Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia

From Policy to Practice

F. Heiduk

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137365491
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Successful reform of the security sector has been regarded as pivotal for a successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy by Western donors. A global cast of contributors examines SSR in a variety of policy fields in Southeast Asia, paying specific attention to the adaption of 'Western' reform concepts by local actors.

1

Introduction: Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia

Felix Heiduk

As a region, Southeast Asia has been somewhat of a latecomer with regard to what Huntington termed the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). This striking rush of political change started in Southern Europe in the 1970s, reached the military dictatorships of the Latin Americas in the 1980s and, most notably, fostered the democratization processes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989/90. The so-called third wave did not topple authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia until the second half of the 1980s (the Philippines), the early 1990s (Thailand) and the late 1990s (Indonesia, Timor-Leste). Despite the fact that various Southeast Asian countries, most notably Indonesia, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Cambodia and the Philippines, have undergone significant transformation processes throughout the last two to three decades, the results of the transformation processes have nonetheless proven not to be irreversible. The potential fragility of the democratic transitions in the region has most clearly been exemplified by the coup d’état launched by the Thai military in 2006, which removed the government of Thaksin Shinawatra from power. What’s more, the so-called third wave did not reach the shores of Myanmar’s military dictatorship. So far it has also, arguably, had few transformative effects on Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, and has had even less of an impact on Vietnam and Laos.

Hence, at first glance there seems to be little that binds Southeast Asia together as a region. To be sure, even with regard to the “third wave of democratization”, each state’s transition processes take place within their own unique social, political and economic settings, and at their own pace. Consequently, the region as such has for the most part been characterized in terms of its diversity and heterogeneity rather than its similarities. This diversity notwithstanding, all countries of Southeast Asia share certain historical experiences relevant to SSR (Security Sector Reform), such as highly politicized militaries, military intervention in politics, authoritarianism, and often weak patterns of civilian control over the state’s security apparatus, to name just a few. However, while the concept of SSR as such has so far only found its way into Indonesia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste, and to a lesser extent into Thailand, all Southeast Asian states have been confronted with at least some of the more general problems SSR aims to resolve. These include: a lack of democratic, civilian oversight of the security sector forces; direct military interventions in politics; excessive military spending; poor management of resources; ineffective security provision; oversized security forces; weak civil society; presence of militias and other non-state armed actors; and legacies of religious militancy, ethnic strife, piracy, armed separatism and other insurgencies. Furthermore, yet again risking overgeneralization, it seems safe to say that for the most part the security forces in Southeast Asia were sources of insecurity, rather than providers of security, to large parts of the populace of Southeast Asian states. In line with this, Bellamy and Hughes (2007, 42) noted that

rather than protecting their citizens, in practice the region’s militaries have expended more effort controlling, killing, torturing and arbitrarily imprisoning them in order to maintain a particular order or regime. The primary purpose of armed forces in the region has been to protect states and regimes from internal opponents rather than external aggressors.

However, many of the aforementioned problems that are nowadays associated with the need to reform a country’s security sector were not at the top of the list of policy concerns of the major powers during the Cold War period (Smith 2001).

Before SSR: the politics of military aid and assistance

Throughout the Cold War period, the primary threat to the Western world was seen as stemming from the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism. Consequently, the provision of assistance and aid to countries under threat of falling under Communist influence was thought of as a tool to bolster economic prosperity and therefore reduce the appeal of Communism while buttressing the prospects for democratic rule. However, by the end of the 1960s it had already become clear that many recipients of Western assistance and aid, despite having experienced high levels of economic growth and modernization, did not develop democratic institutions. In fact, many of them had witnessed the installment of authoritarian governments, which were often headed by military men or at least backed by the military. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s experiment with democracy ended in 1965 when General Suharto came to power. Timor-Leste was invaded by Indonesia after being released from Portuguese colonial rule in 1976 and therefore did not manage to experiment with democratic rule until its independence in 2002. The Philippines witnessed more than two decades of authoritarian rule under General Marcos, while Thailand experienced various military coups d’état succeeded by periods of military rule. And in Burma the military under General Ne Win established an authoritarian regime through a coup d’état in 1962.

