Politicizing European Integration

Struggling with the Awakening Giant

Dominic Hoeglinger

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137550682
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Europäische Politik

This book offers a comprehensive treatment of the timely question of the politicization of European integration. It shows how this issue's complex linkages with traditional political divides pose a tough challenge to politicians and lead to bitter framing contests about its actual meaning.

1

Introduction

When the Nobel Committee in Oslo announced that the winner of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize was the European Union, reactions to the decision were fairly mixed. At EU headquarters in Brussels, the news was a cause of great celebration. José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, recalled in a Twitter statement the European Union’s unique achievement of having united a continent deeply divided by two devastating world wars in a common project for peace. By contrast, politicians from the radical left as well as the populist right all over Europe mocked the decision, seeing it instead as proof of the Norwegians’ strange sense of humor. And while most leaders of EU member states readily attended the award ceremony held a few weeks later at Oslo City Hall, including Christian Democratic German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French Socialist President François Hollande, a few were notably absent, most prominently the British Prime Minister David Cameron. He sent his deputy Nick Clegg, leader of the pro-European coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, to represent the UK. It was generally assumed that Cameron made this move to please his Conservative party’s Eurosceptic wing. On the same night, outside on the streets of Oslo hundreds of citizens joined a protest organized by leftist political groups who regarded the European Union an unworthy winner (Guardian 12 October 2012; New York Times 9 December 2012).

This interlude during the early heights of the Eurozone crisis vividly demonstrates that European integration has become an increasingly contested political issue over the years and finally entered mass politics. It actually took politicians and scholars some time to realize that the long-standing former permissive consensus in the area of European integration had been eroded and given way to a new ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2006). Politicization had already started back in the early 1990s, and increased in the course of an unprecedented deepening and widening of the European Union. The treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and those following in Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon pushed European integration far beyond what used to be a simple economic community, and the supranational institutions of the European Union were gradually strengthened. EU membership more than doubled from 12 states in the early 1990s to 28 in 2013, the latest newcomers being the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, most recently, Croatia. Along with these steps to an ever closer and ever wider union, Eurosceptic attitudes among citizens have continued to grow over the years (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), and the issue has made its way into national election campaigns, affecting party competition and creating new opportunities for challengers, mostly from the right-wing populist end of the spectrum (Kriesi 2007). European matters have eventually become an integral part not only of institutionalized politics, but also of the realm of protest politics and social movements (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Imig 2004). Yet it was only the defeated referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005 that made the significant politicization of Europe painfully clear to those politicians who had hitherto been unaware of it and thus taken by surprise by this momentous wave of Euroscepticism.

Today, under the lasting impression of the Eurozone crisis and its widespread repercussions, the diagnosis seems clear to most scholars: ‘[T]he politicization of the European Union seems obvious and its advance inevitable, even if no one is quite sure where it will lead’ (Statham and Trenz 2013, 1). Politicians’ attempts to reverse this trend are doomed to fail, according to De Wilde and Zürn (2012), as the root cause – the increasing political power of the European Union – remains in place and the factors conducive to politicization are, at least partly, beyond the control of Europe’s executive political elites. Hence, what we have observed in the first decade of the 21st century is, according to Risse (2010, 230), ‘only the beginning of more to come’. This new predominant view is in line with earlier work that believed that the ‘sleeping giant’ (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004) – a metaphor used to describe the widespread Euroscepticism among citizens with the not yet exploited potential to fundamentally reshape domestic politics – has been finally woken up by political entrepreneurs who are deliberately mobilizing on this issue (de Vries 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2009; also see van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Kriesi 2007). Although mainstream parties tried to depoliticize European integration as they suffered from internal dissent on this issue, Hooghe and Marks (2009, 21) argue that they ultimately failed to do so. The populist right, national conservatives, and the radical left ‘smelt blood’ and did not pass up this opportunity. If true, this would not only greatly affect the future course of European integration but also profoundly change the structuring of domestic political conflict and political competition, as we know them.

