British Clandestine Activities in Romania during the Second World War

Dennis Deletant

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137574527
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

British Clandestine Activities in Romania during the Second World War is the first monograph to examine the activity throughout the entire war of SOE and MI6. It was generally believed in Britain's War Office, after Hitler's occupation of Austria in March 1938, that Germany would seek to impose its will on South-East Europe before turning its attention towards Western Europe. Given Romania's geographical position, there was little Britain could offer her. The brutal fact of British-Romanian relations was that Germany was inconveniently in the way: opportunity, proximity of manufacture and the logistics of supply all told in favour of the Third Reich. This held, of course, for military as well as economic matters. In these circumstances the British concluded that their only weapon against German ambitions in countries which fell into Hitler's orbit were military subversive operations and a concomitant attempt to draw Romania out of her alliance with Germany.

1

Mission Accomplished: The Coup of 23 August 1944

The most extraordinary event to occur in Romania during the Second World War was the coup orchestrated by the young (22-year-old) King Michael on 23 August 1944, and the events leading up to it. The coup overthrew the wartime leader, Marshal Ion Antonescu, who had taken Romania into the war as an ally of Germany and stubbornly remained loyal to Hitler even as the tide of war was turning against them. Antonescu, aware of the fragility of Romania’s territorial integrity in the face of the Soviet advance in summer 1944, continued to hold out for armistice terms with the Allies which would guarantee Romania’s independence of Soviet authority.

Yet the more he delayed, the closer the Red Army moved to Bucharest and the greater the threat of occupation. Only King Michael and his advisers seemed to grasp the fact that Stalin would be tempted to withhold his assent to armistice conditions if he manoeuvred himself into a position to impose them through military might. Antonescu’s refusal to accept what he considered to be unsatisfactory terms from the Allies, together with his reluctance as a military man to desert his German ally who was now on the defensive, prompted King Michael to order his arrest.

As the military situation steadily deteriorated after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in January 1943, Marshal Antonescu’s mind began to turn to consideration of an understanding with the Allies.¹ His thoughts were shared by Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, who took the lead in taking soundings of the Italians.² The Marshal tolerated the sending out of such peace feelers, both from within his own government and from the opposition leader Iuliu Maniu. Mihai Antonescu gave some indication of his own change of heart in January 1943 to Bova-Scoppa, the Italian minister in Bucharest. Bova-Scoppa went to Rome to present a report of his conversation with Antonescu to Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, who had already anticipated the new mood of the Romanian leaders. In his diary entry for 10 January Ciano noted:

I think the Germans would do well to watch the Romanians. I see an about-face in the attitude and words of Mihai Antonescu. The sudden will for conciliation with Hungary is suspicious to me. If the Russian offensive had not been so successful I doubt that all this would have taken place.³

Mihai Antonescu’s proposal elicited some sympathy from Ciano who recorded on 19 January:

Bova-Scoppa has made a report on his long conference with young Antonescu who has returned from German headquarters. The latter was very explicit about the tragic condition of Germany and foresees the need for Romania and Italy to contact the Allies in order to establish a defence against the bolshevization of Europe. I shall take the report to the Duce and shall make it the subject of a conversation which I have been planning for some time. Let us not bandage our heads before they are broken, but let us look at the situation realistically and remember that charity begins at home.⁴

Mussolini, however, was not swayed by Ciano’s argument:

Taking my cue from Bova’s report I told the Duce what I thought. The Duce began by replying that ‘he was sure that the Germans would hold tenaciously’. Then he listened to me attentively. He naturally refused Antonescu’s offer, saying that ‘the Danube is not the way we must follow’. But he did not react when at a certain point I said openly that we too should try to make some direct contact.⁵

The Duce reiterated his view on the following day, 21 January:

As I anticipated Mussolini wanted to reread the Bova report. He described Antonescu’s language as over-subtle and he reaffirmed in terms much stronger than those of yesterday his decision to march with Germany to the end.⁶

This rebuff prompted Mihai Antonescu to attempt direct contact with the diplomatic representatives of the Allies in neutral countries with a view to concluding a separate peace. He himself raised the matter with Andrea Cassulo, the Papal Nuncio in Bucharest, while the Romanian minister in Berne was instructed to make contact with the Papal Nuncio there. In March the Romanian minister in Madrid asked his Portuguese and Argentinian counterparts to let the American ambassador Carlton Hayes know of Romania’s desire to conclude a peace with the Allies.

