Fairness in the Workplace

A Global Perspective

A. Cohen

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137524317
• Topic: Negocios y empresa
• Subtopic: Gestión de recursos humanos

This book takes a multi-dimensional approach to the concept of organizational fairness, one that views organizational fairness as being comprised of procedural justice, organizational politics, organizational trust, and psychological contract breach, all of which are indicators of the global evaluation of the (un)fairness of the organization.

Part I

Introduction

1

The Conceptual Framework of Organizational Fairness

Fortin (2008) raised two interesting questions about organizational fairness. First, he asked, “Why does fairness matter to people?” and second, “How do people make fairness judgments?” Both questions are important for our understanding of organizational fairness, since they may be interrelated. The level of willingness to take justice into account may influence the way judgments about justice are made. While there is no consensus about the definition of organizational fairness, several theories have attempted to deal with the issue of how evaluations about it are formed. One of the more thorough works is that of Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp (2001a), who argued that the distinction between process and content provided by motivation theories fits quite well as a framework for classifying theories of fairness. They called these two types of theories “process theories” and “content theories,” correspondingly.

Content theories focus on the fundamental question, “Why do people engage in goal-oriented behavior in the first place?” Simply stated, why do people invest time thinking about fairness when they could be thinking about something else? Fortin (2008) offered several answers to this question. First, he suggested the instrumental model, which argues that individuals are concerned about fairness because it is a mechanism for ensuring predictability and that the long-term outcomes will be favorable (Tyler, 1987). Fortin also discussed the alternative group-value model of Lind and Tyler (1988), later called the “relational model,” which posits that individuals care about fairness because receiving fair treatment indicates status and value within a group. However, neither of these models explains why people are concerned with justice even when there is no direct economic benefit for them and only strangers are involved. Folger (1998) reasoned that there must be yet another reason why people care about justice. He argued that people see virtue as a value in itself and as an expression of human dignity, stylizing it as the moral virtue model of justice (Fortin, 2008).

According to Fortin (2008), Folger expanded his moral virtues model, turning it into a “deontic theory of fairness” (Folger, 2001). This theory acknowledges multiple interests. First, the presence of selfish motives does not preclude concern for others. Second, multiple interests mean that none of them can hold absolute sway over the others. However, all experiences of injustice constitute experiences of negative transgression, involving some type of pain, which might apply equally to ourselves and even to complete strangers.

Fortin mentioned that Cropanzano et al. (2001a) made another attempt to integrate the three different types of content theories, arguing that the three motives for wanting justice fulfill different psychological needs. The instrumental motive corresponds to the need for control, the relational motive to the needs for belonging and self-esteem, and the virtue motive to the need for a meaningful existence. These different needs may be regarded as different forms of self-interest: an interest in economic outcomes, interpersonal outcomes, and the protection of one’s self-image or the avoidance of guilt feelings (Schminke & Ambrose, 1997). Gillespie and Greenberg (2005) proposed that the ultimate goal of fairness is belonging, achieved through the more concrete goals of fair relationships with entities and fairness in events. Similar arguments have been made about trust and security as the ultimate goals of justice (Colquitt et al., 2005). These views share the assumption that there is a hierarchy of goals, with one’s self-interests ultimately at the top (Fortin, 2008).

However, a recent review of self-interest as a human motivation disagrees with this approach, arguing that other motives exist, notably empathy and moral duty (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2005). As Fortin (2008) noted, Cropanzano and colleagues argue that some acts are simply intended for the benefit of another person. For example, the goal of belonging cannot explain experimental evidence showing that individuals are willing to sacrifice their financial self-interest in response to unfairness, even when there are no material or symbolic benefits for doing so, and even when they and the victim are in different social groups, or will have no future opportunities for interacting with either the victim or the transgressor (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002).

In summary, Fortin’s thorough review shows that little clarity exists about the ultimate goal of justice and whether there are altruistic goals of justice or only goals related to self-interest. However, we do know that people care about fairness for a number of reasons, including instrumental, relational, and moral concerns.

The approach taken in this book is to focus on process theories, since at this stage of research on organizational fairness, we want to know more about the how (process) than the why (content), although Cropanzano and colleagues (2001) advanced an integrated content model of organizational fairness (Fortin, 2008). It is believed, however, that process theories of fairness can provide key insights into how individuals formulate their judgments about justice. Such theories have a cognitive flavor as they deal with the processing of fairness-related issues.

