Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest Good

Virtue, Happiness, and the Kingdom of God

Roe Fremstedal

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137440884
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest Good is a major study of Kierkegaard's relation to Kant that gives a comprehensive account of radical evil and the highest good, two controversial doctrines with important consequences for ethics and religion.

1

Methodological Considerations: Contextual and Analytic Approaches to the History of Philosophy

1 Introduction

Few, if any, of the present academic disciplines makes as extensive use of its history as does philosophy. Unlike most other disciplines, philosophy often views its history as an integral part of itself as a discipline, with the result that philosophy develops by way of its engagement with its own history. However, the history of philosophy has long been marked by controversies over method. One central question is whether we should contextualize theories (and thinkers) by situating them in their original historical context or rather focus on how they can contribute to present discussions. Another is whether we should study how different thinkers in fact relate to – and influence – each other or whether we should present and compare historical (that is, non-current) theories in a systematic (thematic) and non-chronological manner. The two main approaches which have risen out of these debates are known in the Anglophone world as the contextual history of philosophy and the analytic history of philosophy, respectively. Whereas the contextual approach tends to focus on the historicity of philosophy, the analytic approach tends to focus on the meaning and validity of philosophical theories.

This chapter discusses historical and systematic approaches to studying Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard, a case which tends to mirror more general methodological questions within the history of philosophy. In what follows I will discuss methodology in the history of philosophy by addressing research on the relation between Kant and Kierkegaard, in particular Ronald M. Green’s Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (1992) and Ulrich Knappe’s Theory and Practice in Kant and Kierkegaard (2004). Green represents a historical and contextual approach which focuses on Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard, whereas Knappe represents a thematic (systematic) and non-chronological approach which is largely analytic.

2 The historical approach: contextual history of philosophy

The most influential example of the historical approach today, at least in the Anglophone world, is the contextual history of philosophy. Sometimes this approach is referred to as the antiquarian approach or merely antiquarianism. It is more closely related to the history of ideas, intellectual history, historical-philological scholarship, and classical studies than is the analytic history of philosophy. At its very heart lies the idea that we only understand thinkers and theories by contextualizing them, by situating them in their original historical context. In the case of Kant and Kierkegaard, this involves reading German texts from the late 18th century and Danish texts from the mid-19th century, as well as knowing the contexts of Köningsberg and Copenhagen and having access to relevant texts from the period, including secondary sources which Kant and Kierkegaard could have relied on.

There are also additional requirements for contextual history of philosophy. Gary Hatfield comments: ‘The minimum aim for a contextual approach must be to consider both the major and minor works of a chosen philosopher, the major and minor predecessors against whom the philosopher reacted, and the contemporaries who formed his or her audience.’¹ Finally, the contextual approach should seek to work upwards from past philosophers’ own statements in establishing the aims or motives of individual philosophers or schools.² An example of such an approach is Jon Stewart’s work on Kierkegaard and Hegel, which takes Kierkegaard’s comments on Hegel as its starting point.³

With regard to Kant and Kierkegaard, the foremost example of the historical approach is the work of Green, who investigates the degree and extent to which Kant influenced Kierkegaard. However, since Green hardly articulates and defends his methodology,⁴ we have to look elsewhere for a defense of the historical or contextual approach. The most prominent representative of this approach within Kierkegaard scholarship today is Jon Stewart. Stewart is currently editing Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, a series which uses the contextual approach to investigate Kierkegaard’s sources and the reception of his thought.⁵ Green has authored the article dealing with Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard in this series, presumably because Green is the leading expert on Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard and because Green’s methodology is in line with the contextual approach.⁶

3 The systematic approach: analytic history of philosophy

Within the history of philosophy, the most influential example of the systematic approach today – at least in the English-speaking world – is the analytic history of philosophy. This approach focuses on the meaning and validity of theories rather than on their historicity. It favors those philosophical positions, principles, and arguments which are believed to contribute to present philosophical research. Rather than being concerned with, for example, Kant’s historically situated intentions, analytic history of philosophy concentrates on whether Kant makes valid points and whether his theory is relevant to current philosophical debates. Analytic historians of philosophy are not only interested in what a philosopher said, but also in what he or she could and should have said.⁷ Partially as a result of this, analytic historians often analyze historical positions by using contemporary terminology, instead of the thinker’s own historically contextualized vernacular.⁸ Within this approach, historical and philological research is only of importance insofar as it contributes to contemporary philosophical discussions.

With regard to scholarship on the relationship between Kant and Kierkegaard, the closest we get to analytic history of philosophy is probably the research of Ulrich Knappe, a German philosopher writing in English.⁹ Knappe tries to develop his analysis in a systematic way by focusing on a given topic (for example, hypothetical imperatives) and then comparing what the theories of Kant and Kierkegaard each say about this topic. Rather than merely referring to what Kant and Kierkegaard actually said, Knappe tries to reconstruct their thinking in a systematic way by analyzing key concepts that are abstracted from the relevant texts. In order to analyze and clarify concepts, Knappe tries to reconstruct their definitions.¹⁰ In doing this Knappe emphasizes argumentation and tries to think with Kant and Kierkegaard. In his own words, he tries to ‘illuminate how the distinctions they draw are systematically related to each other and to discuss to what extent their views are plausible.’¹¹ Knappe is interested in the meaning, validity, and relevance of their views (although he does often not relate these views to contemporary discussions explicitly).