However, there exists a second strand of scholars that is much more skeptical, arguing that the extent of Europe’s politicization is exaggerated. In their view, the issue of European integration is, and will remain, a ‘giant fast asleep’ – particularly because those who ultimately matter, namely the mainstream parties, have no incentive to politicize it (Green-Pedersen 2012; also see Mair 2001, 48). They expect European integration to remain a marginal issue in domestic politics and unlikely to rock the boat, as opposed to other newly emerging issues such as immigration. In particular, Green-Pedersen (2011; 2012) takes issue with the claim that extreme parties are able to drive the politicization of Europe. The crucial point is rather, he argues, whether and how the mainstream parties react to these efforts to politicize newly emerging issues. Mainstream parties have no incentives to politicize a new issue if it makes government coalition-building more difficult and if it does not fit easily into the established patterns of conflict – the latter brings the risk of ending up with strange bedfellows. Because European integration is effectively such a difficult issue, Green-Pedersen (2012) argues that the sleeping giant is to remain fast asleep and the politicization of Europe constitutes, if anything, a strongly limited phenomenon. With Europe being in the midst of serious economic difficulties and social unrest and the media focusing on the crisis management of the European Union and domestic governments, these skeptical voices are at the moment clearly underrepresented. Nevertheless, one should refrain from hastily dismissing them. In fact, surprisingly little is known about the true scale of the politicization of Europe.

Hence, the present study’s first principle objective is to provide a systematic assessment of the actual extent of the domestic politicization of European integration in Western Europe. Is it still a marginal phenomenon compared to how politicians compete over other political issues, such as welfare and immigration, or has it already superseded them? How sustained is the politicization of European integration, is there a steady increase or are there significant ebbs and flows over time? And is it taking place in a few outlier countries only, such as in the traditionally Eurosceptic UK, or has politicization arrived in most Western European countries, regardless of whether they are Eurosceptic by tradition or not, and whether they are members or only affiliated neighbors? This study sets out to provide nuanced answers to these central questions in order to better assess the sustainability and broader impact of the politicization of Europe not only for the past two decades, but also for the years to come. As I will show, European integration has matured into a political issue that is being politicized on a regular basis in Western European countries, on some occasions even quite massively. The politicization of Europe is a fact, and it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. Yet many observers have gone even further and evoked dire scenarios of large-scale politicization with severe consequences for both domestic politics and European integration. However, such bold conclusions, I will argue, might be all too hasty because the politicization of Europe is not unchecked and it is therefore unlikely to skyrocket in the near future.

The relatively limited politicization of European integration is due to factors related to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of politicization. More specifically, what actually drives this process of Europe being politicized? Which actors are involved and for which motives? What are the mechanisms through which politicization works and which conditions are conducive to it? Exploring these questions is the second main objective of this study. As mentioned above, the root cause lies at the very heart of the integration process – the massive shift of public authority from the national to the European level. Yet this is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for politicization. Disaffection about this development constitutes potential that can be mobilized if, and only if, politicians are willing to do so.

In the existing literature, the inverted-U-curve hypothesis has been highly influential in explaining attitudes to European integration among politicians. This hypothesis suggests that while mainstream parties are generally pro-European, it is fringe parties from both the left and the right that oppose Europe in the same motivated strategic move to challenge this mainstream in order to reap electoral benefits (Mair 2001; Sitter 2002; Taggart 1998). Yet more and more scholars have gone beyond this notion of a simple curvilinear pattern of contestation and the view that opposing Europe is merely a fringe party phenomenon stirred by long-term opposition to the government. They argue that this conflict goes much deeper, given that these two opposing groups fundamentally differ in their ideological outlook and that opposition to Europe is not confined to fringe parties anymore but has entered the mainstream (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004; Kriesi 2007). In their view, substantive and more general political divides, such as the economic and particularly the cultural dimension, crucially shape political contestation about Europe and explain why some politicians eagerly try to politicize Europe, while others refrain from doing so. According to Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012), this is due to European integration being part and parcel of a mainly culturally manifested larger cleavage between the winners and losers of de-nationalization (for a similar view, but with an emphasis on the economic consequences of integration, see Fligstein 2008). Most recently, Statham and Trenz (2013, 168) have taken issue with what in their view represents a ‘false dualism between identity and interest politics’. Instead, they see these two dimensions of political contestation that can be boiled down to the basic questions of ‘who are we?’ and ‘who gets what?’ as closely interlinked and to be jointly at work in the politicization of Europe. Regardless of these differences, what these approaches share is their emphasis on the substantive, ideological foundations that shape elite attitudes to Europe. The present study shares this interest in the deeper underlying motives of politicization and takes pains to uncover them in detail.