Given that our interest is in process models, they will be reviewed in greater depth. The equity theory of motivation is one theory that demonstrates the importance and meaning of organizational fairness. According to Adams (1963), employees bring to their jobs certain inputs (such as education, experience, training, and skills) and receive certain outcomes (such as organizational rewards). A state of inequity occurs when individuals perceive that the ratio of their outcomes to inputs is not equal to the ratio of some other referent, such as a co-worker. Adams’ (1965) equity theory emphasizes the need for a fair balance between an employee’s inputs (hard work, skill level, tolerance, and enthusiasm) and an employee’s outputs (salary, benefits, and intangibles such as recognition). According to this theory, a fair balance creates a strong and productive relationship with the employer, with the overall outcome being satisfied and motivated employees. The theory is built on the belief that employees become unmotivated, in relation to both their job and their employer, when they feel that their inputs are greater than their outputs. When employees sense that such is the situation, they can be expected to respond by becoming unmotivated, reducing their effort, becoming disgruntled, or, in more extreme cases, perhaps even disruptive. In short, Adams’ equity theory of motivation states that positive outcomes and high levels of motivation can be expected only when employees perceive their treatment to be fair. The notion of organizational fairness can thus result from the basic idea behind the equity theory.

Kotabe, Dubinsky, and Lim (1992) applied the logic of the equity theory to advance their conceptualization of organizational fairness. They relied on Carrell and Dittrich (1978), who argued that a fruitful approach to assessing perceived equity and its effects may be to measure perceptions of the net balance or overall fairness of the relationship between the input/outcome ratio of an individual and that of comparison persons. They suggested that rather than specifying a comparison person, the individual should be allowed to use an internally derived standard for comparison. Such a comparison would result in an overall feeling of fairness about the relationship of all of the elements in the original equity inputs/outcomes model (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978).

The exchange theory also supports the logic behind organizational fairness. According to this theory, social exchange involves a series of interactions that generates obligations. These interactions are usually seen as interdependent and contingent on the actions of another person. The social exchange theory also emphasizes that these interdependent transactions have the potential to generate high-quality relationships. One of the theory’s basic tenets is that relationships evolve over time into trust, loyalty, and mutual commitment. To do so, the parties must abide by certain rules of exchange (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). When applied to the workplace setting, the theory argues that certain workplace antecedents lead to interpersonal connections, referred to as social exchange relationships. Social exchange relationships evolve when employers “take care of employees,” resulting in beneficial consequences. The exchange relationship can include both economic and non-economic exchanges. In addition, workers can form social exchange relationships with their superiors, co-workers, employing organizations, customers, suppliers, and others with whom they interact at work. Because individuals return the benefits they receive, they are likely to match the goodwill and helpfulness they receive with comparable behavior toward the party with whom they have a social exchange relationship (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). In contrast, organizational unfairness can arise when employees feel that the exchange is not fair, namely, that there is no match between their contributions and the benefits they receive from the organization or any other entity representing the organization, such as superiors or even co-workers.

Bettencourt and Brown (1997) also based their definition of organizational fairness on the logic of the exchange theory. However, they argued that fairness is a fundamental characteristic of effective exchange relationships because it assures employees that they will receive their deserved reward for their effort and contribution to the organization. They contended that fairness also extends the relationship between the employee and the firm beyond merely economic obligations. Interestingly enough, Bettencourt and Brown used the scale developed by Kotabe et al. (1992) to measure organizational fairness, a scale that was tailored more to fit the equity theory. This may point to the ambiguity that surrounds the concept of organizational fairness. Colquitt, Scott, Rodell, Long, Zapata, Conlon, and Wesson (2013) also argued that social exchange theory is strongly linked with organizational justice. They contended that fairness was capable of fostering a social exchange relationship, which involves the mutual provision of diffuse, vaguely defined obligations delivered over an open-ended time frame.

While the above theories are prominent in the field of organizational behavior, their application to fairness is somewhat ambiguous. These theories have been applied to a wide variety of concepts and processes and do not relate specifically to the notion of fairness. For example, some have criticized the relevance of the equity theory to fairness (Cropanzano et al., 2001a), arguing that it is too narrow in its explanation of how judgments about justice are formed. Thus, there is a need for theories that describe more specifically how evaluations of fairness are made. Folger (2001) also criticized the current theories, arguing that somewhere along the line of theory and research, scholars of fairness took the wrong turn. They continued that search for phenomena related to fairness but lost sight of how fairness relates to morality.