Knappe criticizes the lack of a systematic structure in Green’s research, stressing that we are not told the exact status of, for instance, Kierkegaard’s theory of stages. Knappe concludes that

we still lack for the most part a systematic approach in a comparative study of Kant and Kierkegaard . ... I take up the challenge and develop a systematic reconstruction of Kant’s and, to a greater degree, Kierkegaard’s thinking. ... Contrary, then, to Green’s approach, my analysis is first of all conceptual. By this I mean that I abstract important concepts from Kierkegaard’s text and analyse them for the most part in isolation from any historical or contextual concerns . ... The few times I refer to ‘historical’ issues, I do so in order better to understand and illuminate what Kant and Kierkegaard mean. The historical is not for this study a concern in and of itself.¹²

The last point is important. As Hatfield puts it:

One might, of course, be well aware of the need for historical context to gain better access to past texts while still wanting to use those texts primarily as a source of raw material for solutions or answers to present philosophical problems. This would be historically sensitive reading in the service of fixed-upper ends. [Hatfield’s note:] The practice of combining historical scholarship with fixing upper aims is found especially in writings on Kant’s works ... presumably because philosophers today find much in Kant worth salvaging, but realize that miming his rich texts is aided by scholarly attention to context.¹³

Knappe is not concerned with whether Kierkegaard actually read Kant (like Green is). Instead he focuses on the extent to which ‘Kierkegaard’s thinking is internally connected to Kant’s thinking.’¹⁴ Knappe explains the latter by stating that the framework and meaning of one body of thought can be in agreement with the framework and meaning of the other without the respective philosophers having ever read each other’s text: ‘Hence the analysis and the corresponding establishment of such internal connections is valid independent of any historical influence. Such an analysis stands on its own feet and, in this respect, the approach of this investigation differs and indeed intends to differ from the way in which most present day literature on Kierkegaard is written.’¹⁵

4 Discussion

Studies in the history of philosophy are rarely historical in a narrow sense, since they typically want to focus on the philosophical issues at stake.¹⁶ This can mean different things, however, since the meaning of philosophy itself has undergone numerous changes over the past two and a half millennia. Whereas the historical approach takes philosophical issues in their original historical context (for example, what Kierkegaard meant by philosophy¹⁷), the analytic approach focuses on contemporary philosophical issues. This involves reading past philosophers as if they were our contemporaries, as if they can contribute directly in our discussions. By doing this, analytic history of philosophy is often criticized for being Whig history, for viewing history as a progress towards the present situation. Richard Watson argues that the proper background for understanding this much repeated claim is:

1)‘that analytic historians must prove that their work really is of contemporary significance’;

2)that ‘analytic historians do not have to know much about the history of philosophy’;

3)and that they are restricted to working on positions and arguments that they think will contribute to contemporary work in philosophy. This cuts out most of history. You cannot work on minor figures, or look at the general historical context and intellectual milieu, unless you think there is something there that will advance philosophy today. In short, for analytic history of philosophy, history is irrelevant.¹⁸

What this would mean for the case of Kant and Kierkegaard is not easy to tell. Today, Kant scholarship is oriented both towards historical research and contemporary relevance. Kierkegaard scholarship is somewhat less oriented towards contemporary discussions.¹⁹ This is partially due to Kierkegaard’s being a less influential or more minor figure compared to Kant, and that there exist fewer attempts to reconstruct and defend the theory of Kierkegaard.²⁰ It follows from this that working on Kierkegaard within the analytic approach is quite demanding, since the scholar who makes such an attempt typically ends up with the lion’s share of the burden of proof.

The claim that the ‘analytic historians do not have to know much about the history of philosophy’²¹ seems to have problematic implications when it comes to Kant and Kierkegaard. Working on Kierkegaard without historically contextualized knowledge of 19th century Copenhagen may lead to misunderstandings or could have the result that the claims are taken out of context in an anachronistic manner.²² Stewart says that ‘if there was ever a thinker rooted in a specific historical context, it was surely Kierkegaard.’²³ Alastair Hannay makes a similar claim about Kierkegaard’s works: ‘perhaps more than the work of any other contributor to the Western philosophical tradition, these writings are so closely meshed with the background and details of the author’s life that knowledge of this is indispensable to their content.’²⁴

If this is correct, it seems that a lack of familiarity with the 19th century historical context is risky indeed. For instance, Stewart has argued that earlier scholarship has misconstrued Kierkegaard’s relation to – and critique of – Hegel precisely because it has not paid sufficient attention to historical context.²⁵ Rather than holding the contextual approach to be superior, Stewart makes only a limited defense, claiming that the contextual approach is more suited when doing research in cases where there exist historical points of contact:

The fact that Kierkegaard read Hegel’s texts and had contact with his philosophy from different concrete sourc...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  Methodological Considerations: Contextual and Analytic Approaches to the History of Philosophy
• 2  Original Sin and Radical Evil: Moral Freedom and Anxiety
• 3  Anthropology and Morality: Facticity and Moral Character
• 4  History and Morality: The Moral Structure of the World
• 5  The Highest Good: Virtue, Happiness, and the Kingdom of God
• 6  The Moral Argument for the Existence of God and Immortality: Natural Theology and Divine Revelation
• 7  Religious Faith and Divine Grace: Human and Divine Agency
• 8  Divine Revelation and Christianity: Rationalism and Supernaturalism
• 9  Religious Hope: Moral Agency and the Expectancy of the Good
• 10  Religion and Metaethics: Divine Commands and Autonomy as the Source of Moral Obligations
• 11  Closing Discussion: Overlap and Influence
• Notes
• Select Bibliography
• Index