mandate to enforce its trusteeship over Palestine, a binational state, or establish a unitary Arab state absorbed or dominated by Transjordan.³⁴ However, by January 1946, Britain was already considering the possibility of turning over its mandates to the UN, although it had not yet decided on the question of Palestine.³⁵ On 12 October 1946, the ambassador to the US, Archibald Clark Kerr, 1st Baron Invernchapel, noted that such suggestions were being reported in the US press. Foreign Office official Harold Beeley responded that such a move would not be wise unless it was on the basis of a clearly defined policy.³⁶

On a visit to New York in November 1946, Bevin told the US Secretary of State James Byrnes that Britain was considering either giving the Mandate to the US or to the UN. Byrnes implied that of the two options, Britain should refer it to the UN.³⁷ Britain was certainly in a difficult position. If it sought a solution on Arab terms, the US would be alienated and the Yishuv would launch a full-scale insurrection. On the other hand, agreeing to partition or to the establishment of a Jewish state would enflame the Arab world.³⁸ Illegal immigration and the British policy of intercepting ships sending immigrants to camps in Cyprus, according to the British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Alan Cunningham in February 1947, was plunging the Yi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Introduction: The Palestinian Refugee Problem as an Impediment to Peace
• 1. The Palestine Factor in Anglo-American Post-War Middle Eastern Policy, 1945–48
• 2. Friends Reunited? Britain and the US Respond to the Palestinian Refugee Problem
• 3. Diplomatic Deadlock: The Palestine Conciliation Commission and the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Part 1)
• 4. Economics over Politics: The Palestine Conciliation Commission and the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Part 2)
• 5. Compensation: The Key to Break the Logjam?
• 6. The Refugee Factor in Direct Arab–Israeli Negotiations
• 7. The Birth of UNRWA: The Institutionalization of Failed Diplomacy
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index