Earlier, Folger (1986, 1987) himself had presented a theory called the “referent cognitions theory,” which maintains that when an individual believes that a more favorable outcome would have resulted from an alternative procedure that should have been used, he or she will consider the organization to be unfair. The referent in this model is the procedural alternatives that would lead to a more favorable outcome of which the individual is aware (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p. 167). Despite its contribution, Cropanzano et al. (2001) criticized the referent cognitions theory as being not sufficiently complete to serve as an integrative process theory of organizational justice. Folger and Cropanzano (2001) pointed out that, although the theory defines the conditions necessary to hold others accountable for unfair treatment, it does not explain the process by which these accountability judgments are made.

A revised referent cognitions theory, called the “fairness theory,” maintains that social injustice occurs when an individual is able to hold another accountable for a situation in which his or her well-being (either material or psychological) has been threatened (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001; Nicklin, Greenbaum, McNall, Folger, & Williams, 2011). According to the fairness theory, three necessary processes must occur before a situation can be interpreted as being socially unjust. First, an unfavorable condition must be present. In other words, some adversity must be present in the eyes of the “victim.” Folger and Cropanzano (2001) termed this aspect of the process “the would” component. Second, one must determine who is accountable for the injustice. In this process, the individual decides whether the target (the person or entity responsible for the situation) could have acted differently. This process is called “the could” component of the fairness theory. The third process in the fairness theory model is “the should” component, a crucial and previously unaddressed process in formulating judgments of fairness. It takes into account whether the harmful actions violate ethical principles of interpersonal treatment. A situation is not perceived as unjust unless it is viewed as violating some moral code. The incorporation of “the should” component into the fairness theory explains why we often collectively react to unjust situations faced by others with whom we have no personal connection. Justice, in this case, is a moral virtue that dictates how people should treat and interact with one another (Cropanzano et al., 2001; Crawshaw, Cropanzano, Bell, & Nadisic, 2013).

In experimental studies, Nicklin et al. (2011) highlighted the influence that contextual variables have on fairness perceptions. Specifically, all three of their experimental studies demonstrate that greater injustice is perceived when an action originates from a person who was knowledgeable, and thus could have prevented the mistake. Two of their studies also showed that when individuals are viewed as experts, they are held more accountable for misfortunes than when they are non-experts. It is easier to blame people for their mistakes when they know the risks of the potential harm associated with their actions than when they do not. Similarly, another two of their experiments showed that perceived injustice increases as the severity of the misfortune increases. Consistent with the fairness theory, perceived fairness declined when other people could be blamed for one’s misfortune. Of the four contextual variables examined in their experiments, the type of conduct (omission or commission) had the weakest effect on perceived fairness.

Nicklin and colleagues concluded that future research should continue to examine the role of action against inaction in predicting perceptions of justice. They also advocated other contextual variables not explored in their research such as perceived organizational support and the distribution of outcomes, as well as individual variables such as locus of control, neuroticism, and self-esteem that might influence judgments about accountability and perceived fairness and perhaps heighten counterfactual thinking. Their recommendation accords with the logic advanced in this book. Nonetheless, Nicklin and colleagues’ studies highlight the importance of the situation in the face of negative results. A negative outcome that might have otherwise been considered fair may be deemed unacceptable if the person involved has pertinent knowledge and is considered experienced.

Lind and Van den Bos (2002) advanced another interesting view about fairness, which they called the “uncertainty management theory.” They suggested that fairness helps people cope with uncertainty. If uncertainty renders fair treatment more effective in terms of reducing negative affect and increasing positive affect, enhancing support for organizational policies and decisions, or increasing trust and performance aspirations, it is because being fairly treated is especially useful psychologically to people in uncertain circumstances. Lind and Van den Bos argued that one of the main reasons that people care about fairness is that perceiving the environment as being fair helps them deal with uncertainty. Fair treatment helps people manage their uncertainty, because it both gives them confidence that they will ultimately receive good outcomes and makes the possibility of losing less anxiety-provoking or even, as in fair gambles, enjoyable. Conversely, unfair treatment under uncertainty conditions worsens the feelings associated with uncertainty and makes people even more uneasy.

