Introduction
The principle aim of this book is to provide an answer to the fairly simple question Why do people do what they do? However, asking a simple question does not automatically imply that the answer will be just as simple. Indeed, it is safe to say that there are several possible theoretical alternatives when trying to supply the answer. Bearing this in mind, it is important to begin immediately by precisely defining the intentions, expectations and aims of the project being presented here. We can begin by stating that the main theme in this book is the identification and description of fundamental aspects of human motivation, their underling mechanism(s) and the effects they have on consequent behaviour. The aim is to describe a few basic underlying motivational tendencies that are common to all people when exploring the diversity of human actions. This aim is difficult and frustrating to satisfy because as we all know, human behaviour is complex, variable and above all unpredictable. Furthermore, the workings of underlying motives are per definition merely postulated, as these assumed processes are generally hidden, non-observable and, as such, difficult to study empirically. Indeed, although acknowledging the primacy of some motives, strong voices will suggest that there is no such thing as a basic foundation of motivation when it comes to ranking them according to importance (Pelham, 1997). For this reason, the main aim of this book is quite ambitious and therefore requires a systematic approach, convincing and credible arguments and above all clarity of the presented text.
It is safe to say that human motivation is a difficult and complex theoretical field. In defining motivation, psychological dictionaries predominantly underline two points: (1) that the field of motivation is extremely important in understanding human behaviour and (2) that the concept of motive (or motivation) is most controversial, least satisfactory (Chaplin, 1985), definitionally elusive (Reber, 1995) and has ill-defined boundaries (Evans, 1989). In contemporary theory, the notion of motivation is considered to be a hypothetical construct that causes behaviour to arise, and provides further āfuelā for its execution, direction, selection of goal(s), pause(s) and ultimately its end. The classical definitions of motivation place emphasis on behaviour as āthe activation of internal desires, needs, and concerns, [it] energizes behavior and sends the organism in a particular direction aimed at satisfaction of the motivational issues that give rise to the increased energy (Pittman, 1998, p. 549).ā Similarly, Bandura (1991, p. 69) perceives motivation as āattempts to explain the motivational sources of behavior [which] therefore primarily aim at clarifying the determinants and intervening mechanisms that govern the selection, activation, and sustained direction of behavior toward certain goalsā. Although our understanding of the basic underlying motivational processes or our ability to predict and account for specific behaviours is still unsatisfactory, it is nevertheless difficult to argue that the field of motivation represents a neglected field in both the history of human thinking and contemporary literature. Over the past five to six decades a number of specific theories, books, periodicals and research articles have been produced that delineate the most relevant motivational topics. Over the years, many subtopics have emerged, while others have vanished for good and some have reappeared, perhaps in a different form or with a new focus and using refurnished terminology. Perceived from this historical point of view, it can be noted that the main focus of analysis has gradually but steadily shifted from investigations of basic processes that organise behavioural responses (e.g. traits, drives, instincts and needs), through behavioural theories (stimulusāresponse, reinforcements and contingencies) and finally towards explicit emphasis on self-regulatory processes and attempts to precisely calculate and predict the probability of goal attainment.
Thus, the existing theoretical models predominantly attempt to combine the processes of basic motivation with the processes that are involved in self-regulation of behaviour, putting a little more emphasis on the latter (i.e. goal-directed behaviour in which cognition, emotion and automaticity are combined). Put another way, one could say that over the years, the original interest in basic motivational processes has gradually faded and the theories that analyse the manner in which people energise and regulate their own behaviour towards intended goals have become more prominent. These analyses have also become more and more comprehensive, wherein they attempt to integrate the basic components of human functioning into one broad theoretical model. An illustration of this can be seen in the noticeable differences between the chapters labelled āMotivationā in the widely influential and acknowledged two-volume editions of the Handbook of Social Psychology. I am here referring to editions four (Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998) and five (Fiske, Gilbert, & Lindzey, 2010).