Based on the findings, I will argue that the question of how to best deal with European integration in domestic politics poses a tough challenge for the political elite – politicians struggle constantly, sometimes desperately, with this intricate giant that is difficult to both domesticate and unleash for very long. The reason for this is not because Europe, as a comparatively new issue, bears no relationship to traditional lines of conflict. On the contrary, ideology is a crucial factor in shaping politicians’ responses to European integration. And both economic and cultural divides are at work; any one-sided explanation misses the point. In fact, the unusually complex nature of this issue results in multiple, sometimes contradicting, and over time shifting linkages with these pre-existing lines of conflict. This provides numerous opportunities and substantive reasons for politicians of all sorts to politicize Europe but, at the same time, makes it a difficult and risky task.

What is more, not only the motives and strategies of political parties shape the politicization of Europe, but also the broader setting in which these actors operate. The central venue for political contestation in modern mass-mediated democracies is the public sphere (Bennett 2001; Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Kriesi 2004; Manin 1995). Importantly, public debates stretch beyond election campaigns and are also driven by other events that attract media attention. And unlike election campaigns, where party politicians predominate, public debates generally involve a much broader spectrum of political actors. Such a perspective has led some scholars to speculate whether groups of actors other than the parties, particularly social movement organizations, are decisive in politicizing Europe (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Imig 2004; Imig and Tarrow 2001). In addition, it has been argued that national executives and the European Union have lost control over the European integration issue as the public debate is driven strongly by exogenous events, such as recurring crises and domestic party politics, which represent opportunity structures that are highly conducive to politicization (Wilde and Zürn 2012, 150). To be sure, national executives and the European Union will not be able to turn back the hands of time to a point in the past where Europe was not politicized at all. However, as I will argue in the following chapters, the focus on EU-related institutional events in public debates and the strong standing of public authorities suggests that the latter are still in sufficient control of the issue and of the dynamics unfolding to contain any large-scale politicization in the long run.

Scope and distinguishing features of this study

As outlined above, the study engages in the ongoing scholarly debate about the extent of the domestic politicization of European integration as well as its causes, agents, and conditions by presenting new theoretical arguments and fresh empirical evidence. Moreover, while focusing on European integration the study also contributes to the more general question of how new political issues are being taken up by political elites and become politicized (or not). Apart from these scholarly contributions, a more systematic and deeper understanding of the politicization of Europe also helps practitioners and observers make sense of current events and gauge future trajectories in the area of European integration and European politics.

Empirically, the study relies on original data from a large-scale quantitative media-content analysis of the public debate on European integration from 2004 to 2006 and of national election campaigns from the 1970s up to the 2000s in six Western European countries. The countries are the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland. Tens of thousands of public statements made by all kinds of relevant political actors, including but not restricted to political parties, were meticulously coded.