According to Lind and Van den Bos (2002), fairness provides a guide, directing the personal attitudes and actions needed to deal with uncertainty. When uncertainty is coupled with clearly fair treatment, the individual is able to maintain a positive affect, feel favorable toward the organization, and engage in the sort of pro-organizational behaviors that have long been known to be linked to fair processes and outcomes. These pro-organizational attitudes and behaviors are “safe” because fairness reduces the anxiety about being excluded or exploited, anxieties that might otherwise become very worrisome in uncertain contexts. On the other hand, when uncertainty is coupled with clearly unfair treatment, the individual will engage in self-protective or even competitive actions, seeking to relieve the uncertainty by seizing control of his or her own fate and identity. In this instance, the pro-organizational actions and attitudes are abandoned, and self-interest takes over. Sometimes, when treatment is very unfair or perhaps when even moderate levels of unfairness are particularly threatening in the face of great uncertainty, the sting of unfairness becomes so strong that negative affect drives people to frankly competitive actions in which harming the organization is as much a goal as protecting the self.

Yang, Johnson, Zhang, Spector, and Xu (2013) advanced the concept of interpersonal unfairness, contending that it represents a job demand that taxes employees’ affective, cognitive, and physical resources. Authority figures who treat their employees in a disrespectful manner are saying that they have a problem with the employees. Given the significance of this relationship, problems associated with interpersonal unfairness elicit potent emotional responses in employees. Such responses require employees to devote their available resources to address these concerns and pull their attention away from their work tasks. Interpersonal unfairness also promotes attributional processing as employees attempt to ascertain the cause of their mistreatment and who is to blame for it, thereby placing further demands on available resources.

Barsky, Kaplan, and Beal (2011) further emphasized the role of affect in judgments of fairness. They argued that emotions are integral to the process of forming judgments about justice. Appraisals of events inform both emotional reactions and judgments about justice in a rapid and reciprocal fashion, resulting in a phenomenological experience of bi-directionality or even simultaneity. Their conceptualization suggested that, rather than viewing perceptions of organizational justice as isolated judgments stemming from a “cold,” rational calculus, they are more appropriately conceptualized as “hot” and laden with affect. Appraisals of and reactions to violations of the rules of justice as in the exhibition of bias or lack of consistency are often inextricably tied to, and sometimes the result of, one’s concurrent emotions. Thus, the meaning of the ultimate judgment cannot be understood without reference to the parallel affective experiences. Barsky and Kaplan’s (2007) meta-analysis found that state and trait affect are related to judgments of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice and that the magnitude of these meta-analytic correlations is fairly constant across the variables of affect and justice.

According to Lind and Van den Bos (2002), the use of fairness to manage feelings of uncertainty relies on the global impression of fair treatment rather than on one or another traditional modality of fairness. In other words, they contended that it is not just the belief that one has encountered fair procedures, had fair interactional experiences, or been graced with fair outcomes, but also the global impression of fair treatment based on information from procedures, interactions, and outcomes that is the key to managing uncertainties. This contention will guide the approach advanced in this book.

Lind and Van den Bos (2002) maintained that their theory gives a new perspective on why, when, and how fairness matters in organizations and suggests some new organizational fairness phenomena. To recap, they advanced a rather radical proposition: fairness is important to people because it gives them a means of managing uncertainty. They suggested that uncertainty is a powerful moderating variable for the effects of fairness, such that the latter are magnified in proportion to the level of uncertainty being experienced. Lind and Van den Bos also maintained that uncertainty need not be logically related to the context in which fair or unfair treatment is experienced. Rather, people use fairness to manage their reactions to uncertainty, finding comfort in related or even unrelated fairness experiences and additional distress in unfair experiences.

Although the fairness theory adequately addresses some of the limitations of the referent cognition theory, little empirical testing of the various elements of this model has been conducted. Fortunately, another model, the fairness heuristic theory has been developed and has received empirical support. This theory seems to capture the concept of fairness better and guides the main arguments presented in this book. The fairness heuristic theory ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Preface
• Part I: Introduction
• Part II: Components of Organizational Fairness
• Part III: How Do the Components of Organizational Fairness Fit Together? Toward an Integrative Approach to Organizational Fairness
• Part IV: The Development of Organizational Fairness
• Part V: Organizational Fairness and Work Outcomes
• Part VI: Cultural Aspects of Organizational Fairness
• Part VII: Synthesis and Summary
• References
• Index