In the fourth edition, Thane S. Pittman, the author of the chapter on motivation, looks back on the history of the field and declares that motivation has returned as a major theme in psychological analyses. It is easy to see that Pittman organised this chapter by focussing on broad, basic and fundamental motives, and far less on particular areas of motivational theory. However, in the 2010 edition, the chapter on motivation begins, not with a presentation of basic motivation processes, as was the case in the 1998 edition, but rather with the goal concept and achievement of desired outcomes (see Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010). The chapterās later pages continue to emphasise self-regulation, goal setting and goal pursuit, and further elaborate on these themes. All in all, it is evident that the main focus of this chapter is centred on the differences and similarities between conscious and unconscious routes towards goal pursuit and achievement, and their respective effectiveness. Thus, these two chapters on motivation, that is, the 1998 and 2010 editions, noticeably differ in terms of the main focus and theoretical emphasis (basic motivational processes as opposed to self-regulation and goal attainment). This tendency is also acknowledged by Thrash and Elliot (2001), who note that current theory is dominated by a variety of goal approaches with the aim of attaining consciously articulated ends or purposes at the expense of analyses of underlying processes. Pittman and Zeigler (2007) also explicitly state that the topic of basic human needs is surprisingly neglected and call for more analyses on this issue. In fact, these authors basically predict that exploration of basic human needs in terms of structures and different levels of analyses will be a recurring subject in the future. Despite these promising words, it still seems that the quest to find basic motivators which energise and organise behavioural acts has become somewhat less important compared to analyses of the goal construct and the provision of more precise accounts of the specific behavioural directions towards desired end states (e.g. Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). In other words, exploration of the former is becoming an alarmingly neglected field in contemporary literature compared to the quantity of studies focussing on analyses of the processes immediately prior to the execution of behaviour.
For several reasons, I am not going to discuss here the background regarding for the increase in a preference for self-regulatory processes, as this is not important for this study. After all, shifts in emphasis in research are quite common and expected as accumulation of knowledge works as a wave that dynamically influences the emergence of new subjects of inquiry. Moreover, analyses of possible causes of any given action are always subjected to the fact that motives operate on different levels of abstraction, ranging from concrete tasks and situations, over to more general domains and dispositions, and finally to fundamental levels on which all human behavioural activity might rest (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).
Explicit Focus on Basic Motivation
Regardless of the above-mentioned contributions of contemporary research to a detailed analysis of human action, it is unfortunate when research attention leans too far in one direction. This may directly result in the shortage of theoretical frameworks that aim to identify and analyse the workings of the most fundamental human motivational tendencies. Although pairing motivation and self-regulation in one theoretical model is both desirable and necessary, the accentuated emphasis on the latter might blur the distinction between triggering factors (i.e. causal events prior to behaviour) and fundamental psychological tendencies that are hard-wired in human nature. This is an important distinction to make as it delineates a fundamental question: how far back in the causal chain do we have to go to provide a full account of specific human actions and, more importantly, to fully understand human nature in general?
Using a domino analogy, we can ask how far back in the causal chain we have to explore if we are to understand, for instance, why the 376th domino tile āsuddenlyā collapses. A complete understanding of the collapse is indeed difficult if we do not have sufficient knowledge about the structural organisation of the very first domino tiles. Even though it is difficult to develop empirical procedures that would imply the existence and the nature of these hypothetical entities, this should not stop us from developing a sound and argument-based theoretical proposition that would indicate their existence and their possible effects on human behaviour. The searches for satisfactory explanations are, however, predominantly focussed on all the neighbouring dominos, which indeed represent good candidates (the 375th domino, for example, looks particularly suspicious). Nevertheless, in many ways most of these proximate dominos, although certainly having a hand in the collapse, could be perceived as āmereā triggers. One known effect of triggers is the provision of comfort or closure in the sense that people need and want some form of explanation, no matter how dubious or superficial it might be. As a minor, yet necessary digression, it is important to note the difference between the superficial, which is definitely not good, and the simple, which might be a good and even preferred explanation. Even when explanations are made in the best manner of modern science, they still might be insufficient as they usually include variables that mainly originate from the recent steps in the causal chain.