Situated at the intersection of two fast-growing fields of research, political communication (specifically framing and agenda setting) and research on European integration politics, the combination of the following key features distinguishes this study from others. First, it focuses on public debate as the central venue for political contestation in contemporary democracies. Analyzing public discourse is an established strategy among political communication scholars and sociologists, and the public image of Europe and the prospects and limits of a European public sphere have been extensively researched (e.g. Koopmans and Statham 2010; Risse 2010; Trenz 2005a; 2005b). However, the questions of how, by whom and why European integration is being politicized has led something of a wallflower existence in this literature, and there have been even fewer attempts to engage with the more traditional political science approaches preoccupied with these questions (for a noteworthy exception, see Statham and Trenz 2013). This is unfortunate as public debates can contribute a lot to answering these pertinent questions and they also constitute an excellent source of fine-grained political data. Moreover, in contrast to most existing studies, they also allow going beyond the exclusive focus on parties and considering other political actors, such as social movements and public authorities.

Second, the study develops a more comprehensive conceptualization of politicization. What precisely does it mean if an issue is being politicized? Previous work has usually focused either on dissenting attitudes or on salience. By contrast, I conceive of politicization as entailing three necessary components: (1) polarization, which is a result of dissenting elite attitudes vis-à-vis the issue in question; (2) the intensity of the public debate as a consequence of the emphasis politicians give to an issue (salience). Politicians may hold dissenting attitudes about a particular issue, but only if it reaches a certain threshold of attention does the conflict become politically relevant; and (3) the connection of the issue to more basic political concerns, as achieved via framing. This conceptualization melds three normally separate strands of research into one common framework, and the study deals with each of these components and politicians’ related strategies in detail.

Third, the study breaks new ground by disentangling the issue of European integration. Instead of treating this political issue analytically as a monolithic black box, as usually done in previous research, it pays due regard to the multifaceted nature of this issue and in many of its analyses differentiates between four distinct areas of European integration: deepening, enlargement, market making, and social regulation. Such a disentangling of the issue of Europe enables the complex and varying patterns of political contestation surrounding it to be uncovered. As we will see below, the lines of conflict run in multiple directions among these four fundamental areas of integration, a finding that holds major implications for the politicization of Europe. Similarly, by looking at how politicians frame European integration I am able to show that opposition to as well as support for European integration are based on a diverse range of motives and are not restricted to either nationalist or economic ones only, as has been repeatedly claimed.

Outline of the book

I develop my argument and substantiate it with empirical evidence throughout the book as follows: Chapter 2 provides the conceptual and theoretical building blocks. It starts by clarifying how I conceive of the concept of politicization. It then introduces the three key strategies available to politicians to raise the heat on an issue and on which I will elaborate in more detail in subsequent separate chapters: adopting dissenting attitudes, emphasizing the issue in public debate, and framing the issue so as to connect it to more basic political concerns and to mobilize citizens. The chapter also discusses how this newly emerging political issue is linked to traditional lines of conflict, such as the economic left–right divide or the rift between culturally liberal and conservative views. To verify the tentative argument that European integration is related to these pre-existing lines of conflict in multiple and complex ways, it is necessary to dissect the multifaceted issue of European integration. Therefore, the chapter introduces a four-fold typology that distinguishes the sub-issues of deepening, enlargement, market making, and social regulation. Chapter 3 explains why public debates are relevant for politics in today’s media societies and why we should turn to them in order to study political phenomena more generally. For those with an interest in methodology, it also briefly introduces the approach used to collect the empirical data – the sentence-by-sentence coding of actor statements in the mass media, which offers considerable advantages over other, more traditional approaches. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the reliability and validity of this data that is novel to most political scientists.

Chapter 4 then identifies the general dynamics and the relevant political actors in the public debate on European integration. The great battle over Europe is not taking place on the streets, as some scholars suggest, but in the partisan arena. Party politicians and public authorities, the chapter indicates, dominate and...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Preface and Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Challenging Politicization of a Multi-Faceted Issue
• 3 Public Debates as a Source of Political Data
• 4 Dynamics and Participants of the Public Debate on Europe
• 5 How European Integration Orientations Are Structured
• 6 To Speak or Not to Speak of Europe – Issue-Emphasis Strategies
• 7 The Framing of European Integration
• 8 Wide Awake or Fast Asleep? – The Limited Politicization of Europe
• 9 Conclusion
• Appendix: Additional Tables
• Notes
• References
• Index