Given the fact that the major policy concern did lie with the containment of Communism, a consensus emerged among Western powers, especially the US, which perceived the role of military apparatuses in the newly independent, so-called developing, countries as positive. For Huntington in his study on Political Order in Changing Societies (Huntington 2006), political interventions by the military were often seen as a direct effect of weak civilian institutions unable to cope with social and economic transformations. Other scholars emphasized different socio-political factors, such as political culture or the cohesiveness of societies (or, rather, the lack thereof), as explanatory factors for military involvement in politics (Janowitz 1988). In short, disappointment with the weakness of civilian elites to guide the political and economic modernization of many Third World countries in turn led to a new outlook on Third World militaries. The latter were increasingly regarded as potential drivers, instead of opponents, of modernization processes. Representative of this new outlook is the argument, prominent at the time, that, because of its discipline and expertise, the military as an institution would serve as a vehicle for modernization (Shils and Johnson 1962).

Accordingly, scholars working on Southeast Asia argued that, due to the weakness of civilian institutions and their inability to establish functioning governance, achieve political legitimacy against large ideological, religious or ethnic divides and foster nation-building as well, the military took up a wider role in the political, economic and social sectors. Militaries in the region have led ministries and sometimes even governments, served as parliamentarians and bureaucrats and in the diplomatic service, built roads and schools, policed villages, run hotels, and owned TV stations, rice mills or airlines (Alagappa 2001; Croissant, Kuehn, and Lorenz 2012; Mani 2007; May and Selochan 2004). Linked with the vast array of socio-political and economic functions came corresponding doctrines, which legitimized military involvement in politics – sometimes even against constitutional processes. What is more, the doctrinal inclinations were reflected in the constitutions and in the organizational structures of the military. In turn, these have facilitated, and sometimes even engrained, participation in government and business (Crouch 1988; Sundhausen 1985).

This new understanding of the military as a pillar for modernization, in turn, informed the foreign policy agendas of Western states, first and foremost those of the US. Based on the assumption that military agencies would serve as a catalyst for economic and social modernization, Western governments supported many Third World military establishments by delivering military aid and providing training programs. The impact on policymaking of the literature about Third World militaries was felt in Southeast Asia, where Washington, after Suharto took power, extended generous amounts of military aid and became the principal supplier of equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. After Indonesia’s invasion of Timor-Leste, Washington doubled military aid to Jakarta. In the years that followed, the US was Indonesia’s largest weapons source, transferring over a billion dollars’ worth of weapons. It was not until the 1980s that US–Indonesia military ties became subject to closer, more critical scrutiny due to the public outrage in the US over massacres committed by the Indonesian armed forces in Timor-Leste. A similar picture evolved for the Philippines and Thailand, where substantial sums of US aid were in the form of grants under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), or in the form of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, to strengthen the military’s capabilities through the modernization of its equipment, the improvement of its operational tactics, and increased training for its personnel. As both countries faced Communistsupported insurgencies, the overall strategic goal of US assistance was to support the security forces in their counterinsurgency actions. Hence, Valenzuela rightly holds that “ironically, the most lasting contribution of the ‘scientific’ literature on the military in the Third World was its impact on policymaking […]” (Valenzuela 1985, 136).

This is not to say that there were no critical research agendas on the role of the military in the so-called Third World. Especially scholars in the field of development studies from the 1960s onwards understood the role of the army in state and society differently, critically illustrating the negative impact of skyrocketing military expenditures, the burgeoning arms trade and armed conflict on development. Furthermore, by the late 1970s the assumptions over a positive role of the armed forces in the modernization processes in Southeast Asia and other parts of the “Third World” were heavily questioned by new studies, which illustrated that the military had not managed to live up to these expectations. In fact, in a study by Nordlinger it was argued that many military regimes were actually less prone to contribute to socio-political modernization processes and economic growth than their civilian counterparts (Nordlinger 1977). Furthermore, the gross human rights violations committed by military forces in Southeast Asia, most notably by the US-backed South Vietnamese Army during the Vietnam War and the Indonesian armed forces in the 1980s in Timor-Leste, led to public outrage in the West. These events caused changes in the policies of the Western states vis-à-vis Southeast Asia, as military aid programs came under closer scrutiny by parliaments and the general public. However, it seems safe to state that throughout the Cold War security assistance was generally understood as a tool “to foster strategic relationships with key allies, many of whom were ruled by military governments or had civilian-led governments with extremely close ties to the military and other security services” (Ball 2010, 29).