It should be clear that it is not my intention that the opening pages of this book should offend a great number of accomplished and skilled members of the scientific community with an apparent if unintended arrogance. The majority of the recently published work in the realm of motivation is complex in terms of detail and impressive when it comes to the use of various methodological approaches. As such, motivational theory has made clear advances, especially when it comes to understanding the workings of specific variables, such as self-efficacy, attitudes, intentions, norms and similarities, which tend to ābehaveā differently under various conditions. These evident contributions notwithstanding, the apparent disadvantage is that the majority of these approaches are too specific and can hardly provide a deep and multi-chained explanation of the given action ranging from visible behaviour to fundamental motivational tendencies. Excessive focus on identification of all possible proximate triggers sometimes only results in finding convenient scapegoats, with assignment of responsibility and āguiltā when it comes to how these specific variables work.
Another potential limitation of ātriggerā analyses is that many complex behaviours often have a different surface expression from the original motivational background they come from, just as two brown-eyed people can give birth to a blue-eyed child. As an illustration of the difference between non-observable or hypothetical underlying motivational tendencies and motivational processes that occur prior to behavioural expression, the conceptual difference between genotype and phenotype might be used. āGenotypeā is the term that refers to hereditary information about an individual, even if the genes are not expressed or directly observed. Thus, the origin of potential change is āhiddenā yet has a powerful effect on human behaviour. On the other hand, the term āphenotypeā refers to visible or directly observable characteristics, such as hair or eye colour. This type of information also has evident effects on human behaviour, but the information is incomplete without knowing the personās genetic code in the cells. It follows that phenotype descriptions are powerful as the evidence lies in āseeing is believingā. Similarly, postulating the effects of genotypes might be difficult as their workings might not always be evident to external observation or be manifested externally. Another similar illustration, which also vividly shows the difference between non-observable and directly observable processes, is the widely used conceptual difference between homology and analogy (e.g. see Elster, 1999, on the phenomenon of addiction). Homology refers to similarity between entities based on deeper underlying mechanisms, such as sharing a common ancestor. Analogy is the type of similarity that is based on somewhat superficial resemblance and does not necessarily indicate there is a recent common link between two organisms, or the motivational processes as is the case with the purposes of this illustration. Analogy thus refers to the several changes and adaptations between two relatively unrelated entities for the sole purpose of obtaining similarity in appearances. The widely used example of this difference is the comparison between sharks and dolphins, which indeed look strikingly similar in terms of visible characteristics. But the scientific fact is that one of them is a fish and the other is a mammal. I could go on and identify several other instances of common underlying characteristics and superficial similarity, such as the apparent etymology of certain words that only superficially look alike, the difference between surface and source traits (Cattell, 1946) or even the notion of structuralism as an example of the theoretical tradition in which the relation-specific elements and overarching structures are underlined. But the general point would be the same: the things we observe directly or the things that take place either close in time or in space might just represent scapegoats that distract us from identifying the actual causal forces. Thus, the analyses of the most recent causal effects might be misleading and not always match the basic origins of the phenomenon in question.
It is again important to clarify that the analyses of causal factors that occurred prior to the event and a better understanding of goal-oriented behaviour in general are extremely important, as they provide a viable explanation of the specific actions and are informative in terms of the prediction of behavioural outcomes. However, the possible consequence of a noticeably increased focus of contemporary theory on proximate causal mechanisms is the neglect of theoretical models that address the question of which underlying processes influence the selection of goals initially, and equally important, why. After all, motivation is more about the why of behaviour and less about the how and what. In other words, the predictive knowledge and calculations of probability about the how, and which goals should be attained, may represent qualitatively different aspects of t...