Similarly, Victor Cadere, the Romanian Minister in Lisbon, took soundings in October of President Salazar and of the British Ambassador. In December the Romanian chargé in Stockholm, George Duca, contacted the British and American ministers in the name of Maniu and Brătianu. All these efforts foundered on the Anglo-American insistence upon ‘unconditional surrender’, proposed by Roosevelt and accepted by Churchill at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, which could not be reconciled with Antonescu’s desire to guarantee Romania’s post-war independence from the Soviet Union.

When questioned by the writer Alexandru Brătescu-Voineşti, in an interview published on 5 March 1943 in the pro-regime Porunca Vremii (The Command of the Times), as to why, having sided with the Axis, he did not maintain links with the Allies in case they emerged victorious, Marshal Antonescu retorted, ‘how, in the first instance, could such a stance be hidden from our own allies? And then, our major virtue, admired without reservation by our own great allies, is, alongside the bravery of our army, our loyalty, sincerity and lack of duplicity. This loyalty will represent one of the most precious possessions when peace is concluded.’⁷

These peace feelers were not unknown to Hitler. At their meeting at Klessheim Castle in Salzburg on 12 April 1943 the Führer confronted Antonescu with the information he had about them from German intelligence regarding the approaches made in Madrid and asked him to ‘analyse them’ from the point of view of their impact on the international community. ‘He did not expect an immediate answer from Antonescu’ to this unexpected problem. ‘He would fully understand, even if Antonescu did not give him a reply.’

Antonescu replied on the spot: ‘He could assure Hitler that the entire Romanian nation supported him now, more than ever, and that he would not allow anyone to carry out a policy other than that which he (Antonescu) considered the best one, in the interests of Romania and of Europe.’ He promised the Führer that Romania would continue alongside Germany until the end of the war: ‘The policy of the opposition, especially Maniu, did not count . . . However, he (Antonescu) could not touch Maniu, since he (Antonescu) knew his people and did not want, through measures taken against Maniu, to make a martyr of this man who was advanced in years and who had negative ideas, thereby granting him what he had long wished to obtain.’

Antonescu told Hitler that he would never take an initiative without informing him and undertook to investigate the action of the Romanian minister in Madrid. At the same time he defended Mihai Antonescu: ‘It was inconceivable that Mihai would have tried to conclude peace or to request assistance from the Americans or other states, since he (the Marshal) would not have anyone alongside him who would be disloyal to Germany.’ Hitler accepted this declaration of loyalty.⁸

Nevertheless, Hitler returned to the subject the next day. He was concerned that the approaches made in March by the Romanian minister in Madrid gave the impression to the foreign (Portuguese and Argentinian) diplomats that Romania and Germany were ready to conclude a peace with the Allies. The Führer stated that ‘the important problem was that the main enemies of the Axis had formed a completely erroneous impression about the position of Germany and Italy and that was due solely to the action of Mihai Antonescu’. He asked the Marshal to ensure that such a thing never happened in future. The latter replied that he was grateful that they had discussed this problem, ‘but the truth was totally the reverse of what Germany knew’.⁹

Antonescu was less than honest with the Führer in this matter. He was aware of the approaches made by his Foreign Minister and did nothing to stop further soundings of all three Allies made by Mihai Antonescu and Maniu through different channels over the following twelve months. In their turn, the Western Allies, led by the British, sought to maintain regular contact with King Michael. In autumn 1943 a British intelligence officer, using the cover of a journalist, met the King and Queen Helen at the palace in Bucharest in order to gain a first-hand account of the political situation in Romania and Michael’s own position. A note of the interview, made by Henry Spitzmuller, a French diplomat who remained in Romania after the fall of France to serve the Allied interest,¹⁰ offers a rare contemporary firsthand account of Michael’s predicament and his relations with Antonescu, which shows them to have been severely strained. The King told the officer, a Mr House,¹¹

not to forget to explain that consideration for my country’s future does not blind me to the fact that the Allies’ policy is based on cooperation between the three Powers and I therefore understand that Russia and Romania must come to some kind of agreement.