The emergence of the international SSR paradigm

The end of the Cold War and the perceived failure of military regimes to live up to the aforementioned expectations brought about a more critical understanding of the roles of military agencies. This more critical view of the military went hand-in-hand with changes in donor policies which eventually gave rise to the concept of SSR. Hence the concept of SSR in many ways is the result of a new, people-centered concept of (human) security, which regards security not as a commodity but as a public good, and assumes that society as a whole, as well as its individual members, will benefit from an increase in security. That said, the concept ideally adds to, but in reality finds itself often at odds with, traditional notions of security with their emphasis on state security or, even more narrowly, the security of particular regimes. In line with the focus on human security, this broader approach, which aims at reforming the whole security environment and not just the security agents of the state, is built on the normative assumption that democratic oversight and accountability of the security forces serves as a precondition to security and stability. Accordingly, the UN regards a “professional, effective and accountable security sector” as pivotal for the consolidation of peace and security (UN 2008, 3). Thus, SSR decisively aims to step away from traditional forms of military aid with their narrow focus on strategic goals and military effectiveness by adding a governance dimension, with the goal of SSR being to support countries to “meet the range of security and justice challenges they face, in a manner consistent with democratic norms, and sound principles of governance and the rule of law” (OECD DAC 2007, 21).

The term “security sector” is hereby used to describe “the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country” (UN 2008, 3). Similarly, the security sector as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes “all those institutions, groups, organizations and individuals – both state and non-state – that have a stake in security and justice provision” (OECD DAC 2007, 22). Hence, the security sector consists of all institutions/bodies responsible for the protection of the state and its citizens. This naturally comprises first and foremost the state’s security forces: the armed forces, police and intelligence agencies. Other possible sub-sectors for reform in which core security sector actors operate are police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces and militias, private security and military companies (PSMCs) and intelligence services. Furthermore, the security sector comprises the institutions that formulate, implement and oversee security policy: the legislative, executive and judiciary. This includes oversight bodies like parliament and legislative committees, the executive, financial management, but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media. Hence, SSR does not exclusively address the immediate actors of the security sector, such as the military. Instead, a so-called whole of government approach is favored.

In line with this, the UN and other donors by and large subscribed to the general framework for effective and accountable security sectors laid out by the OECD, which is comprised of the following features: a legal framework for the legitimate use of force in line with human rights standards; an institutional set-up that allows the governance and management of the security sector; sufficient institutional capabilities in terms of personnel, equipment and resources to provide security; mechanisms to facilitate interaction and exchange among security actors; and a professional culture of service among all stakeholders. SSR is hereby defined as a process of “assessment, review, implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation”, which is to be led by national authorities. In a similar manner, the framework establishes four overarching reform objectives: effective oversight and accountability of the security sector; improved delivery of security and justice services; local ownership of the reform processes; and sustainability of the delivery of security and justice services (OECD DAC 2007, 21).

When trying to extract ideal conditions for a successful and sustainable implementation of SSR from the general literature, one finds oneself confronted with an array of quasi-ideal type characteristics defined as preconditions for a successful SSR: a secure environment, in which all former warring parties are committed to processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; all stakeholders, civilian and military, have agreed to a set of SSR terms, objectives and proceedings in order to ensure comprehensive local ownership; all security agents regard a stronger professionalization as being in line with their vested interests; all oversight bodies (executive, legislative, judicative and civil society) are able, competent and committed to control the security agents; and, last but not least, external support for SSR is sufficiently large and long-term, as well as in line with the terms and objectives set by the respective national government, to last over the course of reforms.

While the construction of benchmarks for a holistic, comprehensive reform of the security sector makes sense theoretically in order to ensure the prevalence of general objectives and the establishment of best practices, various studies have illustrated the fact that the aforementioned characteristics are rarely found on the ground. As Schnabel argues, experiences from SSR practitioners show that:

More often than not SSR takes place against many odds, in difficult, barely enabling, less-than-ideal political, security, economic and social contexts. […] Such environments may be characterized by transitional, often unstable, political arrangements, endemic corruption, ongoing violence, attempts to implement i...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Notes on Contributors
• List of Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction: Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia
• 2. Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia: From Policy to Practice
• 3. Eurocentric and Ahistorical? The Concept of SSR and Its Limits
• 4. Impediments to Security Sector Reform in Thailand
• 5. Superficial Consolidation: Security Sector Governance and the Executive Branch in the Philippines Today
• 6. Stifled Development: The SSR – Civil Society Organizations Community in Post-authoritarian Indonesia
• 7. Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia: The Role of Private Security Providers
• 8. Do as We Say, Not as We Do? Gender and Police Reform in Timor-Leste
• 9. A Sisyphean Exercise of SSR: Examining the Role of the UN in Timor-Leste
• 10. Conclusion: Assessing Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia
• Index