Mr House then remarked that the Allies had repeated most recently that unconditional surrender remained the essential condition of any armistice. ‘I know’, the King replied, ‘but it is not because of this formula that I would refuse to negotiate if the occasion arose. Without underestimating its importance, I consider and hope that even the framework of this formula would permit interpretations which would allow me to accept it.’

The conversation then concentrated on the possibility of a putsch linked to an approach by the King to the Allies. The King and all those present explained to Mr House that such a move would result in the complete and immediate occupation of the country by the Germans, who would then have all the resources of Romania at their disposal. The King and his counsellors again explained to Mr House that the situation in Romania at that moment was unique in the sense that Marshal Antonescu’s government represented only a tiny minority which, having taken power and maintained it with the support of the Germans, had imposed and continued to impose on the country a policy which was contrary to its wishes and its interests. A new government which would truly represent the people’s wishes could only come to power through a putsch, which was impossible at the present moment without close cooperation with the Allies.

‘If the Allies made a landing in the Balkans’, the King said, ‘everything would be simpler. The peninsula is practically undefended, but if Romania were to be occupied by the Germans the situation would immediately become less favourable.’¹²

The acceptance of unconditional surrender by the Romanians, whether from Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the opposition National Peasant Party or from Antonescu, was the stumbling block in all subsequent negotiations held between Maniu’s representatives and the Allies in Cairo in the spring of 1944.¹³ Yet approaches made in December 1943 by Soviet officials to Romanian diplomats in Stockholm suggested that their government wished to set up independent contacts with Antonescu and Maniu and was prepared to accept less than unconditional surrender.

A curious situation thus emerged in which both the Romanian government and opposition were seeking to obtain the best possible terms for an armistice in parallel negotiations, one in Cairo with the Allies collectively, and the other in Stockholm with the Russians separately. Not surprisingly, both Antonescu and Maniu believed that they were in a position to bargain over unconditional surrender, hence the misunderstanding that arose between the Allies and Maniu, and the increasing British irritation with the latter. Maniu wanted some assurance as to what conditions he could get before making any plans to overthrow Antonescu and was particularly anxious to prevent Soviet occupation of Romania. The Russians, on the other hand, doubtless took the pragmatic view that it was more realistic to treat with Antone...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Map of Romania
• Acknowledgements
• Biographies of Key Figures
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Mission Accomplished: The Coup of 23 August 1944
• 2. Setting the Scene: Problems of Cohesion, 1918–1938
• 3. The Drift into Germany’s Orbit: Romania, 1938–1941
• 4. The Prelude to Hostilities: Projecting Britain in Romania
• 5. Challenging German Ambitions: Clandestine British Military Operations in Romania, 1939–1941
• 6. Clandestine British Operations in Romania, 1942–1943
• 7. The ‘Autonomous’ Mission
• 8. MI6 and Romania, 1940–1945
• 9. The Eradication of Opposition to Communist Rule
• 10. Condemned but not Forgotten: The Fate of Pro-British Activists in Romania, 1945–1964
• Conclusion
• Appendix 1: Note of an interview between King Michael and a British intelligence officer made by Henry Spitzmuller, a French diplomat who remained in Romania after the fall of France
• Appendix 2: Biography of Emil (Emilian) Bodnăraş (1904–1976)
• Appendix 3: Rudolf Pander – interrogation report 7 December 1945, Military Intelligence Center USFET, CI-IIR/35
• Notes
• Select Bibliography
• Index